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Abstract 
  
This study focuses on the process of communication between government agencies and the 
public during crisis situations, and the development of an effective response strategy when a 
significant threat to public health and/or safety is believed to exist. My specific research interests 
are (1) the nature of the decision-making process that influences the communicative choices 
made during such events, and (2) how decision-makers make sense of an evolving, ambiguous, 
and unpredictable situation, in order to establish credibility with the public, determine the 
appropriate response strategy, and gain the public’s trust in order to influence its behavior. This 
is a qualitative research study based on a series of in-depth interviews conducted with key staff 
members of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding the CDC’s 
organizational response to the 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic. As global public health 
threats have the potential to significantly affect critical areas of the U.S. economy, national 
security policies are evolving to include strategic planning for issues related to global public 
health threats.  However, despite having faced several serious public health threats during the 
past decade, governments worldwide and the global public health community continue to 
struggle with developing sufficient contingency plans and effective response strategies to meet 
the challenges of unexpected, highly unpredictable, and potentially devastating public health 
crises. My research addresses gaps identified in exploring the experience of crisis response 
participants in order to understand the process of response development. Additionally, I identify 
practices, processes, and recommendations that will be useful for future response teams 
confronted with equally challenging emerging threat and/or crisis scenarios. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
Extreme threats to public health, such as infectious disease epidemics, bioterrorist 
attacks, or contaminated food or water supplies, have the potential to cause massive disruptions 
in highly developed and economically interdependent globalized countries. For countries such as 
the United States, with numerous dense population centers, frequent international travelers, and 
vulnerable yet crucial infrastructures for food and water supply, these kinds of public health 
threats are particularly perilous.  Global economic interdependencies have increased as a result 
of expanded international trade, especially in food, clothing, and other basic commodities. Many 
large U.S. corporations and industries related to international travel (i.e., international shipping, 
airline and cruise industries) depend heavily on uninterrupted access to worldwide multi-national 
markets and transportation facilities such as airports and seaports. Losing access to these key 
infrastructure networks would have substantial and possibly devastating economic consequences.   
Since global public health threats have the potential to significantly affect these critical 
areas of the U.S. economy, national security policies are evolving to include strategic planning 
for issues related to global public health threats.  However, despite having faced several serious 
public health threats during the past decade, governments worldwide and the global public health 
community continue to struggle with developing sufficient contingency plans and effective 
response strategies to meet the challenges of unexpected, highly unpredictable, and potentially 
devastating public health crises (Gibbons, 2007; Kahn, 2009; Koplan et al., 2009).  
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The experiences of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, the 2003 Sudden Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) international epidemic, and the 2009-2010 H1N1/A1 influenza 
global pandemic are examples of highly disruptive and serious threats to public health with the 
potential for worldwide social and economic consequences.  
The SARS and H1N1 cases also illustrate how the complexity of a public health threat 
increases dramatically when it involves a communicable infectious disease outbreak, as the 
interconnectedness of our contemporary globalized societies significantly increases the risk of an 
event in one country quickly becoming a worldwide disaster. Additionally, as a senior official at 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention points out, with the ease of mobility that has 
evolved from the influence of globalization public health threats and disease outbreaks are less 
likely to remain confined to one geographic area- whether a city, state, or country (Khan, 2011). 
Public health security is a new priority for public health officials and a rapidly expanding area of 
concern for government officials concerned with national security threats. 
 Non-communicable diseases, such as anthrax (although deadly with the potential to 
cause severe illness and death) are easier to contain and control once the source of the disease 
infection is identified, as the infected person is not contagious.  Conversely, communicable 
diseases, such as smallpox or influenza, are not easily contained because every person infected 
becomes a potential disease transmitter, and is theoretically capable of infecting anyone with 
whom they have contact (Bryant, Vertinsky, & Smart, 2007).  
 As a result of the experience with the U.S. domestic anthrax attacks in 2001, the Federal 
government’s response and the roles and responsibilities of the U. S. government agencies 
1 The H1N1 virus strain first identified by the CDC in April 2009 was designated officially as H1N1/A to denote its 
status as a novel virus. Adding novel to the virus label indicated a combination of flu virus genes and a flu strain not 
previously seen together and not previously identified in humans. In the literature H1N1/A is usually referred to as 
H1N1. In this paper, the H1N1/A influenza virus will be referred to simply as H1N1 and the 2009-2010 H1N1 
pandemic (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 2009). 
2 
involved in managing public health threats changed significantly.  For instance, the public health 
organizations of the Federal government, specifically the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and its subordinate agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), which traditionally functioned primarily as disease prevention and health advisory 
organizations, became the focal point for all national public health crisis response.  As these 
organizations assumed the primary roles in responding to public health crises, their leadership 
and the organizational processes for developing and implementing crisis response strategies were 
closely scrutinized, and often criticized; by the media, elected officials at the Federal, State, and 
local government levels, other Government agencies, the medical community, and the general 
public.  Suddenly, the actions of the leaders of these key Government agencies and especially 
their public communication during each crisis received national and international attention. 
When a public health crisis arose, or as unexpected and complex health-related threats 
emerged, these organizations were expected to quickly develop a crisis response strategy that 
would appropriately manage the effects of the threat.  At the same time, they were also expected 
to keep the public health community informed and communicate clearly and effectively with the 
public, often without specific or complete information, in a rapidly changing highly 
unpredictable crisis environment characterized by extreme ambiguity and uncertainty (Bryant, 
Vertinsky, & Smart, 2007; Freimuth, 2006; Kahn, 2009; Leonard & Howitt, 2007; Vanderford, 
2003). 
In describing the importance of public communication, particularly during infectious 
disease outbreaks, several authors have noted that few studies focus on exploring the personal 
experience and specific actions of the public health officials who were directly involved in the 
response to a public health crisis (Frewer et al., 2003; Glik, 2007; Holmes, Henreich, Hancock, 
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& Lestou, 2009; Shore, 2003).  Also noted was the lack of research focused specifically on the 
evaluation (rather than a description) of official public communication, especially the 
communication of uncertainty, during crisis events (Frewer et al., 2003; Glik, 2007; Holmes et 
al., 2009; Shore, 2003). My research intends to address these two gaps and in so doing contribute 
to the existing literature on crisis response and the role of communication.  
Focus and Rationale of the Study 
This study focuses on the process of communication between government agencies and 
the public during crisis situations, and the development of an effective response strategy when a 
significant threat to public health and/or safety is believed to exist.  My specific interests are in 
understanding (1) the nature of the decision-making process that influences the communicative 
choices made during such events, and (2) how decision-makers make sense of an evolving, 
ambiguous, and unpredictable situation, in order to establish credibility with the public, 
determine the appropriate response strategy, and gain the public’s trust in order to influence its 
behavior.   
To accomplish these objectives, I explore the processes of and relationship between 
sensemaking and decision-making by members of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC) senior leadership response team during a specific public health crisis; the 
2009/2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Using data collected during a series of in-depth interviews 
with key response participants, I examine how the CDC’s senior leadership and crisis response 
team made sense of the developing H1N1 crisis from its first point of identification and how 
their decision-making process(s) influenced the development of the CDC’s official 
organizational response and public communication.  Particular emphasis is given to two areas:  
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1) Challenges posed by the need to address multiple organizational goals during a crisis 
response and  
2) The diverse communication needs of different audience groups that constitute what is 
broadly defined as “the public.”   
 Different audience groups that would have to be considered would include for example; 
the general population, other government officials or organizations (e.g., Congress, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and the broader medical and public health communities, including the international 
health community, specifically the World Health Organization (WHO).  
From a close examination of this case, I hope to learn how the CDC leadership team 
initially made sense of H1N1 as a public health threat, how they recognized it as a developing 
crisis, and how/what they decided to do in response. I also hope to gain an understanding of their 
decision-making processes and the factors that influenced their decisions as they developed and 
implemented a response strategy, in order to better understand the process of organizational 
crisis response.  
Additionally, because the overall response to the H1N1 pandemic is generally regarded 
as a success by the CDC and the Federal agencies that were involved, especially in the area of 
public communication (Schuchat, 2009, November 10), I anticipate identifying practices and 
processes that will be useful for other/future crisis response teams confronted with equally 
challenging scenarios. Speaking at a press briefing in August 2010 regarding the overall response 
to H1N1, the CDC Director, Dr. Thomas Frieden stated, “Looking back over the past year and a 
half, I think many things went very well” (Frieden, 2010, August 23, p. 1).  According to surveys 
conducted by the CDC and the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH), it appears that the 
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American public2 also evaluated the Government’s response favorably (SteelFisher, Blendon, 
Bekheit, and Lubell, 2010).  Additionally, senior U.S. Government officials such as the 
Secretaries of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human 
Services regarded the H1N1 response as a success and in public statements recognized the CDC 
and the other government agencies for their contributions (Napolitano, 2009, October 21; 
Sebelius, 2009, October 21).  
Senior U.S. government officials also recognized the overall H1N1 response as an 
example of effective coordination between multiple government agencies. This public 
recognition and praise was particularly important considering the strong criticism that the 
Federal government received for their performance in this area during the 9/11 response, 
especially during the anthrax attacks. Mr. Arne Duncan, Secretary of the Department of 
Education stated in his testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs that “interagency coordination and cooperation in the Federal H1N1 
effort- from top to bottom- has been extraordinary” (Duncan, 2009, Oct 21, p. 90).  During her 
Congressional testimony on that same day, Janet Napolitano (then) Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security, described the H1N1 response in this way, 
Close coordination among Federal departments dealing with H1N1 flu has 
facilitated a strong response. Our partnerships with HHS, including the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), with the Department of Education, 
and with other Federal departments and agencies continue to play a critical role in 
2 Throughout the H1N1 pandemic, surveys showed that more than half the U.S. population appeared to have a 
positive impression of the government's response. In the early days of the pandemic, 54% believed the response of 
the federal government was appropriate and 39% believed the government had overreacted (Collins, 2009, May 19). 
In January 2010, 59% of those surveyed believed that public health officials did an excellent or good job in their 
overall response to the pandemic, whereas 39% believed they did a fair or poor job (SteelFisher, Blendon, Bekheit, 
& Lubell, 2010, p. 65). 
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our efforts. Our other partners – from State officials to private sector leaders – 
have consistently noted that the level of collaboration across the Federal 
government is unprecedented (Napolitano, 2009, October 21, p. 3). 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized in five chapters; Chapter One provides the topic introduction, 
problem statement, and the study’s focus, rationale, and organization. Chapter Two provides my 
review of the literature and past research. Chapter Three describes my approach to gathering the 
data, an overview of my data sources, organization of the data, and method of analysis.  Chapter 
Four provides the results I obtained from my data analysis in response to my primary research 
questions (RQ1) and (RQ2). Key themes emerged from my analysis based on reviewing the data 
against specific analytic categories and are highlighted. Chapter Five concludes with a summary 
of my findings, implications, limitations, and recommendations.   
Statement of the Problem 
Developing public communication messages during an emerging crisis presents a number 
of unique challenges for any government agency.  In the context of a public health and safety 
crisis or threat, an immediate concern is the establishment of public trust and affirming 
organizational credibility in a rapidly changing and uncertain environment where either action or 
lack of action may have serious consequences.  
 The type of information provided by the responsible government agency and perhaps 
most important, the way (mode/manner) that it is communicated will largely influence how the 
public understands the crisis and their response(s). Additionally, the degree of trust in the 
accuracy of this information provided and the public’s perception of the organization’s ability to 
‘manage’ the crisis is critical to influencing public behavior. In the early stages of an influenza 
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pandemic, when a vaccine will not be available, controlling the spread of the disease will depend 
heavily on specific preventive actions taken by individuals and communities. The level of trust 
and the public’s perception of the responsible organization will depend to a large degree on how 
well the organization develops its public communication strategy and how effective the 
organization’s leaders and spokespersons are in explaining the crisis and what will be done to 
address/resolve it. Having the public’s confidence and trust will be critical to achieving any goals 
of influencing or changing behavior (Kahn, 2009; Reynolds, 2007, 2008).  
Considering these critical needs, how do decision-makers construct a crisis response 
narrative that (1) meets the organization’s goals of informing, reassuring, and protecting the 
public and (2) instills sufficient confidence in the organization to insure the public will be 
influenced to take the actions deemed necessary to manage the threat? 
Government Responsibilities 
During times of crisis, one of the responsibilities of government agencies (“the 
government”) is to provide timely and accurate information to the public about the current 
emergency or threat.  This is in keeping with a fundamental responsibility of government to 
provide for and maintain the welfare of its citizens, a responsibility inherent in the 10th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution where “authority over the welfare, safety, health, and 
morals of the public” is outlined (Lister, 2005, p.4).  
Natural disasters such as wildfires, earthquakes or weather related emergencies (floods, 
hurricanes, and tornadoes) occur with some seasonal regularity, and the public is accustomed to 
receiving emergency warnings, instructions, situation updates, and other emergency 
communication from the local municipal or State disaster response authorities when they do 
occur. Federal authorities tend to become involved in these kinds of events only if, or after, the 
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crisis has developed beyond the capabilities and capacity of the local responders, or has become 
a national level threat to public health or safety. However, other crisis events such as acts/threats 
of terrorism, bioterrorism, or widespread infectious disease pandemics (which fortunately happen 
far less frequently) have the potential to affect large, often geographically dispersed segments of 
the population. These extreme circumstances require a crisis response at the national rather than 
the State or local government level and will likely involve emergency response authorities and 
organizations of the Federal government (e.g. the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and/or the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)) typically from the outset of the threat or crisis event. 
Severe public health emergencies such as widespread deadly infectious disease 
pandemics also clearly threaten public safety and welfare, yet they may not receive the same 
degree of media attention or public focus as acts or threats of terrorism. While these infectious 
disease outbreaks may be initially localized in one State or municipality the potential for rapid 
and widespread contagion due to frequent international and domestic travel patterns in our 
contemporary globalized society puts them in a unique public health threat category.  
Worldwide, the threat to public health from infectious diseases is complicated not only by 
this increased mobility but also by the widely varying standards of living and the level of public 
health protection measures in certain geographic areas, particularly overcrowded cities. In these 
areas, where major international corporations previously had only a small presence, there are 
now large permanent business centers, such as factories and manufacturing plants. As these 
business centers continue to develop and expand, the public health problems associated with 
generally poor public sanitation practices and unsafe food production and preparation methods 
that may be commonplace in those areas will put the workers (especially foreign workers who 
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may not be used to living and working in this kind of environment) at significant risk for 
contracting a variety of infectious diseases (Holmes, 2008).   
Additionally, the nearly instantaneous communication channels available today to a large 
percentage of the global population via the Internet, social media, and satellite television 
complicate information management by public health authorities. Misinformation, inaccurate 
reporting, and rumors about a health threat or disease outbreak will be impossible to entirely 
prevent and difficult to correct once made public.   
Serious public health threats such as communicable disease outbreaks which may have 
the potential for nation-wide impact in the U.S. will require emergency response at the Federal 
government level and will directly involve the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), and its parent organization the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
Depending on the severity of the situation, these events may even warrant direct response and 
public communication from government authorities at higher levels, including 
organizations/agencies traditionally expected to respond to national security threats and/or the 
Executive Branch of the Federal Government; as was the case with Sudden Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and H1N1 in 2009 (Kahn, 2009; Seeger, et al., 2008; Reynolds, 2007, 
2012). 
Defining Public Health 
In a study published by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which is part of the National 
Academies of Sciences, public health was defined as, “the efforts, science, art, and approaches 
used by all sectors of society to assure, maintain, protect, promote, and improve the health of the 
people” (Committee on Assuring the Health of the Public in the 21st Century, 2002, p. 20). 
However, in practice, the responsibility for public health falls primarily to Federal, State, and 
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local governments.  This is not only because existing public health laws and Federal mandates 
require it, but also because serious public health threats that arise from infectious disease 
pandemics, food-borne illnesses, or deliberate acts of bioterrorism, are not problems that face 
only one segment of a population. Their impact is more widespread- in fact, these kinds of 
threats truly “do not discriminate” and may potentially cross all occupational, gender, 
generational, and geographic boundaries. This potential to affect, and potentially debilitate, a 
large percentage of the population in a short amount of time would seriously disrupt the ‘normal’ 
functioning of society- affecting businesses, forcing school closings, and overburden (if not 
overwhelm) emergency response and medical treatment facilities. Health care providers and 
emergency responders would also not be immune to these public health/infectious disease threats 
and the resulting (potential) loss of their much-needed services will have to be taken into account 
when planning for a public health emergency response. During these kinds of national crises, 
government authorities will (theoretically) have additional means and resources available to 
them to address these potentially widespread problems and issues, for example by mobilizing 
National Guard forces or other military reserve support. Public health is therefore differentiated 
from general “healthcare” because it is focused on large population groups, not on individuals. 
Also, public health officials may have the ability to access additional government resources to 
provide assistance in crisis and/or emergency response support (Kahn, 2009, Lister, 2005).  
One of the earliest definitions of public health comes from C. E. Winslow, who describes 
it as ‘both a science and an art” and as a ‘community effort’ aimed at preventing disease 
infection and transmission, educating the populace on good health and sanitation practices, and 
organizing medical services to ensure early diagnosis and treatment (Winslow, 1920, pp. 6-7).  
Public health, as it is understood today, evolved from social and medical practices developed 
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primarily in the UK, Europe, and the US beginning in the mid-1800s with efforts to control 
deadly outbreaks of infectious diseases such as cholera and the plague (Last & Wallace, 1992).   
Among the fundamental tenets of contemporary public health practices, three are 
particularly relevant to this study: 
(1) Decision-making based on data and evidence, such as statistics, surveillance, outbreak 
investigations, and laboratory science; 
(2) a focus on the general population rather than individuals; and  
(3) an emphasis on disease prevention (Koplan et al., 2009, p. 1993).   
Public health is described as being “situated at the intersection between disease systems 
and dynamic social systems, structures, and institutions” (Seeger et al., 2008, p. 7) where a 
system must be capable of rapid change and recovery after significant impact on normal order or 
processes, such as immediately following a crisis. One way complex systems re-establish order 
during and/or after a crisis is with effective communication, whether it is with internal 
organizational communication or by (external) public communication. Depending on the nature 
of the emergency or crisis event, especially in the case of a large government organization, both 
types of communication may be required.  
Mission and Organization of the U.S. Public Health System 
In the United States, Federal, State, and local laws mandate public health activity. Most 
of the legal authority for making and implementing public health policies exists at the State 
government level, with the individual State governments have the primary leadership role 
especially in public health emergencies and first responder situations (Lister, 2005). 
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),  
“The mission of the public health system is to promote the physical and mental health of 
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communities and populations, and to prevent disease, injury, and disability” (Lister, 2005. p.3). 
To accomplish this mission, the U.S. Public Health system is organized in a multi-layered 
hierarchical structure of numerous government agencies ranging from local municipal health 
departments to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) at the national level. In 
addition to these government organizations, within the overall domestic U.S. public health 
structure there are also many non-government health agencies and resources such as the Red 
Cross, public and private hospitals, pharmacies, volunteer organizations, and government, 
academic, and private medical research centers and laboratories. 
 In a report prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. 
domestic public health system is described as a complex, generally decentralized, yet highly 
interdependent system of public and private sector organizations (Lister, 2005). Within this 
system there are the lead public health agencies and organizations of the Federal government; 
HHS and all of its subordinate agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC); fifty-nine State and territorial health departments, and more than three 
thousand county and city health departments (Lister, 2005).  
The Department of Health and Human Services has the primary responsibility for public 
health at the Federal level, but there are other Federal agencies with separate areas of 
responsibility related to public health. These include the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
(OSHA), and the Departments of Defense, Veteran’s Affairs, and Homeland Security. 
Depending on the nature of a public health crisis any one, or all of these agencies working 
collaboratively, could have a role in the overall response (Shore, 2007). 
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Public Health Law 
 The Public Health Service Act, originally enacted into law in July 1944 by the 78th 
Congress and amended numerous times since, gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
significant emergency powers, including the authority to declare a situation a public health 
emergency. The declaration of an emergency situation allows the Federal agencies to take charge 
of a particular situation or event, and greatly expands the scope of Federal authority.  While it 
has seldom been used, this authority was enacted on September 11, 2001 to allow the Federal 
Government to assume control of coordinating the response to the terrorist attacks in New York 
City and Washington DC.  
  As a result of the gaps and failures in operational response, planning, and 
coordination for national emergencies and disasters that were identified in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks (including the subsequent anthrax attacks), Congress passed a number 
of other laws to further improve preparedness and the response capabilities for national 
emergencies.  The existing law, The Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act (P. 
L.106-505), which Congress had passed prior to 2001, was replaced by The Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (P. L.107-188), and became 
law in 2002. This new law was written to specifically address many of the vulnerabilities 
and weaknesses of the public health and national emergency response systems and 
capabilities that became evident during the government’s response to the 9/11 attacks. To 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies and authorities during national 
security emergencies Congress also mandated the development of an entirely new 
Federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Homeland Security 
Act (P. L.107-296) created the DHS and chartered it to address the significant Federal, 
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State and local government collaboration, coordination, and other inter-agency operating 
issues that became evident during and after the 9/11 attacks (Lister, 2005). 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)  
 HHS stands at the top of the hierarchy in the large network of Federal agencies and 
organizations with public health responsibilities. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is 
a Cabinet level position and serves as the principal advisor to the President on matters related to 
public health. However, there are numerous subordinate agencies chartered to support the public 
health mission and to work in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services. 
The primary agency for disease prevention and response to disease outbreaks (or other health 
related events) under the HHS Departmental structure is the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). Other important subordinate organizations include: the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). However, 
within the HHS organizational structure, the U.S. Surgeon General (Head of the U.S. Public 
Health Service) and the CDC have the principal leadership responsibilities for defining and 
developing public health policies (Lister, 2005).   The HHS organizational structure is provided 
in Figure 1. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
The CDC was originally established in 1942 as a small organization within the U.S. 
Public Health Service (PHS) known as the MCWA (Malaria Control in War Areas) (Karnes, 
2008).  Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, its primary mission was to control malaria in the 
Southern parts of the United States and in the Caribbean. This mission later expanded to address 
control of other infectious diseases posing threats to military personnel stationed overseas and/or  
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 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (s.d.). HHS organizational chart. Washington, DC: Author. 
Retrieved from http://www.hhs.gov/about/orgchart/ 
 
Figure 1. DHHS Organizational Chart. 
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returning to the U.S. from overseas duty.  In 1946 the MCWA was renamed the Communicable 
Disease Center (CDC) and during the next decade significantly expanded its role and areas of 
expertise. Throughout the 1960’s, the CDC continued the expansion of its role in public health, 
adding issues of quarantine and occupational safety to its portfolio along with other infectious 
diseases, such as tuberculosis and polio (Karnes, 2008).  
During the 1960’s, the CDC also began publishing the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report (MMWR), which eventually became one of the pre-eminent journals in the public health 
community and today serves as a primary vehicle for official public health communication on a 
wide range of topics. In 1970, the organization was renamed as “the Center for Disease Control” 
and subsequently in October 1992, it became the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
This was done to highlight the role of the CDC in disease prevention as well as detection and 
control ("Historical perspectives: History of CDC," 1996, June 28).  
From its modest beginnings with a small staff and limited budget, the CDC is recognized 
today as the principal agency in the U.S. public health structure. It employs more than fifteen 
thousand doctors, scientists, epidemiologists, laboratory researchers, and other public health 
administrators assigned in more than fifty countries with a total reported operating budget for FY 
2013 of $11.2 billion (USDHHS, 2014; CDC, 2013).  
CDC Organization 
The CDC is organized in a complex network of offices and centers. The Office of the 
Director, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the Center for Global Health, 
and seven other separate offices; Public Health and Preparedness (OPHPR), State and Local 
Support, Surveillance, Epidemiology and Laboratory Services, Non-communicable Diseases, 
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Injury and Environmental Health, and Infectious Diseases. Figure 2 provides the current CDC 
organizational structure. 
According to the National Strategic Plan for Public Health Preparedness and Response 
(2011), CDC’s primary operational roles are: domestic and global surveillance, maintaining 
laboratory research capability and facilities, providing occupational health and epidemiology 
functions, and responding to public health threats such as anthrax, smallpox, influenza, and 
outbreaks of other infectious diseases. In addition, complications from food-borne illnesses, 
contamination of food and/or water supplies, and radiation contamination would fall within the 
CDC responsibilities.  However, CDC’s primary role remains disease prevention and it 
accomplishes this by providing subject matter experts and assistance to State and local health 
communities in support of public health preparedness, and emergency response. CDC also 
reaches out to international public health partners for disease prevention assistance worldwide, 
and in response efforts to global public health threats, doing so through coordination with the 
World Health Organization (WHO).  
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 Adapted from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2014, February 14). CDC organizational chart. 
Atlanta, GA: Author. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/orgchart.htm 
 
Figure 2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Organizational Chart 
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 The Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services (CSELS)  is the 
CDC division where three of the agency’s primary missions are centered. These key functions 
within CDC are fundamental to the agency’s overall mission of protecting public health. 
According to the CDC the goals of this center are to: 
  …provide scientific services, expertise, skills, and tools in support of CDC’s national 
 efforts to promote health; prevent disease, injury and disability; and prepare for emerging 
 health threats (CDC, 2014, February 24). 
Surveillance. 
Surveillance is one of the key missions of the CDC and plays a critical role in effectively 
identifying and tracking disease outbreaks. As such, surveillance is particularly important to the 
overall public health mission. Surveillance is critical to the early detection of communicable 
disease outbreaks that will provide the public health community with valuable early warning of 
outbreaks that could be potential pandemics. CDC defines surveillance as “the on-going, 
systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data about a health-related 
event for use in public health action to reduce morbidity and mortality and for outbreak 
detection” (Buehler, Hopkins, Overhage, Sosin, & Tong, 2004, May 7, p. 2).   
According to the CDC (2013, November 15, para.1), surveillance activities are “the 
foundation of public health practice” and the CDC’s Surveillance Resource Center serves as the 
primary coordinating office for the public health surveillance community. This community is 
comprised of the CDC surveillance resources plus the extensive national network of State and 
local surveillance agencies, field offices, and organizations.  
Effective surveillance also depends on the capabilities of the public health 
infrastructure to “track and forecast important health events including the detection of 
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any changes in the disease patterns in the community” (Moore, Mawju, Shiell, & 
Noseworthy, 2007, p. 284). This capability for change detection requires a flexible and 
adaptive surveillance system- one that makes use of advanced technology for not only 
data gathering but also for communication. The CDC explains the importance of this 
capability in this way,  
A surveillance system must be flexible enough to adjust to expanding health 
information needs and to use the best technology to deliver the data when and 
where they are needed. Surveillance systems that are not easily adapted to 
changing information needs might not be able to evaluate the impact of new 
prevention interventions in different population subgroups. Surveillance systems 
that are not efficient (e.g., the delivery of needed information demands more 
resources than are available) will not be useful (CDC, 2012, July 27, p. 10). 3 
 Closely related to surveillance is epidemiology, another key role for the CDC in 
public health preparedness. Epidemiology has been defined as ‘the study of the factors 
that determine the frequency and distribution of disease in populations’ and a science that 
involves the identification of patterns in disease transmission.  Coupled with surveillance 
activities, this allows public health officials to determine and measure both incidence and 
prevalence of a particular disease in a community or population and to search for 
underlying causes of the outbreak (Hanson & Levin, 2013, pp. 8-9, 172).   
 Epidemiology. 
 The Epidemiology and Analytic Methods Program Office (EAPO) is the primary 
staff office at CDC that is engaged in epidemiologic activities.  According to the CDC, 
3 “In 2001, the intentional dissemination of Bacillus Anthracis spores and subsequent  cases of anthrax in the United 
States provided an impetus for automating surveillance to enable early detection, rapid characterization, and timely 
continuous monitoring of urgent public health threats” (CDC, 2012, July 27, p. 1). 
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 EAPO supports public health decision making by advancing epidemiologic 
 methods, analytic techniques, library sciences, health equity, information 
 dissemination and systematic literature reviews (CDC, 2014, February 24). 
EAPO accomplishes these activities through analysis and modeling of potential or actual 
disasters and with key publications for the public health community. EAPO is responsible 
for publishing the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) and the Guide to 
Community Preventive Services. Both of these publications are highly respected and 
have a wide circulation within the global public health community. The motto of the 
EAPO, according to their webpage is;  “Good science, well translated, protects people, 
conserves resources, and mitigates disasters.”  
Laboratory Research Services. 
Another key public health responsibility for the CDC is to provide Laboratory Research 
Services. The Division of Laboratory Programs, Standards and Services (DLPSS) is the principal 
organization within CDC focused on the laboratory science and services mission of the CDC. 
Laboratory services are key to disease identification and infection confirmation. This mission 
charges CDC with leadership responsibilities as well as support responsibilities for conducting 
laboratory science, establishing policy and providing guidance and support to laboratory research 
services at CDC and at the State and local levels.  The DLPSS describes its mission in this way, 
To strengthen state and local public health laboratories' ability  
To perform their critical role in protecting the public’s health through: 
(1) fostering connectivity and collaboration across the laboratory community;  
(2) enhancing integration of laboratory science practice and informatics into 
public health and patient care;  
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(3) developing standards to enhance the performance of public  health laboratory 
systems;  
(4) increasing opportunities for the improving the quality of public health 
laboratory practices and services;  
(5) increasing the capacity of the laboratory workforce;  and  
(6) fostering a culture of efficiency and excellence (CDC, 2014, February 24). 
Response Capability. 
Perhaps one of the most important roles CDC plays in the public health community is as 
the national coordinating center for emergency/crisis preparedness and response. The Office of 
Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR) is the lead organization within the CDC 
focused on public health crisis/threat preparedness and response. According to their website, 
OPHPR provides “strategic direction, support and coordination for activities across the CDC 
organization and with local, State, tribal, territorial, national and international public health 
partners” (OPHPR, 2012, March 27). 
Public Health Crises 
 Public health crises are described as “severe threats to the physical and psychological 
security, stability, health, and well-being of the public resulting from complex, nonlinear, and 
unanticipated interactions” (Seeger et al., 2008, p. 6).  Public health crises can arise from a 
variety of causes and differ significantly in terms of severity and potential for causing 
widespread harm. Examples include after-effects from naturally occurring disasters such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes, floods; intentional acts of bioterrorism (e. g., Sarin gas exposure, 
anthrax infection), or the threat of nuclear contamination whether intentional or accidental.  
Public health crises can also result from naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious diseases such 
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as typhoid, cholera, or seasonal influenza; salmonella, E. coli bacterial infections, or other types 
of poisoning from contaminated food and/or water.   
The diversity of causes, effects, and varying degrees of severity in public health threats 
create many different kinds of situations requiring a wide range of response strategies.  As such, 
public health crisis events and possible threat scenarios present unique challenges to government 
agencies, organizations, and officials tasked with responding to them.  Contemporary public 
health threats are expected to be complex with the potential to affect widely dispersed population 
groups, potentially on a global scale. Traditional response strategies, which focused on planning 
and training to contain and manage a localized/ single threat or crisis- and one that was clearly 
understood and positively identified- are not adequate to meet the challenges of complicated and 
emergent public health threats where considerable degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity prevail. 
Successfully managing these kinds of threats will require the public health community to;  
1) have the ability to engage in ‘a flexible and adaptive manner’ 
2) be able to apply the principles of organizational learning to meet the challenges posed 
 by dynamic and unpredictable threats, and  
3) strengthen the response capability for future similar or unanticipated crisis events 
(Seeger et al., 2008, pp. 16-17).  
Pandemic Flu 
A severe influenza pandemic may be one of the most complex communication challenges 
we face (Reynolds, 2007, p. 37). 
 The CDC defines a pandemic as ‘a global disease outbreak’ and an influenza pandemic as 
a ‘new influenza A virus for which there is little or no immunity in the human population and 
which spreads easily from person-to- person’. Another characteristic of pandemic flu is an 
24 
 
atypical number of infections (illnesses) and deaths occurring in a short amount of time 
(Reynolds, 2007, p. 22, 56). Pandemic flu represents a unique public health threat because 
influenza outbreaks are unpredictable and highly contagious, often moving from instances of 
single case confirmations to widespread infections within a matter of days or weeks.  
 Pandemic flu is significantly different from seasonal flu outbreaks. Seasonal flu is a 
regular (annual) illness that is also contagious and communicable, but unlike pandemic 
influenza- a seasonal flu vaccine is available and a segment of the population will have some 
degree of immunity to the virus either from previous infection(s) or from regular vaccinations. 
Despite this, the CDC estimates that in the Unites States every year there are 36,000 deaths from 
seasonal influenza and 226,000 hospitalizations.  However, there is no comparable immunity for 
pandemic influenza and public health officials know that a vaccine will not be available for 
many months after the new virus strain is identified (Reynolds, 2007, pp 35-37).   
 In testimony presented to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 
Commerce’s Subcommittee on Health, Ms. Marcia Crosse, the Director for Health Care at the 
United States Government Accounting Office (GAO), defined an influenza pandemic as  
 The emergence of a novel influenza virus, to which much or all of the population is 
 susceptible, that is readily transmitted person-to person and causes outbreaks in multiple 
 countries (Cross, 2005, May 2).   
Four years later, in November 2009, in the midst of the H1N1 pandemic, the Director of 
Strategic Issues for the GAO provided a detailed report to the Chairman of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security addressing key concerns about the potential 
dangers of a flu pandemic.  The report stated,  
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… an influenza pandemic remains a real threat to our nation and to the world. An 
influenza pandemic is not a singular event but is likely to come in waves, each 
lasting weeks or months, and pass through communities of all sizes across the 
nation and the world simultaneously … While a pandemic will not directly 
damage physical infrastructure, such as power lines or computer systems, it 
threatens the operations of critical systems by potentially removing essential 
personnel needed to operate them from the workplace for weeks or months 
(Steinhardt, 2009, July 29).  
 Despite advances in vaccines and other prevention measures, Dr. Eric Toner, a Senior 
Associate in the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), 
argues that the threat from pandemic influenza is still seriously undervalued in terms of its 
bioterrorism potential (Staff, 2007, March 1). While there are many similarities in pandemic flu 
and bioterrorist event response requirements, in a traditional bioterrorist threat scenario the threat 
is expected to be confined to a specific or defined geographic area, such as one city or a key 
transportation node (e. g., subway or airport), and would likely affect only one or a possibly a 
few populations centers at the same time.  Pandemic flu, however, could potentially infect the 
entire country simultaneously, or certainly within a short period of time, thereby completely 
overwhelming U.S. medical facilities and treatment infrastructure (Staff, 2007, March 1).  
Monica Schoch-Spana, PhD, a medical anthropologist at the UPMC Center for 
Biosecurity, states that the decision of the U.S. Government to begin ranking flu pandemics with 
the same type of scale currently used for ranking hurricanes is an attempt to raise public 
awareness of the severity of the threat posed by influenza.  She says, 
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 Americans, even those who don’t live in hurricane prone regions, came to 
understand just how strong an effect a hurricane could have through [Hurricane] 
Katrina.  I believe that they were trying to find a way to define the range of 
possibilities to an American public most of whom have not lived through even a 
moderate pandemic flu. Conversations about influenza mostly turn on it being a 
naturally occurring outbreak, simply because pandemic flu is a regular 
occurrence, but the origin doesn’t really matter. The management challenges are 
extreme if it is a novel strain and pandemic flu is a great example of an extreme 
public health emergency (Staff, 2007, March 1, p. 10). 
 Research has shown that the majority of the population does not take potential or possible 
threats from disasters or emergencies of all types very seriously. The Red Cross estimates that 
approximately twenty-five percent of the U.S. population has taken or is likely to take any 
definite steps to prepare themselves for possible emergencies, regardless of the type of potential 
threat. Most disaster or emergency preparation (typically weather related events) happens only a 
short time before the disaster is predicted to occur. Early preparation for a  “possible” emergency 
does not appear to be a popular activity in American culture. Interestingly, the Red Cross also 
says that within the remaining seventy-five percent of the population some will be “interested in 
obtaining information about the threat, but will still not take any action to prepare early” 
however, the majority will do nothing even when provided with clear threat information 
(Reynolds, 2007, p. 24).   
 On April 11, 2013 in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper discussed the national 
security implications of pandemic influenza threats. He noted that the World Health 
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Organization described one previous influenza pandemic as “the epidemiological equivalent of a 
flash flood” and warned  
An easily transmissible, novel respiratory pathogen that kills or incapacitates 
more than one percent of its victims is among the most disruptive events possible. 
Such an outbreak would result in a global pandemic that causes suffering and 
death in every corner of the world, probably in fewer than six months (Clapper, 
2013, April 11, p. 13). 
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Chapter Two: Review of the Literature 
 To address my specific research interests in the sensemaking and decision-making 
processes that influence the development of an appropriate response strategy and the 
organizational communication practices employed during crisis situations, I reviewed literature 
concerning;  (1) Crisis communication, specifically in the context of the U.S. Public Health 
system; (2) Sensemaking and decision-making including the influencing factors of framing and 
transparency; and (3) Major components of organizational crisis response: (a) processes, (b) 
practices, and (c) organizational culture/climate and its effects on organizational and individual 
behavior.   
This review focuses on and is limited to crisis communication practices of government 
organizations and does not include literature pertaining to corporate organizational crises and/or 
public communication with a stronger public relations and reputation management context.  I 
have also limited this review to literature primarily concerning public health-related crises, 
excluding other serious crisis events such as natural disasters resulting from wildfires, floods, 
and/or weather related events such as hurricanes or tornadoes. 
Crisis Communication 
According to one definition the word crisis derives from “krisis”, a Greek word meaning 
‘to separate or to judge’ (American heritage dictionary, 2009). Another interpretation provides a 
somewhat more complex understanding of krisis as a specific point in time, an event- a ‘moment 
of decision, judgment, or choice’ (Muhren &Van de Walle, 2010, p.1). However, the specific 
meaning of the term depends on the context of the situation being evaluated and who is defining 
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a particular situation or event as a crisis (Preble, 1997).  The framing of specific events and 
circumstances as crises is significant in the eventual determination of which organization or 
agency is responsible for developing and communicating the official response strategy. Who 
determines that (1) there is a crisis and (2) the severity of the crisis and how it is presented 
(framed) and/or will be addressed is extremely important to asserting responsibility for and/or 
maintaining ‘control’ of the situation.   
In literature pertaining to organizations, crises are defined as “low probability, high-
impact events that threaten the viability of the organization, are characterized by ambiguity of 
cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly” 
(Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 60).  To facilitate resolution of these threatening events and to 
implement response strategies organizations engage in a practice known as crisis 
communication. Crisis communication is therefore one of the means by which government 
authorities gain/sustain control of a situation, mitigate social disruption, and manage the public’s 
reaction to a developing crisis, public emergency, or disaster event (Reynolds, 2007; Reynolds & 
Seeger, 2005).  
Defining Crisis Communication 
Crisis communication is a complex form of public communication that occurs during 
(and after) unexpected and highly disruptive events.  Crises can result from natural disasters, 
such as hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes, and from man-made events, such as acts of war, 
terrorist/bioterrorist attacks, toxic chemical contamination, epidemics/pandemics of infectious 
diseases, and other disasters similar in magnitude, effect, and importance.  In a report prepared 
for the Department of Homeland Security, effective crisis communication is defined as, 
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An effort by experts to provide information to allow an individual, stakeholder, or 
an entire community to make the best possible decisions about their well-being 
within nearly impossible time constraints and help people ultimately to accept the 
imperfect nature of choices during the crisis (Meredith et al., 2008, p. ix).  
Crisis communication encompasses literature from a wide range of academic disciplines 
and within this very sizeable body of literature, there tends to be a division between two 
categories of disasters and crises: natural and anthropogenic.  There is also a second divide based 
on a significant historical event, the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001.  The 
crisis communication literature reflects distinct differences between works authored “pre-9/11” 
and “post-9/11”, particularly in the context of public health crises and government response. This 
divide can be directly attributed to the impact of the unprecedented (and unanticipated) domestic 
anthrax attacks in 2001 that followed the September 11th terrorist strikes in New York and 
Washington D.C.  While the anthrax attacks were not localized or contained solely in either of 
these two cities and occurred several weeks after the physical attacks on 9/11, they are 
considered part of the 9/11 history and have had significant influence in determining how the 
Federal government (now) responds to public health crises (Freimuth, 2003, 2006). 
Differences between Risk and Crisis Communication 
Risk communication in the public health context has traditionally referred to public 
warnings about threats to some aspect of an individual’s health, either from specific behaviors 
(e.g. smoking, drug abuse, unsafe sexual contact) or from an identified environmental hazard 
(e.g. potential release of a dangerous substance or toxic chemicals). Risk communication is the 
basis of public health messages and information campaigns designed to influence/change health-
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related behaviors.  It is defined as, “the intentional effort to inform the public about risks and 
persuade individuals to modify their behavior to reduce risk” (Seeger et al., 2008, p. 9).  
Risk communication traditionally refers to an “exchange of information among interested 
parties about the nature, significance, or control of a risk”. Risk communication is most often a 
component of the pre-crisis stage or planning initiatives in anticipation of crisis situations 
(Covello, 2003; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003).  Although risk communication occurs in a 
variety of sectors, (e.g. financial markets, consumer product safety, the insurance industry), in 
this study, I limit the discussion of both risk and crisis communication specifically to the area of 
public health. 
Risk communication and crisis communication, while often inter-connected; differ 
significantly in definition and scope. Although risk and crisis communication have some 
common characteristics and share certain operational features, such as delivery methods (notably 
mass media) and a basic objective (inform the public), their fundamental goals differ.  Risk 
communication addresses probabilities and potential situations of harm or danger, while crisis 
communication focuses on a specific event or action that has already occurred or will almost 
certainly occur in the near future. Risk communication is based on what is already known about 
a situation (or at least thought to be true) and typically claims a basis in scientific or technical 
evidence.  There is no emphasis, or consideration, on what is not known about a situation, 
condition, or event.  Risk communication messages almost always address likely (future) 
consequences, are based on some form of persuasive or very compelling ‘evidence’, and are 
intended to prevent or modify specific behaviors or practices. For example, ‘smoking will cause 
cancer and heart disease’, or ‘drinking alcoholic beverages during pregnancy may cause birth 
defects’ (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, Reynolds, 2007).  
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Conversely, crisis communication is an on-going process that occurs during the actual 
crisis event, operating continuously as the crisis unfolds and evolves, until there is some kind of 
resolution.  During crisis events that occur within an organization or situations that affect a single 
organization, established, effective and well-practiced contingency plans and emergency 
communication processes can help the organization to respond appropriately, preserve (or 
regain) order, and maintain a consistent organizational message or position. Research has shown 
that, during crisis situations, public trust and the government’s credibility is strongly influenced 
by the consistency of messages from the various organizations and a perception of consensus 
from the leaders directly involved in the crisis response (Freimuth, Hilyard, Barge, & Stokler, 
2008; Hilyard, Freimuth, Musa, Kumar, & Quinn, 2010; Holmes et al., 2009; Seeger et al., 2008; 
Shore, 2003).   
For example, in the event of a natural disaster, such as a flood or earthquake, rapid and 
effective communication is essential to facilitating and coordinating recovery and maintaining an 
accurate understanding of the situation.  Once the immediate crisis event has ended or subsided, 
a post-crisis communication phase begins and continues until there is consensus that the situation 
is under control.  Crisis communication, as a responsibility of government agencies, in this 
context is defined as the need to “protect health, safety, and the environment by keeping the 
public informed” and “to restore public confidence in the [government] organization’s ability to 
manage an incident” (Seeger et al., 2003).  In a broader context where the crisis does not involve 
an official government response (although it could), crisis communication is employed to 
“prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the organization, 
stakeholders, and/or industry from damage” (Seeger et al., 2008).  
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Crisis communication addresses both what is known and what is not known about a 
specific situation.  Uncertainty and ambiguity are integral components of crisis communication, 
which add to its challenging, complicated, and complex nature.  One other significant difference 
between the two concepts relates to the influence of time.  Crisis communications (and 
situations) are characterized by significant time pressure and (often) lack of complete 
information. Nonetheless, organizations/leaders are expected to provide immediate information 
and guidance to the public and not to wait until the situation becomes clearer or is ‘under 
control’. For example, in April 2009 during a press briefing in the early days of the emerging 
H1N1 pandemic, Dr. Richard Besser, Acting CDC Director, made the following public 
statement:  
I want to acknowledge the importance of uncertainty. At the early stages of an 
outbreak, there’s much uncertainty, and probably more than everyone would like. 
Our guidelines and advice are likely to be interim and fluid, subject to change as 
we learn more (Reynolds, 2007, p. 14). 
Practicing Crisis Communication 
The literature I reviewed is limited to crisis communication as practiced by U.S. 
Government agencies, specifically government agencies within the U.S. public health 
community (mainly the CDC) and their responses to major public health threats. Primarily this 
involves literature published post 9/11, focusing on the CDC’s response as a public health 
agency to the 2001 anthrax attacks and the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic. 
Irrespective of the specific cause of the public health threat or emergency, the basic principles of 
effective crisis communication are generally applicable to most, if not all health related crisis 
situations.  These principles are summarized by the CDC in their official crisis communication 
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publications as, “Be first. Be right. Be credible.” and tie directly to the main goals of effective 
public communication in a developing crisis situation, which are:   
(1) Prevent further illness, injury, or death 
(2) Restore or maintain calm 
(3) Engender confidence in the operational response (Reynolds, 2007, p. 1). 
Crisis Communication Models and Approaches 
In reviewing the literature on models used in the field of crisis communication I 
discovered one model and one innovative approach that are of particular use for this study’s 
purpose. These are the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model, developed by 
the CDC, and the concept of the Emerging Infectious Disease Communication (EIDC) as a 
method or approach to communication during an infectious disease threat or outbreak.    
The CERC Model. One of the most significant changes made to previous models and 
processes for risk and crisis communication was the merger of the two concepts, Risk and Crisis 
Communication, into a combined model (Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication) known 
today by the acronym CERC.  Dr. Barbara Reynolds, Crisis Communication Specialist at the 
CDC, and Dr. Matthew Seeger, Professor in the Department of Communication at Wayne State 
University, developed this model as a direct response to the many problems and communication 
failures identified in the response to the 2001 anthrax attacks. The CERC model has been widely 
accepted in the field of emergency response and crisis communication and is currently the 
standard operating model for crisis communication at the CDC (Reynolds, 2007, Reynolds & 
Seeger 2005).   
According to one of the developers of the original CERC model, the fundamental concept 
is fairly simple and straightforward: 
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CERC is a way to talk to people, a set of principles that allows us, in the heat of a 
crisis when the unthinkable happens, to be able to get a message through to 
people in a way that they can actually understand it and act on it. (Reynolds, 
2012, p.1) 
As an integrated model, CERC “builds on the existing literature in the fields of health and risk 
communication and synthesizes those with crisis communication” (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, p. 
24).  
 
 
Adapted from Figure 1-1. Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) Lifecycle.  In Reynolds, B. 
(2012). Crisis and emergency risk communication (2012 ed., p. 9). Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.  Retrieved from http://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/pdf/CERC_2012edition.pdf 
Figure 3.  Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) Lifecycle 
 
EIDC.  Another important perspective in the field of crisis communication in public 
health is the concept of Emerging Infectious Disease Communication (EIDC).  The threat of a 
global pandemic and the challenges that governments and health organizations will face in 
communicating during a pandemic demands new concepts and plans for effective crisis 
communication to ensure speed and accuracy during an infectious disease outbreak where 
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uncertainty is a dominant factor.  The ability of the government, or other official organizations, 
to communicate uncertainty to a highly diverse audience with varying levels of education, health 
literacy, and risk appreciation without sacrificing public trust is crucial to effectively countering 
and containing the threat.  Additionally, consideration of other influencing factors such as public 
trust, perceptions of power and authority, and cultural biases have to be taken into account by 
crisis/emergency response planners (Holmes, 2008).  
EIDC as an approach is relatively new within the fields of risk and crisis communication 
and targets potential challenges to public trust and organizational credibility by focusing on 
communicating throughout the emerging crisis constantly providing new information, as it 
becomes known to decision-makers.  The emphasis is on clearly defining risk and developing a 
communication strategy that will raise public awareness of individual risk and the need to follow 
official guidance, without creating widespread panic or fear.  However it is different from 
traditional health communication campaigns or health messaging in that it is intended to be fluid, 
changeable, and responsive to an emergent threat conditions or an unpredictable threat 
environment.  EIDC proponents argue that the best method for accomplishing these objectives is 
to develop a communication strategy that adapts to changing information as the threat emerges 
and evolves, and recognizes the ethical responsibility of keeping the public fully informed 
throughout so that individuals can/will make appropriate decisions to take the recommended 
actions.  
EIDC also recognizes a clear need to engage the public in the process, both in preparing 
for emergencies and during a response, making this process participatory and dialogic. While 
these factors are regularly discussed as needs in the crisis communication literature  and the 
EIDC is often used as an example of how they could be effectively addressed (Reynolds, 2007, 
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2012, Seeger & Sellnow, 2008), there is not as yet a formally articulated communication model 
engaging the EIDC concept,  reflecting a need for one.  
Traditional health communication models center on the transmission of information 
(from a recognized “authority’) as the primary means of influencing behavior and encouraging or 
discouraging a specific action. These kinds of health message campaigns and messages rely 
principally on what is called the “rational actor” model, which is based on the assumption that 
simply providing clear guidance based on factual information to the public will be sufficient to 
change attitudes or behaviors. Research has shown, especially in the case of the anti-smoking 
health campaigns, that this approach will be effective with some population groups but not with 
others, even when the message and guidance is clearly understood. Using the EIDC approach, 
the goal becomes “informed decision-making rather than specific behavior change” which may 
actually result in the desired behavior change (Holmes et al., 2009, pp. 353-354).  
Crisis Communication and Public Health: The CDC’s Response to the Anthrax Attacks 
During the anthrax attacks of 2001, the CDC was suddenly thrust into a primary role in 
national crisis response as the public’s focal point for medical and scientific information. The 
CDC also became the principal Federal agency responsible for all official public communication 
during this public health crisis.  Consequently, studies and analyses of the CDC and its actions 
during and after the 2011 anthrax events constitute a significant portion of the contemporary 
literature related to crisis communication and public health threats published in the last decade. 
Many of these academic studies and analyses of various aspects of the H1N1/A pandemic were 
authored by current or former CDC employees, or were based on interviews with CDC 
employees, which provides a unique perspective from an insider’s point of view (Chess &Clarke, 
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2007; Freimuth, 2006; Vanderford, 2003; Pollard, 2003; Prue, Lackey, Swenarski & Gantt, 
2003).  
The 2001 Anthrax Attacks  
The condition most conducive to panic isn’t bad news—it’s conflicting messages from those 
in authority (Reynolds, 2013. p.39).  
The Federal government was strongly criticized for its response to the domestic U.S. 
anthrax attacks in 2001, particularly with regard to public communication. Responsibility for the 
government’s response to this unexpected and unfamiliar threat fell to the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) and most directly, to the CDC. At the time, anthrax was not well 
known in the broader public health community, as infections of the disease were extremely rare 
in the United States and anthrax infection had not been identified as a potential or likely public 
health or security threat. Most public health officials at the State and local levels quickly looked 
to HHS and the CDC for guidance on how to address the developing public health crisis as 
instances of contamination were confirmed in their areas. Unfortunately, contingency plans for 
dealing with anthrax outbreaks, especially at the local levels, were generally nonexistent. Also, 
due to its rarity, many health care providers were not familiar with anthrax diagnosis, prevention 
methods, and treatment protocols. At a minimum the possibility of anthrax infection as the 
source of a patient’s symptoms would have been considered remote and probably would not have 
been investigated until many other more likely diseases had been ruled out. Also, at the time the 
CDC had never planned or prepared to respond to this kind of public health threat- multiple 
intentional anthrax infections in geographically dispersed areas (GAO, 2003, October).  
Unlike the direct attacks on the World Trade Center Buildings and the Pentagon, the 
anthrax attacks did not result in a high number of human casualties or cause extensive physical 
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destruction.  There were a total of twenty-one U.S. postal facilities located in widely dispersed 
areas and one private business facility, a publishing office, located in Boca Raton, Florida where 
anthrax contamination was confirmed. Disease outbreaks were reported in five separate 
geographic areas: Florida (1st), New York, New Jersey, the Washington DC metro area, and 
Connecticut. All of the confirmed disease infections were caused by direct contact with active 
anthrax spores transmitted in pieces of contaminated mail. This resulted in twenty-two confirmed 
cases of anthrax infection; eleven cases of cutaneous (skin) infection and eleven cases of 
inhalation (respiratory) infection. These infections ultimately resulted in five deaths, all from 
inhalation anthrax4 (GAO, 2003).  
While these infection and fatality numbers may appear small and perhaps insignificant in 
comparison with the casualty numbers at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, their 
psychological effect on the American public, particularly with regard to the public’s confidence 
in the Federal government, was substantial. As a result of the generally negative public 
perception of the Government’s ability to manage such events, and as public fears of future 
similar attacks continued to grow, there was a significant shift in thinking by the response 
organizations about the concepts of risk and crisis communication and their relationship to each 
other during extreme emergencies (Freimuth, 2003, 2006; Kahn, 2009; Reynolds &Seeger, 
2005). The response to the anthrax attacks also revealed many weaknesses in the government’s 
ability to respond effectively to an unexpected public health crisis; especially one with the 
potential to affect widely dispersed segments of the population. The use of the U.S. mail delivery 
4 Anthrax infections can be cutaneous, gastrointestinal, or inhalation. Cutaneous (skin infection through some form 
of tactile contact with anthrax spores) and gastrointestinal (acquired from consuming meat from contaminated 
animals) are the most common type of anthrax and are usually survivable. With proper treatment likely survival 
rates are 60% for gastrointestinal and 80% for cutaneous anthrax. Inhalation anthrax, which is acquired by breathing 
airborne anthrax spores, is most often fatal with an estimated survivability rate of 10-15% without treatment. Early 
and aggressive treatment may improve the likely survivability rate to 55% (www.cdc.gov/anthrax).  
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system as a means of disease transmission not only involved Federal government authorities 
from the beginning, but also greatly increased the urgency and pressure to develop an effective 
response strategy as suddenly nearly all of the U.S. population was potentially at risk. The degree 
of uncertainty that arose as a result of what appeared to be random targets combined with the 
potential to reach anyone who might receive deliveries from the U.S. Postal Service, resulted in 
high levels of public anxiety and fear. The developing public reaction to the growing number of 
suspected or confirmed anthrax infections and the extensive media coverage of these incidents 
(some of which included false, inaccurate, or misleading information) put considerable pressure 
on the leadership of the national response agencies, especially HHS and the CDC, to provide 
immediate and detailed information to the public. This prompted Government agencies and 
leaders at the national level to make frequent public statements about the situation, in hopes of 
averting widespread panic. Unfortunately, this resulted in some (now infamous) public 
statements by high-level government authorities that were factually incorrect, inaccurate from a 
medical perspective, or highly implausible.  For example, during a White House press briefing 
on October 4, 2001, Mr. Tommy Thompson, (then) the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
publicly stated [regarding the (1st) confirmed case of anthrax in Florida] “ It appears that this is 
just an isolated case. There is no evidence of terrorism.”  In response to a question about how the 
first victim might have become infected, he answered, “We don't know that at this point in time. 
We do know that he drank water out of a stream when he was traveling to North Carolina last 
week” 5 (Thompson, 2001, October 4, p.2).  
5 According to the CDC, Anthrax infections occur naturally in wild and unvaccinated domestic animals in many 
countries including the U.S. Workers can be infected if they are exposed to infected animals or to meat or products 
(such as wool or hides) from infected animals. Exposure can also occur from contact with water supplies (rivers, 
streams, ponds) or ground areas that have been contaminated by infected animals. Infection can occur if the 
individual has a cut, scrape or open wound and comes in contact with anthrax spores which can persist in the 
environment, particularly soil, for years or decades (www.cdc.gov/anthrax). 
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Mr. Thompson’s public statements were problematic for several reasons, not the least of 
which was the official medical report from Dr. Larry Bush, the physician who treated the first 
anthrax victim. In his report, Dr. Bush strongly suggested that the anthrax contamination of the 
facility was very likely a deliberate act of bioterrorism and that the infection of this individual, 
because of the type of anthrax contracted, had to be intentional. Additionally, at the time of Mr. 
Thompson’s statements it had already been widely reported in the media that the victim died 
from inhalation anthrax, a form of the disease that is not acquired ‘naturally’, i.e. from animals, 
animal products, or contaminated water.  
This obvious disparity about the source of the victim’s infection generated extensive 
discussion (and much speculation) by the media that the Government was intentionally 
misleading the public in order to hide the seriousness of the situation and/or threat to the 
American people. The Government’s credibility with the public suffered substantially as a result 
of these conflicting statements and what appeared to be deliberate misinformation. These 
statements also created considerable confusion and contributed to increasing the level of public 
paranoia about the anthrax threat rather than diminishing it (Freimuth, 2003, 2006; Kahn, 2009; 
Mebane, Temin, & Parvanta, 2003).   
In another example, in New Jersey (where anthrax infections had been confirmed in 
postal facilities), State public health authorities were actively trying to convince postal workers 
there was no real threat to their safety, despite specific evidence to the contrary. In fact, news 
reports had already confirmed anthrax contamination in postal facilities in the Washington DC 
area.  One New Jersey postal union official described the obvious disparity between the 
government’s public statements and their actions in this way: 
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The [health department official] called everyone into the cafeteria and told us how 
safe we were. Then four days later the SWAT teams were running in.…in their 
decontamination uniforms…. and the FBI was ordering us out of the building 
within 30 minutes or they would put us under arrest…[I]t was like something out 
of a movie  (Chess & Clarke, 2007, p.1580).    
 Impact of the Anthrax Response: A Paradigm Shift. 
The Government’s flawed response to the anthrax attacks had major and lasting impact 
on the practice of crisis communication, by all levels of government, from local municipalities to 
the highest levels of the Federal government. In terms of affecting government response to risk 
and the practice of crisis communication, the impact and influence of the entire 9/11 crisis is 
unprecedented but specifically regarding a public health crisis response, the anthrax attacks were 
the impetus for major change. The issues identified as shortcomings and/or failures in 
communication by the government authorities became catalysts for fundamentally rethinking the 
way government organizations interact with the public during a crisis. 
The Federal government’s response to these events also highlighted serious problems 
with the ability of the many layers of government response organizations to respond in a 
coordinated manner with each other and particularly highlighted problems with effective inter-
organizational communication during public health crises. This perception was reinforced by the 
emerging allegations of multiple failures in coordination and information sharing among the 9/11 
first responders and the Federal government’s response organizations. Recognition of these 
problems prompted comprehensive reviews of (and changes to) official emergency response 
procedures and the public communication practices of the Federal government. Put simply, there 
was one concept and practice of emergency crisis communication by government officials and 
43 
 
organizations prior to these events and a very different concept and practice of crisis 
communication post 9/11 and post anthrax (Chess & Clarke, 2007; Freimuth, 2006; Mebane, 
Temin, & Parvanata, 2003; Reynolds, 2007; Vanderford, 2003; Wise, 2003). 
Evaluating Organizational Crisis Response 
In thinking about how to investigate the process of crisis response development, and draw 
conclusions about its effectiveness, I identified three analytic frameworks to use in evaluating an 
organization’s response. These are Sensemaking, Decision-making, and Communication. Each 
of these frameworks provides a unique lens to use in observing and analyzing how a crisis 
response is developed. Additionally, I have identified three thematic categories; Processes, 
Practices, and Organizational Culture/Climate that may be useful in analyzing an organization’s 
strengths and weaknesses regarding its ability to develop and implement effective response 
strategies.  
Sensemaking  
Sensemaking is an effort by an individual or a group to develop an understanding in a 
confusing or unfamiliar situation.  According to one definition, “ a process of how people try to 
find out the story, the deliberate effort to understand events and how they give meaning to what 
is happening in order to reduce the equivocality and ambiguity that surrounds them” (Muhren 
&Van de Walle, 2010, p. 30). The words process and deliberate are important to consider in any 
definition of sensemaking that relates to what happens in an emergency or crisis situation where 
the pressure of timeliness and immediacy of response are critical to success. Effective crisis 
response demands (of an individual or organization) an ability to (1) quickly determine what is 
going on, (2) determine what the risks are, and (3) make decisions about what action(s) must be 
taken. “Deliberate” in this context refers to the concentrated effort to fully ascertain the severity 
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of the crisis and the risk factors, in order to provide clear and useful information to the decision-
makers based on the information available at the time. These decision-makers will then 
determine the appropriate response based on what they understand, or think they understand, of 
the situation.  
Sensemaking, according to Karl Weick, ‘is about sizing up a situation, about trying to 
discover what you have while you simultaneously act and have some effect on what you 
discover’, and  ‘usually an attempt to grasp a developing situation in which the observer affects 
the trajectory of that development’ (Weick, 2001, p. 460). He also contends that participants in a 
crisis construct/create meaning (enact sensemaking) by reflecting on past (perhaps similar) 
events and personal experiences. He also argues that through the process of social interaction, 
participants work to achieve a consensus view of the crisis event or environment thereby 
establishing a common understanding of the situation (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Sensemaking Properties. 
Weick identifies seven properties of sensemaking which he believes have a direct effect 
on an individual’s capacity for sensemaking and ability to “size up what they face.”  He 
describes these properties as:  
(1) Social context:  the actual, implied, or imagined presence of others.  
(2) Personal identity: a person’s sense of who he or she is in a setting.  
(3) Retrospect: things are seen before they are conceptualized – people know 
what they have done only after they do it.   
(4) Salient cues: individuals have preferences for certain cues and they actively 
select them – affecting their sense of what is happening around them.  When cues 
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become equivocal, contradictory, or unstable, people begin to lose their grasp of 
what is happening.  
(5) Ongoing projects: Experience is a continuous flow. Sensemaking is 
constrained not only by past events, but also by the speed with which events flow 
into the past and interpretations become outdated.  
(6) Plausibility: Sensemaking is about coherence, certainty that is sufficient for 
present purposes and credibility. Plausible sense is constrained by agreements 
with others, consistency with one’s own stake in events, the recent past, visible 
cues, projects that are demonstrably underway, scenarios that are familiar, and 
actions that have tangible effects.   
(7) Enactment:  Action is a means to gains some sense of what one is up against.  
To stay detached and passive is not to improve one’s grasp, because much of what 
any situation means lies in the manner of its response. (Weick, 2001, pp. 461-
463). 
  To support my exploration of the “communicative dimensions of crisis,” I draw 
primarily on Karl Weick’s concepts of sensemaking and retrospective sensemaking in 
organizations. He describes sensemaking as a means of ‘organizing to reduce ambiguity’, a 
process that ‘involves on-going efforts to transform general recipes into actions and structures’ 
(Weick, 2001, p. 34).  
Weick’s idea of retrospective sensemaking is useful in exploring how the CDC decision-
makers and key response directors used their past experiences with other infectious disease 
outbreaks and other public health emergencies to guide the development of their response 
strategy to the novel H1N1 virus. Understanding how the CDC decision-makers enacted 
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retrospective sensemaking is particularly important in the interpretation of the interview data 
from participants who were asked to remember and reflect on their actions, thoughts, and 
feelings as the H1N1 crisis evolved over the period of more than one year. Working with the data 
I collected in my interviews, I use Weick’s seven categories  and the related concepts identified 
by Muhren and Van de Walle (2010) to analyze the sensemaking and decision-making processes 
of the CDC response team during the 2009/2010 H1N1 pandemic. 
Framing. 
Erving Goffman believed that understanding an individual’s primary frameworks is 
critical to understanding how they organize experience. He states, “We tend to perceive events in 
terms of primary frameworks, and the type of framework we employ provides a way of 
describing the event to which it is applied” (Goffman, 1974, p. 24).  Framing, in the context of 
sensemaking in crisis situations, is about perceptions of risk and uncertainty and understanding 
the influence of these primary frameworks. Goffman argued that people infer significance in a 
situation based on primary frameworks developed from their past experiences. Key to 
influencing their current perception is understanding these past experience frames- and being 
able to address them effectively- by either confirming or disconfirming the perceptions. He also 
contends that the less structure and transparency there is during an event, the greater the 
possibility for distortion; while more structure and greater transparency will lessen the possibility 
of distortion (Goffman, 1972). In communicating with the public during times of crisis or 
emergency where health, safety, or survival is at stake this concept of transparency by the 
government will be key to having credibility and in obtaining the public’s trust and cooperation.  
In order for the public to recognize a specific situation or threat as a “crisis”, a 
responsible/credible individual or organization must first declare it as such. Framing strategy is 
47 
 
significant in terms of the degree to which public behavior can or will be influenced, the 
perception of the severity of the threat, and the resources that will be made available to assist in 
managing the situation. To be responsible and accountable leaders, decision-makers must 
consider the ethical dimensions of framing a particular event or threat as a crisis. What must 
decision-makers consider in making the choice to identify an event or threat as an emergency or 
public health crisis?  
In rapidly evolving and emerging novel crisis/threat situations, decision-makers face the 
difficult problem of communicating the nature of an unknown and uncertain situation to the 
public in familiar and unambiguous language.  They must find a way to ‘normalize’ an abnormal 
situation and to define an unconventional threat in conventional terms so that a large public 
audience with a very wide range of education levels, language expertise, and/or familiarity with 
the immediate threat (such as a specific disease outbreak) can understand the threat/crisis and 
will be motivated to take the desired action(s).  How the threat/crisis is framed (both for and by) 
the public is crucial to achieving these goals.   
Additionally, in the case of national emergencies or disasters the authority of the Federal 
or State government (usually the President or the Governor) to declare a situation an 
emergency/crisis also provides the affected area(s) i.e. States or cities access to critical 
emergency funding and support from national level disaster response capabilities. The Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (2007) gives the President of the United 
States the power to invoke a state of emergency, upon the request of the governor, where such an 
emergency has arisen. The language in the law states: 
Any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal 
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save 
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lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the 
threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States (P.L.93-288, as amended, 
42 U.S.C. 5121-5207). 
Transparency. 
Closely related to the issues of decision-making and information release, particularly in 
the case of government agencies, is the concept of transparency.  Warren Bennis describes 
transparency as a principle of organizational communication “encompassing candor, integrity, 
honesty, ethics, clarity, full disclosure, legal compliance and a host of other things that allow us 
to deal fairly with each other” (Bennis, Goleman, & Biederman, 2008, p. vii).  As a factor in a 
decision making process, transparency can be defined more narrowly as ‘the degree to which 
information is available to outsiders that enables them to have an informed voice in decisions 
and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders” (Florini, 2007, p. 5). 
How the transparency ideal influences decision-making processes involving the release of 
potentially harmful or frightening information -- such as warnings to the public of a developing 
global pandemic, or of a possible bioterrorist attack is important to consider.  In examining the 
H1N1 case study, the following questions seem relevant: 
• What is the role of transparency in EIDC?   
• What are the structural, cultural, or organizational constraints influencing the 
situation and the decision-makers?   
• What is the public’s right to know, and what is the Government’s responsibility to 
manage or control the release of information to prevent panic in the midst of a 
complex, chaotic, and evolving threat situation?  
• Is withholding some information ever justifiable?  
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• Who has the authority to make these kinds of decisions when public health and safety 
is at stake? 
In looking at this issue, I consider whether there are nuanced interpretations of 
transparency that are more pragmatic and/or appropriate in responding to certain types of crisis 
situations.  Is the concept of ‘targeted transparency’ (Fung, Graham, & Weil, 2007), where 
specific organizations responsible for particular aspects of public risk, safety, or behavior, make 
decisions about the type, scope, and timing of information release, a legitimate and ethical 
practice? 
In the area of public health communication, transparency has a somewhat different 
definition and role. The following principles and guidelines illustrate these differences; 
• Acknowledge uncertainty  
• Provide follow-up information as quickly as possible  
• Advise patience and flexibility  
• Admit mistakes and move on 
• Provide advice that fits the context and can realistically be acted upon (Jennings & Arras, 
p. 18). 
In reviewing literature related to transparency it was apparent that despite their stated 
commitments to transparency goals, many Government organizations and agencies are struggling 
with the challenges of incorporating the principles of transparency into their operational 
practices, particularly in the area of crisis communication.  All agree that there is a need to 
inform the public of impending threats and danger, but there is also a felt responsibility to avoid 
unnecessary alarm and maintain social order and this often presents a significant ethical dilemma 
(Florini, 2007; Mitchell 2010). 
50 
 
Transparency policies have frequently been in conflict with “right-to-know” policies and 
the government’s attitude toward becoming more transparent has been slowly evolving ever 
since Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.  This tension between openness 
in government (visibility of practices and procedures) and a desire for secrecy to protect 
government operations has a long history in American government bureaucratic politics.  What is 
referred to as “a 1st generation of legislated transparency” or “the right-to-know policies” 
emerged from the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act that mandated public disclosure of 
Executive Branch proceedings. These policies and mandates for government disclosure of 
information to the public have continued to evolve with each successive administration and 
Congress.  However, there have been both successes and setbacks in expanding these “right to 
know” policies, notably the success of the Freedom of Information Act in the 1970’s and 
conversely the Bush Administration’s efforts to increase the scope of “official secrecy” 
regulations and policies (information control) beginning in early 2001. These efforts continued 
and were expanded after the 9/11 attacks with the passage of the Patriot Act and other 
government measures designed to increase the governement’s capablity for monitoring actions 
and/or individuals thought to be of concern from a national security perspective (Fung, Graham, 
& Weil, 2007, pp. 25-28). 
The recent (June 2013) incident, involving the release of highly sensitive information by 
Edward Snowden concerning a “secret” U.S. Government technical surveillance program, and 
the continuing debate about the legality of his actions has brought this issue of the Government’s 
‘right’ to collect certain information on its citizens and political allies and to withhold 
information about these programs to the forefront of public debate once again. In an article titled 
NSA Management Directive #424: Secrecy and Privacy in the Aftermath of Edward Snowden, 
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the author quotes from Snowden’s published statement in which he defends his decision to reveal 
the NSA surveillance program: 
So long as there’s broad support amongst a people it can be argued there’s a level 
of legitimacy even to the most invasive and morally wrong program, as it was an 
informed and willing decision …. However, programs are implemented in secret, 
out of public oversight, lack that legitimacy, and that’s a problem. It also 
represents a dangerous normalization of “governing in the dark” where decisions 
with enormous public impact occur without any public input (Lucas, Jr., 2014, 
p.1). 
Components of Organizational Crisis Response 
In reviewing literature related to how organizations respond in crisis situations, I 
discovered a number of significant issues directly related to the official response to the 2001 
anthrax crisis. These issues generally fall within the three thematic categories I identified; 
processes, practices, and organizational behavior/culture.  
Organizational processes 
In the category of organizational process, reports and studies of CDC’s response during 
the anthrax crisis highlighted many systemic organizational issues such as problems associated 
with information ‘flows’ (both internal and external). These were attributed to complicated 
hierarchical organizational structures and the existence of policies and regulations that impeded 
effective internal coordination and complicated the inter-organizational coordination process 
(Chess & Clarke, 2007; Freimuth, 2003, 2006).  Issues concerning the inadequate size and 
equipment of the physical space allocated to crisis teams and emergency response centers were 
also noted and cited as factors contributing to a lack of timely and effective staff coordination 
52 
 
that affected the overall response process (Vanderford, 2003).  In addition to the physical 
workspace problems, the lack of sufficient  (IT) communication technology (e.g. laptops, 
desktop computers, mobile phones) allocated to the response staff to support the response 
operations led to delayed information transmission or resulted in missed information altogether 
(Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). Also noted as problematic was the smooth and effective 
integration of highly technical information in the planning process (Jederberg, 2005). 
Other studies cited the lack of any pre-prepared guidance for the organization’s 
communication staff to assist in managing the large volume of media inquiries, and poorly 
defined or nonexistent procedures for official coordination and collaboration with the media 
(Freimuth, 2006; Robinson & Newstetter, 2003). Also noted was the insufficiency of readily 
accessible and useful subject matter specific information resources to respond to what should 
have been anticipated media and public inquiries, such as ‘What is anthrax?’  ‘How is it 
contracted?’  ‘Are all forms fatal?’ Unfortunately, due to this lack of prepared/approved 
guidance (i.e., Frequently Asked Questions) what appeared to be conflicting and sometimes even 
contradictory information was provided. For example, confusion and outrage resulted when the 
CDC recommended that postal workers in mail handling facilities identified with anthrax 
contamination be given the antibiotic Doxycycline as a preventative measure. This was 
problematic because only a short time prior, the CDC had recommended the employees at the 
Senate Hart Office building in Washington DC and the NBC television studios in New York 
(where the presence of anthrax spores had also been confirmed) take the antibiotic Ciprofloxacin 
(Cipro) to protect against possible anthrax infection. The CDC knew that both drugs were 
equally effective and that Doxycycline was perhaps even preferred as a preventative treatment 
due to its fewer potential side effects. However, this information on the differences between the 
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two drugs was never fully communicated to the postal workers or the public. The medical facts 
contradicted what the postal workers believed to be true, that Cipro was somehow a “better” 
drug. Consequently, the postal workers alleged that they were being given “a less effective 
medication” and were being treated as “second class citizens” (Vanderford, 2003, p. 11). 
 The public information resources on anthrax that were available were also frequently 
criticized for being “too scientific” or “too complicated” for the health literacy levels of the 
general public, sometimes resulting in misinformation due to misinterpretation (Mebane et al., 
2003; Prue, Lackey, Swenarski, & and Gantt, 2003; Robinson & Newstetter, 2003). 
The CDC’s cumbersome clearance (release) process for official statements and 
information updates was also identified as one of the problematic organizational issues. This 
process frequently resulted in delays for providing new information to the media, which created 
the perception (paranoia) that important information was being deliberately withheld from the 
public. Also cited as a problem was the failure of the CDC leadership to designate a single or 
“official” spokesperson(s) for the agency, which sometimes resulted in conflicting and 
contradictory public messages as the media would interview several different “official 
spokespersons”, often on the same day, whose information and messages were not only not 
coordinated internally for consistency but were also not reviewed for currency and accuracy. 
Officials of the government agencies were also criticized for their apparent failure to adequately 
anticipate the extreme time pressure that the crisis situation imposed on the media staff for rapid 
response to public inquiries and the volume of media demands for information updates (Chess & 
Clarke, 2007; Holmes et al., 2009; Prue et al., 2003; Robinson & Newstetter, 2003; Seeger et al., 
2008; Vanderford, 2003). 
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Organizational practices 
 There are a number of studies that recognize the need for and implementation of certain 
organizational practices that would contribute to the likelihood of a successful response. Specific 
recommendations included the use of clear, readable and understandable (e.g. non-scientific) 
language both in printed materials and from official spokesperson(s), broad dissemination of all 
available information (both in print and visual media), and timeliness, accuracy, and consistency 
of messaging (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Covello, 2003; Glik, 2007; Schuchat & 
Vanderford, 2010).  
One practice used to enhance communication between communities or groups with 
significant differences in culture, language, or other social barriers is the use of boundary 
objects. Boundary objects facilitate interaction between different communities by “enabling 
knowledge exchange across organizational and professional borders” and “establish a joint 
language for representing knowledge” (Carlile, 2002).  In this way, boundary objects can be 
useful to organizations struggling with the challenge of communicating critical information to an 
audience that includes the public and other professional organizations with different interests, 
priorities, or agendas (Carlile, 2004). 
The concept of boundary objects is used in studies of organizations facing this complex 
problem of communicating with diverse audiences and/or participant groups involved in solution 
development.  This analytic concept originated in the field of scientific inquiry and derives from 
studies of specific scientific objects that occupy ‘intersecting social worlds’.  These objects often 
will have different meanings within these individual social worlds but will still be understood 
well enough to allow them to function as a ‘means of translation’ within and across disparate 
social and/or professional groups (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 393).  
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In my study of a government agency facing an emerging crisis, I investigated how the 
organization developed and used boundary objects in developing an effective crisis 
communication strategy. A key role for boundary objects in this process is to establish some 
common ground or common understanding of the problem. During its response to the H1N1 
pandemic, the CDC created a number of boundary objects to facilitate communication with 
population groups identified as being at high risk for contracting H1N1. Because these groups 
differed in age (significantly), gender, and reasons for resisting the idea of vaccination, the 
boundary objects developed and used to facilitate communication with each ‘at risk’ group were 
necessarily different and customized to each group. For example, with the highest risk group, 
teenagers and college age young adults, the CDC used social media (Facebook and YouTube)  as 
well as web podcasts, widgets, and eCards to communicate their prevention and vaccine 
campaign messages. Additionally, a concerted effort was made to reach the public via the 
Internet with a dedicated webpage (www.flu.gov) where daily flu updates were posted as well as 
short informational videos about how to avoid getting/spreading the flu and the importance of flu 
vaccinations (Schuchat & Vanderford, 2010, p.479). While these methods of communication 
may seem commonplace today, providing important information via a website using podcasts 
and video clips and the use of a social media platform to reach target audiences during a public 
health crisis was a significant and completely new communication initiative for the CDC.  
In order to address (perceived) concerns about the H1N1 vaccine for the next highest risk 
group, pregnant women, in addition to the electronic media, the CDC developed specialized 
health message campaigns using printed information (pamphlets, posters, information sheets) 
that were distributed to community health care providers such as obstetricians, pediatricians, and 
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primary care physicians where the CDC believed this population group would most likely seek 
out information on H1N1 risks and answers to concerns about the vaccine.  
The CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) series is also an example of 
a unique inter-organizational boundary object. While the MMWR series are primarily directed 
toward the scientific and medical communities, these documents are available to the public 
through the CDC website and can also be accessed via electronic subscriptions from public 
and/or academic libraries. These publications are often referred to as “the voice of the CDC” and 
provide an important, easily accessible information resource for the public as well as the global 
public health community (CDC, 2010, January 15). 
It has also been argued that in situations where the immediate problem requires radical 
innovation for resolution, the use of boundary objects can be extended to facilitate the decision-
making process. In a rapidly changing and unpredictable environment where the consequences of 
the decisions made may have significant repercussions on public safety, the use of boundary 
objects may help the decision-makers in their process of integrating different or competing 
perspectives and/or proposed solutions (Dodgson, Gann, & Salter, 2007). 
Organizational Culture  
In his analysis of The Mann Gulch Disaster, Weick (1993) poses two fundamental 
questions about organizational response during crises: (1) why do organizations unravel, and (2) 
how can organizations be made more resilient?  In my study, I consider the latter question of 
organizational resilience and, in particular, investigate the role of communication in developing 
this critical organizational quality.  
How best to determine the organizational process of developing an effective response to 
an emerging and evolving threat?  Karl Weick (2007) refers to this as “managing the 
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unexpected,” an ability to create ‘resilient performance’ through the creation of ‘mindful 
infrastructures’ and an organizational culture that encourages a mentality of mindfulness. He 
defines this as, 
A mental orientation toward continually refining and differentiating categories, an 
ongoing willingness and capability to invent new categories that carve events into 
more meaningful sequences and a more nuanced appreciation of context and ways 
to deal with it (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 88). 
How does this concept of mindfulness help an organization adapt to a dynamic crisis 
environment characterized by high degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity? 
 According to one definition, organizational culture is “a set of shared mental assumptions 
that guide interpretation and action in organizations by defining appropriate behavior for various 
situations (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006, p. 437). An organization’s culture can therefore be viewed as 
a key determining factor in how the members of the organization will respond during times of 
crisis. How they understand or perceive the acceptable behavioral norms, leadership’s 
expectations, the organization’s history, and the perception of the organization’s public 
reputation all contribute to the understanding of an organization’s culture and what would 
constitute an appropriate response.  
 In crisis situations, experience with previous and/or similar situations will be a significant 
influencing factor in how the crisis is addressed. If the organization is accustomed to frequent 
crisis response and the members have had experience with either simulated or actual crisis 
situations, the response process will likely be much smoother and cause far less internal stress 
and anxiety. The degree of familiarity with crisis response practices and the organization’s 
member’s level of comfort with each other in a crisis environment is an important aspect of 
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organizational culture.  One definition that takes into account the many and diverse elements that 
come together under the label of ‘organizational culture’ describes it in this way, 
Culture would include the system of values, symbols, and shared meaning of a 
group including the embodiment of these values, symbols and meaning into 
material objects and ritualized practices…the ‘stuff’ of culture includes customs 
and traditions, historical accounts be they mythical or actual, tacit understandings, 
habits, norms and expectations  (Sergiovanni & Corbally, 1984, p. viii).  
Another significant hindrance in the overall response effort was failing to take into 
account important but unrecognized aspects of organizational culture, as it affected 
organizational behavior and as an influencing factor in determining and defining critical response 
strategies. For example, evidence of conflict or lack of trust among different response agencies, 
differing organizational objectives, weak or non-existent inter-organizational relationships, and 
competition for ‘authority’ in making decisions or public statements (Chess & Clarke, 2007; 
Vanderford, 2003; Wise, 2003; Zarcadoolas, Pleasant, & Greer, 2005). 
The majority of the studies I reviewed are sharply critical of the practices of government 
organizations, especially the CDC, in these areas. They also emphasize the need to develop more 
effective crisis communication plans and processes, or to refine and adjust existing 
plans/processes to current circumstances and conditions. Several studies cite the need to develop 
an adaptive response strategy with a substantial degree of flexibility that would be successful in 
situations of emerging and evolving threat scenarios where high levels of uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and unpredictability exist (Freimuth, 2006; Kahn, 2009; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).  
In addition to the criticisms of the impediments in the communication processes and 
issues related to organizational structures used by government agencies (particularly with 
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engaging the news media), there appears to be a consensus in the literature that a critical area for 
further study and research in crisis communication regarding public health threats is with the 
quality of interagency and/or inter-organizational collaboration, coordination, and 
communication (Chess & Clarke, 2007; Freimuth, 2006; Karwa, Currie, & Kvetan, 2005; Millar 
& Heath, 2004).   
Other issues related to the general concept of organizational ‘culture’ or behavior 
identified as having a negative impact ranged from leadership’s unwillingness (or inability) to 
diverge from traditional ways of doing business and issues affecting organizational behavior 
stemming from the public’s perceived general lack of trust in ‘the Government’ (Holmes et al., 
2009; Pollard, 2003; Shore, 2003; Vanderford, 2003).  One issue clearly related to the concept of 
an organization’s culture is the perceived ability of the organization to cope with uncertainty in a 
crisis situation. This was highlighted as a one of the most critical issues in developing trust with 
the public and for maintaining a public perception of having the situation under control. (Chess 
& Clarke, 2007; Freimuth, 2006; Mebane et al., 2003; Reynolds & Quinn, 2008; Robinson & 
Newstetter, 2003; Shore, 2003). 
Research Goals and Questions  
The primary goal of my research is to gain an understanding of the relationship between 
two separate but interconnected processes-- sensemaking and decision-making during a crisis 
situation -- and how these two processes influence an organization’s response to the crisis 
situation.  
My secondary research goal is to explore the role of communication in shaping and 
developing the crisis response. My research focus is specifically on a large, complex government 
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agency confronting an unpredictable, ambiguous, and uncertain threat and its process of 
developing a response to that threat.  
Given my interest in these two areas, I have developed the following primary research 
questions to guide my data gathering and analysis:  
RQ1.  How do government decision-makers make sense of an emerging threat or crisis 
situation in order to develop an appropriate response?  
RQ2.  When confronted with an uncertain and ambiguous threat, how does a government 
agency effectively communicate this response strategy?  
To address these research questions, I focus on what has been called the “communicative 
dimensions of crisis” (Seeger et al., 2003); how participants facing an evolving crisis situation 
make sense of and construct meaning in a climate of extreme uncertainty, where ambiguity and 
chaos override  ‘normal’ or predictable organizational response processes.   
Within this context, I ask a number of additional questions:  
• What are the organizational processes that determine the dissemination of information 
to the public during the emerging threat or crisis situation?  
• Who makes the decisions about whether and what information is released to the 
public?   
• What factors (i.e., a decision-maker’s personal experience, dominant organizational 
culture constraints and practices, or the interpretation of the threat 
context/environment affect this decision process?   
• How are the content, format, and timing of the information dissemination 
determined?   
61 
 
• How and with whom do government decision-makers collaborate in this process and 
how do they choose to communicate with the public?  
These questions guide my exploration of the CDC’s organizational response to the 2009/2010 
H1N1 pandemic.  I explore these questions using the following conceptual frameworks; 
sensemaking, framing, transparency, boundary objects, and mindfulness. 
In Chapter Three, I provide a discussion of my research methods and a description of my 
research data. 
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Chapter Three: Methods and Data 
The primary method I use in my data analysis is the concept of the Case Study. Case 
studies are used in a variety of disciplines and can be valuable research tools providing a specific 
context or event for study. One definition of case studies and how they are structured in social 
science research comes from Robert Stake’s work. He says,  
… in the social science literature, most case studies feature: descriptions that are 
complex, holistic, and involving a myriad of not highly isolated variables; data 
that are likely to be gathered  at least partly by personalistic observation; and a 
writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, 
illustration, and even allusion and metaphor. Comparisons are implicit rather than 
explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate 
to the understanding of the case (Stake, 1978, p.7).  
The case I use for my research is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s organizational 
response to the novel H1N1 influenza pandemic during the period from April 2009- June 2010.  
It is important to note that the data used in my case study and analysis of the H1N1 pandemic 
was drawn from more than one kind of source. In addition to published literature on H1N1, CDC 
press briefing transcripts, and transcripts of Congressional testimony from senior Government 
officials, I also used transcripts from interviews done in support of the CDC’s H1N1 Oral 
History Project. While I conducted the interviews that I used in my analysis this data should be 
considered a secondary data source as I did not independently develop and select the interview 
questions that were used. I submitted approximately several drafts of proposed questions and 
63 
 
CDC officials made additions, changes, and deletions to the list. Thus, the final determination of 
which questions would be used in the interviews was made by the CDC. These interviews were 
done for one purpose- creating the CDC Oral History- and I am using them for another, as data 
for my research and analysis of the organizational response to the H1N1 pandemic.  
Case Study: The 2009-2010 H1N1 Virus Pandemic 
In mid-April 2009 a previously unknown strain of influenza virus, Type A Novel H1N1 
(H1N1/A) suddenly appeared in the United States and raised concerns within the international 
public health community that a potentially devastating worldwide flu pandemic was imminent.  
The CDC identified this particular influenza strain as a combination of several different types of 
flu virus genes not previously seen together and one not previously identified in humans (Centers 
for Disease Control & Prevention, 2009). This outbreak of an H1N1 strain was of great concern 
to the CDC and HHS because of the history of the H1N1 virus beginning at the start of the 20th 
century and the expectation in the public health community that another flu pandemic would 
likely occur. 
The 1918 Flu Pandemic 
The1918 flu pandemic, also known as the Spanish Flu, was a significant event in the 
history of public health and an important influence in how public health policies and practices 
developed. Current estimates of the impact of the 1918 pandemic include the following statistics: 
• Approximately 20% of the worldwide population became ill 
• An estimated 50 million people died 
• At least 675,000 people died in the United States 
• In one year the average life expectancy in the United States dropped by twelve years 
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Unlike previous disease pandemics and other flu outbreaks the 1918 flu pandemic (which was 
determined to be a strain of the H1N1 virus) resulted in very high mortality rates among what 
were considered “healthy young adults.”  Illness and death rates were actually higher in adults 
aged 20-50 years than they were in adults over the age of 50, traditionally a higher risk 
population group for death due to influenza. The reasons for this unusual disease infection 
pattern have still not been determined and remain a mystery (Reynolds, 2007, pp. 21-23). 
The H1N1 Threat Significance 
 To underscore the significance of the threat posed by a new (or returning) H1N1 flu virus 
and the potentially devastating consequences of another H1N1 influenza pandemic, CDC points 
out that more people died from the 1918 influenza pandemic than were killed in World War 1. It 
is estimated that approximately 16 million people died in World War 1, while approximately 50 
million deaths (worldwide) are attributed to the 1918 flu pandemic. Due to the nature of record 
keeping at the time, precise records of deaths caused directly by the pandemic flu virus are not 
available, however, it is generally agreed that somewhere between 675,000 and 700,000 of the 
deaths attributed to the 1918 H1N1 pandemic occurred in the United States (CDC, 2007, 
October). 
 Yet, the 1918 H1N1 virus outbreak, while the most severe, was not the only influenza 
pandemic in recent history. Other flu pandemics occurred in 1957 (70,000 U.S. deaths and 1-2 
million deaths worldwide), and in 1968 a flu pandemic resulted in 34,000 U.S. deaths and more 
than 700,000 deaths worldwide.  However, because the 1918 flu pandemic was caused by the 
H1N1 virus, the 2009 confirmation of an H1N1 variant in the United States raised fears that this 
devastating virus may have returned and could potentially have similar, or perhaps worse, 
consequences for infection and fatalities (Reynolds, 2007, 2012; Kahn, 2009). 
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Confirming H1N1/A 
The H1N1/A virus was positively identified initially in a 10 year-old patient in California 
on 15 April 2009 (CDC, 2010, June 16).  Although there had been several reports of confirmed 
cases of a novel influenza strain in Mexico prior to this date, this was the first official 
confirmation of the H1N1/A virus in the United States.  On 17 April, a second patient living in 
California but located more than 100 miles away and without any apparent connection to the first 
patient also tested positive for the H1N1 virus.  One day later on 18 April 2009, following the 
established protocols, the United States International Health Regulations Program notified the 
World Health Organization (WHO) of the positive identifications of the H1N1 virus in the 
United States (CDC, 2010, June 16).   
On Saturday, April 25, 2009, the Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr. 
Margaret Chen, declared that the H1N1 outbreak was a “Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern” (Chen, 2009, April 25).  She recommended that surveillance activities be 
increased and instances of any flu like symptoms immediately reported to the World Health 
Organization.  
Also on April 25, 2009, New York City officials reported influenza-like illnesses in a 
high school, and CDC testing confirmed two new cases of the 2009 H1N1 influenza infection in 
Kansas. Subsequently, another H1N1 infection was confirmed in Ohio, making it evident that the 
disease was spreading rapidly to widely dispersed geographical areas.  On 26 April 2009, based 
on the recommendation from the CDC following additional confirmations of H1N1 the Acting 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Mr. Charles E. Johnson, declared a National Public 
Health Emergency.  A public statement released by HHS explained this action: 
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The Acting Secretary of HHS determined, as a consequence of confirmed cases of 
Swine Influenza A (now called “2009—H1N1 Influenza”) in California, Texas, 
Kansas, and New York, and after consultation with public health officials, as 
necessary, that a public health emergency exists nationwide involving 2009 H1N1 
Influenza that affects or has significant potential to affect national security 
(USDHHS, 2009). 
Two months later on June 11, 2009, the WHO Director General, Dr. Chen, issued a press 
statement officially declaring H1N1 a global pandemic, stating that “nearly 30,000 confirmed 
cases [of H1N1] have been reported (to date) in 74 countries”.  She also issued a warning about 
the future progress of the disease saying, “Although the pandemic appears to have moderate 
severity in relatively well-off countries, it is prudent to anticipate a bleaker picture as the virus 
spreads to areas with limited resources, poor health care, and a high prevalence of underlying 
medical conditions”.  In her statement to the press, she explained the reasoning that led the WHO 
to decide to raise the worldwide influenza pandemic alert status from Phase 5 to Phase 6  stating, 
“On the basis of available evidence and expert assessments of the evidence, the scientific criteria 
for an influenza pandemic have been met. The world is now at the start of the 2009 influenza 
pandemic” (Chen, 2009, June 1).  Figure 4 describes the WHO pandemic alert levels and 
recommended actions for each. 
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 NEW PHASES OVERARCHING PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS 
Interpandemic period  
Phase 1. No new influenza virus subtypes have been 
detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that 
has caused human infection may be present in 
animals. If present in animals, the riska of human 
infection or disease is considered to be low.  
Phase 2. No new influenza virus subtypes have been 
detected in humans. However, a circulating animal 
influenza virus subtype poses a substantial riska of 
human disease.  
 
Strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness at the 
global, regional, national and subnational levels. 
Minimize the risk of transmission to humans; 
detect and report such transmission rapidly if it 
occurs.  
Pandemic alert period  
Phase 3. Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but 
no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances 
of spread to a close contact. b  
Phase 4. Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-
human transmission but spread is highly localized, 
suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to 
humans. b  
Phase 5. Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human 
spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is 
becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but 
may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial 
pandemic risk).  
 
Ensure rapid characterization of the new virus 
subtype and early detection, notification and 
response to additional cases. Contain the new virus 
within limited foci or delay spread to gain time to 
implement preparedness measures, including 
vaccine development. Maximize efforts to contain 
or delay spread, to possibly avert a pandemic, and 
to gain time to implement pandemic response 
measures.  
Pandemic period  
Phase 6. Pandemic: increased and sustained 
transmission in general population.b  
Minimize the impact of the pandemic.  
a  The distinction between phase 1 and phase 2 is based on the risk of human infection or disease resulting from 
circulating strains in animals. The distinction is based on various factors and their relative importance according to 
current scientific knowledge. Factors may include pathogenicity in animals and humans, occurrence in domesticated 
animals and livestock or only in wildlife, whether the virus is enzootic or epizootic, geographically localized or 
widespread, and/or other scientific parameters.  
b The distinction between phase 3, phase 4 and phase 5 is based on an assessment of the risk of a pandemic. Various 
factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge may be considered. Factors may include 
rate of transmission, geo-graphical location and spread, severity of illness, presence of genes from human strains (if 
derived from an animal strain), and/or other scientific parameters. 
Adapted from World Health Organization. (2005). WHO global influenza preparedness plan: The role of WHO and 
recommendations for national measures before and during pandemics.  Geneva, Switzerland: Author.   
Figure 4.  WHO Pandemic Levels and Recommended Actions   
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CDC’s Response to the H1N1 Pandemic 
The CDC’s response to the 2009/2010 H1N1 pandemic provides an excellent opportunity 
to explore the relationship between sensemaking and decision-making in public communication 
when a public health organization responds to an unknown, unfamiliar, and unpredictable crisis.  
Under the existing federal government structure, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) share the responsibility for 
coordinating a national response to an influenza pandemic, however, as the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic evolved and public health threats became the focus over national security concerns, 
HHS assumed the primary directing and coordinating role in the response (Steinhardt & Crosse, 
2011, June 27).   
Within the HHS organizational structure, the CDC is recognized as the agency with 
primary responsibility for developing and implementing the response strategy and 
communicating with the public about an infectious disease epidemic and/or pandemic (Kanof & 
Anderson, 2004, January 30).  In developing the official government response to the emerging 
H1N1 pandemic, the CDC faced many complicated and complex challenges.  The issues of 
communicating effectively with multiple and diverse audiences (publics), balancing multiple 
organizational goals, the critical need to establish and maintain credibility and gain public trust, 
and the unprecedented demand for immediate and accurate information from the 24/7 media 
news cycle were all factors affecting how the CDC developed its crisis response strategy. 
This unique infectious disease outbreak, which developed very quickly from a few 
localized and seemingly unrelated and cases of influenza in the United States into a global 
pandemic, provides an excellent opportunity to explore and analyze the difficult and complicated 
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challenges facing government decision-makers who are confronted with a complex, 
unanticipated, emergent, and highly unpredictable public health threat. 6 
The H1N1 Oral History Project 
In January 2010, Dr. Marsha Vanderford, Associate Director for Communications in the 
CDC Center for Global Health, proposed the development of an official oral history of the 
organization’s response to the 2009/2010 H1N1 pandemic. The objective would be to capture 
unique insights and observations from the CDC response participants and to create a permanent 
record of their thoughts, recollections, and reflections as a resource for participants facing similar 
challenges in the future.  The CDC Director, Dr. Thomas Frieden, supported her proposal and 
approved the H1N1 Oral History project.  Dr. David Sencer, a former (and the longest serving) 
CDC Director (1966-1977) who also assisted the CDC during the H1N1 response as an emeritus 
advisor, was named as overall project coordinator for the H1N1 Oral History. As a special 
advisor to the CDC Director during the H1N1 pandemic period, Dr. Sencer participated actively 
in the development of the CDC’s H1N1 response attending high-level decision briefings and 
meetings as part of the Director’s “Team B”, and working alongside the senior leadership staff.  
His personal involvement in the development of the CDC’s response strategy, plus his previous 
long tenure (and popularity) as a CDC Director gave him unique access to CDC staff members 
whose experiences and recollections were key to creating the H1N1 Oral History record. The 
strong personal and long-term professional relationships he enjoyed with these CDC members as 
6 The 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic affected more than 214 countries (WHO, 2010, August 6). The CDC (2010, May 
14) estimates between 14 million and 34 million cases of 2009 H1N1 occurred between April and October 17, 2009 
in the United States.  In the U.S. 41,914 laboratory-confirmed, influenza-associated hospitalizations were reported to 
CDC and U.S. deaths estimated to be between 8,717– 18,046 (CDC, 2010, July 30). Worldwide, the death total 
attributed to H1N1 (by the CDC) during the pandemic period is 284,500. Notably, 80% of the deaths attributed to 
H1N1 were in people younger than 65 years old (Dawood et al., 2009). 
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well as their deep respect for him contributed significantly to the successful completion of the 
Oral History project.  
Once the CDC Director approved the project, Dr. Sencer identified and selected specific 
CDC employees for the oral history project interviews. He based his selection on his knowledge 
of each individual’s current and /or past positions at CDC and the degree of their involvement in 
the CDC’s H1N1 response. Dr. Vanderford subsequently offered me the opportunity to conduct 
the oral history interviews with these selected employees and she and Dr. Sencer became my 
principal points of contact at the CDC. 
Oral History Project Interviews 
An oral history, according to Donald Ritchie (2003, p. 19), “collects memories and 
personal commentaries of historical significance through recorded interviews. An oral history 
interview generally consists of a well-prepared interviewer questioning an interviewee and 
recording their exchange in audio or video format.”  
The H1N1 Oral History was developed through a series of in-depth interviews conducted 
with these key CDC staff members and office directors during the period from January 2010 to 
June 2010.  Planning sessions for the project were held in January 2010 and the first Oral History 
interviews began in early February 2010 following receipt of final IRB approval for the study 
from the University of South Florida. The planned timeframe for conducting these initial 
interviews was approximately six months.  During this six-month period I traveled to the CDC 
Headquarters in Atlanta, GA on four occasions. Three visits were devoted to conducting the in-
person recorded interviews and one visit focused on separate (not recorded) follow-up 
interviews. During the final visit I also reviewed the videotape footage for final editing with the 
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media department technicians and the project coordinator, Dr. Sencer. Each visit was 
approximately one week in length for a total of four weeks on site at the CDC.  
The Oral History Project included twenty-eight interviews, each of which were conducted 
and videotaped in the television studios located in the CDC Headquarters Building, Clifton Road 
Campus, in Atlanta, GA.  Approximately nineteen hours of High Definition (HD) videotape 
recordings resulted from these interviews, with each interview averaging 35 minutes in length. 
The interview video recordings were technically edited by the CDC electronic media department 
and then copied onto DVDs in individual files. These DVDs and the original video recordings 
were subsequently archived by the CDC library and are now part of the CDC’s permanent 
document collection. All of the interview recordings are available for review as public records in 
the CDC library, also located in the CDC Headquarters Building at 1600 Clifton Road, Atlanta, 
GA. The CDC provided me with DVD copies of each of the interview video recordings, which I 
used as my primary source material in my data analysis. 
Selection of Data. 
The videotapes, transcripts of these interviews, and the follow-up interviews I conducted 
with selected CDC staff members became the primary data sources for my research. I converted 
the HD video recordings of the interviews to audio only format using a commercial software 
program (Audio Hijack) and then had the recordings professionally transcribed. This resulted in 
147 pages of interview transcripts that I used in conjunction with the copies of the video 
recordings to conduct my analysis.  I reviewed the interview recordings and transcripts and 
coded them for examples pertaining to;  (1) the participants’ sensemaking process(s), (2) the 
internal decision-making process/structure within CDC, (3) the response development, and (4) 
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description of the communication practices, both internal and external, during the crisis response 
period.  
I reviewed each of  the transcripts of the sixteen Oral History interviews I selected for my 
study and  compared the participants’ recollections of events and their answers to the interview 
questions. In this thematic-oriented analysis, I looked for differences, similarities, and insight 
into their personal sensemaking and the organizational process(s) of decision-making that 
appeared to have influenced the development of the CDC’s response to H1N1.   
As part of my literature review for the study of the CDC’s organizational response to 
H1N1, I searched for publications describing and evaluating CDC’s actions and public 
communication during the 2001 anthrax attacks to compare it with the CDC’s response to H1N1 
during 2009-2010.  As the anthrax attacks were the genesis of the current emergency and crisis 
communication response processes and practices at CDC, reviewing the organization’s response 
during the 2001 anthrax crisis provides an excellent means of evaluating certain aspects of the 
organization’s response to the 2009/2010 H1N1 crisis.  In particular I looked for instances where 
specific response actions during the anthrax crisis were noted as insufficient or problematic and 
searched for examples of these (or similar) actions during H1N1 to determine if changes had 
been made to address these shortcomings.  
This review of the organization’s response to the anthrax crisis also helped to 
contextualize the decision-making process and the CDC’s ability to respond to an emerging 
threat under conditions of extreme uncertainty.  I believe this comparison provides useful insight 
into how the organization’s response during the H1N1 crisis differed from the anthrax response 
and how the H1N1 “story” was constructed to meet the organization’s revised crisis 
communication goals and practices.  
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Many of the key CDC decision-makers and response participants involved in H1N1 were 
also directly involved in the response to the anthrax crisis and that experience very likely 
influenced their behavior and thought processes in developing the response to the H1N1 threat.  
The significant level of public and official criticism that was directed at the CDC for the way the 
2001anthrax events were handled, overall, had an impact on the organization’s reputation and 
also provided strong incentive for the CDC leadership to develop different and more effective 
crisis response strategies and capabilities.  
Data Gathering. 
This is a qualitative study with primary research based on semi- structured, in-depth, 
personal interviews conducted with CDC employees who either were previously involved in the 
CDC’s response to the H1N1 pandemic, or were in positions with ongoing responsibilities 
related to H1N1 during the period April 2009 thru June 2010. A specific position description of 
each interview participants’ role in H1N1 is included in the biographical detail of the interview 
participants and is provided in Appendix B.  
Research Site. 
The main campus and headquarters of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) is located at 1600 Clifton Road in Atlanta, Georgia. This was the primary research site for 
the H1N1 interviews.  The CDC has an established position category for Guest Researchers, 
which allows outside (non-employee) researchers to gain access to CDC offices and employees, 
as well as internal library holdings, and provides an official organization sponsor.  I obtained 
formal organizational support for my on-site research and interviews at CDC with the assistance 
of Dr. Marsha Vanderford, (then) Director of the CDC Emergency Communications Division in 
the Emergency Operations Center, and my official CDC research sponsor. 
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Interviews 
Interviews with twenty-eight CDC employees were conducted and recorded for the H1N1 
Oral History Project.  Dr. David Sencer, a senior advisor at CDC and member of the Director’s 
H1N1 response team and the Oral History project coordinator, selected these individuals based 
on his personal knowledge of their positions and official responsibilities during the H1N1 
pandemic as well as their background and experience at CDC. This may be considered a 
limitation of the study as not every individual with key responsibilities during the 2009-2010 
H1N1 response participants was included in the Oral History interview process. The individuals 
who were selected for interviews were chosen based solely on Dr. Sencer’s personal judgment 
and independent decision.  
Dr. Sencer conducted three of the Oral History project interviews; I conducted all of the 
others. Of the twenty-eight total interviews, I selected sixteen to use as primary data sources for 
this study. The sixteen interviews were selected based on the specific role each participant 
played in the CDC’s H1N1 response and his/her involvement in either (or both) the decision-
making process or public communication strategy. A complete list of the sixteen interview 
participants and their position in the CDC organization during the H1N1 response is provided in 
Appendix A.  Biographic details of the sixteen selected interviewees, including descriptions of 
their background and experience at CDC and areas of professional expertise are provided in 
Appendix B.  
Interview format 
The formal interview process included asking several standard introductory questions of 
all respondents, designed primarily to initiate conversation and build rapport. However, the 
interview process was designed to be sufficiently flexible to allow for (and encourage) 
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considerable extemporaneous response. I intentionally sought detailed narrative accounts of 
individual experiences for those CDC staff members who were directly involved in developing 
CDC’s H1N1 response strategy.   
Open-ended interviews where participants are encouraged to offer personal recollections 
and observations are ideal for obtaining a variety of perspectives and interpretations of events 
from those directly involved in the decision-making and communication processes surrounding a 
specific crisis situation.  From these individuals’ firsthand experience detailed descriptions of the 
‘atmospherics’ and other important context related information (data) can be obtained as well as 
information about the organizational and operational processes that were followed or enacted. 
These personal interviews were useful for comparing different individual accounts, 
interpretations, and perceptions of the same events as the crisis evolved. Based on the gap 
identified in my literature review in the area of interagency and intra-organizational collaboration 
and communication, I was also interested in investigating how this aspect of organizational crisis 
response affected the CDC’s operational practices during the response to the H1N1 pandemic. 
From the interview data I obtained detailed accounts by individuals directly involved in 
the response that provided unique insight into the CDC’s decision-making process. I was 
particularly interested in learning about the perceived influences and/or constraints on the 
decision-makers from organizational structures and/or established processes in place at the time. 
Information that I sought included answers to questions such as: 
• What were these established processes, if any, that CDC enacted during the H1N1 
crisis to facilitate decision-making?  
• Were decisions made by a group or were they made by a single individual, and if so, 
at what level in the organization?  
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• What was the coordination and collaboration process (and methods) for 
interagency/intra-organization communication?  
• How was information shared, both internally and externally?  
• If the organization determined that a single spokesperson should be identified for the 
release of all information, how was this individual selected?  
Interview questions 
I prepared a set of thirty-five questions to use as a guide during the interviews; however, 
the focus of each interview (topic focus) shifted somewhat depending on the interviewee’s 
position in the organization and specific responsibilities during the H1N1 response. For example, 
questions related to the preparation of messages for release to the public or participation in 
decision-making forums were not applicable to all interviewees.  The questions were designed 
primarily to be a conversation guide, to prompt personal reflection and to elicit personal 
narratives, thus the direction of the interviews depended to some extent on the individual 
participants’ responses and was adjusted accordingly.  
Final interview questions. 
My draft interview questions were reviewed and approved by the Oral History project 
leader, Dr. David Sencer, and the project sponsor, Dr. Marsha Vanderford, prior to beginning the 
interview process. Both Dr. Sencer and Dr. Vanderford provided input (and added specific 
content or additional questions) to my original set of questions. The CDC leadership had specific 
interests in learning about how certain aspects of the response affected each agency division or 
office- especially in terms of allocating staffing and budget resources- so questions addressing 
these areas were included. 
The interview participants were not provided with advance copies of the questions prior 
to their interviews, as one of the goals of the project was to obtain extemporaneous responses. 
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They were, however, told that one purpose of the interviews would be to capture personal 
recollections and anecdotal accounts of their individual experiences during the response that 
might not be included in formal after action reports and that this kind of information was of 
particular interest. They were also advised that another purpose for making the video records was 
to document their experiences as reference for use by other responders in future pandemics or 
other crisis events. Each of the participants signed a release form acknowledging that their 
interview recordings would be maintained in archive by the CDC and would become part of an 
official organizational Oral History on H1N1 and would also become public records. 
I prepared an additional set of questions for follow-up interviews with selected 
individuals to allow for any new topics or issues raised during the interviews and/or an interest 
specifically related to my study related to their role during the H1N1 response that was not of 
specific interest to the Oral History project. Primarily this focused on the specifics of the 
decision-making process and practices of one of the Director’s advisory groups known as “Team 
B”, which was chaired by Dr. Sencer.  
The following list of interview questions were used in the Oral History interviews and 
reflect both the interest of the CDC in creating a detailed record of the CDC’s organizational 
response to the H1N1 pandemic, and my specific research interests in the relationship between 
sensemaking and decision-making during a crisis event response.  While it was not possible to 
ask each interview participant every one of the thirty-five questions, I selected questions from 
each topic area based on what each participant identified as their specific duties and 
responsibilities in the H1N1 response. For example, I refrained from asking specific questions 
about interacting with the media when the participant stated that they had not been involved in 
developing public communication messages and/or interacting with the media.  
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H1N1.   
The initial questions were designed to begin the conversation, build rapport, and 
encourage the interviewee to remember (relive) the early days of the H1N1 response. As most of 
the participants participated in the crisis response from the very beginning (April 2009), and 
nearly a year had passed from the start of their initial involvement, these questions were designed 
to prompt memories of the events of the early days and weeks of the crisis. They are also 
designed to determine the degree to which the first notifications raised concerns about a possible 
or potential crisis.  
Q1. When did you first hear about H1N1? 
Q2.  Do you recall how it was presented? Did it strike you as a potential crisis? 
Q3. How/why, did you become involved in the preparedness/response to H1N1? 
Q4.  Were you directly involved in day-to-day planning and response strategy 
development? 
Response Process - Personal/Organizational. 
As the interviewee begins to remember the details surrounding the early days of the 
crisis, the next set of questions targets their emotional reaction and immediate response to the 
unfolding events.  Subsequent questions focus on the more concrete procedural aspects of the 
response as they began to actively develop and implement a strategy to cope with the quickly 
developing crisis situation.  
Q5.  When you first heard about H1N1 what did you think/do? 
Q6.  Whom did you notify and how did you contact them? 
Q7.   Can you describe the first few days of the initial response period?  
Q8.  Were the existing plans activated? Did they work? 
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Q9.  How much of your time initially was devoted to the H1N1 issue? Did this change as 
the crisis developed? 
Q10.  What modifications did you need to make to processes or staff organization to 
respond more effectively to the threat as it emerged/developed? 
Q11.  How did you go about making these changes? 
Decision-Making. 
The questions about decision-making were posed to all interviewees, even if they were 
not in what they might consider a formal ‘decision-making role”.  I believe that comparing 
different perceptions and opinions about key decisions made, and the way they were made, will 
provide significant insight into the organizational decision-making process during the response 
and the perception of the organizational culture/environment.  
Q12. What do you think were the key decisions that needed to be made in the first few 
month/months of the response?  
Q13. How were these decisions made? Who were the key decision-makers?  
Q14.  How were these decisions communicated internally and publicly? 
Internal communication processes. 
 For those interviewees who were not involved in the dissemination of information 
internally, questions in this section focused on how well they felt they were informed of what 
was going on at the organizational level as the crisis developed, how decisions were 
communicated within the organization, and how well these communication processes worked. 
They had the opportunity to provide insight into specific problems or obstacles if they felt they 
were not kept sufficiently well informed by the CDC leadership and to explain how they 
obtained information from different sources, if they felt it necessary.  
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Q15. Can you describe the internal communication processes/means that were used to 
keep CDC employees informed about the organization’s response? 
Q16.  How well do you think these internal processes worked?  
Q17. What were the challenges you faced in getting information to or from CDC staff 
members?   
 Demand for information from the media/public. 
These questions involving media contact and public communication were asked only of 
the participants whose duties required them to engage with the media. However, those 
employees who were not directly involved in providing information to the media were asked for 
their opinion on how well the CDC did in communicating with the public, based on their 
observation of the television and press reporting.  
Q17.  In times of public health emergencies there are often heavy demands placed on 
organizations for immediate and detailed information about the threat situation. Did 
you find this to be the case with H1N1? 
Q18. How did you manage these demands for information? 
Q19. Did you experience (or perceive) any instances of ‘media sensationalism”? 
(inaccurate reports, misleading information, etc.) How did you respond to these? 
Q20. What were the communication systems in place at CDC to respond? 
Q21. How well did they work? 
Q22. Did you find it necessary to modify these systems? If so, how/why? 
Time commitment for H1N1 response. 
The questions about time commitment and organizational resources are designed to 
capture information about the kinds of organizational structure and process issues that may have 
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impeded, or affected individual directorates and office’s capability to respond in the most 
effective way. [Note: The CDC project sponsors had a particular interest in gathering this kind of 
anecdotal information from participants who were working the staffing and organizational 
structure issues on a daily basis.]  
Q23. How much of your workday was/is devoted to the H1N1 issue?  
Q24. Has this changed since the beginning of your involvement? 
Q25. Did the H1N1 response require redeployment of organizational resources in your 
area or in areas that directly affected your operations?  
Q26. What changes in organization or personnel did you make? 
Q27. How were these change needs identified?  Did you collaborate with managers in 
other parts of CDC or in partner organizations outside of CDC?  
Collaboration. 
My review of the literature identified a significant criticism of the ability of government 
agencies to effectively conduct inter/intra organizational collaboration and effectively coordinate 
across multiple agencies during crisis events. The following questions are designed to elicit 
personal stories about how internal collaboration was conducted in CDC and to explore any 
efforts of external coordination and collaboration with colleagues in other government agencies 
or other organizations. 
Q28. Did you engage in active collaboration with other parts/divisions of CDC?  
Q29.  Can you describe this process? What worked well, what didn’t? Why? 
Q30.  Who were your primary contacts within the organization or outside of CDC? 
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Reflection, retrospection, recommendations.  
With almost a year of time having elapsed since the H1N1 crisis emerged, participants 
were asked to reflect on their experience and offer suggestions for different approaches or 
strategies, as well as to evaluate the overall response effort. One of my research goals is to be 
able to provide recommendations for improving an organization’s ability to respond effectively 
to an emerging and evolving crisis situation and I believe these reflections and suggestions from 
the participants will provide important context for future response strategists and decision 
makers and examples in developing those ideas.   
Q31. Looking back over the past year, what would you have done differently? 
Q32. What could the organization have done differently? 
Q33.  Overall, how would you evaluate the CDC’s response to the H1N1 threat?  
Q34.  What were/are the strong points? Weak points? 
Q35.  What recommendations would you offer to someone faced with a similar situation 
in the future?  
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Chapter Four: Results 
 The following chapter outlines the results of my research. I begin by restating my 
research goals and my primary research questions that guided the analysis of my data. I also 
provide a demographic description and analysis of the sixteen interview participants I selected 
for my study including their education, experience, and tenure at the CDC.  Following this, I 
explain the thematic categories I chose to use in analyzing my data and provide selected quotes 
and excerpts directly from the interview transcripts to illustrate findings in each of the categories.  
Research Questions 
The primary goal of my research was to gain an understanding of the relationship 
between two separate but interconnected processes, sensemaking and decision-making during a 
crisis situation -- and how these two processes influence an organization’s response to the crisis. 
My secondary research goal was to explore the role of communication as an integral part of 
developing the organization’s crisis response. To guide my data gathering and data analysis, I 
developed the following primary research questions:  
RQ1.  How do government decision-makers make sense of an emerging threat or crisis 
situation in order to develop an appropriate response?  
RQ2.  When confronted with an uncertain and ambiguous threat, how does a government 
agency effectively communicate this response strategy?  
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Interview Participants Demographic Profile 
 CDC employs a highly educated and exceptionally skilled professional workforce. CDC 
is unique among U.S. Federal Government agencies with the concentration of  (and combination 
of) medical expertise and academic credentials among its professional staff. The majority of 
CDC professional staff members have advanced degrees and many hold more than one. Most are 
board certified medical doctors in addition to having strong academic credentials in public 
health, public policy, or other public health related fields. The sixteen interview participants I 
selected for my analysis reflect this rather unusual organizational demographic. (Appendix B 
provides specific details on their individual credentials and professional experience). 
These sixteen individuals have all been publicly recognized as experts in their respective 
fields and have established impressive professional credentials. They have, individually and 
collectively, received a wide variety of national and international awards and commendations 
and have contributed substantially to research in their areas of expertise with years of field 
experience as well as numerous academic publications.  Scientific and scholarly publications 
from individual members within this group often total more than one hundred, per individual.  
 Education. Within the selected interviewee group, nine of the sixteen participants are 
Medical Doctors (MD) and three of these individuals also hold Master of Public Health (MPH) 
degrees. Five of the sixteen have PhDs and one individual in this group also holds an MPH 
degree. Two of the sixteen interviewees hold MA degrees and one has an MBA. This educational 
and professional background will influence each participant’s perspective on the situation and 
establish ‘frames’ or pre-conceived ideas and points of view that each will bring to the 
discussion. It is important to recognize how these different frames can potentially influence 
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sensemaking and decision-making in order to fully understand this multi-faceted process of 
constructing a shared or cohesive understanding among the group members.  
Work Experience at CDC. The selected interviewee group also has significant long-term 
work experience at CDC. Of the sixteen interviewees, the shortest length of time for anyone in 
the group to have been employed directly by the CDC (at the time of the H1N1 response) was 
seven years. There are two individuals in this category and for both their prior professional 
experience was with organizations related to the CDC, or with organizations directly related to 
the CDC’s mission, providing them with considerable working knowledge of the CDC and an 
established professional network of contacts within the CDC. The degree of professional 
familiarity and level of trust all of these interview participants have with each other as colleagues 
is an important influencing factor in the organizational response development process.   
Collectively the interview participants have an impressive number of years of experience 
working directly for the CDC. Their years of experience range from 7- 24, with an average of 15 
years.  Most of these individuals have spent the majority of their professional lives within the 
CDC organization working closely with many of the same colleagues for their entire careers. 
There are also a number of tandem couples working in the senior levels of the CDC. This along 
with the many other long-standing personal friendships and professional relationships that have 
developed is an important dynamic in an organization’s culture. As a result of this extensive 
shared experience and the strong relationships it has helped to nurture, they have come to depend 
and rely on each other and  a significant level of trust and confidence has developed among these 
individuals.  Because these strong relationships exist, in any crisis situation that occurs it is most 
likely that they will reach out first to members of this community for information, 
validation/confirmation of information, and direction or guidance on what to do next. It is also 
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less likely that they will make independent decisions- and more likely that they will seek a 
consensus based approach to decision-making. Their shared experiences, including experiencing 
multiple crisis situations together, and their personal connections have created a highly cohesive 
professional community and a strong sense of affiliation to the organization, creating a distinct 
CDC identity. 
 There are also several other significant factors related to this depth of experience and 
tenure at the CDC to consider as potentially influencing factors in the response development 
process. First, because of the length of time they had been employed all but three of the 
participants had worked at the CDC during the anthrax crisis in 2001. Five of the thirteen 
interviewees who were at CDC during the anthrax crisis were directly involved in that response 
and the other eight members were either peripherally involved or at least fully cognizant of the 
anthrax crisis and the CDC’s responsibilities. Only two of the sixteen interview group members 
were not part of CDC in any capacity during the anthrax response. However, one of these two 
individuals was part of a State public health organization, separate from but connected to, the 
CDC during the anthrax crisis  and was thereby involved indirectly.  
 Over these many years of working together these participants have developed not only 
strong professional relationships but also strong personal friendships. This creates a group that 
has shared considerable day-to-day work experience and professional expertise but also has 
developed social relationships outside of work that have contributed to their understanding of the 
CDC’s unique organizational culture. It has also shaped the organization’s culture in that 
personal relationships, including marriages, among the senior staff members are more the norm 
than they are atypical as tends to be the case in other large government organizations. 
Establishing this sense of cohesion requires a certain commonality of perspectives among the 
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participants. Fundamental to this process will be sharing similar past experiences, a certain 
degree of familiarity and professional expertise with the specific issue/threat/problem in 
question, and a high level of trust and confidence in the qualifications and capabilities of the 
individuals within the group. The CDC is also unique among government agencies in that its 
members share similar professional backgrounds and expertise as members of the medical and 
public health communities. This is another important and atypical characteristic when compared 
to other large Federal government agencies or organizations where there is likely to be more 
diversity in background and expertise especially among the senior leadership. At the CDC these 
top tier leaders are primarily physicians and/or health scientists. The CDC is focused on one 
mission- public health- and therefore the CDC workforce is predominantly comprised of people 
with skills in that field. These various factors contribute to a high degree of solidarity among the 
members of the organization, which supports a strong sense of organizational cohesion and 
loyalty to the CDC.  
Categories for Data Analysis 
 To begin the process of analyzing the data in my interview transcripts, I first developed 
the following categories for analysis that tie directly to my primary research questions. These 
are;  Sensemaking, Decision-making, Response, and Communication. Within each of these 
major categories I created sub-categories to further separate the particular aspects of each of 
these actions and map them to each research question. Creating these separate sub- categories 
allowed me to review and analyze the transcript data looking for examples of each of these 
specific activities. I looked for these examples in the experience(s) of the interview participants 
as they recollected the steps they took and the procedures they used while moving through their 
individual sensemaking and the organization’s decision-making processes. It was my hope that 
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by carefully examining specific examples from the recollections of the response participants, 
especially after they had time to reflect on their actions, I would find useful data and insights 
regarding the evolution of the organization’s response.  
Data Analysis for Research Question #1 
How do government decision-makers make sense of an emerging threat or crisis 
situation in order to develop an appropriate response? 
 To respond to my first research question concerning the process of sensemaking in an 
emerging threat or crisis, I used three frameworks for data analysis focused specifically on 
understanding how sensemaking happens. These are frameworks are based on (1) Karl Weick’s 
seven properties of sensemaking (Weick, 2001), and (2) an analytic approach to sensemaking 
derived from them (Muhren & Van de Walle, 2010) that targets three specific actions that take 
place during sensemaking. They identify these as noticing, interacting, and enacting. Using these 
specific categories, I analyzed the interview data to determine how the participants’ sensemaking 
processes were reflected in their responses to specific interview questions. 
 I also included the concept of framing as an analytic lens looking for examples in the 
interviews (explicit or implied) where framing could be clearly identified as an influencing factor 
in the sensemaking process. Framing is a unique category as it is an underlying (pervasive) 
influence in each of the specific sensemaking activities- individuals filter and sort information 
based on their pre-existing ‘frames’ of experience, expectations, or biases.  
 I provide direct quotes from the participants’ interviews as specific examples of how each 
of these concepts was demonstrated as the participants recalled their reactions to various events, 
the actions they took, and provided their observations about the emerging crisis situation as they 
became engaged in the CDC’s H1N1 response.  
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Noticing 
 Noticing is probably the very first action an individual takes in sensemaking. The 
sensemaking process is one of gradual realization and understanding- as events and 
actions begin to shape a recognition pattern for the observer. Noticing relates to the 
observer’s growing awareness of how a situation is developing and evolving- as certain 
indicators and signals are recognized. This aspect of sensemaking is directly related to 
two of Weick’s seven sensemaking properties, Salient Cues and Personal Identity. Weick 
(2001) says that individuals have preferences or predispositions for certain cues and will 
actively select these from their environment. Many factors such as past experience, 
assumptions, and established beliefs can influence which cue an individual will respond 
to, i.e. what they will notice. Choosing to focus on specific actions or activities will affect 
their sense (understanding) of what is happening around them by either confirming 
preconceived ideas and expectations or causing others to be missed altogether. Cues or 
signals that are dismissed or overlooked can also be significant influences on the 
sensemaking process by skewing the observer’s perception or by “confirming” false 
assumptions based on expectation not on observation.  Dr. Marsha Vanderford, Director 
of CDC’s Emergency Communication System during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
described her initial reaction and that of the people working around her to becoming 
aware of (noticing) the potentiality of a new H1N1 virus in this way: 
You know, it took, I think, a couple of hours [for us] to really get a sense that this 
was new, this was novel, this was not seen in people before- and then sort of the 
awareness that this could be-this could be the pandemic that we were so 
concerned about (Dr. Marsha Vanderford, Director, Emergency Risk 
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Communication System, Emergency Operations Center, Interview #15, lines 22-
25, Appendix C). 
 Muhren and Van de Walle (2010) believe that sensemaking is “grounded in 
identity construction” and this aligns with Weick’s category of Personal Identity. Using 
identity as a filter can affect the interpretation of what is happening-  and individuals with 
certain defined roles/positions (especially leadership) will most likely notice different 
things in (or about) a situation, or they may interpret them differently than will 
individuals with non-leadership roles. They may also be concerned with the 
organization’s identity and notice aspects of a situation that could potentially affect the 
organization’s public reputation or challenge the perception of its identity (role).  
 In the first set of interview questions, I asked each participant the question, “Do you 
recall when you first heard about H1N1?”  This question directly relates to the sensemaking 
concepts of noticing and salient cues and perhaps also provides insight into the personal identity 
filters of the interviewee. Every one of the interview participants answered this question 
affirmatively – and most in very specific detail as to their exact whereabouts and activities when 
they were first made aware of the H1N1 outbreak. Words used most often in response to the 
questions included: ‘absolutely’, ‘most certainly can’, and ‘yes, very specifically’. Considering 
that these interviews were being conducted nearly a year after the first surveillance notice/early 
warning period for H1N1, I found the level of detail in their responses quite amazing. For 
example, Dr. Beth Bell answered this question by saying,  
 I most certainly can [recall] because I was the Acting Director of the 
 Center, NCIRD, [National Center for Immunization and Respiratory 
 Diseases] at that time, in April, and I was actually performing in a choir 
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 concert that Friday night, and had turned off my phone. I turned it back on 
 after the concert and found I had a call from someone in the Flu Division 
 saying they had detected two of these [cases] over the past couple of days 
 and they were concerned. So, I got a, you know, a very comprehensive 
 update about what people were doing about it- sitting there in my car in 
  the parking lot, after the choir concert. It’s quite – quite a clear memory 
 of the first time I heard about this (Dr. Beth Bell, Acting Director,  
 National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), 
 Interview #2, lines 18-28, 32-33, Appendix C). 
Another example of a very detailed and vivid memory of the initial recognition that there 
could be something significant developing came from Dr. Jay Butler, Director of the  
H1N1 Vaccine Task Force. In response to this question he said, 
 I can recall the moment very clearly actually because I was not at CDC in 
 Atlanta at the time. I was actually attending the American College of 
 Physicians’ Conference in Philadelphia finishing my term as governor of 
 the Alaska State chapter. In sitting in the convocation ceremony and being 
 a little bit ADD, I was getting restless and I pulled out my Blackberry and 
 saw some emails about a new swine flu strain that had been isolated in 
 children in Texas and California. And remember thinking at the time, this 
 does not sound good and particularly with two separate geographic 
 locations. It raised some concerns. And as I was leaving the convocation 
 call, I ran into Greg Poland who is well known as a – someone who’s done 
 quite a bit of research and promotion of vaccines and we were talking 
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 about it and both had the same impression that this did not sound – sound 
 good at all. (Dr. Jay Butler, Director, H1N1 Vaccine Task Force, 
 Interview # 4, lines 26-37, Appendix C). 
Dr. Stephanie ZaZa also recalled her initial notification of the developing H1N1 threat with 
specific location and situation details.  
 I do. I was actually in Washington, DC on a three month assignment. And 
 I was at a meeting of the Institute of Medicine in their building and I 
 received an email from Phil Navin who is the director of our emergency 
 operations center asking me to participate in a call of the Department and 
 CDC regarding some cases of an unusual flu in California. And because 
 the Institute of Medicine building is – I don’t know what it’s made of, it’s 
 Kryptonite or something, and I had to go stand out on the sidewalk to take 
 the phone call because I couldn’t get a signal otherwise (Dr. Stephanie 
 ZaZa, Deputy Director for Strategy in the Office of Public Health 
 Preparedness and Response (OPHPR), Interview #16, lines 24-31, 
 Appendix C). 
 In Karl Weick’s seven properties of sensemaking (Weick, 2001) he identifies one as 
‘Plausibility’ – or ‘Plausible Sense’-  a process of developing coherence, something constrained 
by agreements with others and consistency with the recent past, visible cues, and familiar 
scenarios. When asked if she could remember her initial notification concerning the developing 
cases of an unknown flu (identified later as H1N1), Dr. Anne Schuchat, (then) Acting Deputy 
Director of the CDC, responded; 
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 Sure. Friday, April 17th, I opened my door at home and my cell phone 
 went off and my colleague Beth Bell was on the phone. Beth was serving 
 as the Acting Director of the Center while I was on this detail to the Office 
 of the (CDC) Director. She was calling to let me know that our lab had 
 found two different children with a new influenza virus that had swine 
 origin. We had been following unusual influenza cases that had swine 
 origin; we’d had one here and one there- over the past two years or so.  
 But these were two children with no contact with each other, or with pigs 
 or any animals apparently, who had a new [flu] strain that wasn’t one we’d 
 already seen. So that was when I first knew about it and I, in turn, called 
 [Dr.] Rich Besser who was the Acting [CDC] Director to let him know as 
 well (Dr. Anne Schuchat, Director, National Center for Immunization and 
 Respiratory Diseases, Interview # 13, lines 20-32, Appendix C). 
These detailed recollections clearly show that the initial notifications and the initial cues 
were recognized immediately by each of these individuals as important and significant. 
Additionally, in reviewing the interview transcripts I realized that six of these sixteen key 
personnel were not physically located at the CDC, or in Atlanta, when they were first notified of 
a potential problem or at least a concern about the developing H1N1 threat. Several of them were 
traveling, including being out of the country, on vacation, or on temporary assignments in other 
locations. Yet each of them was notified almost immediately and directly- either by a phone call 
or an email- from a colleague or a supervisor and were made aware that something important 
was developing. This indicates the senior leaders in the CDC organization have established a 
strong informal communication network to keep themselves aware of and informed on unusual 
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or developing situations and significant events- and that it works. For those senior staff members 
who were at the CDC headquarters when these reports surfaced many reported that they quickly 
initiated face-to-face meetings to discuss what they knew and to try to determine what was 
actually happening, or thought likely to happen, based on the information that had been received 
so far. An example of this kind of response came from Dr. Lyn Finelli. She recalled, 
It was April 15th, I was in my office, and one of my colleagues came into the 
room and said she had just gotten a call from the laboratory saying  they had a 
novel Influenza A isolate and that it was an H1. But we didn’t know the type. She 
thought we should do an investigation. So I gathered my team and we decided to 
call California to find out about the case. … 
 Yeah, in the next few hours, I – I called my Branch Chief,  [Dr.] Joe Bresee, and 
he came down. I called my husband, [Dr.] David Swerdlow, he was then the 
Associate Director of Science in our Center, and asked them all to join the 
conference call with California. I thought that as many good heads as we could 
get in the room was important because this seemed to be a pretty unusual event 
(Dr. Lyn Finelli, Lead for Surveillance and Outbreak Response Team, CDC 
Influenza Division, Interview # 7, lines 14-18, 52-56, Appendix C). 
 An important influencing factor that might determine what individuals notice about a new 
situation, or how quickly they are able to make sense of what appear to be random and unrelated 
facts or events has to do with their experience with other (perhaps similar) situations in the past. 
In the case of disease outbreaks or other serious public health crises this would relate directly to 
the type and extent of response planning that had been done, the kinds of training exercises that 
individuals had participated in, or just their general level of awareness concerning warning signs 
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of potential threats. All of these factors would affect not only the specific details that an 
individual would notice but will also affect the degree of significance that they would attach to 
them and therefore not dismiss them as random or unrelated events.  
 Prior to 9/11, very few U.S. Government or CDC staff members had participated in 
disaster/crisis planning and response scenarios that involved a domestic bioterrorist threat 
centered on the intentional (yet random) infection of U.S. citizens. The idea of an anthrax attack, 
although acknowledged by the U.S. military as a possibility, was considered unlikely and far 
more likely to occur as an attack on U.S. military forces in a foreign country. The disaster/crisis 
scenario planning and exercises that were conducted tended to practice responding to what were 
considered more traditional bioterrorist threats, such as nerve gas exposure or nuclear radiation 
contamination.  
 One large-scale tabletop disaster planning exercise involving a critical infectious disease 
threat did precede 9/11 and took place in June 2001. This exercise, known as “Dark Winter”, 
presented a hypothetical situation of the intentional release of the smallpox virus in three major 
cities in the United States. The exercise primarily involved senior government policymakers and 
members of the media as the response participants. Notably, it did not involve operational level 
first responders or medical/public health specialists and the response centered on the actions 
required of senior policymakers and government leaders. Eerily foreshadowing the assessment of 
the Federal Government’s role in the 9/11 response the exercise was criticized as a complete 
failure of coordination and collaboration among government agencies and the response was 
evaluated as ineffective (Kahn, pp 4-5, 179, 2009).  
 Conversely, the CDC had been engaged in influenza pandemic planning and exercises for 
many years and regularly practiced responding to pandemic flu threats. Many of the interview 
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participants commented on how valuable the planning and practice exercises had been as 
preparation for responding to H1N1. The following two quotes, from Dr. Jay Butler and Dr. 
Marty Cetron, provide examples of how the participants found their prior planning and exercise 
experience important and how it helped them as they developed the H1N1 response.  
The planning was very beneficial. But the plan is not a protocol. It helped to think 
through the issues that we needed to deal with but the pandemic that was arriving 
was little different than the pandemic we had planned for in that a lot of plans 
were built around a worst case scenario of either of either a 1918 type pandemic 
or an H5N1 type pandemic with a very high mortality rate. As it turned out, of 
course, this was a different kind of epidemiology (Dr. Jay Butler, Director, H1N1 
Vaccine Task Force, Interview # 4, lines 94-100, Appendix C). 
I think the fact that we had been planning for a pandemic for three  years or more 
and had been exercising intensively, sometimes there or four times a year with 
live fire- real life simulations- really helped us all get comfortable in that 
environment. In fact, the level of comfort of the interactions, understanding lanes, 
roles and responsibilities, ways of evaluating and patterns of responding were 
made much, much better because of all our preparedness, probably in ways that 
we will never fully appreciate, but to fully emphasize how important it is to go 
through that preparedness, the planning the development, even if you modify your 
plans extensively, being familiar with the key decision points, the places where 
you want more information, the structures in which you’re going to share 
information along the cascade of partners, the systems, was – was really very, 
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very valuable (Dr. Marty Cetron, Director of Global Migration and Quarantine 
Division, Interview # 5, lines 203-217, Appendix C).  
In both of these quotations it is easy to see that the concept of familiarity, of ‘comfort’ with a/the 
crisis environment is one that the participants recognize as key to successfully managing and 
responding in a crisis. This idea reinforces Weick’s idea of Plausible Sense – an outcome of 
sensemaking based in part on recognizing visible cues, and familiar scenarios. This would also 
influence their ability to more quickly determine what was happening because their frames (and 
therefore signals/cues) would be set or at least influenced by the practice exercises they had 
experienced. They would already be primed to look for specific ‘salient cues’ in the situation. In 
real life situations this would likely prevent them from missing or dismissing critical indicators 
due to ‘perceptual blinders’ that would assess certain important cues as too improbable (i.e. 9/11, 
anthrax) and thereby cause them to misinterpret the situation early on in the crisis.  
Interacting 
 Interaction is key to staying informed in a rapidly changing and evolving situation such 
as a crisis. Muhren and Van de Walle (2010) position this capability for interaction as a “means 
to reduce ambiguity and equivocality” as well as a point of verification for information sources 
and information accuracy. They contend that this process includes such activities as “information 
exchanges with colleagues, partner organizations and friends, formal exchanges through 
meetings and informal exchanges through chats over coffee” (p. 31). Having an established 
network of contacts and resources within the organization is critical to being able to effectively 
engage in this practice when a crisis occurs. As Dr. Jay Butler (Director of the H1N1 Vaccine 
Task Force) stated, “An emergency is a terrible time to be exchanging business cards” (Interview 
#4, lines 111-112, Appendix C). 
98 
 
 Several of the interview questions prompted answers that reflected this process of 
interaction among the response participants. These questions included:  
1. Can you describe the first few days of the response period?  
2. When you first heard about H1N1 what did you do?  
3. Did you engage in active collaboration with other parts/divisions of CDC?   
Examples of the kinds of responses that addressed how this process of interaction actually 
worked during the H1N1 crisis include the following: 
 And so I would be phoning back and forth and saying, when do I come back and 
what can I do? I got off the plane and walked the halls – and asked how can I be 
of use? What do you need to know? And this was like the very early days just 
when they’re trying to figure out what does the virus do, who gets it, how many 
get it and what happens to them when they get it? (Dr. Martin Meltzer, Sr. Health 
Economist, Division of Emerging Infections and Surveillance, Interview # 10, 
lines 46-50, Appendix C).  
Participants also reported that they made conscious efforts to get information from contacts and 
colleagues located outside of the CDC headquarters- in an effort to be as comprehensive as 
possible, to get as much information as possible, to add to the discussion of what was/was not 
known at the time. An example of this kind of outreach came from Steven Boedigheimer, 
Deputy Director, Division of State and Local Readiness,  
 I think another useful tool that a few of us utilized which may not be captured in 
an after action report was simply pick up the phone and contact somebody, in a 
State health department, or a local health department, that we knew or had worked 
with in the past that was in the epicenter of the response, and validate the 
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information, maybe gain some insight that we hadn’t had. For example, I would 
pick up the phone and call the Deputy Director in Delaware, Dr. Paul Silverman, 
and ask him his perspective. Or pick up the phone and call the health officer or 
the chief operating officer in the Arkansas Department of Health and say, “What 
are you hearing? How’s it working? What do we need to know that maybe we’re 
not getting at?” (Steven Boedigheimer, Deputy Director, Division of State and 
Local Readiness, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Interview 
#3, lines 161-171, Appendix C).   
In Karl Weick’s concept of sensemaking, this process of interaction among the response 
participants would also support the idea that ‘the process of group communication is where 
participants achieve a consensus view of the event or the environment’ (Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005).  The following three examples given by interview participants reflect an effort 
to establish a sense of common understanding – through this process of group communication 
and interaction.  
I think we did continue to rely on, you know, our science to figure out what 
indeed was going on and I- as you probably heard, or have seen, we are all a 
bunch of people who, you know, believe in trying to actually figure out what is 
going on to the best of our abilities and use that to guide our policies, our 
recommendations, and our actions (Dr. Beth Bell, Acting Director, National 
Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Interview # 2, lines 231-236, 
Appendix C). 
I did participate in the meetings with Dr. Frieden [CDC Director] and there were, 
you know, daily or twice daily briefings with him –every morning and every 
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afternoon at the beginning. First looking at the surveillance data, you know, 
where is the outbreak was found. We already, at that point, were beginning to 
identify what it was and isolate what it was- then determining from all the 
locations and all the reporting was this the same- the same virus. (Dr. Lynn 
Austin, Deputy Director for Operations, OPHPR, Interview #1, 164-170, 
Appendix C).  
With the State health departments, I think we worked with some partner 
organizations like ASTO and NACHO and they were absolutely key to our being 
able to facilitate those conversations and communication with the State and local 
health departments. They really came through. We had meetings with them. We 
even detailed a representative from their organization to be part of our team and to 
be in on the briefings so that they could turn and relay the information to their 
organizations- the State and local governments (Dr. Lynn Austin, Deputy Director 
for Operations, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Interview # 
1, lines 99-105, Appendix C). 
Enacting 
 Muhren and Van de Walle (2010) define ‘Enacting’ primarily as a communication 
activity- ‘when people communicate to enable action’. Weick would characterize this as part of 
the sensemaking process where “Action is a means to gains some sense of what one is up 
against”. Muhren and Van de Walle argue that this practice is extremely important in crisis 
response as a lack of action at a critical time, or a delay in action (responding) may result in a 
complete response failure, even if it is only perceived as such and not a failure, in fact. Examples 
of these kinds of tragic events regularly make news headlines and often cause permanent damage 
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to the public reputation of the responsible agency or organization that is blamed for the inaction. 
For example, the (local) city and State government response organizations and the Federal 
government response agencies were all severely criticized for the perceived lack of effective 
action during the 2005 Hurricane Katrina response.  
According to Muhren & Van de Walle (2010), communication is the foundation for 
enacting- they contend that communication is what will ‘enable action’. In the interview 
questions, none of the pre-planned questions were specifically designed to elicit responses to 
describe how this process of enactment actually worked during the H1N1 response.  However, 
spontaneous responses and responses to other questions did provide interesting insight into how 
the participants engaged in this process of ‘enacting’. Examples of these responses include the 
following; 
… I didn’t spend more than about 30 minutes in the meeting because the news 
about Mexico had just come out that morning. That was a Friday morning. And I 
was pretty much in and out of conference calls the rest of the day…. 
 I remember we were saying, ‘well, what’s next’? And finally I said, I’ve got to 
go home. I’ve got a State that I need to be in during what sure sounds like is going 
to be an influenza pandemic (Dr. Jay Butler,7 Director, H1N1 Vaccine Task 
Force, Interview # 4, lines 39-42, 44-45, Appendix C).  
In another example that shows clearly how communication can ‘enable action,’ Dr. Lyn Finelli 
recalled how her Outbreak and Response Team quickly moved to position reporting assets close 
to the first confirmed H1N1 infection locations, 
7 Jay Butler was the State Medical Officer in Alaska during the initial phase of the H1N1 outbreak. However, he 
moved to CDC to become the Director of the H1N1 Vaccine Task Force, which was his position when interviewed. 
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Well, during the week, that week of the 20th [April 2009], we decided to send a 
couple of teams out to the field. So we sent a team to San Diego and a team to 
Imperial County- a team of EIS Officers and some supervisors to oversee the 
investigations. When we sent those teams, we were still looking for a swine 
connection. Then when we heard about the Texas cases, we decided to dispatch a 
team to Texas, which we did (Dr. Lyn Finelli, Lead for Surveillance and Outbreak 
Response Team, Influenza Division, Interview # 7, lines 162-167, Appendix C). 
Framing 
An important component of the sensemaking process is determining and understanding 
the frames used by decision-makers in responding to an ambiguous threat scenario with very 
high levels of uncertainty in critical areas, a rapidly changing understanding of the disease, and a 
continuously evolving definition of risk. This aspect of sensemaking is more difficult to 
specifically identify as it tends to be a more subconscious activity- often not recognized by the 
individual attempting to make sense of a complicated situation. Framing in this sense contributes 
to a mindset that influences the selection and processing of information (cues and signals).  
Goffman (1974) argued that people infer significance in a situation based on the primary 
frameworks developed from past experiences. Key to influencing an individual’s perception is in 
understanding what these past experience frames are- and being able to address them effectively- 
by either confirming or disconfirming the perceptions. These kinds of frames are (can be) 
developed from a variety of experiences, such as direct personal involvement in a similar 
situation or knowledge of another individual’s personal experience that is deemed credible. Also 
having participated in training exercises for similar situations or having engaged in developing 
plans for possible emergency or crisis scenarios- especially similar situations- will affect how the 
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(crisis) information presented to the individual is received and perceived. These experiences will 
construct frames – preconceived ideas and expectations- that may affect the perception of the 
information being presented or may influence the degree of significance attached to specific 
events.   
 Throughout the interviews I found many instances of the participants’ reporting there 
were general expectations or presumptions about what the “next” flu pandemic would be. These 
would certainly be considered framing influences. Many participants discussed the extensive 
planning sessions and practice training exercises that the CDC holds in hopes of preparing for 
the next influenza pandemic. Their responses indicate that there was indeed a pre-conceived idea 
(frame) for what the next influenza pandemic would be like and where and how it would 
manifest. I think it is important to recognize that these expectations had become part of what 
might be termed ‘conventional wisdom’ within the CDC community- and were not being 
challenged as false assumptions. The following four examples from the interviews provide 
insight into what they thought most likely (next) flu scenario would be and exactly what the 
CDC response team was expecting, 
We had been preparing for years for pandemic influenza and I think our – our 
assumptions were that it would be very likely be Avian Influenza (Dr. Marsha 
Vanderford, Director, Emergency Risk Communication System, Emergency 
Operations Center, Interview #14, lines 19-21, Appendix C). 
I would say most people were thinking about a pandemic that would emerge in 
South East Asia that may emerge as a combination of the H5N1 virus and not 
necessarily a pandemic that would emerge directly in North America or would be 
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from this specific type of swine-derived virus (Dr. Marty Cetron, Director, Global 
Migration and Quarantine Division, Interview #5, lines 80-83, Appendix C). 
There was a lot of pandemic planning that had gone on, most of which I wasn’t 
very involved in. But there was a whole, you know, infrastructure, and a whole 
mindset- a whole paradigm in a way- about influenza pandemics and about how 
to prepare for pandemics that was actually very well developed (Dr. Beth Bell, 
Acting Director, NCIRD, Interview #2, lines 96-100, Appendix C). 
It was more than ironic. I was on- getting on a plane to go to Europe for a 
conference on influenza and influenza pandemic planning and preparedness- 
except the pandemic they were talking about was all H5, Avian influenza (Dr. 
Martin Meltzer, Sr. Health Economist, Division of Emerging Infections and 
Surveillance, Interview # 10, lines 35-38, Appendix C).  
Within the concept of framing is the idea that naming or labeling something (event, situation, 
person, group) in a particular way is a powerful and significant act- and one that will influence 
how the event or situation is perceived and/or what an appropriate response would be. 
Naming/characterizing a situation as a crisis, or even a potential crisis, brings forward differing 
views and understandings of that term- and may lead to unintended consequences if the 
perception becomes that the situation is unmanageable or the authorities lack full control of the 
situation. The determination of a ‘crisis’ event, at least in the public health community, is a 
serious decision and is left to the most senior organizational leaders in the highest levels of the 
Government’s public health structure, i.e., Department of Health and Human Services, the CDC, 
or the World Health Organization.  
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 One of the interview participants, Dr. Beth Bell,  provided an interesting and somewhat 
different perspective on how framing (labeling) the emerging 2009 H1N1 situation as a crisis 
was perhaps not the best approach. In her view, not calling it a crisis was a better strategy and 
one that would allow for a more thoughtful consideration of alternatives and how to define the 
way forward.  When asked if/when she recognized the emerging situation as a crisis, she replied; 
The whole question of was it going to be a crisis and how was this all going to be 
played out, I think is a – another question altogether. I have found in general in 
dealing with these kinds of responses that it’s better not to think of it that way. 
And it’s better to just think of what needs to be done, you know, try to think about 
thinking the most rational science based comprehensive way about what the way 
forward is, try not to forget things, try to, you know, consider all the 
considerations and not think about it as a crisis (Dr. Beth Bell, Acting Director, 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Interview # 2, lines 
60-66, Appendix C). 
Another interview participant commented on this same issue, noting that he perceived there was 
an effort to not label the emerging situation as one thing or another in the earliest days of the 
investigation, particularly in official (public) communication.   
Well, it was very matter of fact- and of course, I was at that time getting it from 
outside of the Agency [CDC]. I wasn’t getting a lot of inside information and it 
did strike me – there was- there seemed to be an avoidance of the using the word 
pandemic – at least in the official communication. Yet, everything that was 
developing over the next several days certainly gave every indication that this 
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very well could be the beginning of the next flu pandemic (Dr. Jay Butler, 
Director, H1N1 Vaccine Task Force, Interview # 4, lines 55-60, Appendix C). 
Both of these examples could be evidence of a deliberate attempt to engage in what has been 
called “strategic ambiguity” (Eisenberg, 1984, 2007) specifically in order to allow for a certain 
degree of “plausible deniability” should this situation not develop into a full-scale pandemic, as 
feared.  Bearing in mind and anxious not to repeat the mistakes made in public communication 
during the 1976 Swine Flu pandemic (Kahn, 2009, pp 82-85) one could speculate that the 
leadership in the Government’s public health organizations were employing a strategy of 
ambiguity by not identifying the developing situation as a pandemic threat. 
Sensemaking Components 
 These primary sensemaking components; noticing, interacting, enacting and framing 
comprised the initial period when the response participants struggled to understand what the 
information they had at the time actually meant and what they needed to do in response. These 
fundamental sensemaking elements were the basis of their individual and group sensemaking 
processes– how they comprehended what they were learning and how this information ‘fit’ with 
expectations and preconceived likely scenarios- their ‘frames’.  Despite what they may have 
been expecting from their experiences and from the past training exercises, the recollections of 
the participants show that their process of sensemaking was not one of reaching a quick 
conclusion – even when the data initially appeared to confirm a recognizable or familiar pattern. 
Instead, it appears that they noticed disparities and anomalies in the data- a testament to their 
ability to recognize important ‘cues’ and to be open to indications that traditional or conventional 
(expected) signs or signals were not necessarily going to be found.  The participants’ comments 
show they gradually arrived at their conclusions- in more of a ‘dawning realization’ than a swift 
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judgment – arrived at by engaging in a deliberate process of thorough data gathering and review, 
analysis, and extensive group/team communication to consider various possible explanations.   
 Examples from the participants’ interviews that reflect how they engaged in this 
sensemaking process include the following comments; 
Yeah, I think it was a bit of a – a surreal feeling if you will. We had done so many 
exercises in preparation for pandemic influenza. And everyone, I think had such a 
heightened sense that this would be such a severe event it- that the repercussions 
of it would be so dramatic that in the first several days as we were watching this 
event and trying to gather information, that sense that “oh my gosh”, this is 
it…this is what we’ve been preparing for. I think all of those moments of thinking 
– sometimes it felt like we were still exercising then you realize- no this is real. 
People are sick, people are- this is spreading. So I think there was a sense- and I 
can remember several of us that afternoon that we first became aware of it – later 
it was maybe seven or eight o’clock at night, and there were several of us still in 
the Joint Information Center, kind of saying to one another…oh my gosh. This is 
what we’ve been planning for and preparing for” (Dr. Marsha Vanderford, 
Director, CDC Emergency Risk Communication System, Emergency Operations 
Center, Interview #15, lines 34-41, Appendix C).  
Reflecting on his sensemaking process during the actual H1N1 crisis, Dr. Marty Cetron 
made the following observations, 
I think one of the challenges- and exciting parts of- of this job is to  try to filter, 
sift through, make sense, validate, and evaluate the quality of the information 
from different sources- you know- what’s more credible, what’s less credible.  
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But when you’re hungry for data and you want it faster than it’s available- you- 
you try to take as many inputs as you can while prioritizing getting first hand 
information- by having boots on the ground where the action’s going on (Dr. 
Marty Cetron, Director, Global Migration and Quarantine Division, Interview # 5, 
lines 177-183, Appendix C).  
In addressing the issue of feeling pressure to make a determination of the disease cause and 
assess or predict the likely severity of the threat, Dr. Toby Merlin stated,  
You know,  what I remember as the key focus early on was really trying to get a 
good handle on what was going on in Mexico City because there was a lot of non-
scientific information, a lot of non-verifiable information and trying to get as 
good a grip as we could on what the actual underlying facts were as well as trying 
to rapidly determine the extent of disease in the U.S. and turning up surveillance 
systems particularly in the cross-border states where it appeared most of the 
disease was occurring. … Then on the laboratory side, there was this enormous 
push to characterize the agent and develop diagnostics for the agent to genetically 
characterize the agent and develop PCR tests that could be used to detect the 
agent- that was an enormous full court press that was – that turned out to be quite 
successful (Dr. Toby Merlin, Deputy Director, Influenza Coordination Division, 
Interview # 11, lines 56-62, 63-67, Appendix C).  
Decision-Making 
 Examples of how decision-making was approached and conducted during the H1N1 
crisis show that there were several distinct phases of the decision-making process development. 
In the earliest days of H1N1, decisions tended to be made quickly and with incomplete or 
109 
 
imperfect information. Later, as the H1N1 threat was more clearly identified and better 
understood, the CDC’s decision-making process evolved into a more formalized structure within 
the organization and the decision-makers developed definite steps and organizational procedures. 
The evolution of this decision-making process and the procedures that the CDC developed to 
structure decision-making will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five as the approach the CDC 
took has significant implications for meeting similar challenges in future organizational 
responses. 
Data Analysis for Research Question #2 
When confronted with an uncertain and ambiguous threat, how does a 
Government agency effectively communicate this response strategy? 
To respond to my second primary research question, which focuses on the role of 
communication in the development of the response, I developed two analytic sub-categories for 
Communication- internal and external.  Surrounding the communication process and related to 
my major category of decision-making are the influences of  uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Interwoven throughout the participants’ responses to questions directed specifically at these 
central ideas are many obvious references to perceptions of uncertainty and ambiguity, although 
these terms are not always used by the participant in describing the situation.  I have included 
examples of how these factors were recognized and addressed specifically or how the 
participants perceived the organization to be responding to them more generally.  I found it 
interesting that some of the interview participants provided clear examples of experiencing a 
high degree of uncertainty, especially during the early days of the H1N1 crisis, but never actually 
used the word uncertainty to describe what they were feeling or experiencing. Others, however, 
were very specific in their use of the term and emphatically stated there was a lot of uncertainty 
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and ambiguity both in what they were observing and in the decision-making process as they 
gathered new information, analyzed the data they had and continued to refine their understanding 
of what was developing. Several participants specifically noted the role of communication (both 
public and internal to CDC) as critical to diminishing this sense of uncertainty and reducing the 
ambiguity surrounding the situation.   
Uncertainty and Ambiguity 
In her analysis of leadership and decision-making during epidemics or other public health 
crises, Laura Kahn (2009) points out that all such threats and crises are surrounded by 
uncertainty and ambiguity, particularly during the earliest days of the outbreak or crisis event. 
She argues that leaders confronting public health threats and disease outbreaks are particularly 
challenged by these conditions as they also face an immediate demand from the public for 
action/response and detailed information about the situation from the news media which is 
operating on a 24/7 schedule. The nature of these kinds of threats- health, bioterrorism, disease 
outbreak- are uniquely unsuited to the demands of immediate response. They often require 
extensive scientific research and periods of testing to determine their exact cause and true 
potential for harm. The experts who will likely investigate these threats or crisis events are also 
by nature and training not prone to making immediate determinations or coming to conclusions 
precipitously. They are primarily scientists and accustomed to conducting careful research and 
testing before coming to conclusions. All of these factors are in tension with each other and yet 
the pressure (and necessity) to provide a credible and immediate response is real.  
Further, public health threats and public awareness of them are communicated in near 
real time with the open availability of the Internet, email, text messaging, and social media 
conversation forums such as blogs and chat sites. These horizontal and global communication 
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channels plus the predominance of the television new media as an information source seriously 
complicate crisis communication and “official” response. The following examples from the 
interviews provide interesting insight into how these factors of uncertainty and ambiguity were 
recognized by the CDC H1N1 response team. Addressing the issue of uncertainty specifically 
Dr. Steve Redd, Dr. Stephanie ZaZa, and Dr. Beth Bell made the following comments, 
I think what actually happened is that we learned that we knew less and less about 
what the situation was- than we thought- and that was a bit unnerving- but 
keeping a grip on the uncertainty became an important way of navigating; and 
also, identifying some practical actions to take to find out more (Dr. Steve Redd, 
H1N1 Incident Commander, Interview #12, lines 84-88, Appendix C). 
And so the first I heard about it was on that call and really wasn’t quite sure at 
that point what, if any, role I would have or if this would even really materialize 
into anything important or major. And at that point, there were I think only a 
couple of cases and it was an usual virus but nobody really had a very good sense, 
at least I certainly didn’t have a good sense, of what this would turn into. (Dr. 
Stephanie ZaZa, Deputy Director for Strategy, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response, Interview # 16, lines 32-36, Appendix C). 
Early on we really were trying to figure out how – what was this, what was the, 
you know, how severe was this, what was the clinical spectrum of illness, how 
much had it spread, what was this virus, a lot of those very fundamental 
questions.… 
 And so a lot of the first questions had to do with, you know, why was that; were 
we missing things; was there something different in Mexico; was it the same 
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virus, even, and what could, you know, sort of like especially was what our 
surveillance was telling us about this country accurate, or was there something 
else that, you know, was missing or that we hadn’t really understood or detected 
(Dr. Beth Bell, Acting Director, National Center for Immunization and 
Respiratory Diseases, Interview # 2, lines , 70-73, 79-84, Appendix C)? 
Speaking of how ambiguity affected decision-making in the early days of the H1N1 response Dr. 
Beth Bell- part of the senior leadership team and one of the decision-makers- made the following 
observation; 
So I think the way we managed the ambiguity in the response was hopefully to 
recognize it and then usually somebody made a decision. And usually, it meant 
that, you know, somebody was pushed out of their comfort level one way or the 
other (Dr. Beth Bell, Acting Director, National Center for Immunization and  
Respiratory Diseases, Interview #2, lines 258-261, Appendix C). 
It is apparent from these comments that ambiguity and uncertainty were not conditions 
that inhibited action by the response participants. In fact, it could be said that these were 
not entirely unexpected conditions- and that the CDC responders just accepted them as 
part of the problem set. The ability of an organization to function under these conditions 
indicates that there was a high degree of trust- a culture of trust- among the response 
participants. This is a characteristic of a cohesive organization- one where the members 
feel confident enough to make changes, or make decisions, that challenge the existing 
structures or processes but will not fundamentally challenge the unity of the organization. 
This kind of organizational culture will thrive in crisis environments because it is likely 
to lead the participants to new ways of thinking or doing.  
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Communication 
 Communication plays a critical role in crisis situations as a mitigating influence on the 
inherent uncertainty and ambiguity that surrounds crises- especially in the very early stages when 
information is scarce and sometimes conflicting and the known ‘facts’ are often contradictory.  
In addressing how the CDC response team recognized the specific role communication played in 
helping to diminish or alleviate uncertainty and ambiguity in the H1N1 situation, these next two 
quotes provide excellent examples; 
I think the appreciation of communicating what we know, what we don’t know, 
what we’re doing to learn more and committing in our communications to telling 
people on a regular basis – updating the information in the news- is probably an 
important component of helping to ease the uncertainty (Dr. Marty Cetron, 
Director, Global Migration and Quarantine Division, lines 100-103, Appendix C). 
Risk communication deals with what is known about a situation and is described as “the 
intentional effort to inform the public about risks and persuade individuals to modify their 
behavior to reduce risk” (Seeger et al., 2008, p. 9).  Crisis communication, on the other hand, 
deals with what is known and what is not known about a given situation. In the following 
example, Risk Communication is cited as being the basis for the CDC communications about 
H1N1- however, it is important to note that with the emphasis placed on sharing the uncertainties 
of the situation and the likelihood that the situation (and guidance) would change there was a 
distinct commitment to the principles and tenets of Crisis Communication. This is important to 
note as the CDC has pioneered a new approach that combines both Risk and Crisis 
Communication practices - the CERC model- and this example provides an excellent rationale 
for why this was done.  
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 In his interview Dr. Glen Nowak, Director for CDC’s Media Relations, commented on how they 
had consciously incorporated the fundamental principles of Risk Communication and also how 
uncertainty was addressed; 
I think- I hope- that when people look at this they realize that one of the reasons it 
went so well was because the communications were very good. I think they will 
see that we followed the tenets of Risk Communication early and often. We 
shared- and we were comfortable sharing dilemmas with people, acknowledging 
the uncertainty, telling people what the uncertainty would mean. We were 
comfortable in telling people that the course would change and when the course 
changed. You know, we acknowledged that it was going to be disruptive for 
some” (Dr. Glen Nowak, Director of Media Relations for CDC, Interview # 11, 
lines 564-570, Appendix C).  
The key role of communication in the response development was recognized and 
acknowledged by almost every one of the interview participants. Overall, the participants were 
highly complimentary to the CDC’s communication staff and of the official communication 
about H1N1, particularly noting the designated Agency spokespersons, the primary media 
spokesperson, Dr. Anne Schuchat, and the personal involvement of the CDC Director in the 
public communication process.  One example from the interview transcripts that highlights these 
sentiments comes from Dr. Lynn Austin who stated, 
We also found that communications are absolutely critical. Most of us who are 
not directly involved in the communications ourselves were glued to the TV sets, 
you know, waiting, watching the media trucks outside; but we were glued to see 
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Dr. Besser [Acting CDC Director] , and Dr. Schuchat and then later Dr. Frieden 
[CDC Director] on television and what they were saying. And coming out of 
some of the daily briefings, knowing about what, you know, planning on what 
was going to be said, what – what the status was for the day, and then seeing it on 
the nightly news was pretty amazing in some ways. But it also showed me that 
CDC – this is one area I think CDC really excels is trying to share that 
information with the public (Dr. Lynn Austin, Deputy Director for Operations, 
Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Interview # 1, lines 62-70, 
Appendix C). 
And in that afternoon of discussion about the next steps, one of the things that was 
abundantly clear was that this was going to probably be of media and public 
interest for awhile and that we, CDC, had to be prepared to be in front of cameras 
answering media and policy-maker questions quite frequently and be ready to go 
and assume that for the next few days, next few weeks, we were going to be 
having to update people on a regular basis ...  
And so one of the systems we did was we instituted daily press briefings. 
And if we needed, we – we did a couple of additional smaller press 
briefings each day. So for the first five, four or five weeks of this, we did a 
press briefing every single day, including weekends, including holidays, to 
bring people up to speed. Every day, we got together with the people who 
were going to be serving as the spokespeople for those press conferences, 
whether it was Dr. Besser and most of them were -Dr. Besser, sometimes 
he was joined by Dr. Schuchat, sometimes he was joined by Dr. Cox, [Dr. 
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Nancy Cox, Director of the Influenza Division]  depending on, you know, 
what the specific issues were, and we looked at what had been reported as 
of that morning. We looked at what we knew as an agency that was 
different from the previous day. We looked at how things were playing out 
and we – we tried to anticipate where the stories might be going, where the 
media and reporter interest might be going. And we factored all that into 
trying to figure out what our key messages were going to be that day.  
 (Dr. Glen Nowak, Director, CDC Media Relations, Interview # 11, lines 170-175, 
256-269, Appendix C). 
 In Chapter Five I provide a summary of my findings based on my data analysis and 
provide additional detail as to how these key factors I have identified were influential in the 
development of the CDC’s response to H1N1. I also provide my analysis of the likely 
implications of these findings in terms of addressing threats and crisis situations, discuss the 
limitations that I have recognized in my study and findings, and offer recommendations for 
conducting additional research in this area and for organizations or leaders faced with responding 
to future emergent threats or crises. 
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Chapter Five:  Findings, Limitations, Implications, and Recommendations 
Ultimately, disease response is about human behavior, and human behavior is 
about what people understand and how they think about something. The more- the 
better-informed people are, we feel, the better choices they can make for 
themselves to protect themselves and their communities (Dr. Thomas Frieden, 
Director, CDC, August 23, 2010).  
Summary of Findings 
 CDC’s response to the 2009/2010 H1N1 pandemic is recognized as a major success in 
numerous traditional aspects of organizational crisis response- but the CDC demonstrated 
particular skill and proficiency in two key areas- public communication during a crisis and the 
ability to adapt the response to a rapidly changing situation. This adaptive response capability is 
one of the most notable and important findings from this study of how the CDC navigated the 
H1N1 crisis and has potential implications for organizations of all kinds that are confronted with 
emerging, uncertain, and ambiguous threats or crisis events. In my analysis of the interview 
data/results I have identified numerous significant actions taken by the CDC response 
participants that directly contributed to both the overall success of the response effort but also to 
developing and implementing this important quality of organizational adaptability- or, in 
Weick’s terms, the qualities of organizational resilience and mindfulness. Words used frequently 
by the participants during the interviews to characterize the response development included; 
flexibility, adapt, revise, adjust, evolve, and navigating.  
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 I identified several major categories of action that take place in the first/early stages of 
sensemaking- noticing, framing, interacting, and enacting. These actions are clearly reflected in 
the response participants’ interviews and confirm that they are fundamental components of an 
individual’s or group’s ability to make sense of what is happening around them even as the 
‘facts’ change and the crisis situation evolves in a completely unexpected direction.   
Specific Findings 
 In reviewing how the CDC response participants engaged in the process of developing an 
effective response the following observations can be made:  
1) Noticing and Interacting occurred almost simultaneously 
 These two activities were most often joined together by the participants- noticing 
(recognition of salient cues) was almost immediately followed by some form of interaction- 
either a form of communication (phone call, meeting, email) or by initiating a specific action or 
procedure- often as had been practiced in the training exercises and response drills. The 
participants who reported these kinds of actions did not distinguish between these two activities 
and tended to view them as a seamless process of response to a known (or expected) cue or 
signal. It was very apparent that the response participants quickly noticed and understood that a 
serious threat was emerging just from the initial fragmentary (and disparate) cues they received- 
although the specific cause of the threat was not yet known. This simultaneous process also 
speaks to the culture that existed within the CDC organization- the strong relationships between 
the members- indicating a high level of trust existed between them.  A seamless process of  
noticing and interaction results from this sense of shared trust but also from a point of familiarity 
with each other’s expertise, capabilities, and experience- creating an environment where group 
members almost instinctively reach out to one another when alerted to a potential threat.   
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2) Interaction was on-going from the beginning to the end of the pandemic.  
 This was noted by almost every interview participant- the involvement of so many people 
for such a long period of time – the longest crisis response in their history. Close interaction 
among the offices, divisions, and staff members was frequently commented on and participants 
recognized that its effectiveness was enhanced by the close working relationships and strong 
sense of organizational cohesion that exists at the CDC. This pattern of interaction extended to  
inter-agency collaboration and coordination and was recognized as highly effective by senior 
government officials (Duncan, 2009, Oct 21, p. 90; Napolitano, 2009, October 21, p. 3). This 
was particularly noteworthy as the CDC had been severely criticized for not collaborating or 
coordinating with other Federal agencies during the anthrax crisis of 2001 (Chess &Clarke, 
2007; Freimuth, 2006). 
 3) Influence of Frames was evident from participants’ responses. 
 Three primary frames were evident from the participants’ responses to the interview 
questions. These were;  
a.  1976 Swine Flu Outbreak 
  b. 2001 Anthrax Experience  
   c. Prior Influenza Pandemic Exercises/Expectations  
 In the case of the Swine Flu outbreak that occurred in January 1976 and lasted for almost 
one year, it is important to note that Dr. David Sencer was the CDC Director at that time. The 
Federal government’s 1976 Swine Flu response is generally considered a failure on multiple 
levels and the CDC and the Department of Health and Human Services were strongly 
criticized over their actions during the outbreak. The entire incident generated considerable 
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negative publicity for both the CDC and the Federal government and ultimately Dr. Sencer 
was asked to resign his position as CDC Director as a result (Kahn, 2009, pp. 82-85).  
  However, in 2009 during the H1N1 crisis Dr. Sencer was again part of the CDC response 
to a potential flu pandemic, this time in a key role as a special advisor to the Director and 
senior leadership staff and Chair of the Director’s outside advisory group known as Team B. 
Dr. Sencer’s personal experience, and the history of CDC’s experience during the 1976 
Swine Flu outbreak, was undoubtedly a framing influence on the 2009 H1N1 response 
development.  
 Similarly, the generally negative perception of the CDC’s response during the anthrax 
crisis of 2001 influenced the CDC’s leadership and their approach to developing a response 
to H1N1. While neither the anthrax attacks or the 1976 Swine Flu were directly mentioned 
(other than an occasional reference to anthrax) by the interview participants, both of these 
events and their history within the organization clearly influenced the H1N1 response team. 
Most of the H1N1 response participants had lived through one of these events- anthrax- and 
in any case all were well aware of the severe criticism that the CDC had endured as a result 
of the Agency’s response to both.  It seemed to me that both of these events were a kind of 
shadow influence on the H1N1 participants, not directly acknowledged or spoken of, but 
always present in the background and indirectly- almost subconsciously- influencing actions 
and decisions. Interview participants noted how they consciously reminded themselves of 
‘how not to do it’ in considering various response actions.  
 The number, frequency, and type of planning and practice exercises for influenza 
pandemics was also mentioned by almost every interview participant.  Even though they 
acknowledged that they had practiced and prepared for a completely different disease (flu) 
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scenario than the one presented by H1N1, all agreed that extensive practice and planning had 
made a significant difference in their ability to develop an effective response to H1N1. The 
participants noted that merely having had the experience of working together as a team had 
been tremendously beneficial, and credited this experience as having made the difference in 
how quickly they were able to determine the actual threat and adjust their plans accordingly.  
4) Uncertainty was recognized and publicly acknowledged. 
 From the CDC Director to the Media Relations staff to the individual response 
participants- everyone acknowledged uncertainty as a significant component of the H1N1 
pandemic. Many interview participants stated that they felt challenged by the degree of 
uncertainty that was confronting them- and as scientists often felt the need to be exact and to find 
definite answers before stating any possible conclusions. They mentioned feeling somewhat 
pressured to draw conclusions with imperfect and/or incomplete information and noted that this 
made them uncomfortable- even though they understood the need to be transparent and to 
provide information to the public as quickly as possible.   
 Most participants specifically noted that uncertainty was publicly acknowledged by the 
leadership from the very beginning of the H1N1 crisis and the CDC spokespersons were very 
open about it in public communication. They were also careful to state that the information being 
released was always qualified as ‘subject to change’ as new information became known and that 
the CDC would revise their guidance to the public when it did. The CDC Director(s) [both Dr. 
Besser who was the Acting Director at the onset of H1N1 and Dr. Frieden who later became the 
permanent Director] were very clear in the initial public briefings on H1N1 that the CDC was 
working with a high degree of uncertainty about the disease outbreak and that the public should 
anticipate that official guidance might change as new information was discovered and the actual 
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threat from the disease was better understood. This practice of admitting uncertainty and having 
incomplete information stood in stark contrast to the public information releases from the early 
days of the 2001 anthrax incidents where misinformation and erroneous information was 
presented as fact by senior government officials.  
5) Communication was viewed as critical and a means to reduce uncertainty. 
 Communication was mentioned by every interview participant as being one of -if not the 
most- critical aspects of the response. The majority of the participants rated the CDC’s 
communication practices, both internal and external, as extremely effective and as having 
contributed significantly to the overall success of the response effort. 
 Many commented specifically on the priority placed on communication (and transparency) by 
the CDC Director.  
6) There was an organizational commitment to Transparency. 
 This commitment was stated repeatedly by numerous interview participants, including 
those not directly involved in media relations and public communication. The chief media 
spokespersons frequently mentioned this as a priority for the Agency, as did the CDC Media 
Relations staff. Other staff members also mentioned this during their interviews citing the 
importance of keeping the public informed even when the information was not certain or was 
likely to change. Several interview participants remarked that they believed this had been one of 
the Agency’s strongest points during the response. This commitment to transparency was almost 
certainly a result of the previous experience during the anthrax crisis where the Agency,  the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) , and the Federal government in general was 
accused of deliberately hiding and withholding information from the public. 
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7) The CDC response was pro-active and adaptive with numerous examples of innovative   
thinking and willingness to revise/change practices evident in key areas of the response.   
 Planning. 
Well, I think it’s sufficient to say that- that the pandemic that emerged upon us 
was not necessarily the pandemic that we had anticipated with the greatest 
probability. However, I think it’s also fair to say that all along in our exercises 
and our planning, we appreciated that any pre-event planning would need to have 
inherent flexibility to adjust the reality on the ground. And so I think there were 
many decision points along the way in which we recognized that we would choose 
options based on how things were unfolding (Dr. Marty Cetron, Director, Global  
Migration and Quarantine Division, Interview # 5, lines 66-72, Appendix C). 
 The ability to make adjustments to plans and expectations.  
The biggest issue was- ok- this is not H5N1. It doesn’t- we don’t know what the 
mortalities are- there’s just a lot of thing we don’t know and it’s also not on the other side 
of the world. It’s in our country now. What- what do we do? And so a lot of the work was 
adapting the plan to the situation that was actually evolving (Dr. Jay Butler, Director 
H1N1 Vaccine task Force, Interview # 4, lines 70-73, Appendix C). 
 Disease/outbreak modeling. 
 One of the areas where CDC was particularly innovative was in developing new models 
to predict the spread of the H1N1 outbreak. Since the H1N1 virus was not behaving like a 
‘normal’ flu virus and its transmission patterns did not match the existing models, the CDC had 
to come up with a new approach. Dr. Martin Meltzer, an economist and specialist in modeling, 
described how complicated this modeling process was and how they had to think about a 
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different way to use the data they had in order to make useful predictions about where the 
disease (likely) would go next and what part of the population was at highest risk for infection.  
So we started to produce some early models giving some estimates and the word 
guesstimate is probably more accurate because at that time, we had not ideas 
really of the true number of people that were falling ill and even the rates of 
hospitalization and death were somewhat of a guess. I was using a lot of 1968 
type data. I said if this was a 1968 type data pandemic, this is what it might look 
like -knowing full well it probably wasn’t and saying this is an initial estimate. 
And as we worked on that, we were waiting for better data to come along which it 
did fortunately and it was a very rare event that we got the better data.  
So I started using that. And then we did what’s never been done as far as I know 
in influenza, we used what we called the pyramid model in which you start off at 
the top with the known lab confirmed reported cases and hospitalizations, and 
work your way back by going out into the field and doing surveys and getting a 
sense of who gets tested if they go to the doctor. ‘Cause not everybody that goes 
to the doctor gets tested. So what percentage of people who go to the doctor get 
tested? And even the step before that-not everybody who’s ill goes to the doctor 
so we did surveys in particular in Detroit and Chicago, but there were other 
similar surveys in New York and Minneapolis asking people and doctors, if 
you’re ill, do you go to the doctor? And if you’re at the doctor, does the doctor  
test you? And if the doctor tests you, do they send the sample forward to a State 
epidemiological lab for testing? And if the lab tests, do they send us the report? 
And again the same with hospitalization. This sort of protocol has actually been 
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used for a while in food borne diseases, but it’s never been used, that I know of 
prior to this, for influenza or any respiratory disease (Dr. Martin Meltzer, Senior 
Health Economist and Distinguished Consultant, Division of Emerging Infections 
and Surveillance, Interview # 9, lines 82-89, 99-11, 112-114, Appendix C).  
Decision Making Process 
 The decision-making processes during the H1N1 response deserve special recognition for 
being unconventional and innovative and for contributing to the adaptive nature of the CDC 
response. Participants reported that decision-making could be split into two timeframes or 
phases- the very early days of the crisis – lasting approximately ten days- and then the second 
phase that began after the pandemic had been officially declared.  
• Decision-making was participatory and unconventional  
 One of the novel approaches that CDC took in structuring their decision-making process 
was in creating a staff organization known as the Plans Decision Unit (PDU).  Dr. Steve Redd, 
the H1N1 Incident Commander praised this approach and described the way it operated,  
 We actually used a method of decision-making that was called the Plans Decision Unit so 
 we’d identify a decision that needed to be made, there’d be a group that would sequester, 
 come up with a briefing in a very structured way, including options, pros and cons for 
 options, and a developing criteria for evaluating the options and then recommendations-  
 and we’d talk about that and come up with a- all the important things were actually 
 recommendations even though we called them decisions but we’d come up with a CDC 
 recommendation (Dr. Stephen Redd, H1N1 Incident Commander, Interview # 12, Lines  
 Appendix C).  
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Dr. Stephanie ZaZa, a key leader of the PDU and one of the principal decision strategists, 
described the way the group approached developing these recommendations, 
  …And so they were calling on us to try and run through these processes with the subject 
 matter experts who could provide the data, and could provide some of the reality checks 
 on what those options were. So it was a relatively small cadre of people who were 
 actually in the Plans Unit. If I was given an assignment, so for example, the assignment 
 to do the school closure recommendation, I would then pull in people from the 
 epidemiology unit, from the group of people who thought about school closures in the 
 past and who’d one some of the original planning for that, and I - you know- I can’t 
 remember, but for each one, it was generally a slightly different group of people based on 
 their expertise. We always tried to bring in an ethicist to help us think through the issues.  
 …My feeling is that it is an extremely systematic but rapid method for looking at a lot of 
 information very quickly and bringing it forward to a leader. So it’s a very effective 
 method and one that I use all the time because it suits my style, and it suits my need to 
 move very quickly. I do think it will be something that we’ll be able to very easily 
 translate to other types of responses  (Dr. Stephanie ZaZa, Deputy Director for Strategy, 
 Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Interview # 16, Lines 88-98,183-
 186, Appendix C).  
• Use of outside advisors (Team B) was a significant advantage 
 Team B was a special advisory group formed by Dr. Besser [Acting Director] and chaired 
by Dr. David Sencer. In his capacity as a special advisor to the Director, Dr. Sencer had 
considerable influence on the leadership team and facilitated a number of working groups 
and strategy sessions to assist in the H1N1 response. Team B was a small group of highly 
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qualified, often highly specialized subject matter experts from outside the CDC. Using his 
extensive personal and professional network or contacts, Dr. Sencer was able to personally 
reach out to these individuals and ask for their support and advice during the H1N1 response 
period. Dr. Stephanie ZaZa who had a key leadership role in strategy development during 
H1N1 described Team B in this way, 
 …there was a group that Dr. Besser had initiated that they called Team B, which was a 
 group of outside experts from around the country who could weigh in on certain issues 
 and help us think through them from a more practice, or academic, or policy perspective. 
 And a couple of times, in doing decision briefs, we would  bring a specific question to 
 them and ask for their input, and then we would take that input and bring it into the 
 decision briefing process itself and use that as a source of information (Dr. Stephanie 
 ZaZa, Deputy Director for Strategy, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 
 Interview # 16, Lines 119-126, Appendix C).   
• Leadership made important decisions about decision-making  
1) Identify decisions that need to be made and prioritize them 
 2) Communicate often  
 3) Change when necessary  
Examples from transcripts that demonstrate how these were enacted include the following: 
And I think in the first few days or maybe a week or so, there was so much activity that 
the decision making was not very organized and I think that’s an important thing to try to 
get a grip on- is what are the decisions that need to be made and just the process of 
identifying them is really helpful in- to provide the structure that’s needed. 
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…Overall I think we wanted to make sure that information that went out was 
grounded. And so it was grounded in evidence that if we didn’t know the 
information or, excuse me- didn’t know the certainty of the information, that we 
communicated that. So we did not wait until we had everything figured out before 
we would say it (Dr. Stephen Redd, H1N/A Incident Commander and Director, 
Director CDC Influenza Coordination Unit, Interview # 12, lines 223-227, 
Appendix C). 
Dr. Daniel Jernigan commented on his perception of the focus on being transparent and 
timely in releasing information to the public. He stated, 
And so we always wanted to make sure that what we provided was something 
they could use to prevent illness themselves, or to act on. But, in general, it was 
the transparency, getting it out very quickly, and making sure that we were 
presenting it in a way that they could understand our concern about it, but in a 
way that would induce panic unnecessarily but we want people to understand the 
potential problems (Dr. Daniel Jernigan, Deputy Director, Influenza Division, 
Interview #8, lines 113-117, 123-128, Appendix C). 
Commenting on how guidance and decisions were revised based on finding new 
information or just by gaining a better appreciation of the severity of the threat, Dr. Marty 
Cetron said,  
So these were very difficult decisions [school closings, school dismissal] and I 
think what we saw was an appreciation of how difficult the decisions were, what 
CDC’s role would be in laying out the risk analysis, laying out some of the 
options, communicating those challenges directly to senior  decision makers both 
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inside the Agency [CDC] and above – above us in the – in the thinking. And you 
saw an evolution of CDC’s recommendations around school dismissals based on 
learning more information about the virus  (Dr. Marty Cetron, Director, Global 
Migration and Quarantine Division, Interview # 5, lines 126-132, Appendix C). 
Additional Observations and Areas for Further Research 
 An interesting factor that affected some aspects of the early phase of the H1N1 response 
development was the absence of permanent leadership at both the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the CDC.  The appointment of Kathleen Sebelius as Secretary of Health and 
Human Services had been delayed repeatedly in Congress and she was not finally confirmed 
until April 28, 2009.  The CDC had announced the H1N1 outbreak publicly 10 days earlier and 
there had been considerable media attention since the initial announcement. All official 
communication regarding H1N1 was coming directly from the CDC, primarily in the form of 
daily press briefings with the Acting Director and Dr. Anne Schuchat, who assumed the role of 
primary media spokesperson for the Agency.  
 Response participants, particularly members of the media relations staff mentioned that 
obtaining Departmental (HHS) clearance for public statements was a difficult and complicated 
process- and was exacerbated by the lack of a permanent Secretary and a resulting reluctance on 
the part of the staff to make decisions.  On 26 April 2009 the Acting Secretary made a statement 
declaring H1N1 a national health emergency. This had the effect of making the CDC the single 
point and authority for information on H1N1 and this shift away from the HHS as the focal point 
persisted throughout the H1N1 period.  CDC participants noted that there was a perception of 
greater autonomy as a result. However, the CDC was also without permanent leadership until 
June 2009 and experienced its own internal challenges with new leadership coming on board 
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during a public health crisis that had engaged nearly every office and division of the Agency. Dr. 
Richard Besser was the Acting CDC Director during the initial phase of H1N1 until Dr. Thomas 
Frieden was appointed as the permanent Director on 8 June 2009. Addressing this issue 
specifically, Dr. Stephanie ZaZa made the following remarks; 
…I think that there were – that we were operating in an environment of- of either 
no appointed leadership or brand new appointed leadership throughout the entire 
Department and – and CDC was looked to – to lead in that situation and I think 
that our leadership did an excellent job of stepping in, making decisions, moving 
things forward, and using data to drive decisions, to not letting the expedient or 
the easy things drive what they did but to make very, very difficult decisions and 
then move those forward. And then, in the middle of all that, to educate a new 
group of appointed and elected leadership, and to make sure that they knew what 
was going on, I think they did a very good job (Dr. Stephanie ZaZa, Deputy 
Director for Strategy, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 
Interview # 16, Lines 223-231, Appendix C).  
 While the impact of senior leadership transition (and absence) at the agency level and at the 
Federal Departmental level during a crisis of this magnitude was not a focus of this study, it 
definitely would be an interesting area for further research and study. 
 Overall the interview participants regarded the CDC’s response to the H1N1 pandemic as 
very effective and successful. Many stated that they believed the CDC did an excellent job in 
responding to the H1N1 crisis, under very difficult and challenging circumstances. 
Communication, both internal and public, was repeatedly mentioned as a particularly strong area 
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of the response and one that contributed significantly to its overall success. Addressing this 
specifically in her interview, Dr. Stephanie ZaZa stated, 
 The other thing I think CDC did extremely well was laying out a very clear and open and 
 transparent communication process. Making sure that not only were we talking with the 
 people we normally talk to, our State and local health department partners, for example, 
 in frequent- daily- if not multiple times during the day – calls, but also to the public, 
 directly to the public and making sure that our senior leaders were visible and available I 
 don’t know how many press availability sessions they did- and talking points and 
 interviews- but it was constant. And I think that the only way to help leader through that 
 kind of situation is to be very active and proactive in a communication portfolio of 
 activities and I think they did a very good job of that (Dr. Stephanie ZaZa, Deputy 
 Director for Strategy, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Interview # 
 16, Lines 232-241, Appendix C). 
 One area that was consistently noted by the interviewees as an exception to this general  
perception of success, however, was with the vaccine distribution program. The vaccine issue in 
its entirety was very difficult- perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of the response- as it 
was quickly determined in the earliest days of the crisis that the existing flu vaccines (stockpiled 
in millions of doses) would in all likelihood not be effective against H1N1. The CDC was 
confronted with the problem of immediately having to develop an entirely new vaccine, 
laboratory test it, receive approval for use, and then deploy it to the general population. The most 
optimistic estimates at the time put the likely availability date of a new vaccine at more than six 
months after development began, assuming there were no problems in developing the vaccine. 
Unfortunately, the public was already experiencing the effects of the disease and expectations 
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were that the CDC would be able to provide an effective vaccine to control the pandemic. 
Additionally, CDC knew that introducing a new vaccine would raise concerns about vaccine 
safety and this coupled with the existing public perception problem(s) of who actually needed the 
vaccine (who was likely to get sick) and the resistance from the highest risk groups- pregnant 
women, infants (parents), and young adults (primarily ages 18-23) who were not traditionally 
high risk candidates for contracting seasonal flu  - presented the CDC with significant 
communication challenges. Many interview participants stated that they felt the communication 
around the vaccine program was the problem- that the Agency had not done as good a job as 
possible of communicating infection risk, vaccine safety, and most importantly had failed to 
manage expectations concerning vaccine availability. This aspect of the response was also not a 
focus of this study, which may be considered a limitation. However, the vaccine program is 
clearly an area deserving of additional research and study as these same issues will (likely) be  
recurring challenges in future influenza pandemics and it may be possible to provide 
recommendations for improving practices and procedures, and especially in managing 
expectations through effective crisis communication. 
Limitations 
 The Case study approach used in this research may make it difficult to generalize the 
results and findings as well as the recommendations to other situations and scenarios. 
Specifically, the public health focus of this case study, the CDC and the H1N1 pandemic, may 
persuade other researchers that the context limits the study’s applicability and may create a 
perception that the observations and findings are not valid in other crisis contexts. Additionally, 
the unusual and unique CDC organizational demographic with its highly educated and closely 
bonded leadership/response team may mean that other organizations may not be able to adopt the 
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CDC’s approach to crisis response and may not be able to implement the recommendations. 
Qualitative research and studies are sometimes limited with regard to predictive ability due to 
unique situations and circumstances – thus the in-depth personal interviews and the Oral History 
project format may also not be applicable to other large government organizations. In fact, this 
Oral History project was a first for the CDC and the informal and conversational approach used 
during the interviews may not work as well in other organizations and with different interview 
participant groups.  
 A further limitation tied to the interviews concerns the interview data and the Oral 
History project. As mentioned previously, one individual- Dr. David Sencer, personally selected 
each interview participant and their selection was based solely on his judgment and decision. 
This may reflect a personal bias on his part due to friendship and/or a professional relationship 
history. Although Dr. Sencer had an active role in the H1N1 response effort as a special  advisor 
to the Director and Chair of the Director’s advisory group Team B, it is possible that individuals 
with important roles in the H1N1 response but not as well known to Dr. Sencer may have been 
excluded from the Oral History interview process. His choices may also have been influenced by 
his perspective as a former CDC Director where he likely interacted primarily with the most 
senior CDC staff members. All of the Oral History interview participants that he ultimately 
selected had many years of experience at CDC and would certainly be considered senior staff, 
with the majority holding key leadership positions within the organization. This selection of 
primarily senior staff members to provide accounts of the response process would certainly 
influence both the overall assessment of the response effort and the specific details of how the 
response was developed. It is possible that if more junior staff members had been interviewed 
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their observations and recollections would have provided a very different perspective and 
perhaps even a different assessment of the overall response effort.  
 Additionally, it must be considered that due to their seniority, a strong sense of 
organizational identity, and their leadership roles within the CDC, the interview participants’ 
comments and observations were likely influenced, or at least tempered, by their desire to 
maintain and/or protect the organization’s public reputation. Particularly in light of their shared 
experience with the 2001 anthrax attacks and the resulting negative perceptions of the Federal 
government’s response capability to address public health crises, these CDC veterans were 
undoubtedly determined to not repeat the mistakes that were made during that crisis and to 
present the organization positively.  Other constraints or influences that may be important to 
consider in the responses and conclusions of  the interview participants are their background, 
specific professional area expertise, education, and their language choice(s) specifically relating 
to threat characterizations, disease severity and potential, and perspectives as medical doctors.   
Each participant was also made aware that their interview recording would become public record 
and would be viewed internally at CDC by their colleagues. This factor may also have influenced 
or tempered their remarks, particularly in cases where their comments might be construed as 
critical or negative.  
There may also be a bias or error in the selection of the data from the individual 
interviews I used as examples of the designated analytic categories- these interview quotes and 
excerpts were selected solely by me, based on my understanding of the intent of the question and 
my interpretation of the participant’s response. The interview participants did not review this 
study so the accuracy of their individual interview transcripts and their agreement or 
disagreement with the use of their comments to reinforce or demonstrate certain points cannot be 
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determined or assumed. Additionally, the interview questions focused primarily on specific 
process and procedural aspects of the response effort and how the response participants managed 
uncertainty and ambiguity in making decisions during the emerging H1N1 crisis. Other 
important parts of the response such as details of the vaccine production and distribution 
problems were not explored in-depth. As many participants highlighted this as an area where 
they felt the response had not been as good as it could have been and where there was definitely 
room for improvement, I would recommend this as a topic for future research and analysis.  
Implications 
 The findings from this study have implications for organizations and their leaders that are 
confronted with emerging and unpredictable threats- or are facing crisis situations where 
traditional or conventional response actions and plans do not appear adequate. The CDC 
response participants identified many ‘lessons learned’ and made a number of specific 
recommendations in terms of organizational processes and procedures for future crisis 
responders to consider. However, the overarching lesson- or message- has more to do with how 
developing a certain mindset and mentality- an open-minded and flexible approach to problem 
solving- is more likely to lead to a successful response than will instituting specific procedures.  
 The quality of ‘adaptive response capability’ as a singular organizational practice and 
strength is inherent throughout the comments made by the interview participants. The 
importance and value of being able to develop and implement this kind of response capability is 
one of the most significant implications for other organizations and leaders.  
Process and Procedural Recommendations 
 The interview participants made a number of specific recommendations for changes in 
process or procedures, or for organizations planning for potential future crisis situations or 
threats. These specific recommendations and examples from the interviews include: 
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1) Staffing 
Staffing for the response effort was mentioned by several interview participants as a major 
challenge area for the CDC leadership- primarily at the mid management level where Division or 
Office Directors were required to release key staff members to join the response team- with no 
known return date. As the H1N1 response continued for over a year this became a significant 
management problem. There were no staffing plans to account for a disaster or emergency of this 
duration- all the details of adding staff to other teams or to a response team unit were suddenly 
brought to forefront and there were no plans in place. Issues such as office budgets for pay, plans 
for time off, vacation schedules, on-going projects, and so on all had to be dealt with as they 
came up and this resulted in a very uneven application of policies and regulations, which caused 
separate issues. It was also noted that there was not an existing database of experienced people- 
experienced in different aspects of emergency response- and that this would have been extremely 
helpful. Instead, managers reported contacting people they knew directly to see who might have 
certain skills and experience and also if they were available and for how long. There was no 
simple way to determine who was deployed to foreign locations, when they would return, and so 
on. This problem is reflected in a comment made by Dr. Lynn Austin: 
I believe the CDC needs to develop a deeper bench. We often, in these   
kinds of – depending on the type of area- the type of focus- of a response 
or an event- it’s often many of the same people. And in a short-term 
response that’s okay because people can usually crash on an – on an 
activity or event work, you know, many hours, work weekends and be 
okay- then three weeks later or four weeks later can- can slow down a 
little bit. This was so much more, so much longer that I’ve found that we 
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need to – we need to develop more of our junior staff. We need to bring 
them into the response, have them work side-by side- with the senior 
people and then give them the opportunity you know over time in an event 
like this to see- you know, what it’s like and how to respond so that we do 
develop that deeper bench strength (Dr. Lynn Austin, Deputy Director for 
Operations, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Interview 
#1, lines 139-150, Appendix C).  
2) Resource Planning 
Resources, both personnel and monetary, were frequently mentioned by the interview 
participants as an area where they would recommend improvement in process. For example,  
Dr. Anne Schuchat notes,  
The other thing that was procedurally difficult was funding. In May- the weekend 
of May 17th or 18th, a couple of us spent [it] drafting out a budget for a 
vaccination program and rounds and rounds of policy decisions, emergency funds 
or Congressional appropriates, you know, but the ability to move money from this 
part of the Government to another part, from within our Agency to States, to 
locales to where they can do the vaccinations really took extraordinarily too 
much time (Dr. Anne Schuchat, Director, National Center for Immunization and 
Respiratory Diseases, Interview #13, lines 292-298, Appendix C).  
3) Identify experienced staff 
Being able to identify the right people for certain positions and for the response itself was noted 
as a challenge by several participants. Steven Boedigheimer commented on this problem stating: 
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Well, we tried the standard approach of the Emergency Operations Center 
reaching out across CDC to identify individuals that would be available to come 
and be part of the task force. But frankly, the most effective was for our own 
individuals for example myself, to pick up the phone and call people around CDC. 
The informal approach actually worked faster for us to identify talented people 
and get them onboard quickly to offer the support (Mr. Steven Boedigheimer, 
Deputy Director, Division of State and Local Readiness, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response, Interview# 3, 221-226, Appendix C).  
4) Planning and preparedness is critical 
The emphasis that the CDC leadership had placed on table-top exercises and scenario response 
planning was cited frequently by the interview participants as a significant contributing factor for 
the success of the H1N1 response. Even though many noted that they had been preparing for and 
planning for a completely different kind of influenza pandemic- all stated that the experience of 
working on developing response plans or practicing crisis scenarios was invaluable.  
Don’t underestimate the huge amount of –of value- in preparedness, and the 
difference in the ability to confront a crisis, even it it’s totally new or not the 
pandemic you planned for (Dr. Marty Cetron, Director, Global Migration and 
Quarantine Division, Interview # 5, lines 269-272Appendix C). 
3) Commit to flexibility and adaptability  
And then secondly, don’t ever feel wed to the words on –in the planning book and 
make sure that there’s a complete open mindedness along the way for surprises, 
for curve balls, for unintended consequences or unforeseen circumstances, and be 
sure to build in the flexibility to adjust your response – and the wisdom to have- a 
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way to get feedback into that response to be able to see new patterns that did- that 
you might not have thought about in the preparedness phase (Dr. Marty Cetron, 
Director, Global Migration and Quarantine Division, Interview # 5, lines 274-279, 
Appendix C). 
  Other Recommendations. 
 Based on the analysis of my data, one of the recommendations I make is for the 
development of a formal model to support and engage the principles of Emerging Infectious 
Disease Communication (EIDC). In my literature review I was not able to find any working 
models to apply in support of  the EIDC approach to crisis communication.  The CDC’s CERC 
model is currently the standard model used for risk and crisis communication in public health, 
but it is not a model that supports the more emergent and adaptive attributes and characteristics 
of the EIDC approach, which appears to be the direction that CDC is moving in their approach to 
crisis response. I would recommend the development of a formal EIDC model, aligned with the 
CERC model, that would assist crisis response teams in developing communication strategies 
tailored to specific and immediate situational requirements particularly in the case of an 
emergent and unfamiliar/unexpected threat or crisis.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between sensemaking and 
decision-making- in a crisis environment where the situation is unpredictable, emergent, and 
characterized by uncertainty. Based on the data from the CDC H1N1 case study, I believe that 
these two activities cannot be separated but must be engaged in concurrently, as one on-going, 
fluid process where changing direction, revising decisions, and continually incorporating new 
information is the organizational ‘norm’. Sensemaking must be the goal- not decision-making. 
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 In his book Making Sense of the Organization, Karl Weick quotes a firefighting 
commander who explains that he is most effective in his job when he sees himself as a 
sensemaker and not a decision-maker.  He explains why this is in the following statement, 
If I make a decision, it is a possession; I take pride in it, I tend to defend it and not listen 
to those who question it. If I make sense, then this is more dynamic and I can listen and I 
can change it. A decision is something you polish. Sensemaking is a direction for the next 
period. (Weick, 2009, p.5) 
 Leadership support is not only necessary but critical to develop an organizational culture 
that encourages this kind of adaptive and flexible response, one that encourages innovative 
thinking and the ability to look beyond established protocols, to revise and perhaps reverse 
decisions, to maintain a fluid approach to procedures and decision-making. While none of the 
interview participants specifically mentioned the principles of organizational learning as 
described and defined by Peter Senge (Senge, 1990,1994, 2006) it was clear from their 
comments that the response participants had engaged in these practices and that CDC is an 
organization with a ‘learning’ culture, as Senge defines it. In his book The Fifth Discipline: The  
Art & Practice of the Learning Organization, he contends 
 ….in situations of rapid change only those [organizations] that are flexible, adaptive and 
 productive will excel. For this to happen, organizations need to ‘discover how to tap 
 people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels’…and further,  
 While all people have the capacity to learn, the structures in which they have to 
function are often not conducive to reflection and engagement. Furthermore, 
people may lack the tools and guiding ideas to make sense of the situations they 
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face. Organizations that are continually expanding their capacity to create their 
future require a fundamental shift of mind among their members (Senge, 2006).  
Analyzing the CDC’s actions during the H1N1 response as an example of a learning organization 
in practice is also outside the scope of this study, although this would certainly be an interesting 
topic for a future study.  However, just as one good example of how flexible thinking and an 
organizational willingness to engage with uncertainty rather than to try to simply get rid of it, or 
ignore it- was reflected by the interview participants, I think it is worth repeating a quote from 
Dr. Steve Redd, the H1N1 Incident Commander who said,  
 I think what actually happened is that we learned that we knew less and less about 
 what the situation was- than we thought- and that was a bit unnerving- but 
 keeping a grip on the uncertainty became an important way of navigating; and 
 also, identifying some practical actions to take to find out more (Dr. Steve Redd, 
 H1N1 Incident Commander, Interview #12, lines 84-88, Appendix C). 
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Appendix A: List of Selected Interview Participants and Positions Held During the H1N1 
Response by the CDC 
1. Lynn Austin, PhD 
Deputy Director for Operations, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response  
 2. Beth Bell, MD, MPH  
 Acting Director, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
3. Steven Boedigheimer, MBA  
 Deputy Director of the Division of State and Local Readiness, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response  
4. Jay Butler, MD  
 Director, H1N1Vaccine Task Force 
5.  Marty Cetron, MD  
Director, Global Migration and Quarantine Division 
6. Toby Crafton, MA  
Chief of Staff, CDC Director’s H1N1Response Team 
7. Lyn Finelli, DrPH, MS  
Lead for Surveillance and Outbreak Response Team, Influenza Division 
8. Daniel Jernigan, MD  
Deputy Director, Influenza Division 
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9.  Martin Meltzer, PhD  
Senior Health Economist and Distinguished Consultant, Division of Emerging Infections 
and Surveillance 
10. Toby Merlin, MD  
Deputy Director, CDC Influenza Coordination Division  
11. Glen Nowak, PhD  
Director, CDC Media Relations 
12. Stephen Redd, MD (RADM, USPHS)  
 H1N/A Incident Commander and Director, Director CDC Influenza Coordination Unit 
(ICU)  
 13. Anne Schuchat, MD (RADM, USPHS)  
Director, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases; Principal CDC 
Media Spokesperson for H1N1/A response 
 14. Michael Shaw, MD  
Associate Director for Laboratory Science, Influenza Division 
 15. Marsha Vanderford, PhD 
 Director, CDC Emergency Risk Communication System, Emergency Operations Center  
16. Stephanie ZaZa, MD, MPH (CAPT, USPHS) 
Deputy Director for Strategy, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response  
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Appendix B: Biographies of Selected Interview Participants 
 
1. Lynn Austin, PhD 
Dr. Lynn Austin is the Deputy Director in the Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response (PHPR) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Dr. Austin manages 
the day-to-day activities of the PHPR Office of the Director and management operations 
for the organization of over 800 staff and budget of $1.3 billion. She ensures that all 
business services are provided for operations related to the strategic national stockpile, 
select agents and toxins, state/local readiness operations, and CDC's emergency 
operations and response activities. Dr. Austin is responsible for strategic planning and 
utilization of the use of bioterrorism funds, workforce and career development of 
organizational staff, organizational budget and financial management, personnel and 
human resources management, grants and cooperative agreements, facility and space 
utilization, and information resources. She provides leadership in the resolution of issues 
that cross organizational lines, aids in determining policy and program objectives, 
coordinates scientific and program input to the decision-making process, and assists in 
maintaining a focus on the highest priority public health initiatives. Dr. Austin has been 
at CDC since 1988, where she has served as the Chief of Staff to the Director, CDC; 
Deputy Director, Division of Adolescent and School Health, National Center for Chronic 
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion; Associate Director, Management Operations, 
Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention and Assistant Director, Policy, Planning, and 
Partnerships. Dr. Austin received a PhD in public policy from the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, a Master's degree in public administration from Georgia State University, 
and a Bachelor's degree in education and management from Berry College in Rome, 
Georgia. 
 
2. Beth Bell, MD, MPH 
Dr. Beth Bell is the Director of the National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious 
Diseases (NCEZID). Most recently, Dr. Bell has served as the Associate Director for 
Epidemiologic Science, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
(NCIRD). Dr. Bell joined CDC in 1992 as an Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) officer 
assigned to the Washington State Department of Health, where she was the lead officer in 
the seminal investigation of E. coli infections from contaminated hamburgers. After EIS, 
she joined the Hepatitis Branch in the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases and later 
served as Chief of the Epidemiology Branch in the Division of Viral Hepatitis. She has 
made numerous contributions in the epidemiology and prevention of viral hepatitis, 
including spearheading development of policy for the use of hepatitis A vaccine in the 
United States, leading the division’s efforts to prevent foodborne Hepatitis A, and 
assisting in efforts to expand the use of Hepatitis B vaccination globally. Dr. Bell also 
served in leadership roles during CDC responses to several major public health events, 
including the 2001 anthrax attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
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pandemic. As a member of the senior leadership team for the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic response, she provided oversight of policy and scientific direction. Dr. Bell 
received a BA from Brown University, an MD from Yale University, and an MPH from 
the University of Rochester School of Medicine. She is a Fellow of the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America, the American Academy of Family Medicine, and the 
American Academy of Preventive Medicine, as well as a member of the American 
Epidemiological Society. She is the author/co-author of more than 125 scientific 
publications and has received numerous awards for her work including the Alexander 
Langmuir Prize and the Iain Hardy Award. 
 
3. Steven Boedigheimer, MBA 
Steven Boedigheimer joined the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
2001as a branch chief in the Public Health Practice Program Office (PHPPO). He was the 
supervisor of the Health Alert Network during the terrorist attacks on the United States in 
the Fall of 2001. In 2002 he was named Deputy Division Director for Public Health 
Systems Development and Research, where he also functioned as the Emergency 
Coordinator. He was appointed acting Deputy Director of PHPPO in 2003, and in 2005 
became the CDC Senior Management Official (SMO) for Arkansas where he supported 
the Director of the Arkansas Department of Health (Public Health) Emergency 
Operations Center during hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In 2008 he was assigned to support 
the Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services during hurricanes 
Dolly, Gustav, and Ike. In2009 he was appointed as the Deputy Director of the Division 
of State and Local Readiness in the CDC Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response. He led the 2009 H1N1 Influenza State Coordination Task Force with the CDC 
Emergency Operations Center.  
Two Delaware Governors and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy have 
recognized Mr. Boedigheimer for his public health service. He earned a B.S. in Biology 
and Chemistry at St. Martin’s University and an MBA from Willamette University with a 
focus on business-government relations.  
 
4. Jay Butler, MD, FAAP, FACP 
Dr. Jay Butler joined the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National 
Center for Preparedness, Detection and Control of Infectious Diseases (NCPDCID) 
Division of Emerging Infections and Surveillance Services (DEISS) in June 2009 as a 
Program Director to assist with the nation’s response to the H1N1 virus (swine flu) 
outbreak. Before returning to the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia, he served as Chief Medical 
Officer for the State of Alaska since 2007.  Previously, Dr. Butler was the Director of the 
Alaska State Division of Public Health, and headed the division’s Section of 
Epidemiology. From 1998 to 2005, he was Director of the CDC’s NCPDCID/DEISS 
Arctic Investigations Program and also served as an infectious diseases physician at the 
Alaska Native Medical Center in Anchorage. Prior to Alaskan assignments, Dr. Butler 
was a CDC epidemic intelligence service officer for the Wisconsin Department of 
Health.  He is board certified in general internal medicine, general pediatrics, and 
infectious diseases. He was governor of the Alaska chapter of the American College of 
Physicians from 2005 to 2009 and chair of the Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials Infectious Diseases Policy Committee 2008 to 2009. Dr. Butler  is a graduate of 
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the University of North Carolina Medical School, has completed clinical training at 
Vanderbilt and Emory Universities, and is board certified in infectious diseases, internal 
medical, and pediatrics.  He has authored or co-authored over 100 scientific papers and 
medical textbook chapters on infectious diseases and emergency preparedness. His varied 
professional experiences include working as a physician for two months at a mission 
hospital in Kenya, leading the CDC field response to the initial Hantavirus pulmonary 
syndrome outbreak in the US in 1993, and serving as the CDC liaison to FBI 
Headquarters in Washington, DC during in the investigation of the anthrax attacks in the 
fall of 2001.  He was a team co-leader during the CDC responses to the SARS outbreak 
of 2003, avian influenza in 2004, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.  
 
5. Martin Cetron, MD 
Dr. Martin Cetron is the Director for the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine 
Division at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The Global 
Migration and Quarantine Division’s mission is to prevent introduction and spread of 
infectious diseases in the U.S. and to prevent morbidity and mortality among immigrants, 
refugees, migrant workers, and international travelers.  Dr. Cetron has authored or co-
authored more than 100 publications and received numerous awards for his work since 
joining CDC in 1992.  Dr. Cetron holds faculty appointments in the Division of 
Infectious Disease at the Emory University School of Medicine and the Department of 
Epidemiology at Rollins School of Public Health. He received his B.A. from Dartmouth 
College in 1981, and his M.D. from Tufts University in 1985. He trained in Internal 
Medicine at the University of Virginia and Infectious Diseases at the University of 
Washington before joining the CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service and becoming a 
Commissioned Officer in the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) in 1992. His primary 
research interests are international health and global migration with a focus on emerging 
infections, tropical diseases, and vaccine-preventable diseases in mobile populations. Dr. 
Cetron has also been a leader in public health emergency preparedness and response 
activities at CDC and is a graduate of the Harvard School of Public Health & Kennedy 
School of Government’s National Preparedness Leadership Institute.  Since 1992, he has 
led several domestic and international outbreak investigations, conducted epidemiologic 
research, and been involved in domestic and international emergency responses.  He has 
played a leadership role in CDC responses to intentional and naturally-acquired emerging 
infectious disease outbreaks including the 2001 anthrax bio-terrorism incident, the 2003 
global SARS epidemic, and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
 
6. Toby Crafton, MA 
Toby Crafton is acting deputy director of the Division of Health Informatics and 
Surveillance (DHIS), formerly the Public Health Surveillance and Informatics Program 
Office (PHSIPO). Prior to this position, Mr. Crafton served on detail as a senior advisor 
to the PHSIPO director where he provided expertise and advice related to budgets, 
spending plans, functional statements, organization charts, and staffing plans for the 
organization. In his permanent position, Mr. Crafton serves as the program manager for 
the Influenza Coordination Unit (ICU) within the Office of Infectious Diseases. In this 
role, he is a member of the ICU's senior leadership team that develops the plans and 
strategies to ensure that CDC is prepared for an influenza pandemic. Mr. Crafton 
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manages a budget of more than $200 million per year. In addition, he was responsible for 
leading the efforts to address the lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic response that deal with budget and administrative preparedness at both the 
state and federal levels. During his tenure at CDC, he has served as the chief of staff for 
CDC's response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, which required him to coordinate the 
activities of the command and general staffs (approximately 400–500 people) during the 
course of the response. Mr. Crafton also was part of the team that organized and started 
the CDC's Emergency Operations Center and the Division of Emergency Operations. He 
was the first lead for the logistics support team where he was instrumental in establishing 
processes and procedures for logistically supporting CDC emergency responses and 
deployments. 
Mr. Crafton's federal service career started in 1980 when he was commissioned a second 
lieutenant in the U.S. Army. He served in positions of increasing responsibility for more 
than 20 years and retired in 2001. His assignments included various command and staff 
positions in Army medical units, including combat nits, deployable hospitals, and 
medical evacuation units. He also worked on the Army staff in the Pentagon where he 
formulated Department of Defense and Department of the Army policies on subjects that 
included re-engineering the Army's medical force, the mobilization of personnel for 
deployments, and public health support for operations during war and support for natural 
disasters. He earned a masters degree in management from Webster University in St. 
Louis, Missouri.  
 
7. Lyn Finelli, DrPH, MS 
Dr. Lyn Finelli is the Lead for the Surveillance and Outbreak Response Team, Influenza 
Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. Dr. Finelli is a 
graduate of the Bryn Mawr Hospital School of Nursing and received her Bachelor of 
Science and Master of Science degrees from Columbia University.  From 1983 to 1990, 
she taught pediatrics and public health at Columbia University and was the director of the 
Pediatric Primary Care Program (pediatric nurse practitioner program).  She received her 
doctorate in infectious disease epidemiology from Columbia University, School of Public 
Health in 1990. Dr. Finelli began working with CDC in 1990, providing technical 
assistance in epidemiology to the New Jersey Department of Health, where she held the 
positions of epidemiologist and acting State Epidemiologist.  Dr. Finelli came to Atlanta 
in 1997 to work as an epidemiologist in the Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases. 
In 2001, she joined the Division of Viral Hepatitis as Chief of the Surveillance Team. Dr. 
Finelli joined the Influenza Division in 2006. Her research interests include influenza-
bacterial co-infection, influenza complications including influenza-related pneumonia, 
and zoonotic influenza.  Dr. Finelli is the co-author of more than 150 scientific 
publications. 
 
8. Daniel B. Jernigan, MD, MPH    
Dr. Daniel Jernigan is a Captain in the United States Public Health Service and serves as 
the Deputy Director of the Influenza Division in the National Center for Immunization 
and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD) at CDC. In his current role, Dr. Jernigan serves as 
senior medical officer and senior Public Health Service officer for the Influenza Division. 
In addition, he serves as a principle investigator for influenza research and public health 
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evaluation activities. Dr. Jernigan received an undergraduate degree from Duke 
University, a Doctor of Medicine from Baylor College of Medicine, and a Master of 
Public Health at the University of Texas. Dr. Jernigan joined the CDC’s Epidemic 
Intelligence Service in 1994. In 1996, he began serving on assignment from NCIRD to 
the Washington State Health Department as a medical epidemiologist and coordinator of 
national initiatives to improve surveillance for emerging infectious diseases. Dr. Jernigan 
became the chief of the Epidemiology Section for CDC’s Division of Healthcare Quality 
Promotion (DHQP) in 2001. In 2006, Dr. Jernigan joined the Influenza Division as 
deputy director. Dr. Jernigan has authored peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on 
various emerging infectious diseases topics, and has supervised outbreak investigations 
of viral, bacterial, and fungal infections associated with emerging and antimicrobial-
resistant pathogens. He has led epidemiology and surveillance teams for national and 
international responses, including bioterrorism-related anthrax, the emergence of West 
Nile virus, SARS, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza, and public health management 
following natural disasters. During the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, Dr. Jernigan 
served as the CDC lead for all domestic and international epidemiology and laboratory 
activities for the U.S. government’s response. 
 
9. Martin Meltzer, PhD 
Dr. Martin Meltzer is the senior health economist and distinguished consultant, in the 
Division of Emerging Infections and Surveillance Services in the coordinating center for 
Infectious Diseases (Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID), at 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). His research interests include 
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Interview #1 Lynn Austin, PhD, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness & Response  
  
Lynn: My name is Lynn Austin. I am currently the Deputy Director for 1 
Operations for the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response. 2 
At the time that H1N1 first started, we were called COTPER, the 3 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency 4 
Response. And I’ve been at CDC for 20 – nearly 22 years and I’ve been 5 
with the federal government for 33 years. This was the first time that 6 
I’ve worked up close and personal in – in a response actually while – 7 
during my time at CDC.  8 
Barbara. Do you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 9 
Lynn: Yes. I had only been with COTPER for a month and I had just come in 10 
to work on management operations and improving some management 11 
organization and efficiency. And we started getting the briefings about 12 
H1 just within a month after my arrival. Dr. Rich Besser was the 13 
Acting CDC Director and he – his permanent job was actually the 14 
Director of COTPER. And so we had an Acting Director in our 15 
organization also at the time and we both started receiving the 16 
briefings about H1 and what was going on, what the situational 17 
awareness. Right at the beginning, it was beginning to look at the 18 
surveillance data and what state were reporting, what countries were 19 
reporting. It was a lot about surveillance in the very early days. 20 
Barbara: And as the response ramped up and as the threat emerged, did you 21 
have a sense that this was a potential crisis facing the organization?   22 
Lynn: Absolutely. Even though I had not worked so close to an event before, 23 
just looking at the surveillance data alone and looking at the growing 24 
increases in number of cases, I knew that this was going – going to go 25 
on for some time. I had no idea it would go on as long as it did. But it – 26 
it did look like it was going to be a long term. My boss, Dr. Dan 27 
Sausen, was pulled in to a lot of meetings about it. He was in three or 28 
four meetings a day about the outbreak and even as a new senior 29 
leader in the organization, I was designated as Acting Director on 30 
many, many days while he – many months actually during the time 31 
that he was involved in the H1 directly as well as Dr. Besser serving 32 
in the role that he did. 33 
Barbara: Did you find that you needed to make modifications to plans or 34 
practices as a result of the way the threat emerged? 35 
Lynn: What I found was that we had to make changes in how we supported a 36 
long term strategy for a response. Because, you know, it was – it was 37 
very easy for people to burn out because they were working such long 38 
hours. People were working, you know, 16 hour days. They were 39 
working seven days a week. And as the response geared up to the 40 
levels, we were having to, you know, search for staff. We were trying 41 
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to staff the response and so we realized very rapidly that we needed to 42 
develop a very – a much deeper bench of – of individuals who could 43 
work the response.  44 
And that’s not just the scientists, and the surveillance experts, and 45 
the epidemiologists, that, includes all of the – the logisticians, and the 46 
analysts, and the personnel staffers, and financial people. It – that 47 
was what was eye opening to me is that a response is not just about 48 
the scientists although they’re very – they’re the very key part of it. 49 
The whole support network that goes in to supporting an outbreak 50 
and responding to an outbreak like this requires many, many people. 51 
And many people of different job – types of jobs.  And that’s what I 52 
found fascinating but also what was very challenging.  53 
Barbara: Did you find that the practices that you implemented for this 54 
particular response are practices that you will institutionalize? 55 
Lynn: We’re actually moving forward to do that because with the H1N1 56 
response, you know, you had people who ended up not just working on 57 
the response for three weeks or 30 days as we might in like the Haiti 58 
response, or with a tsunami, or a tornado or something response. We 59 
had people who had to be detailed for quite a long period of time. That 60 
actually represented changes to people’s performance plans, how they 61 
were evaluated, how – how they might be reimbursed because there 62 
were actually – when someone is detailed to a response, sometimes 63 
they’re funding their – their home funding cannot continue to support 64 
their salary and benefits during a long term response. So we had to 65 
look at alternative ways that we could provide for those salaries and 66 
offset those salaries. So we found that getting additional funding for a 67 
response is often very critical to being able to respond on a long-term 68 
basis. 69 
 We also found that communications are absolutely critical. Most of us 70 
who are not directly involved in the communications ourselves were 71 
glued to the TV sets, you know, waiting, watching the media trucks 72 
outside; but we were glued to see Dr. Besser, and Dr. Schuchat and 73 
then later Dr. Frieden on television and what they were saying. And 74 
coming out of some of the daily briefings, knowing about what, you 75 
know, planning on what was going to be said, what – what the status 76 
was for the day, and then seeing it on the nightly news was pretty 77 
amazing in some ways. But it also showed me that CDC – this is one 78 
area I think CDC really excels is trying to share that information with 79 
the public.  80 
 I had a lot of people who would call me as well, people who know that 81 
you work at CDC, they – they want to ask questions. They want to 82 
know, can you find out about this, or vaccine or whether it’s 83 
recommended for an immunization if you’re in certain category groups 84 
of people. And I also had two colleague age students and I was, you 85 
know, I was worried. I had one that traveled internationally some and 86 
I was worried about, you know, their own safety as well as looking at 87 
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how CDC responds to an outbreak. And I felt very proud of CDC as we 88 
responded to this event. I know that there was some things that took 89 
longer like the vaccine development. But the fact that we could 90 
identify the virus, to have a vaccine developed as quickly as we did, 91 
just shows how well CDC is able to come together and work on a 92 
solution that quickly. 93 
 Our support to the states was absolutely critical. My organization was 94 
responsible for getting funding out to the state and local health 95 
departments. And so it was absolutely essential because that was the 96 
frontline of combating this – this disease outbreak. And so not only did 97 
we have to get the antibiotics when states would run out and they 98 
couldn’t get them from pharmaceutical companies, but we also had to 99 
respond with funding so they could do the vaccines once we were able 100 
to – to get those developed and manufactured.  101 
 So I think that we worked very, very closely with the state and local 102 
health departments during that time as well in trying to address their 103 
needs on the front line. 104 
Barbara: In terms of practices that you would recommend for going forward 105 
when dealing with these agencies, do you have any specific thoughts 106 
on that? 107 
Lynn: Some of the challenges that we faced probably initially was about the 108 
funding, realizing that this was far more than, you know, what we 109 
could accommodate in a short-term way. That was initially a little bit 110 
of challenge because you’re having to respond, you’re definitely 111 
responding but just not knowing, you know, if the money was going to 112 
be there as we moved – continued forward.  113 
 With the state health departments, I think we worked with some 114 
partner organizations like ASTO and NACHO and they were 115 
absolutely key to our being able to facilitate those conversations and 116 
communication with the state and local health departments. They 117 
really came through. We had meetings with them. We even detailed a 118 
representative from their organizations to be a part of our team and to 119 
be in on the briefings so that they could turn and relay the 120 
information to their – their organizations like the state and local 121 
governments.  122 
 And we also had conference calls. Our organization, Division of State 123 
and Local Readiness, set up conference calls with the state health 124 
departments. I don’t think at the time they were occurring daily but 125 
they were definitely occurring two to three times a week to keep them 126 
apprised of the activities that we were doing and any issues that they 127 
were having to try to help them meet their needs on the frontline. 128 
Barbara: So have these best practices that you developed been institutionalized 129 
for future situations? 130 
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Lynn: There’s actually one of the things that I was mentioned about the 131 
personnel and recruiting people to work in an outbreak situation. We 132 
found that we – you can’t just do that on the fly as we’ve done with 133 
short-term emergencies where people come in. People just kind of 134 
collapse on their response and then in 30 days they’re back on their 135 
regular job. What we found is that we really do need to have a longer 136 
term strategy at CDC for being able to bring people in, be able to work 137 
on a response a little bit longer but then have people who can come in 138 
behind them when they go back to their job. And so we are trying to 139 
look now at establishing a – a personnel resource team within our 140 
Division of Emergency Operations. We’ve handled some of this before 141 
in the past as part of our operations team; but now, as I mentioned, we 142 
have, you know, you have the issues with just who do people report to 143 
while they’re on this response, they’re own performance and just the 144 
whole issue of recruiting people. And so we’ve set up a personnel 145 
response team to be in our Division of Emergency Operation and we’re 146 
working to – to staff that to be able to do this on a – a more standard 147 
and operational type basis. That’s one area. 148 
 Another area is tracking on funding. We’ve begun to institutionalize 149 
the way that we capture expenses and approving of expenses. That 150 
was something that we found people who needed to be reimbursed. We 151 
needed to have a process where their request could be approved so 152 
that we were really doing things that specifically related to the 153 
response that – that CDC was in – working on. 154 
Barbara: As the – as the year progressed and the threat emerged and the 155 
organization was forced to confront an emerging threat rather than 156 
one that was winding down, did you feel that there were sufficient 157 
resources available to meet the demands? 158 
Lynn: Yes there were. But at the same time, you know, like I – I – I believe 159 
that CDC needs to develop a deeper bench. We often in these kinds of, 160 
depending on the type of area, the type of focus of a response or an 161 
event, its often many of the same people. And in a short-term 162 
response, that’s okay because people can usually crash on an – on an 163 
activity or event, work, you know, many hours, work weekends and be 164 
okay, and then three weeks later, or four weeks later, can – can slow 165 
down a little bit. This was so much more, so much longer that I’ve 166 
found that we need to – we need to develop more of our junior staff. 167 
We need to bring them into the response, have them work side-by-side 168 
with the senior people, and then give them an opportunity, you know, 169 
over time in an event like this to see, you know, what it’s like and how 170 
to respond so that we do develop that deeper bench strength. 171 
Barbara: Was your division involved in exercise planning? 172 
Lynn: Oh absolutely. Actually, I think that was absolutely critical to our 173 
success. When I had worked in the Office of the Director at one point 174 
before coming to COTPER, that had been a – a big priority for CDC to 175 
have these kinds of preparedness, planning and exercises so that we 176 
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actually walk through what would happen if it’s a pandemic, or what 177 
would happen in environmental. And I think that was absolutely 178 
critical. We already from those exercises knew who critical key staff 179 
would be, and then those people had walked through an exercise that 180 
would be similar. Certainly nothing that would be as long term as this 181 
turned out to be or even thinking about it being that long term but 182 
yes, I think that absolutely was critical to our success. 183 
Barbara: Thinking back in the early, early response period, what do you feel 184 
were the key decisions that needed to be made? 185 
Lynn: That was – that was interesting ‘cause I – I did participate in the 186 
meetings with Dr. Frieden and there were, you know, daily or twice 187 
daily briefings with him, every morning, every afternoon at the 188 
beginning. You know, first looking at the surveillance data, you know, 189 
where – where is the outbreak. We already at that point were 190 
beginning to identify what it was and isolate what it was, and then 191 
determining from all the locations and all the reporting was this the 192 
same – the same virus. And, you know, the laboratory reporting was 193 
critical. Laboratories in the states were getting overrun with 194 
specimens. So it was key as to how much do we do sample testing, do 195 
we do all testing, of being able to detect then the trend.  196 
 At one point, we had to decide of counting actual cases versus the 197 
alternative count where we would look at the – a percentage. And so 198 
that was a key decision point, a key turning point of how we counted 199 
because then we would – we would not be able to count actual 200 
numbers but we – we had to move past that because we couldn’t 201 
continue to do, you know, all the laboratory specimens that were 202 
coming in anyway. 203 
 Another – some other key decisions that had to be looked at were the 204 
social distancing. You know, what does CDC recommend? What could 205 
we recommend? You know, what we know from a science and evidence 206 
based perspective versus what is realistic that could be accomplished 207 
and what we could recommend from that. So, you know, our own – our 208 
own social distancing, when people were sick and yet were involved in 209 
the outbreak, you know, we had to make sure people don’t come to 210 
work when you’re sick, even for ourselves and even people on the 211 
response team.  212 
 But those were recommendations and policy recommendations that we 213 
– we had to make. We also certainly with the identification of the 214 
manufacturer for the vaccine, what – how much the government 215 
would buy of the vaccine and all of those were very critical decisions 216 
that – that were made along the way. 217 
Barbara: In terms of information that was used to support this decision making 218 
processes, where – where did your information come from? 219 
Lynn: It came from the data. It all had to come from the data of the number 220 
of cases. We had to look at what was available – what could be 221 
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manufactured, the volume that could be manufactured. We had to look 222 
then also at who was at most at risk and so that the recommendations 223 
could first hit with the – with the earliest vaccines coming out of 224 
production, the immunization of the most at-risk populations. Those 225 
were definitely key decisions that – that were made, 226 
recommendations. But it did look at populations that were affected by 227 
the vaccine, I mean by the virus most. So it – it’s all definitely data 228 
driven. 229 
Barbara: Who were the key people involved in this decision making process? 230 
Lynn: That would be, you know, Dr. Besser when he was first here, Dr. 231 
Frieden, Dr. Schuchat, Dr. Redd, Dr. Bell and many others who were 232 
kind of part those directors briefings and – and mainly providing 233 
policy recommendations. Ultimately, many of these fell to the Director 234 
or later as it progressed in concert maybe with the Director, Dr. Redd 235 
and Dr. Schuchat.  236 
Barbara: In terms of organizational response to staffing needs, did you have any 237 
particular recommendations for the future? 238 
Lynn: Yes. You know, I found this with H1N1 and this is also been true with 239 
our Haiti response that we’re – we’re working on right now. We do – 240 
we do detail people to the team. So even if it’s not something that the 241 
people do in their daily job, so I detailed my financial resource director 242 
to work with the funding for H1N1. So she worked on that for about 243 
three months which left a huge gap with us. We – we couldn’t – we 244 
couldn’t detail people in to fill her job ‘cause we were already detailing 245 
other people for the response. So it mean – it mean other people back, 246 
you know, at the home base or our home organization having to fill in 247 
and – and work overtime to fill the gap. 248 
 We detailed someone to work on the personnel recruitment part of it. 249 
And that – we actually had two people on my staff alone that worked 250 
directly in the personnel recruitment on – on two different rotations. 251 
 So I found that for us with OPHPR and then it was called COTPER, 252 
that we provided a lot of staff support that are from people who are 253 
not even normally part of the response team. They’re not people who 254 
work in the Division of Emergency Operations, or the Division of 255 
Stockpile. These are people who worked in business services in the OD 256 
and management office.  So people who actually served as the Chief of 257 
Staff at – at a point in the very beginning before, you know, it took on 258 
under the influence of coordination unit as having the lead.  259 
 So our organization really jumps in as kind of the first response team 260 
and fills some of those key positions. And then over a long-term 261 
response, the strategy has to be to bring in other people and rotate 262 
other people through to be able to continue to support our own 263 
organization but at the same time, give full support to a response. 264 
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Barbara: Looking back over the year of the response so far, are there things 265 
that you felt the organization did particularly well? 266 
Lynn: I would definitely say communication was absolutely critical. I think 267 
this – the government had to be transparent in what we were doing 268 
and I think we really, really did well with that. I think that we, you 269 
know, we got the vaccine out there as quickly as we could. It was still, 270 
you know, everybody – you rather it be sooner rather than any later 271 
but we got it out there just as soon as it could be identified. I think 272 
that we worked with the states very well. We brought them into the 273 
process very early on and they were absolutely a full partner. We were 274 
actually at the point supporting them because they were on the 275 
frontlines with the disease in their state and with responding to the 276 
disease by the immunizations in their state. 277 
Barbara: How about challenges that you feel the organization experienced? 278 
 279 
Lynn: I think the biggest challenge is just the length of time of the response. 280 
Prior to H1N1, the longest term response that we have faced was with 281 
Katrina, Hurricane Katrina, and the aftermath from that. And that 282 
event was maybe four to six months. So this has lasted 11 months by 283 
the time it fully closes out. That’s a very long time to be in response 284 
mode. 285 
 So basically what that means for my organization is that our Division 286 
of Emergency Operation and the CDC Operation Center which we 287 
operate has never not been on, you know, just – just monitoring for 288 
nearly a year. And so that puts a lot of strain on the organization. It’s 289 
not impossible, obviously, we’ve done it and we’ve done it very well. 290 
But it’s – it’s a long time to be in response mode. So, you know, people 291 
put off vacation time, and people put off doing things because we were 292 
in a response. We’ve put off some things with our own planning, our 293 
own exercising, our own, you know, operations because we have, you 294 
know, part of the organization in – in still in response mode.  295 
 And so I’m not sure that there’s anything we could do differently about 296 
that because that’s our job but the long-term nature of it, you know, is 297 
– is a big strain. 298 
Barbara: Do you have any other specific recommendations that you could make 299 
in any area for people who are – organizations that are confronted 300 
with similar? 301 
Lynn: I have been, like I said at the beginning, when I first came to this 302 
organization, to COTPER, I was only here a month when the outbreak 303 
hit. And I had been incredibly impressed by how organized we were 304 
with the response, how people worked so very well together, how even 305 
during the response for H1N1 we were able to handle other responses. 306 
So if there was a food outbreak, if there was a tsunami in another 307 
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country, if there was a flooding, we were still able to assemble a team 308 
to deal with those responses.  309 
 So I have been incredibly proud to work in this organization and just 310 
see how well they work together and how well they support CDC in 311 
responding to an event and one as long-term and as, you know, 312 
potentially dangerous as H1N1 was, and yet we were able to mitigate 313 
much of what could’ve happened by how we responded to that. 314 
Barbara: Great, well thank you very much. 315 
Lynn: Okay. [audio ends 0:25:53.5] 316 
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Interview #2. Beth Bell, MD, MPH 
Acting Director, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
 
Beth: Sure. I’m a physician by training and I’ve been working at the CDC 1 
since the early 1990s. I started in the EIS program like many of us 2 
physicians and was working in Seattle, Washington when the Jack-in-3 
the-Box outbreak associated with contaminated hamburgers 4 
happened. So that was sort of my introduction into public health. 5 
 Most of my career I spent in the field of hepatitis. I’m an expert in 6 
hepatitis vaccines and viral hepatitis in general. And for the past, I 7 
guess, maybe three year or so, I’ve been working at the center level in 8 
the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. 9 
Barbara: Great, are you currently involved in some aspect of H1N1? 10 
Beth: Yes. I am, at the moment, leading our efforts to transition all of the 11 
H1N1 related activities from the emergency response structure back 12 
into our center, into the National Center for Immunization and 13 
Respiratory Diseases. So that’s essentially all of the surveillance, 14 
epidemiology lab stuff which is housed in our Influenza division, and 15 
all of the vaccine related activities which are housed in our 16 
Immunization Services division. 17 
Barbara: Great. Can you remember when you first heard about H1N1? 18 
Beth: I most certainly can because I was the Acting Director of the Center, 19 
of NCIRD at that time, in April, and I was actually performing in a 20 
choir concert, I believe, on the Friday night and had turned off my 21 
telephone because I was performing in a choir concert; and turned it 22 
back on after the choir concert and had a telephone call from someone 23 
from the Flu division saying well now we’ve kind of detected two of 24 
these over the last couple of days. We are concerned about this, the 25 
sort of details that I’m sure you’ve heard before, no recognized contact 26 
with swine, no recognized contact with each other, a novel strain that 27 
hadn’t been seen before, and so I’ve got a, you know, a very 28 
comprehensive update about what people were doing about it sitting 29 
there in my car in the parking lot after the choir concert. 30 
 And so then I, you know, I thanked them and we arranged when we 31 
would talk again and then I called Ann Schuchat who at that time was 32 
the Deputy – Acting Deputy Director of CDC, and we went through 33 
the whole thing and that was sort of – we kind of, you know, went 34 
from there basically. So it’s quite – quite a clear memory of the first 35 
time I heard about this. 36 
Barbara: Could you describe…  [break in audio 0:02:42.5] 37 
Barbara: Could you describe the first few days of the initial response period? 38 
Beth: I don’t have the clearest recollection of that part of things. You know, 39 
there must’ve been a certain amount of back and forth over the 40 
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weekend that I don’t really remember. But I certainly, you know, 41 
remember Rich Besser convening a group of people and us, you know, 42 
kind of talking about what the next steps were. But I don’t have – I 43 
don’t remember all that clearly exactly what, you know, we did during 44 
that next week to tell you the truth. 45 
Barbara: Were you involved in the standup of the EOC at all? 46 
Beth: To the extent, I mean, at the time when we were first standing up the 47 
EOC, you know, as the Acting Director of the Center, you know, the 48 
way that these – the EOC structure is organized, I think, somewhat 49 
depends is varied from response to response and it’s certainly evolved 50 
over the course of this response. But at the beginning of all of this, 51 
there was a place at the table for the center directors of all the 52 
relevant centers in addition to people who might have a role as sort of 53 
– official role in the emergency management structure or whatever it’s 54 
called, Emergency Command. Anyhow.  55 
 So as the Acting Director of the Center, I had a, you know, a 56 
recognized role to play, seat at the table, and certainly was involved in 57 
all of those early conversations from that perspective. 58 
Barbara: Did you have a sense in the early days that this was going to be a 59 
serious crisis?  60 
Beth: Well, crisis is a funny word. I think I certainly had a sense that it was 61 
going to be serious. And, you know, I believed our flu experts who said 62 
this is worrisome, you know, I think this could be serious and 63 
certainly we’d been hearing a lot of reports from Mexico that were 64 
concerning and made me think that it was going to be serious.  65 
 The whole question of was it going to be a crisis and how was this all 66 
going to be played out, I think is a – another question altogether. I 67 
have found in general in dealing with these kinds of responses that it’s 68 
better not to think of it that way. And it’s better to just think of what 69 
needs to be done, you know, try to think about thinking the most 70 
rational science based comprehensive way about what the way 71 
forward is, try not to forget things, try to, you know, consider all the 72 
considerations and not think about it as a crisis. That’s just my own 73 
experience. But, you know, that’s generally the way I tend to approach 74 
it. It’s serious. We’re public servants. We have to protect the public but 75 
not that it’s a crisis.  76 
Barbara: What did you feel were the key decisions that needed to be made early 77 
on? 78 
Beth: Well, early on we really were trying to figure out how – what was this, 79 
what was the, you know, how severe was this, what was the clinical 80 
spectrum of illness, how much had it spread, what was this virus, a lot 81 
of those very fundamental questions, once again, I think in form by 82 
what we were seeing from Mexico, which was suggesting that, you 83 
know, there were a lot of young people who were dying, and, you 84 
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know, a fair amount of mayhem in a certain kind of way. And, you 85 
know, we weren’t seeing that here in this country early on. We were 86 
seeing, you know, we were certainly seeing that it was spreading and 87 
that there were a lot of cases but we weren’t seeing that same kind of 88 
spectrum with a lot of very, very serious cases. And so a lot of the first 89 
questions had to do with, you know, why was that; were we missing 90 
things; was there something different in Mexico; was it the same 91 
virus, even, and what could, you know, sort of like especially was what 92 
our surveillance was telling us about this country accurate, or was 93 
there something else that, you know, was missing or that we hadn’t 94 
really understood or detected. 95 
 So I think early on, very early on, that was really a large part of the 96 
question. And in addition to some of the, you know, the scientific lab 97 
related questions about figuring out what was this virus, where did it 98 
come from, and some of those kind of very fundamental questions that 99 
were obviously being worked on in parallel. 100 
 Barbara: Do you think there was a sense within the organization that this was 101 
going to require an entirely different kind of response? 102 
Beth: Compared with… 103 
Barbara: Previous epidemics. 104 
Beth: Oh, previous flu epidemics. 105 
Barbara: Previous flu epidemics. 106 
Beth: Well, you know, there’s a lot of pandemic planning that had gone on, 107 
most of which I wasn’t very involved in. But there was a whole, you 108 
know, a whole infrastructure, and a whole mindset, and a whole 109 
paradigm in a way about influenza pandemics and about how to 110 
prepare for pandemic that was actually very well developed. And that, 111 
I think, was very different than, you know, previous emergencies even 112 
not to mention influenza pandemics. We had exercised this, we had, 113 
you know, all kinds of activity from the White House, of course a 114 
different administration, from HHS, all, you know, involvement from 115 
all sectors of government feeding into this pandemic plan; which, as I 116 
say, was very well developed with many, many tasks, and many, many 117 
segments of people doing this, and that, and the other thing. 118 
 And so some aspects of – of this, I think, early on felt familiar from the 119 
point of view of some of these exercises and I would say that while, 120 
you know, the scenario that people were mostly planning for in these 121 
pandemic planning did not turn out to be the scenario that happened; 122 
and that the fact that the scenarios were different, in fact, as I 123 
imagine you may have already heard, I think caused some difficulties. 124 
 125 
 But some of the basic, you know, this is what we do, this is how we 126 
start off, this is, you know, these are the questions we need to address, 127 
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these are the people that we need to involve, some of that we had 128 
exercised and I think that those exercises in fact turned out to be 129 
useful. Some of the conclusions of some of the exercises, I think, had 130 
already improved the way that we set up the EOC structure. Some of 131 
the difficulties that we had identified in the exercises, we had 132 
managed to fix already. And I think a lot of that and a lot of that 133 
thinking ahead of times, at time, especially in terms of the process 134 
kinds of things internally, really did help in terms of having the 135 
general flow of things feel somewhat more familiar than it might have 136 
otherwise. 137 
Barbara: Within your division, did you feel it was necessary to make 138 
modifications to any existing plans or structures that you had in 139 
place? 140 
Beth: Well our Center is largely responsible for this response. So we 141 
essentially, two of our – we have five divisions, one of them is a global 142 
division, five divisions, two of the divisions, one of them was – is the 143 
Flu division which is obviously 100 percent involved in this. Another is 144 
the Vaccination Program division which clearly was essentially, you 145 
know, a lynch pin in all of this. And the other two divisions also deal 146 
with respiratory disease and so have many – a lot of expertise both 147 
laboratory and epidemiologic expertise directly relevant to the issue 148 
and, of course, being all from the same Center, people are used to 149 
working together. 150 
 So we essentially suspended just about everything that wasn’t 151 
essential in order to, you know, focus our attention on this. 152 
Barbara: And as the threat emerged and persisted over the long term, how did 153 
your division respond to that? 154 
Beth: Well our Center, you know, this has been a difficulty I think all along. 155 
Many – there were a lot of things that didn’t get done. Many, many, 156 
many people from all across our center participated in the response. I 157 
think, you know, clearly there are some critical things that had to 158 
keep going, and in some ways, I think it was more difficult for the 159 
people that weren’t involved in the response because I think that, you 160 
know, there was generally one had to be careful about not sending the 161 
message that the other things were not important and to make the 162 
other people feel valued. 163 
 It was also, I think, difficult for the people that were not directly 164 
involved in the response to feel like they knew what was going on. And 165 
that was something that was very important, I think, to the rest of the 166 
Center leadership to under – to know what was going on given, you 167 
know, the magnitude of this both from a – just sort of a public health 168 
point of view and also from a point of – the point of view of the Agency 169 
effort. And that whole issue of keeping the rest of the Agency or in my 170 
case the rest of our Center abreast of the developments was actually 171 
quite difficult. They – I think many of them found it frustrating trying 172 
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to figure out who should they talk to, and those of us that were 173 
working in the response probably didn’t do as good a job as we should 174 
have in, you know, kind of going back and going to some of the regular 175 
center meetings and letting people know what was going on. 176 
Barbara: Could you talk a little bit about the internal communication processes 177 
that you used? 178 
Beth: Within the response? Well, you know, I think in general, this 179 
communication issue was very complicated and very difficult. Part of 180 
the reason is that much of the communication, you know, it was a good 181 
thing that lots of people above us were interested in this response in 182 
general. It was a good thing. And was a good thing – I think it’s a good 183 
thing that we as an Agency have recognized the importance of media, 184 
and communication, and partners, and all of those things. 185 
 But it makes for having sort of robust communication – it makes it 186 
very difficult and challenging because there are many sources of 187 
information, they – it’s very difficult to get them all channeled through 188 
a – a small number of people. It’s very difficult for those small number 189 
of people to figure out who are all the people that need to know. And – 190 
and then even the people who need to know often times don’t have the 191 
time to – to then sort of spread the word around to all the people who 192 
would like to know. 193 
 So I think all of it was quite – is quite – was quite challenging and 194 
quite difficult. I think that, you know, we did a reasonable job of this. 195 
We made some mid-course corrections that I think were helpful. We, 196 
you know, instituted sort of like an every morning report where, you 197 
know, all the task force leads, we would all sit down and just go 198 
through everything that, you know, as a group, everything that 199 
everybody knew and needed to know, that needed to, you know, go up 200 
and, you know, stuff that needed to go down. And I think that that did 201 
help. I think that the sort of incident command structure as sort of 202 
uncomfortable as I think it is for some of us who are not used to 203 
functioning in that sort of very militaristic hierarchical kind of 204 
structure, I think that it definitely has its advantages. Even within 205 
that, there were several kind of mid-course corrections where we tried 206 
to clarify, you know, who was the single person to receive xy 207 
information. That also, I think, helped. 208 
 But in general, I think, it – it’s – I don’t know concretely what else we 209 
could have done better. I think that objectively speaking, it’s just very, 210 
very hard when you have so many different inputs. You have many 211 
competing priorities. The priorities of the people above you may not be 212 
the same as the priorities of, you know, the response or of the staff 213 
within the response. And everybody wants to know everything 214 
yesterday. And so I think all of those things were quite difficult. 215 
 I think we did a reasonable job especially of the upward 216 
communication, our daily Chief of Staff calls, I think was really 217 
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impressive that all of the -- of senior people actually managed to sit 218 
down together every day and I think that that really made a 219 
difference,. The communication people had calls every day. We had 220 
obviously senior people within our response, you know, focusing on 221 
communication. And all of those things, I think, really helped.  222 
 I think that, and maybe you’ll hear this more from some of the other 223 
people that you’re talking to, I think from the point of view of the 224 
people that actually were working in the response, especially the 225 
people who had a lot of data that everybody was interested in. For 226 
example, the – the surveillance and epidemiology people. I think that 227 
in some ways this was extremely difficult for them. They, you know, 228 
were getting requests for data from everybody and their brother, from 229 
all over the place with, you know, and some from people who, you 230 
know, were very high up, people from the White House would be 231 
calling them directly. And it’s very difficult for them to say no, not 232 
really in a position where they had the power to prioritize, very, very 233 
overwhelmed with a huge amount – huge number of requests for tell 234 
me this, tell me that, tell me the other thing yesterday; and people 235 
who are very senior scientists, and I think really wanted to be 236 
managing their part of the response, according to what they thought 237 
was most important from a scientific point of view. And I think all of 238 
that was – was quite difficult for them. And I don’t know whether 239 
there were ways that the senior people in the response could’ve 240 
improved upon that. 241 
 But I personally, you know, wish that – that those folks could’ve felt 242 
less put upon than they did which I – I mean I think they did feel 243 
pretty put upon. 244 
Barbara: What were your primary sources of information? 245 
Beth: Well, you know, we – our prime – first – I mean scientifically or what 246 
was going on, our primary resources of information were from our own 247 
people. So, you know, from the people running our surveillance 248 
systems, from the people that were working with our international 249 
partners, from our laboratories, from, you know, those sort of various 250 
parts of our response once we got the vaccination program going, from 251 
the people that were dealing with the states with the vaccination 252 
program. Those really were the primary sources of information. I 253 
think the information from the point of view of what is it that other 254 
people are thinking they need, that probably came from someplace 255 
else, from our media people who are extremely, you know, helpful in 256 
terms of characterizing what the issues were and from, you know, the 257 
people in HHS, and who we would hear from daily about the sorts of 258 
things that they were concerned about and that they were interested 259 
in, you know, kind of managing or helping us manage or that kind of 260 
stuff. 261 
 But I think, you know, in the midst of all of this, I think we all did 262 
continue to rely on, you know, our science to figure out what indeed 263 
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was going on and I – as you probably already heard, or seen, we are all 264 
a bunch of people who, you know, believe in trying to actually figure 265 
out what is going on to the best of our abilities and use that to guide 266 
our policies, and our recommendations, and our actions.  267 
 I mean, we – I mean sometimes you could say to a fault, that’s what 268 
we want to do. I mean I think that the whole question of how do you 269 
make decisions with imperfect information and how long do you wait 270 
to make a decision, how much information should you have is always, 271 
I think, something that’s been, you know, hard for us as an agency to 272 
kind of figure out about where you come down in all of that; how 273 
nimble do we need to be; how correct do we have to be; It’s very hard, I 274 
think, and I don’t think that there’s agreement among all of us about, 275 
you know, what the answer to that is. 276 
 And obviously it depends on the situation. It depends on what the 277 
tradeoffs are and many other things. But it – it’s not, you know, it’s 278 
not straight forward. I think, as they say, and people have very 279 
different points of view about it and I think in this response, there was 280 
a lot of some of us felt like, come on, let’s go already. You know, we 281 
can’t wait forever. And others would say, wait a minute. You know, 282 
this could be wrong. It’s hard to know where to come down with all of 283 
that. 284 
Barbara: In dealing with this ambiguity, particularly related to the H1N1 285 
threat, within your division, how did you manage this decision making 286 
in the face of ambiguity? 287 
Beth: Well this isn’t – I would say – I mean most of this, you know, after sort 288 
of the early days I actually sort of became part of this response. So I – 289 
I actually have very little to do with my Center after, I don’t know, 290 
May or something or other. So I think the way we managed the 291 
ambiguity in the response was hopefully to recognize it and then 292 
usually somebody made a decision. And usually, it meant that, you 293 
know, somebody was pushed out of their comfort level one way or the 294 
other. 295 
 And I guess, you know, the decision is usually, okay, we are doing 296 
something now, or we are waiting. I would say usually the we are 297 
waiting people were – there were more of those probably than we are 298 
doing something. But it required making a decision. And sometimes it 299 
was a decision that was forced upon us by, you know, somebody above 300 
us saying the Secretary is going to say – wants to say, blah, blah. Or 301 
the Secretary wants to say something about blah, blah, what can she 302 
say? And then, you know, well, you just have to kind of, you know, 303 
deal with that. And that, often times, I think is – it was some of the 304 
issue. Some – sometimes the issues are more policy related issue like, 305 
you know, should we issue guidance on this topic right now or should 306 
we wait until we have more data. 307 
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 And, you know, for some things, you know, we have to issue guidance. 308 
So then do we issue the guidance – what do we say, you know, do we 309 
go with the pieces of science that we know, do we – how much do we 310 
consider, practical considerations, how much do we weigh the various 311 
– all these various components, could we wait to know a little bit more 312 
about the disease spectrum, you know. And – and, you know, as – 313 
there were certainly a number of guidance that we revised. And 314 
sometimes we revised them just because the situation changed, and 315 
we knew they needed to be revised. Sometimes we revised them 316 
because I think that our balance between, you know, strictness and 317 
feasibility shifted, which, you know, it shifts when you get a better 318 
sense of how severe the disease is, or how many people are getting 319 
sick, or who the people are that are getting sick, or any number of 320 
other – whether there’s going to be a vaccine, any number of 321 
considerations like that. 322 
 323 
Barbara: In terms of getting clearance for information to be released, how did 324 
you feel that process worked? 325 
Beth: Well, I was the final point of contact for clearance -- for clearance, for 326 
policy, for guidance, for scientific publications. And I think that you 327 
will hear a lot of different opinions about how that worked.  328 
 For many things, I was the final point of clearance here but they 329 
needed to be cleared at HHS. And that was a – a difficult sort of 330 
challenge which I think improved somewhat over the course of all of 331 
this. But, you know, realize this pandemic happened with a brand new 332 
administration, no HHS Secretary, really nobody pretty much at HHS 333 
when we started, no full-time – no whatever, permanent CDC 334 
Director, lots of people in acting positions all over the place including 335 
in Washington. And so this whole question of who needed to see what 336 
really changed a lot during the course of the response. And how much 337 
control they needed to exercise, and who needed to be exercising 338 
control also really changed. 339 
 But when things started, you know, I think, you know, it was just not 340 
really clear what needed to happen. I mean, so I – I can remember one 341 
of – a document that – an early document and may was in June, that I 342 
finished working on and sent for HHS to review and it ended up being 343 
circulated to every single op div in all of HHS for comment. And I 344 
received back a 20-page spreadsheet with, you know, 200 some odd 345 
comments from everybody and their brother. I didn’t know who they 346 
were, that I was supposed to – we were supposed to respond to within 347 
some amount of time. And I mean this clearly was not a feasible way 348 
to deal with an emergency. And I think everybody sort of realized that 349 
and said, oh, that’s not going to work, you know, we have to figure 350 
something else out. 351 
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 But there were a lot of those kinds of things that happened in the 352 
course of – of – of this response. There’s always the issue of, you know, 353 
how long does it take to get things cleared, I think that continued to 354 
be an issue which, you know, I don’t know that there’s a good answer 355 
for that. From my own perspective, I think sometimes the staff feel 356 
like they’ve, you know, they spend weeks working on something and 357 
they think it’s ready to go and unfortunately, it just isn’t ready to go. 358 
And it’s not a matter of, you know, the people take too long to read it, 359 
it’s that, you know, they did a great job but they didn’t actually 360 
understand or recognize all of the various policy issues. They, you 361 
know –it’s not understandable to somebody who’s not an expert in the 362 
area. Any number of ways that, you know, those were issues and so 363 
that, I think is always a, you know, a problem for people and, you 364 
know, it’s something once again I hope that we improved upon over 365 
the course of the response but it’s not easy. 366 
 Another aspect I think that we always struggled with is we had a lot 367 
of people working on this response, and they were all very 368 
enthusiastic, and they all thought that their own little zone was 369 
really, really important, and they really wanted to write something 370 
about it, and they really wanted to have, you know, a guidance to 371 
every, you know, to, I don’t know, the asthmatics with blond hair. And 372 
we didn’t have the best method for surfacing all these things early 373 
enough so that we could provide some context for the ones that were 374 
priorities, and people should work on, and the ones that were not 375 
priorities, and people should not spend their time working on. 376 
 And so this – this became an issue, especially became an issue for the 377 
people who were doing all of the central technical influenza related 378 
clearance which is sort of a level below me. I would get the things that 379 
they thought – that were kind of, you know, kind of big enough that I 380 
would need to read them. But those people sitting in this room, getting 381 
all of this stuff to review for technical correct – technic – technical 382 
correctness, were just inundated with these massive things about all 383 
kinds of topics, many of which, you know, were not appropriate. We 384 
didn’t need those things. 385 
 And so that was something that we tried several times to do 386 
something about, to say, look, for everybody’s benefit, for everybody’s 387 
moral, to respect everybody’s time, do not come up with an idea of 388 
something that you’re going to write something about based on 389 
whatever your, you know, group is that you’re working with and send 390 
it forward. Don’t do that. You know, if you have an idea, you know, 391 
this is the process to have somebody decide – help you decide if that’s 392 
a good thing to do or not. 393 
 I think we had some success with that. Not 100 percent success. I 394 
mean, even, you know, within the last, I don’t know, two or three 395 
months, I was – I had to say to people, somebody, you know, that gave 396 
me something and said, okay, this is ready for you to look at. I’d have 397 
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to say, -- I had to say, we’re not – this is not – we can’t – we’re not 398 
doing this. We’re stopping it. That’s not great. It’s not good to have to 399 
do that. 400 
 So, you know, as I say, I think that’s – that’s something that could use 401 
some more fixing although I’m not sure how fixed it can be. I mean, 402 
then the whole issue of the scientific communications, the media 403 
communications and how those fit together is a whole other story. I 404 
think in general, we did reasonably well here because our media 405 
people are so smart, and they are so respectful of the science, and 406 
they’re so able to take the science and, you know, make it something 407 
that’s understandable. And then our communicators, mostly Tom and 408 
Ann, you know, did a good job of that. And so I think we didn’t have 409 
the problems with that aspect of things that, you know, I’ve seen in 410 
other sectors and certainly, you know, we’ve had at some time – 411 
sometimes in the past. 412 
Barbara: Besides the media, were there things that come to mind that you felt 413 
were done very well? 414 
Beth: Well, I think in general we, you know, this – this was, you know, I 415 
mean none of these responses are easy. Now this one wasn’t – also 416 
wasn’t easy. I think this whole business of everything being in 417 
transition was particularly challenging. I think the whole business of 418 
getting the pandemic planning stuff and people in sync with what 419 
actually happened, and the people that are actually dealing with what 420 
was happening, was also very, very challenging. But – and I think 421 
that the question of how the people that really worked day in and day 422 
out in this, how they feel about the response, and were they valued, 423 
and a lot of those kinds of things, I think, are still not completely clear 424 
to me. 425 
 But I think in general, in terms of people really trying to, you know, 426 
work together, figure out what’s going on as best they could, provide 427 
the best information as quickly as possible, and really, you know, try 428 
to prevent illness and death, and work together to try to do that. I 429 
think in general, the – that sort of unifying spirit was pretty well, you 430 
know, maintained with some, as I say, I think that in some ways it’s 431 
easier for people, those of us who at least have some – are able to see 432 
the bigger picture from, you know, talking to people in Washington, or 433 
you know, understanding what’s going on all across the response, 434 
some of the people who were very important leaders in a particular 435 
sphere, but maybe, you know, didn’t have the opportunity to hear 436 
much of that. That, you know, I think, I’m not sure how well that 437 
worked, and I’m not sure how well the people who were responsible 438 
for, you know, kind of communicating stuff down the chain, as they 439 
say, I’m not sure how well that worked mostly just because nobody 440 
had any time. You know, you just reach a… 441 
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Barbara: So looking back over the past year as the organization has responded 442 
to this threat, are there any recommendations you would make for 443 
future events? 444 
Beth: I certainly think that there’s room for improvement. How to frame 445 
that in the context of recommendations, I guess I would say that 446 
finding the time to let the rest of the agency know what’s going on in a 447 
more, you know, kind of regular kind of a way, I think might’ve been 448 
helpful from, you know, just thinking about things within CDC. You 449 
know, we – we snapped up a lot of people and we spent a lot of time, 450 
you know, detailing people from hither and yon. And I think that that 451 
engendered not the most happiest of feelings in some other parts of 452 
the agency. And I think if there were a way that we could have had 453 
felt that everybody was participating or at least knew what was going 454 
on in some kind of way, that perhaps that would’ve helped a little bit.  455 
 I think the other thing just once again from the internal CDC point of 456 
view, is that I do remain concerned about how all of the people who 457 
worked so, so incredibly hard on this, I mean, you know, I think of 458 
some of the people in the lab or the surveillance people who probably 459 
haven’t had a day off in a year, literally, who, you know, haven’t 460 
worked for less than 10 or 12 hours a day for a year, I just wonder how 461 
– how they’re going to feel at the end of all of this and I wonder if 462 
there was some ways in the course of this – this response that we 463 
could have, you know, at least made them feel like, you know, I mean 464 
we did try to – we did make them feel, try to make them feel 465 
appreciated, go visit the labs and tell – say all the time how much we 466 
really appreciated everybody. But I think sometimes the pressure, you 467 
know, to want information from people, to want them to be done with 468 
whatever the project is or part of this that we’re waiting for the 469 
information, and just a lot of sort of inundated with, you know, 470 
questions from all over the place. I’m a little con – I think if there were 471 
a way that we could control that, if there were a way that we could 472 
prioritize so that we could actually give people better guidance about 473 
do this but don’t do that, this request you really have to deal with, this 474 
other request you really don’t have to deal with, a way that we could 475 
have more control over what it is that we have to provide to other 476 
people. And I don’t know if that’s feasible. I mean given the course of 477 
some of these requests, for providing this to this person and that 478 
person, perhaps is not feasible to control that. 479 
 But I think from a Agency, people, moral point of view, it would be 480 
helpful if we could do that, if we could say, you know, to people above 481 
us, do not, you know, ask directly so and so for such and such. And, as 482 
I say, perhaps that’s not feasible but I think that there were probably 483 
a lot of people within our agency who would’ve been happy to, you 484 
know, have somebody be more of a wall than perhaps we were able to 485 
be. 486 
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 So those are some internal things I think that – that I could imagine 487 
that we could’ve improved. I think probably this whole business of who 488 
was responsible exactly for what got better but maybe, you know, 489 
could be – also could be a lot better.  And I think this issue of keeping 490 
people who have good intentions on a task which is actually an 491 
important one when you have so many people and so many things 492 
going on at the same time is something else that maybe, you know, we 493 
could’ve done a better job on. 494 
Barbara: Great. Well thank you very much. 495 
Beth: Sure. Thank you.    [audio ends496 
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1 
Interview #3. Steven Boedigheimer, MBA 
Deputy Director, Division of State and Local Readiness, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response  
 
Barbara: Good afternoon. We’re here today to begin the development of an oral 1 
history on the CDC’s H1N1 response strategy. And we hope this 2 
history record will be useful to future leaders by giving them the 3 
benefit of your experience with H1N1 as they confront new and 4 
possibly similar challenges. So let’s begin with a little background 5 
information on you. Could you give us your name and your position? 6 
Steve: My name is Steve Boedigheimer and I’m the Deputy Director of the 7 
Division of State and Local Readiness in the Office of Public Health 8 
Preparedness and Response. 9 
Barbara: And what brought you to CDC? What is your background? 10 
Steve: Well I spent several years in administrative positions in state health 11 
departments from coast to coast, Oregon, Delaware and then CDC.  12 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect of the H1N1 response? 13 
Steve: Over the last few months, I have co-led and then led the state 14 
coordination task force and the H1N1 response and the command 15 
structure here at CDC in the Emergency Operations Center. 16 
Barbara. Do you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 17 
Steve: It was in the spring of 2009 and I was in a little different role at that 18 
time. I was the CDC Sr. Management Official for the State of 19 
Arkansas on the staff of Dr. Paul Halverson the Director of Health in 20 
the State of Arkansas. And I functioned in the State Public Health 21 
Emergency Operations Center assisting the State in their response to 22 
H1N1. 23 
Barbara: Great. Do you recall how it was presented to you, the information 24 
about H1N1 and did it strike you as a crisis?   25 
Steve: Well it certainly struck me as an urgent situation. I don’t recall the 26 
exact means of communication but between information provided by 27 
CDC and the senior leadership at the Arkansas Department of Health, 28 
we recognized the urgency of the situation and immediately began to 29 
collaborate with CDC on a Arkansas response, if you will, to H1N1. 30 
Barbara: Could you describe generally those first few days of the response 31 
period? 32 
Steve: Well, in the spring of 2009, the Arkansas Department of Health 33 
established an incident command structure inside its agency and 34 
mobilized its Public Health Emergency Operations Center. So the 35 
typical components of an incident command structure were 36 
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established and the Arkansas Department of Health linked back to 37 
CDC monitoring the initial effort at – CDC’s initial effort at keeping 38 
state health officials informed through a national telephone call which 39 
was held in the spring to get things started. There were other CDC 40 
linkages out that occurred at that time both with epidemiologists and 41 
public information officers, and monitoring of email communications 42 
that came from CDC and certainly the website that CDC maintained 43 
to provide information to state and local health officials. 44 
Barbara: So were you involved directly in the day-to-day response?   45 
Steve: I was involved in the day-to-day response. I had a duty station in the 46 
Public Health Emergency Operations Center in Little Rock, Arkansas 47 
and helped the state health officials link with the appropriate subject 48 
matter experts back at CDC, use whatever means would be available 49 
to me to do that. 50 
Barbara: And when you came to CDC, how did your role change?   51 
Steve: Well it was looking at things from the other side of the lens if you will. 52 
On the CDC headquarters, I assumed a role here that had me 53 
immediately involved in both helping to shape a funding stream that 54 
put public health emergency response dollars in the hands of 62 55 
different projects around the country, 50 states, four cities, eight 56 
territories. And in the course of a relatively short period of time, from 57 
July 31st through the 28th of September, we put $1.35 billion worth of 58 
response funds out to our state and local colleagues in that regard, 59 
and then began to an enhanced means of keeping them informed and 60 
communicating with them. 61 
Barbara: Great. Can you give us any examples of day-to-day activities that you 62 
thought were particularly useful?   63 
Steve: Well, I think one of the things that was particularly useful was 64 
building on the initial experience in the spring of a national telephone 65 
conference call strategy to keep both the state health officials and 66 
their employees informed of what CDC was doing as well as a national 67 
call to keep local health officials informed of the CDC response and 68 
answering questions and so forth. So that was a strategy that was 69 
initiated in the spring but was certainly refined and built on in the fall 70 
of 2009. 71 
Barbara: And over the course of a year, has anything changed? Or is that still in 72 
effect? 73 
Steve: Well, it’s not in effect at this point. We stopped doing that as we 74 
transitioned in the nature of the response in January of this year. 75 
Over the course, however, from – of time from September through 76 
January, there were 23 separate telephone calls held for state health 77 
officials and local health officials. On average, probably the state 78 
health officials, there were 78 or so callers on those calls and given the 79 
number of health officials, that would indicate that more than one call 80 
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per state although we didn’t always have every state on the line. For 81 
our local health officials, there are a lot of them. I think our peak cal 82 
was over 640 individuals had called in from local health authorities on 83 
the one call we had in – in October. 84 
Barbara: You mentioned a particular call strategy earlier that you wanted to 85 
discuss in more detail. 86 
Steve: Well, if you’d like, what we could do is recreate the first three minutes 87 
of what one of these calls was like, and we pick a typical call, perhaps 88 
the 19th of January. As we got near the end of the national calls and 89 
our listeners can see how that call was handled and the approach we 90 
took; just the first three minutes, take us back in time and actually be 91 
there and experience that.  92 
Barbara: Great, let’s do that. 93 
Steve: Well let’s do that. If you would like to play the part of the operator, 94 
we’ll do a little bit of role play here and we’ll just create that – that 95 
call of January 19, 2010. 96 
Barbara: If you need assistance during the call today or you wish to ask a 97 
question, please press star one. I will now turn the call over to your 98 
moderator, Mr. Steve Boedigheimer. 99 
Steve: Welcome from Atlanta, Georgia, the headquarters for CDC for the 100 
weekly conference call with state health officials on the H1N1 101 
response. This call’s being conducted in collaboration with ASTDO and 102 
is intended to give you the most current information available on the 103 
H1N1 response, and to hear from you about the challenges you face, 104 
your questions and most importantly the suggestions you have for us 105 
at CDC. We value greatly your participation in these calls. On this 106 
January 19th, 2010, we have a full agenda as always. And before I 107 
check with our colleagues at ASTDO, Dr. Paul Jarris or Mr. Jim 108 
Blumenstock, to see if they have any opening comments, let me run 109 
down the agenda for today’s call. 110 
 We’re fortunate today in that we have Dr. Dan Sosin, the Acting 111 
Director of Public Health Preparedness and Response Office here at 112 
CDC with us in the room, and Dr. Steve Redd, the Incident 113 
Commander for H1N1. And, as usual, we have a fully packed agenda. 114 
We’re going to hear from Ms. Chris Kosmos on the status of the public 115 
health emergency response grants particularly the status of [inaudible 116 
0:08:26.6] Phase IV. The vaccine task force will provide us an update. 117 
We have Dr. Paschal Wortley and Dr. Tom Shimabukuro here to tell 118 
us about the activities of the vaccine task force. We’re going to get an 119 
update today from Dr. Greg Armstrong about the MMWR report that 120 
was out just recently on vaccine coverage. Also, from Ed Koszwoski, 121 
we’re going to have our epidemiology update today. And from Dr. 122 
Eugene McCray, from medical care encounter measures, we’re going 123 
to hear from them and the latest activities of that task force here at 124 
CDC. Probably touch on the N1 95 mask situation while we’re doing 125 
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that. Our communications update will be from Nadia Bellins today. 126 
And we’re going to spend a few minutes on the Harvard public opinion 127 
poll that was in progress just recently. We’ll hear from Kerry LaBelle 128 
about that. And as always, we’ll take your questions, and comments 129 
and suggestions between speakers as we move ahead with this call.  130 
 So again, thank you for participating in today’s call.  131 
 And that would be exactly pretty close to what it was like had you 132 
been participating on the 19th of January, 2010, as we opened this 133 
national call. 134 
Barbara: Great, thank you. This brings us – brings a good question up about 135 
inner agency coordination and how effective do you feel the CDC’s 136 
ability was to coordinate with other agency? 137 
Steve: Well, the part of the response that I was particularly engaged in had 138 
to do with coordinating with state health officials and local health 139 
officials. And I think that we had communication mechanisms in place 140 
to get a fair idea of some of the challenges that they were facing. The 141 
national calls that we held each week, the one we just re-enacted for 142 
state health officials, gave us a pretty good idea of the challenges and 143 
concerns they had. The weekly call with local health officials also gave 144 
us some insight into some of their concerns, and issues and 145 
suggestions. The first time, for example, that we heard about a local 146 
health jurisdiction that expanded vaccinations beyond the target 147 
groups in the fall, the first time we heard about that was on a national 148 
call like this from a small jurisdiction in the state of Washington.  149 
 In addition to that, we had other means of communication in place, 150 
weekly calls with the leadership of the Association of State and 151 
Territory Health Officials for example, and the National Association of 152 
County City Health Officials. So we were in good connection with 153 
leadership. We established this part of the state coordination task 154 
force a program where we would bring liaison officers in from those 155 
two national associations and they would spend the weekdays with us 156 
here in Atlanta in our Emergency Operations Center with the state 157 
coordination task force and sit in on the meetings that we were having 158 
to discuss policy, and strategy, to carry out a national vaccine 159 
campaign. 160 
 So we had the ability to communicate directly through national calls, 161 
through leadership calls, and actually have representatives of national 162 
associations sitting with us in the Emergency Operations Center as 163 
part of our state coordination task force. So we’re thinking that we are 164 
much further ahead with this national response than perhaps where 165 
we might have been in the past with the way this was approached. 166 
Barbara: And have these practices been institutionalized now for future events? 167 
Steve: Well, excellent question. We’re working in that direction. We certainly 168 
are trying to capture all the lessons learned through after action 169 
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reports, in progress reviews and are in the process of writing that 170 
down into more of a procedure. The state coordination task force, for 171 
example, is capturing an organizational design, the methodologies and 172 
protocols used in the national calls, the way we worked with liaison 173 
officers as we call this, the representatives and national association, 174 
and getting that down in writing so we can use that in the future. 175 
Barbara: Thinking back where you derived your information, where did it 176 
mostly come from? What were your sources of information? 177 
Steve: Well, certainly the examples that I just gave. I think another useful 178 
tool that a few of us utilized which may not be captured in an after 179 
action report was simply pick up the phone and contact somebody, in a 180 
state health department, or a local health department, that we knew 181 
or had worked with in the past that was in the epicenter of the 182 
response, and validate the information, maybe gain some insight that 183 
we hadn’t had. For example, I would pick up the phone and call the 184 
Deputy Director in Delaware, Dr. Paul Silverman, and ask him his 185 
perspective. Or pick up the phone and call the health officer or the 186 
chief operating officer in the Arkansas Department of Health and say, 187 
“What are you hearing? How’s it working? What do we need to know 188 
that maybe we’re not getting at?”  189 
 And those little test methods, if you will, to get what one might get 190 
ground truth, I think, were particularly useful. 191 
Barbara: In thinking about decision making over the course of the history of 192 
H1N1, what do you think were the key decisions that needed to be 193 
made early on in the first few months? 194 
Steve: Well, you know, this many faceted response and I’m sure that there 195 
were key decisions most certainly in the vaccine area, in the 196 
epidemiology area, medical care and counter measures, and so forth, 197 
across our command structure. Early on, community mitigation was a 198 
major issue. So we have subject matter experts in all those areas. I 199 
think in the area that I’m most familiar with, in the state coordination 200 
task force, one of the challenges we faced and key decisions was how to 201 
organize ourselves inside of CDC’s incident command structure to 202 
bring to the forefront the concerns and issues of state and local health 203 
officials who were actually carrying out the vaccine campaign, who 204 
were actually making decisions about community mitigation, and were 205 
facing those challenges in epidemiology and surveillance.  206 
 And so for us at CDC, early decisions were how to organize a part of 207 
our internal incident command structure, how to design that interface 208 
between CDC and state and local health officials. And particularly one 209 
of the decisions as a – in a challenge is how do we function across 210 
these categorical areas where command structures were set up in the 211 
Emergency Operations Center around community mitigation or 212 
epidemiology and surveillance. How does the state coordination task 213 
force design itself and interface across the command structure so as 214 
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not to be a bottleneck or barrier, but can facilitate, leverage the effort, 215 
to gain better information from the field as we say at CDC, where our 216 
colleagues are state and locals are carrying out this, and how do we 217 
make sure that we leverage that effort for good communication. One 218 
example might be working with our JIC, our Joint Information 219 
Center, to identify a daily – the need for a daily email message that 220 
contained H1N1 related information aimed directly at state health 221 
officials and local health officials, collaborating with the Joint 222 
Information Center to establish that type of communication and put it 223 
out there without, in some way, interfering with the activities that 224 
were already underway inside the command structure. 225 
 So as I think anxious as people might be to hear how we might make 226 
decisions impacting the public. In fact, some of our challenges were 227 
upstream from that, how to make decisions about our internal 228 
operation so that we could achieve the ultimate goal of getting timely 229 
accurate information, and hearing what was going on in the field, and 230 
putting that information in the right hands of the right people inside 231 
our CDC command structure. 232 
Barbara: Great. You’ve mentioned several times the – after the activation of the 233 
EOC that you had additional resources deployed to support you. Did 234 
you find that this was something that needed to be longer term than 235 
you planned on? 236 
Steve: I think one of the challenges is to stand up an internal response 237 
structure in a timely way with the right expertise and getting it in the 238 
right places at the right time. The state coordination task force inside 239 
the incident command structure here was the last task force to stand 240 
up. So identifying where the CDC employees were at that could 241 
enhance that effort, and to get them in position in a timely way was a 242 
challenge that we struggled with, I think, early on.  243 
Barbara: Can you talk a little bit about your process of doing that? 244 
Steve: Well, we tried the standard approach of the Emergency Operations 245 
Center reaching out across CDC to identify individuals that would be 246 
available to come and be part of the task force. But frankly, the most 247 
effective way was for our own individuals, for example, myself, pick up 248 
the phone and call people around CDC. The informal approach 249 
actually worked faster for us to identify talented people and get them 250 
onboard quickly to offer the support. So I think we – we still have 251 
some growth to do in that area, finding and getting people placed in a 252 
timely way.  253 
 We also worked to provide people in our task force in the field as we 254 
say. Over the course of this event, the state coordination task force 255 
worked with probably 49 different people, CDC employees, to get them 256 
placed in 21 different states, or territories or cities to accomplish 37 257 
different missions, if you will, to assist that jurisdiction in the H1N1 258 
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response. We have other parts of CDC’s command structure like 259 
epidemiology that could provide epi and surveillance support.  260 
 But in our task force, we were looking for public health advisors that 261 
could assist a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia in ordering 262 
vaccine in a timely way; or identifying somebody at CDC that could 263 
spend a weekend in the District of Columbia observing a mass 264 
vaccination clinic and give them advice on the movement of people and 265 
supplies and so forth to enhance their effort to manage a group of 266 
people and expedite vaccinations in that mass vaccination setting. 267 
 So finding those kinds of people at CDC was also somewhat of an 268 
informal process and somewhat of a formal approach with the 269 
Emergency Operations Center advertising and looking for the right – 270 
right individuals. 271 
Barbara: Thank you. Looking back over the past year, are there any challenges 272 
that you recall where you think – wish you would’ve done it 273 
differently? 274 
Steve: Well, that’s a good question. I would like to think that we could move 275 
a little faster in standing up our response, that in the future we won’t 276 
have to re-invent how a state coordination task force would – would 277 
function in a broader incident command structure, that we would be 278 
able to turn to a boiler plate procedure as at least a starting point for 279 
how to manage national calls with the right subject matter experts 280 
and manage the timing and so forth. We learned a lot from this 281 
experience. And I think we will benefit from that in the future. 282 
Barbara: Do you have any other specific recommendations that you would make 283 
for future leaders? 284 
Steve: Experience is always helpful. So I would think that if we can identify 285 
people in our organization that have experienced what we have just 286 
experienced with the H1N1 response, and turn to the experience 287 
perhaps along the lines of something that we’re doing today, recording 288 
for history what we have been through and drawing from that, or 289 
going right to individuals that have been there and done that, and 290 
taken what they’ve learned from it, and expanding on that as we face 291 
new challenges. 292 
Barbara: Great. Thank you very much. 293 
Steve: Thank you.  [audio ends 0:22:37.3]294 
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Interview #4 Jay Butler, MD 
Director, H1N1Vaccine Task Force 
 
Jay: Jay Butler. I’m Director of the H1N1 vaccine task force. It is February 1 
the 18th, 2010, and we’re in the sound stage at the CDC in Atlanta, 2 
Georgia.  3 
Barbara: Thank you. We’re here today to develop an understanding of the 4 
history [inaudible 0:00:17.6] background information on you. Could 5 
you tell us a little bit about yourself, your training, your medical 6 
specialization and what brought you to CDC? 7 
Jay: Okay. I’m an infectious disease physician, board certified in general 8 
internal medicine, general pediatrics and infectious diseases. I’ve been 9 
with CDC a little over 20 years now. While I was a resident at 10 
Vanderbilt, a number of my mentors had been through the EIS 11 
program. For a couple of years, I kept saying why would I be 12 
interested in the CDC? I want to be an infectious disease doctor 13 
working in an academic center. But somewhere along the way, I began 14 
to – to cave a little bit and got interested, applied to the EIS program, 15 
spent two years with the Wisconsin Division of Public Health, came to 16 
CDC as a preventative medicine resident for a year in the respiratory 17 
diseases branch, and stayed on as a – a staff member; spent seven 18 
years with the respiratory disease branch in Atlanta including a year 19 
that – in there that I was with the viral special pathogens group 20 
during the hantavirus response in 1993. Went to Alaska in 1998 with 21 
the Arctic Investigations program and was there until 2005. And then 22 
for four years, spent time on a detail to the State of Alaska initially as 23 
the state epidemiologist and later as the State Chief Medical Officer 24 
serving as the State Health Officer during my last two years with the 25 
state. 26 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect of the H1N1 response? 27 
Jay: Since June, I’ve been Director of the CDC H1N1 vaccine task force.  28 
Barbara: And when do you – can you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 29 
Jay: I can recall the moment very clearly actually because I was not at 30 
CDC in Atlanta at the time. I was actually attending the American 31 
College of Physicians’ Conference in Philadelphia finishing my term as 32 
governor of the Alaska state chapter. In sitting in the convocation 33 
ceremony and being a little bit ADD, I was getting restless and I 34 
pulled out my Blackberry and saw some emails about a new swine flu 35 
strain that had been isolated in children in Texas and California. And 36 
remember thinking at the time, this does not sound good and 37 
particularly with two separate geographic locations. It raised some 38 
concerns. And as I was leaving the convocation call, I ran into Greg 39 
Poland who is well known as a – someone who’s done quite a bit of 40 
research and promotion of vaccines and we were talking about it and 41 
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both had the same impression that this did not sound – sound good at 42 
all. 43 
 The next day I had traveled to Washington for a meeting. I was Chair 44 
of the ASTO vaccine and infectious diseases subcommittee at that 45 
time and I think I didn’t spend more than about 30 minutes in the 46 
meeting because the news about Mexico had come out that morning. 47 
That was a Friday morning. And I was pretty much in and out of 48 
conference calls the rest of the day. Was at the meeting with some 49 
ASTO staff and I remember we were saying, well what’s next. And I 50 
said, I’ve got to go home. I’ve got a state that I need to be in during 51 
what sure sounds like is going to be an influenza pandemic. 52 
 So I returned to Alaska. The next month and a half was very hectic. 53 
We actually were one of the last states to actually see disease but 54 
certainly being ready for when the virus would eventually get there 55 
was a big part of my job. The time came through both some pushes 56 
and pulls to be leaving the state of Alaska and the opportunity came 57 
up to come to CDC to head up the vaccine task force, and I arrived 58 
here around June 21st of 2009. 59 
Barbara: Do you recall how the information initially was presented when you 60 
first heard about H1N1? Was it – did it give a sense of a potential 61 
crisis? Was it matter of fact? What were kind of your emotional 62 
responses to reading these emails?   63 
Jay: Well it was very matter of a fact – matter of fact. And, of course, I was 64 
at that time getting it from outside of the – the Agency. I wasn’t 65 
getting a lot of inside information. And it did strike me – there was – 66 
seemed to be an avoidance of using the word pandemic, at least in the 67 
official communications yet everything that was developing over the 68 
next several days certainly gave every indication that this very well 69 
could be the beginning of the next flu pandemic. 70 
Barbara: So you mentioned you went back to Alaska. But when – what did you 71 
actually do in terms of making preparations and taking steps to be 72 
prepared? 73 
Jay: Well before I even left Washington that day, had a conference call 74 
with our preparedness director and we have spent a lot of time like 75 
many state over the past four years preparing for the next influenza 76 
pandemic. The concerns about the H5N1 Avian Influenza certainly I 77 
think has been a big driver in that. We had done a number of drills 78 
even full cabinet-level tabletops with the Governor and Lt. Governor 79 
of how we would deal with an influenza pandemic. So in many ways, 80 
we had the drill laid out. 81 
 The biggest issue was okay this is not H5N1. It does – we don’t know 82 
what the mortalities – there’s a lot of things we don’t know and it’s 83 
also not on the other side of the world. It’s in our country now. What – 84 
what do we do? And so a lot of the work was adapting the plan to the 85 
situation that was actually evolving.  86 
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 Beyond that, reaching out to partners in Alaska, there’s only one local 87 
health department but we also work with the tribal organization. So 88 
getting everybody at the table and then working with other 89 
departments within state government and, of course, making sure 90 
that the Governor is aware of what’s going as well as the 91 
congressional delegation in Washington. And that was – that was 92 
actually one big part of my job each day was to provide a briefing in 93 
the form of an email to our congressional delegation as well as to the 94 
Governor’s office. 95 
Barbara: Did you feel you got enough information? Were you satisfied with the 96 
information you were getting? 97 
Jay: Yes. One of the – the best things that happened early on was the daily 98 
conference call, and those occurred about midday for us in Alaska. I 99 
think it was later in the day on the – the east coast. And those were 100 
occurring seven days a week early on. And there were other calls as 101 
well. But that provided a great opportunity to get information directly 102 
from the subject matter experts at CDC, and then also to have 103 
discussion with the other state health officers to find out what were 104 
some of the issues they were dealing with. And that was a great way 105 
to have a heads up on things that we may not have yet had to deal 106 
with. 107 
Barbara: As you were developing your response, did you discover that you 108 
needed to make modifications to these existing plans or processes 109 
within your organization? 110 
Jay: Yes. The – the planning was very beneficial. But the plan is not a 111 
protocol. It helped us to think through the issues that we needed to 112 
deal with but the pandemic that was arriving was a little different 113 
than the pandemic we had planned for in that a lot of the plans were 114 
built around a worst case scenario of either a 1918 type pandemic or 115 
an H5N1 type pandemic with a very mortality rate.  116 
 As it turns out, of course, this was a – a different kind of epidemiology. 117 
It was a virus that primarily impacted young people. And if you look 118 
at it as a pediatric pandemic, it was a pretty bad one because a lot of 119 
kids and young adults died. If you look at it in comparison to seasonal 120 
influenza, it may not seem like it was that bad because that’s a bug 121 
that normally kills the elderly, yet the elderly were relatively spared 122 
by the H1N1, at least so far. 123 
Barbara: In terms of outside coordination with other agencies or even with 124 
other parts of CDC in your position in Alaska, how was that 125 
communication – how did that work? 126 
Jay: A lot of the communication was built on existing relationships. And 127 
that’s probably where the planning that occurred before the pandemic 128 
ever developed really helped because, as they say, an emergency is a 129 
terrible time to be exchanging business cards. So we also had the 130 
advantage of having it being a small state population wise. So the – 131 
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having been in the role for a couple of years, you basically knew people 132 
and even people that hadn’t been directly involved in some of the 133 
planning, it was easy to reach out to them.  134 
And a good example was developing policy for school closure. That was 135 
one where some of the – the guidance coming out of CDC didn’t seem 136 
to, at least at that time, fit our situation in Alaska. Very quickly, we 137 
worked with the Commissioner for the Department of Education. He 138 
set up a conference call with all of the – the superintendents in the 139 
state. I was able to provide a briefing to them and talk through some 140 
of the issues surrounding school closures. And more importantly, 141 
listen to them and hear what some of the concerns they had because 142 
while there’s the health aspects of school closure, there’s also social 143 
aspects that we had to think about of people who were in an absolute 144 
panic and concern that we weren’t responding appropriately. There 145 
may – that’s a factor that we had to consider in terms of making 146 
recommendations within the state of what to do about when and for 147 
how long to close schools.  148 
And that was probably – an important role was to help people look 149 
ahead because these superintendents, particularly in the smaller 150 
school districts, really had not been often times as much involved in 151 
the planning. And helping them to think through the issues of well if 152 
you close the schools, what are you going to use as the threshold to 153 
reopen. And when you began asking questions as well as just giving 154 
information, it was – it really created a great dialogue to be able to 155 
work through the problems that were often times unique in each of the 156 
– the school districts which really ranged from multi-cultural urban 157 
school districts like Anchorage to the North Slope School District. I 158 
don’t know the exact population but the land mass is about the size of 159 
the state of California. It’s a very different type of school district than 160 
anywhere else probably in the country. 161 
So it was – it was good interaction. It was good communication. It was 162 
a lot of fun, I’d have to say because none of us knew exactly what we 163 
were doing. We were doing the best, making decisions on the 164 
information as it come in – it came in. And we had a good – good  165 
Barbara: In terms of deciding what information to put out to the public and 166 
balancing the need to inform the public and yet being cautious about 167 
creating a panic, how – how – what was your process of determining 168 
what information should be released? 169 
Jay: Well, I’m going to go with the assumption that this question is still 170 
based on my – my job during the first two months of the pandemic 171 
response as the state health officer. We had worked with our Office of 172 
Public Affairs very closely throughout the planning period. So there 173 
was a certain amount of okay, this is not just a drill. Let’s do what we 174 
– we trained for. And that aspect was – was very good. We had already 175 
planned through who would be spokes people. I – I was the primary 176 
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spokesperson. We had some backups as well. And it really became 177 
fairly routine. 178 
 We put out daily press briefings although we – we actually pulled back 179 
a little on that because again, we were not one of the states that were 180 
seeing the early disease. And so everybody wanted to know was it here 181 
yet. Is it here yet? And we kept having to say, no, it’s not here yet. 182 
This is what we’re doing to prepare. For instance, when we began to 183 
get anti-virals into the state, we were able to describe that process. 184 
We, at that time, just by chance were also opening a new state 185 
virology lab so we were able to describe the new technology and new 186 
capacity in the state lab that was really remarkable timing that we 187 
had that just in time for the number of specimens that we were going 188 
to see coming in pretty soon. 189 
 And then once we actually had a case diagnosed in state, we were able 190 
to have a briefing, and have the – the kind of – provide the 191 
information to the media in the way we wanted. It – we did have some 192 
surprises before then thought. Of course, it was getting into mid-May 193 
and we had the cruise season starting and we had cruise ship 194 
passengers with influenza like illness. Specifically, we had a 195 
passenger that was in Alaska waters in a ship that had already had 196 
ports of call in Alaska that had H1N1 infection diagnosed in 197 
Washington State. And so coordinating that and helping people feel 198 
that particularly given the locals the appropriate guidance of how to 199 
deal with that was a challenge. And that was one of those issues 200 
where working with the – the media was a little more challenging 201 
because it was a weekend, and trying to communicate with some of 202 
the small towns where the ship had stopped was – was a challenge.  203 
 But ultimately we planned ahead for some of the milestones we knew 204 
we’d be hitting like the first cases and the first death to be able to be 205 
prepared for how we would reach out to the media, and plan to have a 206 
press conference, and plan who would do the – the talking, realizing 207 
that we had to be flexible with that. For instance, did the Governor 208 
want to make any of the announcements? Or would she defer to the 209 
Chief Medical Officer which is – or other staff in the department 210 
which ultimately is what happened. 211 
Barbara: Okay, if you could talk a little bit about your current position and 212 
involvement with H1N1 at this time. 213 
Jay: Yeah. Well, the H1N1 task force was designed to be the component of 214 
the Emergency Operations Center that would address CDC’s role in 215 
vaccine – the national vaccine program. The goal of the national 216 
vaccine program was to provide the opportunity for immunization to 217 
every American who wished to be vaccinated. So the components of 218 
the task force included an implementation team to work with the 219 
states to develop their state programs, a distribution team that would 220 
really be responsible for the logistics of receiving vaccine from the 221 
manufacturers and then getting it out to states and to providers 222 
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around the country, a vaccine safety monitoring team recognizing that 223 
this was a vaccine that had never been used before and because of 224 
some of the experience surrounding the 1976 swine influenza 225 
campaign, there were going to be safety concerns, and that we wanted 226 
to make sure we really had our finger on the pulse of the safety 227 
aspects of this vaccine.  228 
 There was a team assigned to assess coverage of vaccinations so that 229 
we can understand better who was being vaccinated and who wasn’t 230 
and to get that data as quickly as possible to be able to adjust the 231 
program as needed. And we had a – have a vaccine effectiveness team 232 
to be able to determine what’s the clinical impact as well as the public 233 
health impact of the vaccination – of the vaccine in the clinical setting 234 
as well as the program at the public health level.  235 
Barbara: How did you get the information about who was vaccinated? 236 
Jay: The information on who was vaccinated initially came through the 237 
countermeasures response administration forum which was designed 238 
to collect data primarily on the number of doses administered by age 239 
group. And I’d have to say that was probably something that worked 240 
in very few states because there was so much that was happening at 241 
that time, so much work going on. It was very difficult to get that 242 
information.  243 
 Now at the same time, we had started the weekly national H1N1 244 
vaccine survey or – I take that back, NHFS, National H1N1 Flu 245 
Survey, which was a telephone based survey, self-reported data, but it 246 
was a way to quickly get information on the proportion of the 247 
population that had been vaccinated. And then we also had the 248 
BRFSS, the national survey that is done annually and there was a 249 
specific H1N1 component to that to provide monthly data that would 250 
give us more of a – a drill down into risk categories such as pregnant 251 
women or health care providers. 252 
 The NHFS data is usually available late the week after the survey is 253 
completed. For instance, today is Thursday and I just, about an hour 254 
ago, received the data for the week ending February 13th. 255 
Barbara: Do you have any recommendations for improving the way that this 256 
information could be gathered and brought to CDC? 257 
Jay: Well, one of the questions that we’ve been asking ourselves is whether 258 
or not our – our survey techniques are fairly complicated in terms of 259 
the – the sampling methodology and statistical analyses, tell us that 260 
much more than the – the quick and dirty polls. And we actually have 261 
supported some polling data also through the Harvard Opinion 262 
Research group. And then we also – we’ve – we’ve sort of compared it 263 
to polling done by some of the media outlets. And we found that the 264 
numbers are very similar. And it’s not entirely clear to us if that may 265 
be a way to get this information even more rapidly or not. Certainly I 266 
think it’s – it’s something for the – the next time around or for future 267 
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lessons in studying seasonal influenza vaccine; or it may be even other 268 
vaccines. We need to look hard at how we access specific risk groups.  269 
 One of the questions we certainly were interested in was whether or 270 
not pregnant women were receiving the vaccine or not. It was clear 271 
from the epidemiology that pregnant women had a unique risk to 272 
severe illness and death from this virus. So that was a very important 273 
group to have vaccinated.  274 
 At the same time, we had the issues of concerns about vaccine safety. 275 
There were all kinds of things on the internet about things that people 276 
would claim the – the vaccine did. Obstetricians are not clinicians that 277 
are often times that familiar with vaccinating their – their pregnant 278 
patients. So it was a learning curve for them. And at least some of the 279 
preliminary data suggests that that – that was an area where we may 280 
have had actually a major gain, that the coverage rates in pregnant 281 
women for H1N1 vaccine, as well as the 2009-2010 seasonal vaccine, 282 
were much higher than we’ve seen in – in any previous influenza 283 
season. 284 
Barbara: Can you talk a little bit about the process that you used in educating 285 
both the medical community and the public? 286 
Jay: Well actually you just reminded me of an important team in the task 287 
force that I forgot to mention earlier. And that’s the communications 288 
team. The communication team in the task force worked closely with 289 
the media office at CDC as well as the Joint Information Center in the 290 
Emergency Operations Center to help develop very specific messages 291 
for different target audiences.  292 
 There’s a partnership in all of the messaging, specific populations. 293 
And an important partnership was the one that was developed with 294 
ACOG, the – the obstetricians and gynecologists professional 295 
association who are very instrumental in terms of being able to reach 296 
out to their members and to provide the most recent information that 297 
we had in terms of safety of the vaccine as well as recommendations 298 
for use of the vaccine. 299 
Barbara: Were you involved in deciding what information was publicly 300 
communicated at all? 301 
Jay: Sometimes I was, sometimes I wasn’t. There certainly was multiple 302 
levels of decision making, and often times above the level of CDC even, 303 
the decisions about media outreach were done at the department level. 304 
There was feedback loops also from our partners in public health, 305 
particularly through ASTO, I think, was very useful. An example 306 
would be the national influenza vaccination week which normally 307 
occurs in late November, early December. We planned to schedule that 308 
for early December but out partners in the states were very concerned 309 
at that time because we still had demand for exceeding supply. And 310 
there was concern about too much of a media push encouraging people 311 
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to seek vaccination may not be well timed at that – at that time. It 312 
would only lead to frustration when people couldn’t find the vaccine. 313 
 So the decision was made at the Department of Health and Social 314 
Services level, Human Services level, to delay that into early January. 315 
Barbara: Internally within CDC, the communication processes that were in 316 
place, did they support you in – in providing the information that you 317 
needed? Or did you feel you needed to share information with different 318 
organizations internally? 319 
Jay: Well within CDC, I think the communication was fairly good. And 320 
certainly as we got into the more intense and busier times of the 321 
response, Tom Frieden and Ann Schuchat really became the media 322 
spokes people for the Agency. And I think particularly Ann became 323 
the – the person that became the spokesperson for the vaccine 324 
program and the entire pandemic response as well as Tom. But I think 325 
often times people will – will think of Ann when – when all this is 326 
over.  327 
 The – the communications within CDC was pretty good. I think 328 
sometimes there might have been different ideas at the department 329 
level, and how well those communications occurred, I think it’s like 330 
everything. There’s – it looks different from different positions and 331 
there has to be communication to work out the best way forward. 332 
 I have to say, I was very impressed with the savvy of some of the 333 
people at the department level who had ideas that I didn’t agree with 334 
at the time, or I may not even agree with now, but they were right in 335 
many – many instances. 336 
Barbara: Could you give some examples? 337 
Jay: One in particular, actually, what is one in particular that comes – 338 
comes to mind? One in particular that – I’m still not sure I’m entirely 339 
sure what was the right way, but having seen how some of the media 340 
played out, I think this was wise. We had some of the early coverage 341 
data in late November. And if we looked at the number of doses of 342 
vaccine that had been shipped, looked at the coverage data, and made 343 
an estimation of how much vaccine had actually been administered, it 344 
suggested that most of the vaccine was being administered within two 345 
weeks after shipping. That doesn’t happen with any other vaccine. To 346 
me, that was just incredible news to go forward with to be able to say, 347 
look, this system is working. This program is working. Even though 348 
the supply of vaccine is much more limited than we might want, we’re 349 
getting it out and people are getting the vaccine very quickly. 350 
 351 
 The view from HHS was these coverage rates are just horribly low. 352 
And, you know, there’s two sides of the same coin. You know, for us it 353 
was like we can’t give vaccine we don’t have and this is incredibly 354 
quick. I mean people who work in the vaccine field, that actually move 355 
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a lot of vaccine, were – were pretty impressed with it. Yet, say less 356 
than 10 percent of Americans had actually been vaccinated yet was 357 
considered very bad news from the viewpoint of HHS. 358 
 So the decision was made not to go forward with making that 359 
information part of the – the media update. I’m not sure – that’s one 360 
that I’m not sure yet if it’s entirely right but as – that was about the 361 
time we were starting to get a lot of criticism about lack of availability 362 
of the vaccine. We had the issue come up with a report that vaccine 363 
had been provided to Goldman Sacs, for instance. And I think 364 
everybody pictured Scrooge McDuck getting vaccinated while the 365 
pregnant women were not getting vaccinated. And there was a lot of 366 
very, I don’t know if I’d say negative media, but a lot of concern being 367 
expressed in the media that the program was not going well.  368 
Barbara: And there was also, I think, certain fear of the vaccine, public fear, 369 
rumor of fear? So how – how did you work to counter that? 370 
Jay: Yeah, the – one of the – the tools that I found very useful were – was a 371 
serious of three tabletop exercises that were hosted by Forrest Sawyer, 372 
that included both members of the media and the public health 373 
community. And I participated in the first and the last one of those. 374 
The first one was in Washington in September. The second one was in 375 
New York City actually on the day we were launching the – the 376 
program. Ann and Tom attended that one. And then the third was in 377 
November in Minneapolis and I attended that one along with the 378 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.  379 
 Those provided a great venue to have a prolonged conversation with 380 
some national – nationally prominent media people who were covering 381 
this. And to be able to make some very basic points that – I say basic 382 
in that they helped you understand the events once you understood 383 
them. For instance, to help everyone understand the concept of 384 
background rates of bad events, whether that be spontaneous abortion 385 
or Geombre Syndrome, that the vaccine wasn’t going to prevent those. 386 
So in the population, if there’s a set number of cases of Geombre that 387 
were occurring in 2008, they’re probably going to occur again in 2009 388 
but now you’re going to have a good part of that population that’s been 389 
vaccinated and there’s going to be a tendency to attribute that disease 390 
on the individual level to vaccine.  391 
 And Mr. Sawyer, I think was very good at, you know, really pushing 392 
some of the journalists and – in the tabletop, you know, it was a 393 
woman who was vaccinated, who the very next day lost her baby, 394 
blamed it on the vaccine. He went to the, you know, a journalist from 395 
ABC and said, are you going to carry that story? And when she 396 
equivocated he said, let me ask you the question again. Are you going 397 
to carry that story? And it really provided a good opportunity to 398 
discuss the concept of bad things happen every day. And we tend to, at 399 
the individual level, associate those bad things with whatever just 400 
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preceded it. But in the case of immunization safety, we really do have 401 
to look at it at a population level. 402 
 The other important part of that communication was to be able to 403 
discuss what we were doing for monitoring safety to help people 404 
understand that we – we were looking for anything that could happen, 405 
particularly through the vaccine safety data link, through review of 406 
[inaudible 0:30:17.3] reports, as well as some new tools, new systems 407 
to be able to assess vaccine safety.  408 
 And as time went on and more and more data accumulated that the 409 
vaccine was safe, it seemed like there was a – a collective sigh of relief 410 
and a lot less concern about whether or not the vaccine would be 411 
causing harm. Certainly in August, September, even in the month of 412 
the program itself, there were a lot of concerns, a lot of things out 413 
there on the internet. I used to talk about my midnight hate mail. I 414 
got very strange messages from people about how I’d be at the new 415 
Nuremburg trial, and how could I look myself in the mirror, and now I 416 
would be burning in hell for this vaccine program. Those seemed to go 417 
away once the – the program had a couple of weeks under its belt.  418 
Barbara: So looking back over the past year or since you’ve been – since June, 419 
in your position, how would you characterize the progression of the – 420 
of the event, of the threat, and where do we stand now? 421 
Jay: Well, the first three months of the program was really focused on 422 
trying to get vaccine into people. And we spent much of the time 423 
before October trying to set up a system that we thought could move 424 
large quantities of vaccine as quickly as possible. And at that time, my 425 
nightmare scenario was we were going to have such a glut of vaccine 426 
that our system to move it through was going to be inadequate. And, 427 
of course, what ended up playing out is that we had very rapid 428 
succession of declines and projections of – of production followed by 429 
actual production delays such that we really had a trickle of vaccine 430 
never exceeding about 20 million doses a week being available. And so 431 
we had to adjust the system to basically push that trickle out as 432 
quickly as possible being able to receive vaccine at the depot seven 433 
days per week, for example, getting orders from the states and 434 
transmitting them to the depots and having same day shipping out for 435 
overnight delivery. Doing everything we could to get the vaccine out as 436 
quickly as possible. 437 
 Despite that, it was very hard. Basically, we could not keep up with 438 
the demand for vaccine really until the new year. I’d like to say we 439 
had about a 28 minute period where the supply and demand matched 440 
exactly. By early January, we started having questions about why did 441 
the government order so much vaccine because for the first time we 442 
actually had vaccine that was – was in depots and not being ordered. 443 
Barbara: Is there anything that, looking back in hindsight, that you would’ve 444 
done differently? 445 
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Jay: Well there’s plenty of things that I think I might have done differently 446 
in a lot of different levels. I think some things that I probably, at least 447 
from my opinion, that it wouldn’t do differently, one is the way we did 448 
the allocation of vaccine; that the government purchased vaccine, 449 
made it available to states on a pro-rata basis so that it was as fair as 450 
possible. I think this was an interesting year because we could 451 
compare the H1N1 program to the seasonal flu program. And we 452 
heard – there was actually a shortage of seasonal flu vaccine this year. 453 
I don’t think it got as much media attention because of the H1n1 454 
vaccine, but we had some pretty concerning reports of price gouging 455 
for seasonal vaccine. Some – I know the Connecticut Attorney General 456 
was looking into reports of charges of over a hundred dollars a dose for 457 
seasonal flu vaccine. And I think we were able to avoid that with some 458 
of the planning that went into the H1N1 program back during the – 459 
the summer. 460 
 In terms of things to do differently, I think in our structure of the task 461 
force, it would’ve been good to have had more of the task force 462 
physically together. Our distribution team was out at corporate square 463 
the whole time and most of the team was based here on the Clifton 464 
Road campus in the Emergency Operations Center. Those people were 465 
so busy, the hours they were putting in were just amazing. They could 466 
not come over here for meetings. So all of our communication was by 467 
telephone. And I think as – as good as telephone and even video 468 
conferencing is, it’s still not the same as being able to be working 469 
alongside people.  470 
 Certainly there’s communication issues internally I think we could’ve 471 
done better. We had a lot of work go into being able to communicate 472 
but I think sometimes it created some – some busy work that, you 473 
know, just an offhand comment would turn into a request that 474 
suddenly five people were working on that I’m not sure anybody really 475 
wanted the ultimate product of all that work. But I think – this is why 476 
we’ll have after action reviews. And this is really an ongoing process. 477 
In fact, even having this interview now is interesting because it’s still 478 
not over. We’re still dealing with issues related to distribution of 479 
vaccine, and moving into the new era. We have vaccine that may be 480 
expiring in the next two to three months. If it’s not administered, what 481 
do we do with it? It needs to be disposed of appropriately and even 482 
determining what are the federal regulations for disposal of 483 
Thimerosal containing vaccines is, at least on this day, proving to be a 484 
bit of a conundrum because there’s some conflicting information out 485 
there. 486 
Barbara: Do you have any final thoughts or recommendations for people faced 487 
with similar situations in the future? 488 
Jay: Wells, I think where we’re at now is in a situation where we want to 489 
make sure that we learn from our experience and I’m – I’m very 490 
pleased that Dr. Frieden has set that as a priority for the Agency, that 491 
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we don’t lose the experience that we’ve had here. And I think that’s 492 
going to be important at several levels. First of all, how do we respond 493 
to the next pandemic which could be five years from now, maybe 50 494 
years from now; but certainly if it’s soon, it’s going to be important. It’s 495 
important for how we do seasonal flu vaccine programs in the future, 496 
particularly for 2010-2011. This is going to be a flu season unlike any 497 
other because it’ll be the first flu season after a pandemic. And if we 498 
look at the history of 1968 and 1957, they’re very different. I don’t 499 
think we really know quite what H1N1 is going to do, nor what the 500 
2010-2011 flu season is going to look like, when is it going to – when 501 
will we see the peak in disease? Will it even be H1N1? Will H1N1 502 
mutate? Will we – will it be like 57 and we’re going to end up having a 503 
B year next year? We – we really don’t know. 504 
 And finally, what can we learn from this experience for any emergency 505 
response, particularly one that involves mass administration of 506 
countermeasures. I think there’s things that we’ve learned or – and 507 
are learning from the 2009 pandemic response that combined with the 508 
2001 anthrax response will make us even more able as an agency to 509 
respond appropriately to future threats that require antibiotics, or 510 
vaccines, or other countermeasures.  511 
Barbara: Thank you very much.  [audio ends 0:38:23.6]512 
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Interview #5. Marty Cetron, MD 
Director, Global Migration and Quarantine Division 
 
Barbara: …name, your position at CDC, and maybe briefly give us some 1 
background on your training and medical specialization. 2 
Marty: Sure. My name is Marty Cetron. I’m the Director of Global Migration 3 
and Quarantine at CDC. And I’ve trained in infectious disease and 4 
internal medicine and with a focus in international health and tropical 5 
medicine. And I also trained in the EIS Program here at CDC in 1992. 6 
Barbara: Great. And how long have you been at CDC? 7 
Marty: Since 1992, 18 years next – next month. 8 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect related to H1N1? 9 
Marty: Yes, we’re still – we’re still involved in H1N1 in a number of different 10 
aspects, both the CDC related aspects. We continue to work on and 11 
focus on the community infection control issues and how to mitigate 12 
the impact particularly with respect to non-pharmaceutical 13 
interventions, social distancing, issues around schools and school 14 
dismissal, isolation of people at home while they’re ill, those issues on 15 
the national scale. Also, a member of the WHO appointed review 16 
committee that has been asked over the next several months to review 17 
the WHO’s response to the pandemic as well as its overall response to 18 
implementing the International Health Regulations over the last five 19 
years since their passage in 2005. 20 
Barbara. Great. Can you think back to approximately a year ago or so and 21 
recall when you first heard about H1N1? 22 
Marty: I think I first heard about H1N1, you know, early on in the process 23 
when there was – as part of the pandemic planning group at CDC for 24 
several years prior, we’ve had regular leadership meetings with Dr. 25 
Redd and the CDC director. And we were called together, I think, 26 
April 22nd perhaps the first time about the possibility of an unusual 27 
event in Mexico and certainly were meeting in those early crucial days 28 
around April 24th and 25th when the novel H1N1 virus was 29 
characterized and the initial cases were emerging. 30 
Barbara: Do you recall whether or not that first notice struck you as something 31 
that would become a potential crisis? Or did it seem not as serious?   32 
Marty: No, I think by the nature of the way we were convened in the 33 
conference room and by the information that Dr. Nancy Cox, Chief of 34 
the Influenza Division, was sharing, I think it struck everybody that 35 
this had the potential to be a serious situation although exactly how it 36 
would unfold, to what degree of severity, whether it would be 37 
efficiently spreading, those were all very important key questions. But 38 
I think we all appreciated the potential magnitude of recognizing a 39 
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novel virus that was causing disease in humans that also looked like it 40 
had been spreading from person to person. 41 
Barbara: Great. And were you involved immediately and in a day-to-day 42 
response for [inaudible 0:32:05.4] organizational processes adapt to it 43 
slowly? Were you moved somewhere?   44 
Marty: I and – and much of my division was involved right at the outset. As I 45 
indicated, we’d been part of pandemic preparedness planning and 46 
response and had worked on the national strategy, and the CDC plan, 47 
and had drilled and exercised for a number of years, and we stood up 48 
into the operational frame work and the emergency operation center 49 
immediately as things unfolded in April. The kinds of areas of focus 50 
for our – our program and divisions expertise really fell into two large 51 
categories.  52 
One was what, if any, international border responses might be 53 
appropriate, how might they be managed and to look at issues around 54 
possible containment of the threats from traveling around the globe; 55 
and the second was what specific strategies would be appropriate from 56 
a tool kit of interventions before the availability of vaccine in 57 
particular. So as I mentioned, the non-pharmaceutical interventions, 58 
in particular, the isolation of sick patients, the potential 59 
recommendations for family members – exposed family members to 60 
stay home or not, decisions around large gatherings, around schools as 61 
a place of transmission, around infection control in the home and in 62 
the community, those were the large program areas that we were 63 
responsible for as well as guidance development for international 64 
travelers and the consideration in how people would protect 65 
themselves from exposure. So those were the buckets that our 66 
program had planned for, exercised in and was called into the 67 
response to directly advise the incident commander. 68 
Barbara: And how well do you feel that your existing plans work? Did you need 69 
to make modifications or had your plans and your exercise scenarios 70 
been sufficient to meet the challenge? 71 
Marty:  Well, I think it’s sufficient to say that – that the pandemic that 72 
emerged upon us was not necessarily the pandemic that we had 73 
anticipated with the greatest probability. However, I think it’s also 74 
fair to say that all along in our exercises and our planning, we 75 
appreciated that any pre-event planning would need to have inherent 76 
flexibility to adjust to the reality on the ground. And so, I think there 77 
were many decision points along the way in which we recognized that 78 
we would choose options based on how things were unfolding.  79 
 Now, as a specific example, I’d point out that the United States had 80 
anticipated or developed a pandemic severity index, a framework for 81 
appreciating that all – not all pandemics would be of the highly most 82 
lethal sort akin to the 1918 virus and that depending on the severity 83 
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of the virus, different types of measures may or may not be 84 
appropriate.  85 
 So to that degree, our planning was appreciative of the need to be 86 
flexible. On the other hand, I would say most people were thinking 87 
about a pandemic that would emerge in southeast Asia, that may 88 
emerge as a combination of the H5N1 virus, and not necessarily a 89 
pandemic that would emerge directly in North America or would be of 90 
this specific type of swine-derived virus. So there were certainly many 91 
curve balls that required us to adapt and learn, you know, frequently 92 
especially in the early days with great degrees of uncertainty and 93 
having to make decisions early on about which pathways or directions 94 
one might take.  95 
Barbara: Great. And how – could you talk a little bit about that process of 96 
decision making when you encountered those areas of uncertainty?   97 
Marty: Well, those are always great challenges with the emergent of a new 98 
thread or a new virus and that is you don’t know at the beginning how 99 
bad is it going to be, how severe, how widespread will it – what will 100 
the scope of the outbreak be geographically, in a community 101 
containable, or will it spread extensively around the globe. One doesn’t 102 
know whether the – the casualty or the fatality rates will be very high, 103 
which specific populations will prove to be the most vulnerable, will 104 
the treatments be effective. Many, many uncertainties. How bad is it 105 
is probably the biggest one. The early news from – from Mexico was of 106 
young healthy people getting quite sick, being hospitalized and dying 107 
within very short time, within a week of coming to the hospital. So 108 
those types of uncertainties are – pose, you know, really strong 109 
challenges.  110 
I think the appreciation of communicating what we know, what we 111 
don’t know, what we’re doing to learn more and committing in our 112 
communications to telling people on a regular basis updating the 113 
information in the news is probably an important component of 114 
helping to ease the uncertainty. But often decisions have to be made 115 
within complete pictures and – and those are just the realities of 116 
dealing with public health events and crises. 117 
Barbara: Okay, would you be able to give any participate examples of 118 
something that fell into that category where you – you were thrown 119 
one of these situations and then ultimately it was addressed or 120 
resolved?   121 
Marty: Sure. I think probably the most poignant example of the challenging 122 
decisions that had to be made from our perspective in the scope of 123 
work that we deal with were issues around schools and school 124 
dismissal, and the potential for the schools to serve as big amplifiers of 125 
transmission. So we had early news from Mexico – Mexico City about 126 
severe disease and young health people dying, and then the first 127 
outbreaks into the United States were often returned – people 128 
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returning from vacations and spring break and heading back to 129 
schools and universities. And so, for example, the first outbreak in 130 
New York City in – in a high school in, I believe it was in Queens, 131 
posed some really difficult challenges. What should be the appropriate 132 
recommendation for whether those schools should stay open, or at 133 
what threshold they should consider dismissing students, if they 134 
should at all, recognizing the degree of disruption that that would 135 
place – that the intervention would place on the community, and 136 
balancing that against the risk of having a large scale outbreak of a 137 
very severe virus that was propagated in – in a school setting.  You 138 
know, this was also made very poignant by the – the death of a school 139 
official, administrator, principal or assistant principal.  140 
So these were very difficult decisions and I think what we saw was an 141 
appreciation of how difficult the decisions were, what CDC’s role 142 
would be in laying out the risk analysis, laying out some of the 143 
options, communicating those challenges directly to senior decision 144 
makers both inside the Agency and above – above us in the – in the 145 
thinking. And what you saw was an evolution of CDC’s 146 
recommendations around school dismissals based on learning more 147 
information about the virus. So as the outbreak progressed in New 148 
York City even among school children, it did not appear to our direct 149 
observation in New York City to be as lethal as the reports initially 150 
coming out of Mexico were. And this helped attenuate the guidance.  151 
So early on, the very last week of April, the guidance was for schools 152 
that were having outbreaks to consider in addition to keeping sick 153 
people home, to dismissing the other school kids to prevent explosion 154 
of the outbreak and spread. But as we learned more about the – the 155 
severity and the less severe nature of this virus and those outbreaks, 156 
we dialed back that recommendation to be one where schools would 157 
not necessarily dismiss wholesale but in fact would – would shift 158 
toward sick people staying home and making individual school-based 159 
decisions within – at the local level based on the nature of the 160 
populations within those schools. So schools that had very vulnerable 161 
children living on the margin who’s respiratory systems were 162 
compromised by underlying disease, may make one decision but 163 
schools in general with health populations may make different 164 
decisions. 165 
So CDC recommendations and guidance evolved and was flexible to 166 
the new learning that happened over the course of that first week. 167 
And so by May 5th, the school decisions and recommendations had 168 
been reversed. 169 
Barbara: Great. And how would you evaluate the sources of information in 170 
terms of adequacy? Were you getting enough information? Where did 171 
it come from? Where you frustrated by not receiving certain kinds of 172 
information? 173 
 213 
Marty: Well, in these kinds of settings and with a virus that spreads as fast 174 
as influenza where an incubation period might be only two days and 175 
the number of people infected could double every two days, you could 176 
never get as much information as you want, as reliable information as 177 
you want, stream or as fast as you want it. So the truth is that in 178 
these settings with this type of pathogen, Mother Nature has the hand 179 
up on us in terms of speed and in terms of the behavior of the virus is 180 
going to outpace our ability to know everything we’d like to know 181 
about it.  182 
 Even the lag time that we need to make decisions regarding whether 183 
to commit to making influenza vaccine against this strain, come with 184 
a long lag time, five to six months. And so decisions are always 185 
compressed, the making of those decisions is always compressed into 186 
that setting of uncertainty.  187 
The kinds of sources that we – we basically tried to cover as many 188 
basis as possible and, of course, ground truthing and getting eyes, and 189 
ears, and shoe leather epidemiology in the middle of the action where 190 
things are going on are the preferred and best approaches to getting 191 
information sources rather than relying on second and third hand 192 
reports. That’s not always possible and the public health response is in 193 
the context of a whole of society, a multi-department, multi-194 
government, multi-level response. And so information flows were 195 
coming in from many, many directions including media reports, 196 
including rumors, including stories from – from the ground at the local 197 
and community level, through state health departments, through 198 
partners in – in many different settings, through embassies in foreign 199 
governments, through our partners at ports of entry. And what I think 200 
one of the challenges and the exciting parts of – of this job is to try to 201 
filter, sift through, make sense, validate, evaluate the quality of the 202 
information from different sources, you know, what’s more credible, 203 
what’s less credible. But we sort of – when you’re hungry for data and 204 
you want it faster than its available, you – you try to take as many 205 
inputs as you can while prioritizing getting first-hand information on 206 
the ground by having boots on the ground where the action’s going on. 207 
Barbara: Great. So thinking back and sort of taking a step back and looking at 208 
big picture over the past year, are there – are there things that you 209 
think CDC should have done, or could have done differently? 210 
Marty: You know, overall, I’m really proud of the CDC response and that of 211 
our leadership and colleagues all the way down to every individual 212 
that was working so hard in their specific lane, filling their 213 
responsibilities. Clearly as we look back, there’s not only lessons 214 
learned in the positive sense of things that were done, I think, very 215 
well, but there’s also things that in retrospect you might look at and – 216 
and do differently. One of the things that I think that was done 217 
particularly well is the early communication that our CDC – acting 218 
CDC Director, Dr. Richard Besser, had at the time, was really 219 
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tremendous at his ability to provide factual information, particularly 220 
to the media and the public, the right – striking the right tone and 221 
balance between what’s known, what’s unknown, what we’re doing to 222 
resolve the uncertainties, what people can do to empower themselves 223 
to respond to the situation and it’s uncertainty, and communicating in 224 
abundance over and over again on a daily basis and updating that 225 
source of information. I think this is an area where CDC particularly 226 
shined in terms of that response. 227 
 I think the fact that we had been planning for a pandemic for three 228 
years or more had been exercising intensively, sometimes three or four 229 
times a year with live fire, real life simulations, really helped us all 230 
get comfortable in that environment and the Emergency Operation 231 
Center. In fact, in those early days, many people commented by day 232 
three or day four when the exercise might have ended, you know, you 233 
pinch yourself and you say, is this real or is this just end of exercise, 234 
time to quit and debrief. And in fact, the level of comfort of the 235 
interactions, understanding lanes, roles and responsibilities, ways of 236 
evaluating and patterns of responding were made much, much better 237 
because of all our preparedness, probably in ways that we will never 238 
fully appreciate, but to fully emphasize how important it is to go 239 
through that preparedness, the planning, the development, even if you 240 
modify your plans extensively, being familiar with the key decision 241 
points, the places where you want more information, the structures in 242 
which you’re going to share information along the cascade of partners, 243 
the systems was – was really very, very valuable.  244 
 That said, I think there’s also – it’s also clear that some of the things 245 
we had hoped to have in place when the pandemic would happen some 246 
point in the future, we weren’t – we weren’t ready for, hadn’t fully 247 
matured. So some of our alternative surveillance systems, some more 248 
novel approaches through surveillance, using the internet, or 249 
syndromic reporting from hospital emergency rooms, you know, we – 250 
we probably wished we had been further along in the development of 251 
some of those systems at the time.  252 
 Some of the cascading consequences around interventions, 253 
community-based interventions that have both significant benefits but 254 
also high potential for harm, all of the information about those 255 
cascading effects were under, you know, were being evaluated and 256 
researched. But those data weren’t fully matured by the time so we 257 
were still left with – with significant areas of uncertainty. 258 
 We hadn’t fully resolved some of the challenges around our mask and 259 
respirator use guidance. And, of course, those, you know, still remain 260 
as – as difficult contentious issues. Understanding fully the – the full 261 
spectrum of how to deliver counter measures from a strategic national 262 
stockpile, not just when to push it to a state but also how to appreciate 263 
the amount of time it takes on a – on a practical basis to get – to go 264 
from pills in a pallet in a warehouse to pills on the pallet in the mouth 265 
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of a patient in a timely way to make a difference from a public heath 266 
prospective are areas that, you know, we had not fully appreciated all 267 
the challenges in place in that and some of those issues didn’t fully 268 
come up in our exercises.  269 
 So these were clearly areas of improvement. Logistical and legal 270 
obstacles. Although there was an effort in legal preparedness 271 
planning, some of the things that came up with emergency use 272 
authorizations, or off labeled drug uses and things like that always 273 
remain a challenge. 274 
 I think we – as much as we always understood how important 275 
communications and the partners would be and I think we – you 276 
always under estimate the amount of person, hours and time it takes 277 
to simply communicate and make sure everyone who needs to know, 278 
and wants to know, and is hungry for information is getting that level 279 
– the kind of information they want in a timely manner and adjusting 280 
the resources of the response to be sure that we pay significant tribute 281 
to the importance of that communication, can always be improved on. 282 
 That being said, you know, the emergency communication group that 283 
Marsha Vanderford led in her team in the [inaudible 0:49:43.8] was 284 
really outstanding and stellar.  285 
And then finally, another lesson I think that was important to – to see 286 
in real time, this was one of the longest crises responses that I 287 
remember being engaged in at CDC over my 18 years. And we have 288 
done a lot of them. But even the bigger ones like SARS, you know, 289 
went on for three months and not 12 months.  290 
And so finding the right rhythm and pace to sustain a major public 291 
health response over that duration of time, having the resources in 292 
place in terms of numbers of bodies that were needed, making sure 293 
people were spelled to get rest time, I mean, I think that was the 294 
marathon nature of this as opposed to the sprint approach to big 295 
outbreaks and crises isn’t always appreciated till you – till you get into 296 
it. And that too proved particularly challenging. 297 
Barbara: Wow, that’s great. Wonderful. So I guess in – just in closing, I – are 298 
there – is there a particular recommendation or any other suggestions 299 
that you would – in general, that you would like to offer for the future? 300 
Marty: Well, a couple – I think a couple highlights is don’t underestimate the 301 
huge amount of – of value that preparedness and planning, exercises, 302 
revisions and iterations, you know, they really, really make a big 303 
difference in the ability to confront a crises, even if it’s totally new or 304 
not the pandemic you planned for. And then secondly, don’t ever feel 305 
wed to the words on – in the planning book and make sure that there’s 306 
a complete open mindedness along the way for surprises for curve 307 
balls, for unintended consequences or unforeseen circumstances, and 308 
be sure to build in the flexibility to adjust your response and the 309 
wisdom to have – a way to get feedback into that response to be able to 310 
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see new patterns that did – that you might not have thought about in 311 
the preparedness phase. 312 
  So Team B is another example of that where there’s an external group 313 
of people that can watch the situation and help provide input to 314 
maintaining sort of broad situational awareness and help keep us on 315 
focus.  316 
 And then third, communicate, communicate, communicate and have 317 
your best communication team and tools as a very, very high priority 318 
in how you handle the response particularly in appropriately setting 319 
expectations and forecasting steps to help relieve the anxiety that 320 
comes with uncertainty. I think those would be the – sort of the three 321 
big lessons from my perspective. 322 
Barbara: Oh, that’s terrific. Absolutely great. Thank you so much. 323 
Marty: Thanks very much Barbara.   [audio ends 0:52:36.0]324 
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.Interview #6. Toby Crafton, MA 
Chief of Staff, CDC Director’s H1N1Response Team 
 
Toby: Okay, my name’s Toby Crafton. And as part of the response, I was 1 
what they call the Chief of Staff which, pretty much responsible for 2 
the command staff, the operations logistic situational awareness. Most 3 
– most everything but the scientific folks that responded, I was 4 
responsible for coordinating their – their efforts. Budget was a – was a 5 
huge part of my role in managing the – ended up being close to $2 6 
billion that we got from the federal government to respond to H1N1. 7 
So I was responsible for setting up procedures to manage the money 8 
and to make sure that we spent it efficiently. 9 
 What brought me to CDC, I started here in 2003. I retired from the 10 
Army. I was a medical service corp officer. I stationed here at Atlanta 11 
at Fort McPherson and retired from the Army. And actually went to 12 
work for myself doing – my own business and that – did that for two 13 
years, and then I found out that they were starting an operations 14 
center here at CDC. They didn’t – hadn’t had an operations center. 15 
We’d gone through the 911 response and the anthrax responses and 16 
they didn’t have a cohesive way to respond back then. They did but 17 
they didn’t have what we now know as an operations divisions and an 18 
operations center.  19 
 So they were just starting one up and I found out about it and there 20 
was a contractor that was responsible for coming in and setting that 21 
up and I actually knew him from the army. So I called him and – and 22 
got a job here to help establish the operations center. And so I did – I 23 
did that for about 2 ½ years, set up the Division of Emergency – help 24 
set up the Division of Emergency Operations. Went through SARS, 25 
Hurricane Katrina in that job. And then started looking for something 26 
different and found this job over in the influenza coordination unit 27 
which was an organization that Dr. Gerberding, the previous Director 28 
had set up when the federal government got a little bit concerned 29 
about an influenza pandemic and H5N1 was circulating throughout 30 
the world. And there was a lot of concern about another pandemic. 31 
 And so Dr. Gerberding established this entity called the influenza 32 
coordination unit when what was then the center – the Coordinating 33 
Center for Infectious Diseases. And so I started over there, and that’s 34 
where I have been working ever since when the pandemic started. 35 
Barbara: Do you remember when you first heard about H1N1? 36 
Toby: I do. I was actually in Las Vegas. My wife and I love to go to Las 37 
Vegas and we were on vacation in Las Vegas when my Blackberry 38 
started going off quite a bit and there was email traffic about this 39 
potential influenza outbreak in Mexico, and then, of course, we found 40 
it in California. And that’s when it started. And so I was almost at the 41 
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end of my vacation out there anyway so we – we came back and that’s 42 
when it started. 43 
Barbara: Do you recall how it was presented to you and if – did it strike you as 44 
a crisis at that time? 45 
Toby: Well, it – it – pandemic start, generally start off small and then grow 46 
to be quite large. And so there was – there was this disease outbreak 47 
in Mexico and then there was this disease that – outbreak in 48 
California, and once the two were linked, and it was determined that 49 
it was a novel virus, one that had not been found in human’s before, 50 
that it was – it was of concern at that point. And I don’t think it was – 51 
I don’t recall that everybody was in a real panic mode at that point but 52 
there was certainly a lot of concern and we were doing everything we 53 
could to determine what it was and – and how it was spreading, and 54 
obviously at that point, we knew that we were into probably the next 55 
pandemic. 56 
Barbara: Do you recall when the EOC was activated? 57 
Toby: It was probably officially activated, as I recall, maybe a week after all 58 
that. So, and of course, it started off small and grew to be quite large. 59 
And so at the end of – when it was all said and done here, there was 60 
probably close to 3,000 people that responded at some -- in some way 61 
to the – the pandemic, whether – it wasn’t all 3,000 people at the same 62 
time but over the course of the – the – what nine months or 10 months 63 
that we’ve been involved in it. There’ve been about 3 – a little over 64 
3,000 people that have in some way participated in the response. 65 
 So it started off as probably 20 people and then grew from there. 66 
Barbara: Were you involved in the day-to-day operations for the response from 67 
the beginning? 68 
Toby: Yes, I’ve been operating out of the – we normally are in Building 1 69 
here on  [inaudible 0:04:58.1] and we have been operating out of the 70 
EOC since I think it was around the 23rd of April, later in April, we 71 
officially activated and pretty much the entire influenza coordination 72 
unit which is about 17 full-time people, a lot of the flu division, the 73 
senior leadership, much of the NCIRD leadership moved over and 74 
started occupying space in the Operations Center. And from there, it 75 
just – it grew. What – what – what typically the Operations Center 76 
does is operate under what we call the National Incident Management 77 
System or the Incident Command structure which is a structure that 78 
is sort of dictated by the Department of Health and – Department of 79 
Homeland Security.  80 
 And so we started out using the standard response organizational 81 
structure under NIMS, the National Incident Management system. 82 
And we did that for a while for realized after a month or so that that 83 
really wasn’t working well for us and that we – we needed to re-84 
organize the structure to better meet our needs. And so we sort of took 85 
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everything and flipped it upside down and created five task forces 86 
aligned with the major functions that we were performing in the 87 
pandemic. And those – those five task forces, one was the epi-lab and 88 
surveillance task force which was – ended up being the largest task 89 
force. And early on in the pandemic, of course, we didn’t have a 90 
vaccine but we stood up a vaccine task force because we knew that the 91 
development of a vaccine was one of our primary – what was one of 92 
our biggest priorities to – I mean that’s the best way to protect people 93 
in – in – and reduce mortality, morbidity is to get a vaccine that’s – 94 
contains the virus that you’re – you’re talking about. And so we 95 
developed a vaccine task force which grew to be quite large and ended 96 
up toward the latter part of the response was the biggest – was the 97 
biggest task force. 98 
 And then there was another one called medical care and 99 
countermeasures which dealt primarily with all of our 100 
countermeasures. In this particular response, primarily focused 101 
around anti-viral medication and protective masks, and protective 102 
equipment, and dealt a lot with infection control, guidance and that 103 
sort of thing. 104 
 Then there was another one called the community measures task force 105 
which dealt with all the non-pharmaceutical interventions that we 106 
were dealing with which they’re – they’re biggest thing in – in sort of 107 
August, September timeframe was dealing with school closures, and 108 
whether to recommend school closures, and how we were going to 109 
track school closures and everything. So they were sort of responsible 110 
for managing everything that we did that – to try to prevent 111 
transmission not using pharmaceuticals or anti-virals. So that’s four. 112 
 Then the fifth one was we – we realized that since the state and locals 113 
– it really was a response at the local level, the state health 114 
departments and local health departments were going to be 115 
responsible for implementing most of these recommendations that we 116 
were putting out that we created a state and local coordination task 117 
force to make sure that we were coordinating with the state and local 118 
health departments, and the state health officials as much as we 119 
possibly could. 120 
 So we – we sort of took the standard NIMS structure and turned it all 121 
upside down, and created these five task forces which you won’t find 122 
in NIMS at all. But it actually worked and it was – it was the way 123 
that we will in the future plan to respond to a pandemic. 124 
Barbara: And have you institutionalized these changes somehow? 125 
Toby: Well, we are. We’re, you know, we’re – we’re in the process of doing – 126 
we’ve done several in-progress reviews to look at where we – or what 127 
we’ve done and how we can improve things, both things that we could 128 
improve to make them effective during this response and then things 129 
that may take a little bit longer to institution that we couldn’t 130 
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probably do in this response that we’ll need to do in the inter-131 
pandemic period between pandemics. And so now that we – it looks 132 
like this one may be coming to an end, it’s not over yet ‘cause we’re 133 
still – we’re still watching for flu in the spring and in the summer 134 
because in – in the past, we have seen spikes in those time periods, 135 
and another wave if you will. 136 
 137 
 But – so we’re still monitoring for disease but it’s nothing like it was, 138 
of course. We are going to institutionalize as many of these things and 139 
we’re – we’re going to end up doing a final after action review, an after 140 
action report, and a corrective action plan that will institutionalize a 141 
lot of these things that we’ve learned. 142 
 But one of the things that we will definitely institutionalize is this 143 
organizational structure. 144 
 Barbara: And – did you find your other existing plans were adequate for your 145 
needs? Or did you make modifications to those? 146 
Toby: No, we had to make huge modifications because I mean the 147 
assumptions in our planning process were based around an H5N1 148 
kind of response, and it starting somewhere else. And so basically 149 
what happened was it was not an H5N1 and it started here, actually 150 
in Mexico but we, you know, it came here real quick. 151 
 And what we were – what we were expecting was that it would start 152 
somewhere in – in Asia and we would have several weeks before it 153 
came to the United States, and that’s not what happened at all. And, 154 
of course, most of our planning was around a real severe pandemic, an 155 
H5N1, where the mortality rate is up around 60 percent for that virus. 156 
And in this – this particular pandemic was not anywhere near that 157 
severe. So we – we need to do more planning around general scenarios 158 
and general principles as opposed to specific viruses. And a lot of our 159 
planning in the past was done around a specific virus. 160 
Barbara: You mentioned that there was a – a great deal of planning that went 161 
on. Did you create a planning team or how – how were the decisions 162 
arrived at? 163 
Toby: Yea, that’s a good question. We started several years ago. Of course, 164 
when it was the Bushy administration at the time, got concerned 165 
about a pandemic because of the H5N1 virus circulating, they created 166 
a – a couple of plans and those plans cascading down to us. And in one 167 
of the things called the implementation plan, the implementation plan 168 
gave all of the different departments taskings, things that we had to 169 
do to be prepared, or what we thought we would need to do to be 170 
prepared for a pandemic. And so a lot of our activities in 2006, 2007, 171 
2008, were based around this implementation plan and things that – 172 
that the federal government and the White House were telling us that 173 
we needed to do. 174 
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 So one of the things that we did at that point in time was we – we – 175 
we hired a contractor and the contractor is MPRI, is – and I don’t 176 
know what that stands for, we just call it MPRI, which are basically 177 
they – they hire a lot of retired military officers that come in and know 178 
how to do planning, that they’d been planners in the military and, of 179 
course, the military’s real good at planning. So we hired them to come 180 
in and write our – write the CDC’s pandemic influenza operations 181 
plan. And, of course, it was a good plan but it was again a lot of the 182 
assumptions were like I described earlier around H5 starting 183 
somewhere else and having time to do some of these things when in 184 
fact that didn’t occur. So nobody rushed to their bookshelf, and pulled 185 
off the plan and opened it when the thing started.  [ 186 
break in audio 0:12:47.6] 187 
Barbara: …oh, the existing plans. Right. 188 
Toby: Yeah, I was talking about MPRI and our existing plans, and nobody 189 
ran to the… 190 
Barbara: Right, so I’ll go back to existing plans that were in place and did you 191 
need to modify any of those. You mention that there were existing 192 
plans in place. Did you find you needed to modify any of those? 193 
Toby: Yeah, it was – there was a lot of modifications required because as I 194 
said earlier, we had our – some of our basic assumptions in the early 195 
planning process was around an H5 kind of an outbreak which 196 
would’ve been much more severe starting somewhere else in the world 197 
specifically in Asia which would’ve given us several weeks to prepare 198 
and do things when in fact, that didn’t occur. And so we had – we had 199 
a nice plan but nobody ran to the bookshelf and pulled it off when the 200 
pandemic started to see what we were supposed to do. I think the – 201 
the benefit of having the plan was all of the work that went into 202 
building it, and all of the collaboration, and coordination, and the 203 
thinking, and the discussions that took place to build the plan, is 204 
really allowed us to be very flexible when we realized that the 205 
pandemic that was unfolding had nothing – didn’t look anything like 206 
the pandemic that was planned for in the plan. 207 
 There was a lot of stuff that was still valuable and we could use but 208 
there was much of it that we couldn’t use because of the way it 209 
unfolded.  210 
Barbara: Can you recall any specific challenges that were new in this case? 211 
Toby: Well, of course, the fact that it started hear and it – it – I mean one of 212 
the things that we did early on was – was invest quite a bit of money 213 
in the planning process on developing new diagnostic tools to be able 214 
to – to determine what – what kind of flu it is and actually the – that 215 
test was used in California to determine that it was a novel strain of 216 
influenza that we were dealing with. And so that – there was a real 217 
beauty behind and we could see that our investments had really paid 218 
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off there because without that, it may have been another few weeks 219 
before we realized what we were dealing with. 220 
 Of course, the earlier – and the benefit of it starting somewhere else is 221 
that you get a seed strain of the virus that’s – that’s causing the 222 
pandemic, and you can start making a vaccine. And so – and hopefully 223 
if it starts somewhere else, you have three, four, five weeks to get the 224 
vaccine process rolling before it gets to our borders. But in this case, 225 
we didn’t have that time at all. So trying to – to make sure that our 226 
surveillance systems were functioning, and that we – be able to get 227 
information in a timely manner, that was part of the – that was a real 228 
challenge for us was getting information in – in a timely manner.  229 
 Of course, understand that most of the responses that we’d dealt with 230 
here at CDC are very local responses. They are in one place or two 231 
places. I mean Katrina domestically the response was probably as – as 232 
big as any response we’ve ever dealt with, maybe with the exception of 233 
9-11. But, I mean, we were real, real involved in the Katrina response. 234 
But when you think about it, that was in one place, well two places if 235 
you count Mississippi and – but, so, it – getting information from a 236 
small area, you’re dealing with one or two health departments, or one 237 
state, getting information is not nearly as hard as it is dealing with 62 238 
project areas, 50 states, territories, in – in the big cities that we deal 239 
with. 240 
 The good news is that have they’re seasonal flu every year, not that 241 
that’s good news, but in this case, having surveillance systems in place 242 
that – that – that do that surveillance every year is helpful. The 243 
problem is with our current surveillance systems that we had in place 244 
when it started, was they don’t provide real timely information. 245 
There’s a lag of – of several weeks and the information that we get for 246 
seasonal flu and – and that was not adequate to maintain pace, or 247 
keep up with the pace of the spread of the pandemic. 248 
 So that was a real challenge for us as well. What we – we did was – 249 
there was – there are other systems out there that – that you can buy 250 
or lease or – or not lease but you purchase the data from retail 251 
pharmacy, companies out there that that’s what they do is generate 252 
data like this and it’s –it’s –it’s a little more timely than the 253 
information that we were getting. And so Dr. Frieden, when he came 254 
in as the new Director, having come from New York, he was – he was 255 
real interested in timely data.  256 
 And so we ended up leasing – not lease – purchasing through 257 
contractual mechanisms some of this more timely data. Whether or 258 
not it – in the end it made a difference is hard to say and I think the 259 
jury’s still out on that. We are – we are looking to potentially keep 260 
some of these more timely data systems in place for the long term for 261 
seasonal flu to see if we can make them better for our needs in the 262 
next pandemic. 263 
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Barbara: Could you describe the internal communication processes that you use 264 
to keep the leadership of CDC informed? 265 
Toby: Yeah, sure. It was – it was a real challenge as you can imagine. There 266 
are – there’s a lot of moving parts. There’s a lot of different 267 
organizations that respond. And the part of the biggest problem here 268 
at CDC in my opinion is for these kinds of activities. And again, I’m 269 
going to kind of revert back to my – my past which is the military. And 270 
in the military, we do a thing called we train as we’re going to fight. 271 
And almost everything we do in the military, even day to day, has 272 
some relation to how we’re going to do things when we go to war. And 273 
even the – the reporting procedures, and the SOP’s, and how we 274 
maintain equipment, is all – so everyday we’re doing things like we’re 275 
going to do it when we go to war. And that helps build discipline, and 276 
builds communication systems, and even the structure that you’re at 277 
in peace time, typically when you go to war, that same structure just 278 
moves to the theater of operations and continues to operate. 279 
 So you’re boss’s, boss’s boss, is probably the same when you’re in Iraq 280 
that it would be if you were at Fort Bragg for example. 281 
 What we do here at CDC is that when we have a response, we don’t – 282 
we don’t operate during a response like we do day to day. So during a 283 
response, there is no NCIRD, and there’s no CCID, and there’s no 284 
ICU. It’s all – all that goes out the window and we come into this 285 
response structure that unless you are a part of the division of 286 
Emergency Operations or the Office of Public Health Preparedness 287 
and Response, you don’t do this day to day.  288 
 And so learning how to communicate, and keep people informed, and 289 
report and all that is all brand new to people when they leave Building 290 
1 and they come over here to the EOC. And so one of the things that 291 
we did starting in, I don’t know, 2007 maybe, was we started an 292 
exercise program where we – we, and people got really tired of doing 293 
it, but Dr. Redd, our – our Director, saw the value in exercising, 294 
training as we’re going to fight. And so we would – we would do these 295 
three and four day exercises where we would pretend like and MPRI 296 
would help facilitate these exercises where we would be in the middle 297 
of a pandemic and we would have to develop our structure and all 298 
that. And, of course, the exercises were based around that – that NIM 299 
structure I told you about that didn’t work. 300 
 But learning how to communicate and to report was – what was one of 301 
the biggest benefits of doing these exercises. So to get back to your 302 
original question, communications and keep people informed is very 303 
hard. And we established a series of regular meetings where the task 304 
force leaders, and the other leadership of the response, came together 305 
on a routine basis, usually a couple of times a day, maybe three times 306 
a day, to share information and to get guidance from the director, and 307 
from the – from the incident manager, and that sort of thing.  308 
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 But even with that, it – there was a lot of holes in our – in our 309 
communication. And I honestly don’t know how to fix that. I mean, it’s 310 
– unless we’re going to do our day-to-day jobs like we’re going to do 311 
when we respond, or we’re going to respond like we do our day-to-day 312 
jobs which is not very functional either, I think we’re going to have to 313 
just do the best we can and when the – when an event occurs, we hope 314 
that the people that are in those leadership positions have done it 315 
before, they’ve been through this one, or they’ve been through the 316 
exercise program. And so going forward, our exercise program, which 317 
we’re going to continue for pan flu, probably not going to do one this 318 
year but we’ll probably start up again in 2011, we will do those 319 
exercises based on the task force structure that I talked about and not 320 
the NIM structure. So we’ll at least have a good starting point to – to 321 
help with that. 322 
 But – and every day, we were kind of modifying things. If something 323 
wasn’t working, we changed it. And so people have to be – have to be 324 
open to change and to – and to – I think the other thing is – is the 325 
culture at CDC is one where people want to have hundred present 326 
solution. They want to have I exact. They want it to be perfect and 327 
again, from my previous experience, it – in a response, it’s very seldom 328 
is it going to be 100 percent and you have got to be comfortable 329 
making decisions with less than a hundred percent of the information, 330 
and knowing – knowing that it may not be exactly 100 percent correct. 331 
 And early on, there was a lot of apprehension of doing that. And then 332 
as things go on, and went on, I think people became a little more 333 
comfortable with operating in that zone where they weren’t 100 334 
percent sure that they had the right answer.  335 
Barbara: So in dealing with this ambiguity, what – did you have any particular 336 
strategies you employed to increase the level of comfort? 337 
Toby: Not really. No. We just – we just – we forced people to – to make 338 
decisions. And I think, you know, HHS was more involved in this 339 
response than any I’ve ever seen and I’ve been through several here at 340 
CDC starting with SARS. And HHS’s involvement in this was 341 
unprecedented which, I don’t think was a bad thing. and every day the 342 
Chief of Staff at HHS had a teleconference with our incident manager, 343 
often times the CDC Director and other senior leadership, the Chief 344 
Health Officer, to talk about strategy and to try to make decisions 345 
about going ahead. And so I think that helps somewhat. But it’s still 346 
cultural, it’s still engrained that, you know, we’ve talked about 347 
physicians earlier and, you know, physicians like to have, for the most 348 
part, scientists like to be exact. And – and response is not an exact 349 
science. And our surveillance systems don’t provide exact information. 350 
 And so, its – it is by nature, ambiguous and it’s just – I think the more 351 
people were doing it, the more comfortable they got with it but they’re 352 
still not totally comfortable. 353 
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Barbara: You mentioned earlier challenges you encountered with appropriating 354 
the funding that you received. Could you elaborate on that? 355 
Toby: Yeah, it – it was – that was a real challenge. We – when the pandemic 356 
first started, we had carry over funds that we had – in 2006, congress 357 
– in 2006 and 2007, congress appropriated about $470 million to CDC 358 
through a supplemental appropriation that was no year funds that we 359 
could carry over from year to year to help us continue to prepare for a 360 
pandemic. And then in 2008, we got an annual appropriation in – 361 
instead of the supplemental, we got an annual appropriation and we 362 
still are getting an annual. It’s part of the CDC’s budget authority now 363 
aligned for pandemic influenza.  364 
 But that carry over money, we used and were using, and had some 365 
carry over in 2009, when – and so when the pandemic started in April, 366 
we still had carry over funds that were available. And we didn’t have 367 
any money – congress had not appropriated any money yet for the – 368 
for the pandemic. So the only money CDC really had to start our 369 
response was this carry over funds. And so we – we used a lot of our 370 
carry over money that we had from 2006, 2007, initially to start the 371 
response. 372 
 And mainly, early on, a lot of that was travel and deployments of 373 
teams. So we did a lot of that. We did a lot of buying of equipment for 374 
the labs ‘cause they were – their work load significantly increased. 375 
And then congress appropriated money for – for the response and 376 
CDC, when it was all said and done, got about $671 million out of that 377 
appropriation. It was about $2 billion total for CDC. A lot of that, most 378 
of that, went out through a new grant to the states called the Public 379 
Health Emergency Response Grant, or cooperative agreement. There 380 
is – the – Well, PHPR manages a huge cooperative agreement now it’s 381 
called the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative 382 
Agreement and they send out millions of dollars to the states every 383 
year. 384 
 And so we got money to go out to the states and locals to prepare for 385 
the vaccine campaign primarily. But so imagine this influx of, you 386 
know, close to $2 billion coming in – in a matter of a few months. It 387 
came in in – not all at once but several different segments. But when 388 
we got the first segment, it was about $200 million. And we realized 389 
that there was no real procedures in place in the Operations Center to 390 
– to manage that kind of money.  391 
 And so what we did basically was identify the activity areas to epi and 392 
surveillance, vaccine, medical care and countermeasures, sort of align 393 
with the – we didn’t have the task forces then but we created these 394 
budget categories that actually ended up – the task forces sort of 395 
aligned to those. And I’d like to say we planned it that way but we 396 
didn’t. 397 
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 So we created these budget activities and each one of the people that 398 
were responsible for these sort of activity areas, told us that they 399 
needed to – to respond in terms of projects, and how much money it 400 
was going to take. And then we just – we got all of their information 401 
together, and created a purchase request process where they would 402 
have to – and we allocated a certain amount of this $2 million to each 403 
one of those project areas. And then there were certain people in those 404 
project areas that could approve the use of those funds. And we just 405 
started processing these purchase requests through the Operations 406 
Center. 407 
 So we created a whole new infrastructure that had never been there 408 
before basically to manage all of this money. And we’re still – we still 409 
have some money that we’re figuring – trying to – actually this week, 410 
we’re – we’re working with the – and the hard part now is we’re 411 
working with task forces then, but now that the response is kind of 412 
tapering off, we’ve got a start now working with the programs not – 413 
‘cause the task forces are not permanent organizations. 414 
 And so we’re now having to take the money that we have left and 415 
some money that we haven’t allocated and start working with the 416 
programs to allocate the remaining money. So it’s – it’s been a huge 417 
challenge and the concern that I have quite frankly is going forward in 418 
the next year or two when the IG, and the GAO, and others come in to 419 
do audits that we’re able to show where all this money went. And I’m 420 
– I’m confident that we are – are probably 98, 99 percent, we can – we 421 
can show what – where it went. So we got a real good trail of what we 422 
spent it on. Probably some of the things, you look back, probably we 423 
shouldn’t have spent money on. But at the time, in the middle of the 424 
response, you didn’t have a lot of time to think, you know, long term, 425 
is this really the best long term kind of investment when we could’ve 426 
been doing this, but instead we did that. But considering the time 427 
frame, and what was going on around us, and the fact that we just got 428 
all this money sort of appropriated and dumped on us, if you will, at 429 
one time, I thought we did a pretty good job of managing it.    430 
Barbara: Do you, in looking back over the past year, have any specific 431 
recommendations you’d like to make for future challenges like this? 432 
Toby: Yeah. I mean, well one thing we got to do is – it was so – it was so 433 
rewarding actually to see, you know, ‘cause again, I – and I hope I 434 
don’t bore everybody, but going back to my previous life, training was 435 
extremely important. I mean you cannot go to war unless you were 436 
trained to do so. And so instituting these exercise programs was 437 
probably the best thing we ever did. And it was fun to watch people 438 
from CDC who don’t under – who didn’t at the time understand 439 
exercises and the importance and they would come to these exercises 440 
kicking, and screaming, and complaining, and all mad, and huffy, like 441 
I don’t have time to do this. This is crazy. And – but then, after about 442 
the first month or two of the response, the pandemic, you hear them 443 
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say, boy it’s a good thing we did those exercises ‘cause it really, really 444 
helped. 445 
 So I think, to – to train and to prepare yourself for the unknown, and 446 
for – what you think maybe – now again, the exercises we did were 447 
against a completely different scenario, but it didn’t matter. It was – 448 
it’s the processes, and the procedures, and the things that you learn, 449 
and how you interact and communicate during those exercises that I 450 
think was real important. 451 
 And it doesn’t matter what the disease is. It could be any disease that 452 
we’re responding to but the – the exercise program, and the federal 453 
government’s picked up on this, and they’re doing the same thing. 454 
There are those national level exercises and all that, so exercising I 455 
think is critical and I say we’re going to continue doing that for 456 
pandemic preparedness even though we’ve just gone through one. 457 
There’s a lot of things that we’re going to do different and we learned 458 
that we’ve got to continue to do. 459 
 And a lot of these procedures, staffing was a huge problem. Getting 460 
people, you know, you never – CDC never has a problem getting 461 
people to respond to an event, or to a catastrophe for about a month. 462 
And then after a month, people like – I got another job I have to do, 463 
and you know, my boss is telling me I’ve got these reports to do, or 464 
that I’ve got this to do, or that to do. And so getting people to dedicate 465 
two, or three, or four months of their time to come over to respond, if 466 
it’s not their job, you know, the flu division, flu is their job. So none of 467 
them are – are – are, you know, saying anything about being here. But 468 
folks that are in chronic or in some other area, HIV or anything, that 469 
this flu is not their job, to get them to give up what they’re doing for 470 
three or four months, is really asking a lot.  471 
 But you can’t respond to something for a year without those people 472 
coming and doing that. And one of the – the other thing that we 473 
learned early on was we were having people rotate for two weeks. And 474 
to get an epidemiologist or somebody that works in HIV or in chronic 475 
to come in, they may be a totally capable epidemiologist, but they 476 
don’t understand flu. And so to get up to speed with what’s been going 477 
on, may take a week, 10 days, and then they’re rotating out because 478 
you’ve got them in for two weeks. And so we – we learned early on 479 
that – and that’s pretty typical for most responses, two weeks. That 480 
unless you got them for two months, they’re – you’re wasting their 481 
time and our time as well; ‘cause by the time they get up to speed to 482 
what’s going on, they’re –they’re rotating off again unless they’re there 483 
for a while. 484 
 So we’ve had – we’ve had people that have been here for the whole 485 
nine months, 10 months, now I guess it is, that weren’t part of flu, 486 
that came over on a detail and they’re bosses just said, this is 487 
important, go do it. Other bosses said, you can go for two weeks but 488 
you can’t go for longer. So we’ve got to figure that out at CDC. We just 489 
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have to. I mean we’re going through the Haiti response right now. 490 
They’re having the same – exact same problems with staffing that we 491 
had in H1N1. 492 
 The other thing we did was we created a staffing team, a staffing task 493 
force, brought in folks from HRC to staff that and we did a term hires, 494 
FTE hires, and we brought in PGO. PGO’s always a part of the 495 
responses and they’re wonderful, but they – we brought in folks to 496 
help us figure out how to bring in staff on contracts as well to help add 497 
some continuity to the response because there was – there was all this 498 
turnover that was just killing us. So I think that’s important as well. 499 
Barbara: Great. Thank you very much.  [audio ends 0:34:53.9] 500 
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Interview #7 Lyn Finelli, DrPH, MS 
Lead for Surveillance and Outbreak Response Team, Influenza Division 
 
Lyn: My name is Lyn Finelli. I work in the Influenza Division in the 1 
epidemiology branch and I am the team lead for surveillance and 2 
outbreak response.  3 
Barbara: Could you tell us a little bit about your back ground at CDC? How long 4 
you’ve been here?     5 
Lyn: Sure. I’ve worked with CDC for 19 years. I was first located in a state 6 
health department as an assistant to the state epidemiologist. And 7 
then for two years, I was a state epidemiologist in the State of New 8 
Jersey. I came down to CDC in 1997 and worked in the division of 9 
sexually transmitted diseases, spent about two years there and then 10 
worked in the division of viral hepatitis for six years, and I’ve worked 11 
in influenza for three years. 12 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect of the H1N1 response? 13 
Lyn: Yes, I am the lead for epidemiology and surveillance for the response.  14 
Barbara. Do you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 15 
Lyn: I first heard about H1N1, I was in my office on April 15th and one of 16 
my colleagues came into the room and said that she’d just gotten a call 17 
from the laboratory saying that they had a novel Influenza A isolate, 18 
and that it was an H1. We didn’t know the [inaudible 0:01:17.2] type. 19 
She thought that maybe we should do an investigation.  20 
 Now, a little bit of background on this, in 2007, 2008, the Council of 21 
State and Territorial Epidemiologists made novel Influenza A virus 22 
infection, a nationally reportable condition. So since that time, we’d 23 
had sporadic reports of novel Influenza A infection. They were all 24 
swine, at that time, and up until that time, there were 13 cases and 25 
we’d done fairly routine investigations. Almost all of the people who 26 
had novel Influenza A H1N1 infection had contact with swine. 27 
And so on that first day, we thought this would be a typical swine flu 28 
investigation.  29 
 So I gathered around my team and we decided to call California and 30 
find out about the case.  31 
Barbara: Did it strike you at that time that it might be a potential crisis or were 32 
you thinking it was more routine?   33 
Lyn: Absolutely not. I mean I had just done, over the last two or three 34 
years, 13 of these investigations and we were almost always able to 35 
link the case with swine exposure. And so I thought that it was going 36 
to be a routine swine flu investigation. They’re all fine, and they’re all 37 
interesting, so I was looking forward to it. But I didn’t – it was not 38 
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within the realm of possibility to me at that moment that it would be 39 
as unusual as it turned out to be. It wasn’t until two days later, on 40 
Friday the 17th, that I realized that this might be very different from 41 
what we’d experienced before. 42 
Barbara: And what brought you to that realization? 43 
Lyn: On Friday the 17th, I myself got a call from the laboratory saying that 44 
they had a second novel Influenza A virus infection case from a county 45 
which is next to adjacent San Diego County where the first case was 46 
from. The second case was from Imperial County. Like the first case, it 47 
was a child and we – we decided to, at that moment, muster as many 48 
people as we could in California to talk to them about the two cases 49 
and likely exposures. It still – I still thought since it was two children 50 
and most of these cases had been children, I still thought that it was 51 
likely that they had a common link or swine exposure. But we – we 52 
were very concerned at that point, not because – not because both kids 53 
were from California, but because they were from California but from 54 
different counties. Our alarm was raised just a little bit. 55 
Barbara: Can you recall the activities and what took place in the next few days? 56 
Lyn: Yeah, in the next few hours, I – I called my Branch Chief, Joe Bresee, 57 
and he came down. I called my husband, David Swerdlow, he was then 58 
the Associate Director of Science in our center, and asked them all to 59 
join the conference call with California. I thought that as many good 60 
heads as we could get in the room was important because this seemed 61 
to be a pretty unusual event. We arranged a conference call with 62 
California and it took place about 9 PM on the 17th. They had all of 63 
their important folks on the call, and they had San Diego County and 64 
Imperial County on the call with them. And so we looked back and 65 
tried to figure out where both of these children might have been 66 
exposed. We had already interviewed the family of the first case and – 67 
and there was no recollection of swine exposure in that first little boy. 68 
This is often sometimes the case where people need to be prompted 69 
about events that took place in their environs in order to remember 70 
the swine exposure. 71 
 The second – the second little girl was not interviewed yet. And so the 72 
weekend, over the weekend on Saturday and Sunday, we had a series 73 
of conference calls, both days, many, many hours, and we worked 74 
directly with the nurse who went to the family’s houses of those two 75 
cases. Now one red herring which was not a red herring at first ‘cause 76 
we didn’t know what happened, but in – in the first part of the 77 
investigation of the little girl, she had gone to a county fair and she 78 
had not – not had direct contact with swine but visited the swine area. 79 
 And so we thought, aha, this is it. We just have to find out how the 80 
little boy has contact with the Imperial County Fair. Did he go 81 
himself? Did a classmate go? And so we really sat down – we sat down 82 
the road at that point of trying to dig up as much swine exposure on 83 
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these two kids as possible. By Sunday night, both parents had been 84 
interviewed many times and we just could not link the San Diego boy 85 
to any swine exposure. We were looking forward to interviewing the 86 
kids in his classroom and we did find, on Monday, that they had 87 
visited the zoo and there was a pig at the zoo which they had some 88 
contact with.  So we, again, were down the path of looking for swine 89 
exposure among these two kids.  90 
By Tuesday or Wednesday, let’s see that would be the 21st or 22nd, it 91 
looked like we weren’t going to be able to connect him with swine. And 92 
that was right about the time that we heard about two cases in Texas. 93 
When we heard about these two cases in Texas on Tuesday or 94 
Wednesday, I was really alarmed. I – I was willing to think that 95 
maybe we could have a source of this first little girl in Imperial 96 
County with contact with swine, and the boy with no contact – I was 97 
willing to accept that there might have been somebody in his 98 
classroom that’d visited the fair and that he’d gotten sick from them. 99 
But once I heard about the two cases in Texas, I was very concerned. 100 
One of the reasons that I was so concerned was I made the connection 101 
between these Texas cases, these California cases and rumors from 102 
Mexico that I’d been hearing for the last three weeks. About three 103 
weeks before this event, about the first of April or last week of March, 104 
we started to hear about outbreaks, small outbreaks in villages and 105 
small towns of severe respiratory disease where some people were 106 
hospitalized, and we had a couple of conference calls within CDC and 107 
with our colleagues in Mexico to figure out what were – what the – 108 
what the origin of these outbreaks were. The influenza division along 109 
with the respiratory diseases branch and the division of viral diseases 110 
has an unknown respiratory outbreak working group. And so when we 111 
hear about respiratory outbreaks and there’s no obvious pathogen, 112 
then we do a joint investigation. 113 
So we’d had a number of working group conference calls over the last 114 
couple of weeks, and then we’d also heard rumors of a large outbreak 115 
in Veracruz and smaller outbreaks in adjacent places or nearby places.  116 
Now when we talked to Mexico and talked amongst ourselves, there 117 
always seemed to be some sort of reason for these outbreaks. In one 118 
case, they said they did viral culture and got some Influenza B 119 
viruses; in another case, they said that they had adenovirus infection; 120 
and in another case, they said there was RSV. But – and – and so 121 
initially when I heard about the cases in San Diego and Imperial 122 
County, I didn’t connect them to Mexico.  123 
But here I was, on Tuesday or Wednesday, hearing about cases in 124 
Texas also adjacent to Mexico, and hearing about cases in San Diego 125 
also adjacent to Mexico with many people who go back and forth 126 
across the border in both places. And I – I became really alarmed.  127 
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At that point, you know, we were meeting as a group every day, 128 
meeting with our Branch Chief, Joe Bresee, and the people in our 129 
division. At that point, I would not say that we thought that it would 130 
be widespread. I think we thought that this was potentially a big 131 
outbreak but we weren’t quite sure whether it was the pandemic or 132 
not. And in fact, for about a week after that, we – we very sincerely 133 
asked each other many times during the day, do you think this could 134 
be the pandemic? We – we really didn’t know and one kind of ironic 135 
thing was we did five pan influenza planning exercises, functional 136 
exercises in the EOC and we all hated them. And although we 137 
recognized the value of them, especially after the third or fourth one 138 
where we were started to pull ourselves together, this event and the 139 
way that it unfolded just reminded us all so much of those pan flu 140 
exercises that it started to creep into our consciousness that this in 141 
fact could be the pandemic.  142 
And then I think on Wednesday – Wednesday the 22nd, we heard 143 
about a potential outbreak in New York City. And then it seemed like 144 
this was extremely widespread. And so we were – we had had – we 145 
had submitted an IHR on Friday night the 17th and – to let WHO and 146 
[inaudible 0:10:42.8] know. And so we started to engage with our 147 
international colleagues because it was too much of a coincidence that 148 
we’d heard about the rumors in Mexico, that we’d had cases adjacent 149 
to Mexico, and that the outbreak may have been initiated in New York 150 
City from kids who had traveled to Mexico during their spring break.  151 
So at this point on Wednesday or so, the pieces started to fit together. 152 
In addition, Mexico was still having outbreaks and they had sent some 153 
viruses for identification, for characterization, to Canada. And we 154 
knew this on Wednesday night. And we – we knew that we would 155 
know the results on Friday, and the results were going to be kept 156 
quiet until they were absolutely certain. But we were very much 157 
looking forward to the characterization of those viruses.  158 
We, at this point, I asked – I have a number of EIS officers in my 159 
group and I asked Fatimah Dawood who’s now a second year and was 160 
a first year officer and an extremely stellar one, to write – start to 161 
write up these cases for the New England Journal of Medicine, and 162 
that we would help her but we wanted to publish these cases as 163 
quickly as possible. I also asked another EIS officer of mine, [inaudible 164 
0:12:03.3], to write up for the same companion – companion journal – 165 
companion piece for the journal, an article about the 13 sporadic cases 166 
that we’d seen and the degrees of person-to-person transmission that 167 
we saw among those cases. And so we got started on our academic 168 
work.  169 
By this time, it was Thursday. We decided that Fatimah should do a 170 
late breaker at the EIS conference which was taking place this week, 171 
the first week of the outbreak, and that she would make a public 172 
announcement about the cases. And so we worked all night with her 173 
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on Thursday night to prepare her presentation, myself and Tony 174 
Fiore, another person in my group. And she announced to the world 175 
about the investigation about the cases in Texas and New York and in 176 
San Diego and in Imperial County. And in one – and in one hour later, 177 
at 12 noon our time, Mexico made the announcement that they had 178 
H1N1 virus identified from those outbreaks in Mexico. And so we 179 
knew that if not a pandemic, this was a multi-country outbreak. 180 
Barbara: So as it was becoming clear to you that this may be, in fact, a 181 
pandemic event, what were the key decisions that you felt needed to 182 
be made at this time? 183 
Lyn: Well, during the week, that week of the 20th, we decided to send a 184 
couple of teams out to the field. So we sent a team to San Diego and a 185 
team to Imperial County of EIS officers and some supervisors to 186 
oversee the investigations. When we sent those teams, we were still 187 
looking for a swine connection. Then when we heard about the Texas 188 
cases, we decided to dispatch a team to Texas which we did. And in 189 
addition, the – another sort of interesting and complicating factor was 190 
the little boy in San Diego had traveled to Texas himself, to a different 191 
city, while he was ill on an airplane. And once we knew that we were 192 
dealing with something that looked fairly wide spread, we worked 193 
with our colleagues in Global Migration and Quarantine to do a trace 194 
back to the plane and to the passengers of the plane to make sure that 195 
no staff or passengers were ill post-flight with that little boy who was 196 
still ill. 197 
 And so we – we set up some field investigations. We also set up but did 198 
not execute right away an investigation to the New York City 199 
Department of Health to look into the Queens school outbreak. And 200 
we – we really needed to do something about surveillance. So we, over 201 
that week on – on Thursday, let’s see, like the 23rd or 24th, I forget 202 
which – what the date was, we started to work in the EOC and started 203 
to set up some teams there. And one of our ideas which was something 204 
that we did during the pandemic exercises, was have this thing called 205 
a regional team. And the regional team consists of 10 people who are 206 
each assigned five states and who call the states once or twice a day, 207 
or less than that if necessary, to get situation awareness.  208 
 And so we stood up the regional team on Thursday so that we could 209 
get reconnaissance from states. We called all the state laboratories 210 
and asked them to immediately type and subtype their viruses, and if 211 
they had an unsubtypable virus, to send it to CDC right away. 212 
 We initiated, although it took a little bit longer than this, initiated 213 
daily surveillance from our influenza like illness network providers. 214 
We have about 4,000 providers in the U.S. who provide weekly data to 215 
us and we reached out to them to see if they could provide daily data. 216 
We also reached out to laboratories to see if they could provide daily 217 
data from their laboratories.  218 
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 In addition, we reached out to our 122 cities vital statistic offices and 219 
asked them for daily data as well. And so, we tried to tune up and 220 
enhance and make more timely all of our surveillance systems so we’d 221 
have the best information that we could get as quickly as we could get 222 
it.  223 
 By – all during this week, I was attending the EIS conference while 224 
talking on cell phones with my teams. And we were in the process of 225 
recruiting new fellows for the following year so I felt like it was really 226 
essential that I be there. On Saturday, the day of interviews of the 227 
fellows, you can imagine that our positions got a lot of interest because 228 
the rumor was about – about a potential pandemic. We had a lot, a lot 229 
of people to interview and I – I believe it was on that day, on 230 
Saturday, that we found out about cases in Kansas.  231 
 So by the end of the first week or week and a half, we knew about 232 
cases in six states. We had 10 confirmed cases and we had ongoing 233 
evaluations in six more states. So it just unfolded very quickly. Most 234 
people in the early days of case identification had some connection 235 
with Mexico and there was not yet wide spread outbreaks. It took 236 
about another week for that to happen. 237 
Barbara: In terms of the plans that you had in place within your division to 238 
respond to such an event, did those meet this challenge or did you 239 
need to make modifications? 240 
Lyn: As I said before, we had done five pandemic influenza exercises and I 241 
think we sort of invoked that model and I think that model was 80% 242 
good. The – the area in which we didn’t do so well was information 243 
technology. We did not have a way to convey information about cases 244 
from states to CDC electronically. And we only had fax and telephone, 245 
and we could attach an attachment of a case – scanned case report to 246 
an email, but we didn’t have an electronic conduit. We’d been trying to 247 
work that out for a couple of years with our IT colleagues but it just 248 
never really came to fruition. But it was a huge gap. 249 
 So, my husband, David Swerdlow, had worked for almost 20 years in 250 
food borne diseases and on Saturday and Sunday he brought over a 251 
team from foodborne and we set up an FTP site where we could convey 252 
electronic data from states in the form of spreadsheets transmitted 253 
that way. And that was our first line list to find out about cases. And 254 
so he brought over about six or seven people who stayed with us for 255 
about two weeks to make sure that that way, that conveyance of data, 256 
was working.  257 
 In addition, the following Monday, the 27th or so, we reached out to 258 
our IT colleagues here in the former NICV and they started 259 
developing web based applications for us to convey our information. 260 
Those applications weren’t up and running until May 6th. So from the 261 
20s of April until May 6th, we used the – the system that foodborne 262 
had set up for us. 263 
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Barbara: Did you find you needed to make staffing or other organizational 264 
changes within your own division? 265 
Lyn: Well, you know, I was so absolutely preoccupied with my team that I – 266 
I don’t know what went on in the Division as a whole, but I normally 267 
supervise about 30 people. And my team grew to about a hundred in 268 
the first week and to 170 by the second or third week. And so I had to 269 
make a cohesive organizational unit out of those 170 people with team 270 
leads for different discrete teams. And so we, you know, this – this is 271 
not a very interesting part of what we do but we’ve really had to work 272 
very hard to carve out teams with specific responsibilities, find people 273 
in the Agency to lead those teams and to supervise the folks under 274 
them. And so we went from 30 to 170 pretty quickly. 275 
Barbara: In terms of internal communication processes, what means did you 276 
use to keep CDC informed of what you were doing? 277 
Lyn: Well, from the 24th of April, which I think was Wednesday or 278 
Thursday, I did my first director briefing and I briefed the director 279 
every single day, seven days a week, for about six weeks when the 280 
director briefing went to three days a week and stayed at three days a 281 
week until two weeks ago. And so, I – I personally prepared and 282 
briefed the CDC Director over a hundred times over the last 10 283 
months. 284 
Barbara: And were there any other communications internally coming out of 285 
your office other than those briefings? 286 
Lyn: There were a million, yeah. There – there were daily situation reports. 287 
There were slide sets that came out of my office. You know, my office 288 
is surveillance. And so almost all of the data from this outbreak came 289 
from my group, came from this group of 170 people. And we did – we 290 
did this report called the POTUS report. It’s the President of the 291 
United States report where by 9 PM, we sent to HHS a report for the 292 
President to read upon arising the morning. The last POTUS report is 293 
tomorrow and we’re very glad to be finished with that. 294 
 We did a number of contemporaneous briefings to HHS and inside the 295 
agency. And we received internally about 15 data requests per day 296 
and externally about 30. So we did have to prioritize and triage those 297 
requests but the team was very busy creating packages of information 298 
both for, you know, internal CDC leadership, HHS leadership, DAH 299 
leadership and the media. 300 
Barbara: In those processes, were there any particular challenges that you 301 
would like to highlight? 302 
Lyn: I think for me, a necessary but very, very difficult challenge was the 303 
24 hour news cycle. We have surveillance systems which are good and 304 
they have a lot of people who submit data to them. The sample sizes 305 
are very good. But daily data are very difficult. And the signal-to-noise 306 
ratio needs to be taken into account because you can get information 307 
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and misinterpret it if it’s just a single snapshot, or the sample is not so 308 
large, or biased in a way. And we were, you know, Rich Besser when 309 
he was Director, was required to do a news briefing every day at, I 310 
think, one o’clock. And so we would give the director briefing in the 311 
morning and then from 11 to 12, or 10 to 12, go through all the data 312 
and try and think about what was safe and stable to present for Rich’s 313 
press conference. 314 
 And that was extremely challenging. I think had there been a press 315 
conference once a week, we would’ve had this really neat tied up 316 
package, this very stable information. But that – that was particularly 317 
challenging to create a stable package, new information every single 318 
day without making a mistake. 319 
Barbara: Did you have any involvement in clearing information that would then 320 
be presented publicly? 321 
Lyn: Well, I – I created and cleared information for the – the Director’s 322 
press conferences every day, if that counts. 323 
Barbara: Could you talk a little bit about the process you used in determining 324 
what information should be released? 325 
Lyn: It was no structured process. My day consisted of going to meetings 326 
most of the day, having the data cranked – we – we were running 327 
three shifts of the team. So having the data cranked out on evenings, I 328 
would get a look at the data about 10 PM and I would work until 329 
about 12:30 AM packaging that for both accuracy and for just validity. 330 
And then that would go into the director briefing the next day where 331 
the data would be discussed, and then we would decide, as a group, 332 
what we should present at the press conference.  333 
Barbara: Did you feel that you were getting sufficient information to adequately 334 
inform the public? 335 
Lyn: I think so. I think, you know, not – not because of any of my good work 336 
but because of the good work of people who came before me in 337 
surveillance and especially Lynette Brammer who was is the Domestic 338 
Surveillance Chief and the architect of flu surveillance as it is at CDC. 339 
We had very good systems and we, for what they were worth, they 340 
performed beautifully and I feel – I feel really good about the 341 
information that was presented and I feel like we didn’t make too 342 
many mistakes. 343 
Barbara: In thinking back over your involvement over the past year, are there 344 
areas where you felt the organization responded particularly well? 345 
Lyn: I think we did a really nice job with communications in general. I 346 
think much to the credit of the flu communications team, Erin Burns, 347 
Doug Jordan, Nicole Richardson, they were – and Carolyn Bridges 348 
who’s the ADS in our group, they were busy the entire day, and 349 
evening and night crafting messages. And I think the work that they 350 
did was really superb and I think that one of the reasons that the 351 
 237 
Agency looked so good during the response was because they have flu 352 
subject matter expertise, they’d been working with flu for many years, 353 
some of them, Erin I think, over 10 years and they knew how to take 354 
the stuff that my team – the data and the technical information that 355 
my team cranked out and make it into a digestible message for the 356 
public. 357 
 And so I think communications wise, we did really well. I think CDC 358 
as an Agency did extremely well in terms of – and this again is a 359 
technical thing and maybe not so interesting for this interview or for 360 
the public, but we did particularly well defining the epidemiologic 361 
parameters of the outbreak very early on. We identified and defined 362 
the reproductive rate. We identified the attack rate both household 363 
and community. We knew what the generation time was and the 364 
incubation period really early on from those teams that we sent out to 365 
the field. And I think CDC as an Agency made a real – a really – a 366 
really excellent scientific contribution through defining these epi-367 
perimeters by, you know, our New England Journal article was 368 
published on May 5th and had 600 cases contained; and in that article 369 
were these epi-perimeters defined. 370 
 So if you just count the days from April 15th when I got the first call, it 371 
was only about 20 days before – between the first call and the 372 
publication of our New England Journal paper which really described 373 
the outbreak in a very expansive way given the time.  374 
Barbara: Do you feel or can you think of any particular areas where you might 375 
have wanted things to be done differently? 376 
Lyn: Yeah. I mean, many; and some remediable and some not so 377 
remediable. We in the influenza division, despite the fact that we have 378 
a fairly big division and a really nice and very senior epidemiology 379 
branch. Our bench was not deep enough. And we worked way too 380 
hard. We needed some relief and one of the things that the agency did 381 
not provide was support for that. You know, the H1N1 response was 382 
an – “an” Agency priority, not “the” Agency priority. And it’s up to 383 
people like the Director of the Agency to decide that. But that meant 384 
that all of the people that came to help us on our teams were there 385 
because they were volunteers and they weren’t bound to us.  386 
 And we, at times, had extremely spotty coverage and many of us slept 387 
less than five hours a night for the first four weeks because we just 388 
didn’t have the relief that we needed to go home. 389 
Barbara: Do you have any final thoughts or recommendations you’d like to 390 
make for anyone who might find themselves in a similar situation? 391 
Lyn: Well, I think one thing that the agency could do to get ready for the 392 
next emergency response was work – is to work very hard on the 393 
information technology piece. I think there’s a way for us to create a 394 
shell data transmission message and that specifics of the pathogen or 395 
whatever could be stick in at the end. But for us as an Agency not to 396 
 238 
have a way to convey electronic data, in the beginning of the response 397 
was not good. But I think we have a breather and we can create that 398 
and I think there can be some sort of generic IT piece created.  399 
 I also think that the Agency needs to think carefully about staffing 400 
this kind of response. In the beginning, people were here as volunteers 401 
because of their own goodwill. They sometimes showed up, they 402 
sometimes didn’t and they left us in the main influenza division 403 
without help some of the time. And I think the Agency needs to come 404 
out with a strong message to volunteers that they have to come, and 405 
they have to be there for a certain number of weeks which is fixed, and 406 
they have to prioritize making sure that people who are in the core 407 
area of the response get the kind of rest that they need because I think 408 
many of us were really very exhausted. 409 
Barbara: Great, thank you very much. 410 
Lyn: You’re welcome.[audio ends] 411 
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Interview #8 Daniel Jernigan, MD 
Deputy Director, Influenza Division 
 
Dan: My name is Dan Jernigan. I’m the Deputy Director of the Influenza 1 
Division at CDC. 2 
Barbara: And can you tell us a little bit about yourself, your background, what 3 
brought you to CDC, how long you’ve been here?   4 
Dan: I trained as an internist in internal medicine in 1991 to 1994. And 5 
then came from internal medicine residency training to the Epidemic 6 
Intelligence Service, the EIS, in 1994 in the respiratory diseases group 7 
at CDC from 94 to 96. And then after that, worked in the Office of 8 
Surveillance on emerging infectious disease surveillance in Seattle for 9 
three years; and then came back, worked in that same office in the 10 
National Center for Infectious Diseases; and then transferred to the 11 
Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion which is hospital infections. 12 
And then after that, worked for awhile in the NCID Office of the 13 
Director as the Associate Director for Science, and then took the 14 
Deputy Director position in 2006 in the influenza division. 15 
Barbara: So clearly you are involved in H1N1. 16 
Dan: Uh huh (yes). 17 
Barbara: Do you remember, can you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 18 
Dan: About the novel H1N1… 19 
Barbara: Yes. 20 
 21 
Dan: …that we identified? It turns out actually that a part of our pandemic 22 
planning was to develop better diagnostic tests. And so those were in 23 
two sort of ends of the testing spectrum. They were the – the side that 24 
was the surveillance side where referenced laboratories would be 25 
testing with the more complex PCR type tests. And for that, we helped 26 
develop a new test for that. 27 
 The other end of the spectrum is at the clinician’s side at the point of 28 
care. And so working with HHS, we actually had a diagnostic test that 29 
was a –an experimental device that was in clinical trials in San Diego. 30 
And so this device by a company called Meso Scale, was able to detect 31 
Influenza A, Influenza B, the subtypes Seasonal A H1 and Seasonal A 32 
H3, and also two types of – of H5.  33 
 And so this device was actually in use in a clinical trial in San Diego 34 
County and picked up what’s called an unsubtypable. And that 35 
unsubtypable means that if this device found it was Influenza A but it 36 
didn’t match any of the seasonal subtypes, and so it was an automatic 37 
flag for further testing. 38 
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 And so the further testing eventually landed that specimen at CDC 39 
where we found out that it was this novel swine origin Influenza A. 40 
And so that device actually, by chance, really happened to pick up the 41 
first recognized case.  42 
 The second case that was picked up was also in – in south – in 43 
southern California that was picked up through a CDC surveillance 44 
system called the Border Infectious Disease Surveillance system 45 
where we were working with the naval health research center for 46 
doing testing and so that one was picked up the same way, an 47 
unsubtypable result. 48 
 And so within a couple of days, we had two cases from two different 49 
place; one picked up by chance with this experimental device; the 50 
other picked up because of a CDC surveillance system. And so those 51 
really pointed to a problem with swine flu. And up unto that point, 52 
whenever we had swine flu cases, we looked very closely for swine 53 
exposure. And so for both of these cases, we looked very hard and 54 
could not find any exposures. 55 
 The case in Imperial County which is just on the other side of – of 56 
Mexico, had gone to the Imperial County Fair where there were lots of 57 
swine but the swine had all been slaughtered and so we weren’t able 58 
to do any testing of those – of those pigs to see if by chance they were 59 
carrying the same of the H1N1. 60 
 The other case from San Diego County, the 10 year old boy, had been 61 
to the San Diego Zoo where he had actually had some contact with a 62 
pig that was on a leash that was led around the San Diego Zoo so 63 
people could pet it. And so that one we actually were able to swab. We 64 
had to get legal consent to do that. The – I guess the pig had to give 65 
consent but we were able to swab that pig but only after they had 66 
anesthetized it. And a nasal [inaudible 0:04:24.5] swab of that pig 67 
turned out to not have the H1N1.  68 
 So we ended up not finding any link with the swine. This was all 69 
within several days of the first recognition but very soon after the 70 
determination that this was the same set of sequences, the gene 71 
sequences matched some sequences that had been done from patients 72 
in Mexico where there was a very different characteristic of – of 73 
influenza disease down there. And so that – once that happened and 74 
the whole complete character of it changed, and luckily there were a 75 
lot of things in place that allowed us to move very rapidly. But I think 76 
we were lucky to be able to pick up those two cases when we did and 77 
give us that amount of time to get prepared, and to get things going in 78 
terms of assisting with a lot of diagnostics.  79 
Barbara: So in this earlier period, did this strike you as a potential crises? 80 
Dan: With the first two cases, we had had over the five years or so, prior 11 81 
or so cases of H1N1 where there were people that were picked up that 82 
had the swine type H1 or other types of swine flu that did not have 83 
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any further transmission. So you might have one or two family 84 
members, but not any forward transmission. And so with the first two 85 
cases when we started looking, we did not see any other unsubtypable 86 
Influenza A’s in the community; we didn’t see a lot of problems with 87 
increased ICU visits, or hospitalizations, or deaths associated with the 88 
flu. And so things did not point toward the type of pandemic that 89 
everyone had been preparing for and that was a very severe pandemic. 90 
 And so we were assured, reassured in terms of the – the kind of 91 
severity we were seeing or not seeing, but once we saw the connection 92 
with Mexico, we had to figure out exactly what was going on ‘cause we 93 
– we were seeing something very different than what they were 94 
seeing. 95 
 But early on, we had been – we had learned through a lot of 96 
experiences with the Avian Flu and with some other swine flues that 97 
we’d had some media coverage of, but it was important to get out there 98 
very early. And so we prepared the information in an MMWR very 99 
quickly. Tom Skinner from the Division of Media Relations was very 100 
instrumental in making sure that we were quick to put out something 101 
so that people could hear about it; ‘cause his concern and our concern 102 
was that we don’t want to appear to have information that we’re 103 
withholding from the community if there’s something that they can do 104 
about it. 105 
 And so we felt that it would be important to find other cases by 106 
announcing it, but also, it would allow clinicians to know that perhaps 107 
they should treat different or test more in order to find these cases. So 108 
even before we knew any connection with Mexico or the – even the 109 
potential that there was a pandemic that had emerged, we had 110 
already put that information out through an MMWR, we had a press 111 
conference, we were available for press availability, but then also, we 112 
put onto the web the sequences of the genes. And so that was done 113 
very early not only because we wanted to be transparent, but also 114 
because there was a growing movement, if you want to call that, 115 
among a number of countries to think of influenza viruses as 116 
intellectual property.  117 
 And so by putting the sequences out there, we essentially made the 118 
statement that we’re not going to try and make money off this, we’re 119 
not going to try and say that this is CDC’s material. We wanted to be 120 
sure that everyone had as much access to the sequences and to the 121 
subsequent vaccines, and drugs, and things that would be made from 122 
knowing that information. So that was a trend that was started very 123 
early in terms of transparency, getting information out, translating it 124 
to the community, and giving the tools to the community so that they 125 
could make appropriate prevention measures. 126 
 Barbara: Can you talk a little bit about the process involved in determining 127 
what information to release to the public? 128 
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Dan: Yeah, I think overall we wanted to make sure that the information 129 
that went out was grounded. And so it was grounded in evidence that 130 
if we didn’t know the information or, excuse me, didn’t know the 131 
certainty of the information, that we communicated that. So we did 132 
not wait until we had everything figured out before we would say it. 133 
We also wanted to make sure that the way we said it was hitting at 134 
least two audiences, one, the clinical and public health audience that 135 
needed to have it at a certain technical level, but also the general 136 
community. And so for that, there was lots of work with plain 137 
language and other approaches to make sure that people – the right 138 
people were getting the right information to have action with. 139 
 And so we always wanted to make sure that what we provided was 140 
something they could use to prevent illness themselves or to act on. 141 
But in general, it was the transparency, getting out very quickly, and 142 
making sure that we were presenting it in a way that they could 143 
understand our concern about it, but not in a way that would induce 144 
panic unnecessarily, but we did want people to understand the 145 
potential problems. 146 
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 One other thing that I think was very helpful that Dr. Schuchat did 148 
very well was to foreshadow certain things and so we would have a 149 
series of press conferences set up.  And so we would try and anticipate 150 
what information would be at each press conference. And periodically, 151 
we would have information that was emerging that was not ready to 152 
be presented simply because we were still collecting that data. But the 153 
trend that that information was saying, that is maybe cases were 154 
increasing, or pregnant women are more – having more problems with 155 
the disease, she was able to foreshadow that so that when that 156 
information was finally presented in its more formed manner, that 157 
people were ready for it. We were – they were already beginning to 158 
talk about. And so I think that was very helpful for there not being 159 
surprises of information but also of a sense that we were always 160 
letting them know at the level that we knew when we knew it. 161 
Barbara: In terms of the Influenza Division’s organizational structure, did you 162 
make modifications or changes to your staffing? 163 
Dan: Well, our Influenza Division was set up in a traditional manner and 164 
that is there’s an epidemiology group that has a domestic and an 165 
international component to it, and a lab side of the house that has 166 
three branches that focus on different parts of the virus. And so we 167 
were structured essentially to pick up our entire division and move it 168 
into the response. And so, as you know, when there’s a major 169 
response, we initiate the incident command structure. And so the 170 
leadership within our division became leadership within the response, 171 
but that overall response hierarchy was separate from the CDC 172 
bureaucracy, and that’s for a number of reasons but its mainly to 173 
make sure the decisions can be made quickly, that resources can be 174 
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accessed quickly, people can go out and the kinds of things that need 175 
to happen quickly can happen quickly without having to go through a 176 
lot of bureaucracy.  177 
  But that also means that the people that are participating in it 178 
have to recognize a different structure. For us, our laboratories 179 
functioned almost within their normal structure. Our epidemiology 180 
group was greatly enhanced with a lot of folks that came in but the 181 
overall structure in the second half of the pandemic was a much bigger 182 
enterprise than certainly our division and much bigger than what we 183 
had in the initial wave of the pandemic. 184 
Barbara: And how – how was that structured? 185 
Dan: The second part? 186 
Barbara: Yes. 187 
Dan: The – the first part was actually structured more typically in terms of 188 
having an incident commander. I was serving as the Senior Science 189 
Officer and we have what was called a technical specialty unit that 190 
had oversight of most of the technical aspects, the intelligence 191 
gathering surveillance and so forth. 192 
 When we moved to the second half, we needed to get into a much more 193 
robust larger enterprise and that had a vaccine task force, it had an 194 
epi and lab task force that had the laboratory informatics and a whole 195 
lot of other parts of it, the surveillance, but also we had a medical care 196 
countermeasures task force. We had a community mitigation task 197 
force. And the – the largest and perhaps the most critical at that point 198 
was the vaccine task force. And so that’s one that took care of all the 199 
distribution issues, monitoring coverage, monitoring vaccine 200 
effectiveness and so forth. 201 
Barbara: So was that structure already in place, or something that you 202 
developed? 203 
Dan: That had to be developed. And so the vaccine task force was the one 204 
that really did not have a home in the previous structures. And I think 205 
that reflected something that we had learned because of the response, 206 
the pandemic respond, and something we hadn’t appreciated in our 207 
earlier exercises. 208 
 As a part of pandemic preparedness, we would have exercises two or 209 
three times a year, you know, two 48 hour duration exercises where 210 
we had hundreds of people playing as if the pandemic was happening. 211 
And in those, we got a lot of time spent on the beginning, and borders, 212 
and airports, and mayhem in the streets, that kind of thing in terms of 213 
scenarios, but we never adequately got to the issues of vaccine 214 
delivery.  215 
 And so the – the decisions before the pandemic were more of having 216 
pods of vaccine that would get shipped somewhere, and they’d open 217 
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up, and people would start vaccinating. People would line up. And that 218 
just didn’t make sense in the current environment. 219 
 And so we ended up going through vaccine delivery approaches that 220 
were much more similar to have vaccine is normally delivered, you 221 
know, outside of a pandemic, and so utilizing existing structures. And 222 
so if we had a little more time or if we had focused more on that part 223 
of the – the response, I think we might’ve had a better idea of what we 224 
would need in terms of delivering vaccine and making sure that we 225 
had all the right connections with the appropriate state agencies that 226 
do that kind of work. 227 
Barbara: Were you involved in the policy decision unit? 228 
Dan: Uh huh (yes). 229 
Barbara: Could you talk about your involvement? 230 
Dan: Yeah. That actually came out of some of the exercises. Early on, we 231 
were using the traditional incident command structure and that has a 232 
plans unit. It has a logistics unit, a finance unit and an operations 233 
unit. And the work that CDC does in outbreaks is almost all 234 
intelligence gathering, its surveillance. It’s information that leads to 235 
decision making and recommendations. 236 
 Incident command in the traditional sense is something to respond to 237 
wildfires, to earthquakes, to hurricanes, where there’s a defined event. 238 
There’s usually a defined location where it occurs and you have a 239 
bunch of people who are doing things. And so the plans unit says 240 
what’s the weather, how many places are on fire now, and then says, I 241 
need these units to go over there and cut down trees, and clean the 242 
roads up. That’s a different need than what we had for the – for a 243 
pandemic, for any large outbreak really. 244 
 And so over a series of really almost years, we rearranged that 245 
incident command approach to be much heavier in the gathering of 246 
information, development of recommendations, implementation of 247 
policy because while we weren’t cutting down trees, and cleaning 248 
roads, our products were the recommendations that we put out and to 249 
get implemented through other people that are actually doing the 250 
operations. 251 
 And so what we found was that there needs to be a time and a space 252 
where people can think, where it’s not so noisy, that it’s not complete 253 
mayhem happening all the time. The – the urgency of the moment can 254 
always prevent you from thinking ahead. And so we knew that we 255 
needed to have that. And so Toby Crafton who served as the Chief of 256 
Staff during the – the response, and I, and a few others, came up with 257 
this notion of the plans decision unit which we envisioned as a 258 
separate place, with people assigned to do thinking and planning so 259 
that they could not be picked up and put on TV, they wouldn’t be 260 
picked up to go to some meeting that was urgency needed, they would 261 
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be there to think, and they would have access to the subject matter 262 
experts, and they would have access to resources that they could ask 263 
questions, how many children are in school every day; and how many, 264 
you know, whatever question needed to be answered. 265 
 And so that through exercises became a really helpful thing because 266 
we actually would cue up policy decisions that needed to be figured out 267 
for pandemic preparedness so that they could get figured out during 268 
the exercise which was really pretty helpful.  269 
 And so when the pandemic actually hit, we just simply continued that 270 
process where people were brought in, they were educated on decision 271 
making, there were, you know, a set science to that that was followed, 272 
they would identify the facts, the assumptions, they could come up 273 
with three courses, four courses of action. They would weigh each of 274 
those with criteria and then present that to leadership where a 275 
decision then could be made.  276 
 And so it helps us to have a record of what we did in terms of big 277 
policy decisions. It also is a – a way to demonstrate confidence, I think, 278 
to people outside of us that we were thinking clearly about expensive 279 
disruptive types of interventions and making sure that all of the sides 280 
were weighed and that the evidence was helping us to make the best 281 
decisions. 282 
Barbara: In terms of getting information to support decision making, can you 283 
talk about that process? 284 
Dan: About how we got that information? It comes from different places. 285 
And I think some of our experience in anthrax, the response in 2001, 286 
was there were very few people that were subject matter experts. And 287 
some of the information was based on data from a long, long time 288 
earlier. And so I think we in the division had a number of subject 289 
matter experts that had been working on flu for awhile. But we also 290 
had people from throughout the agency that have expertise in 291 
different aspects of things, vaccine delivery, vaccine adverse events 292 
and things like that. And so we were able, because of that approach, to 293 
pull from those subject matters within the – the agency. 294 
 We also had a thing called Team B which is a group that was set up of 295 
outside individuals who met frequently, sometimes twice a week 296 
sometimes more, to have questions cued up to them and they would 297 
provide that information to us. And so sitting on that group were 298 
people that had managed the swine flu outbreak, people that had done 299 
a lot of enormous interventions with small pox, people from 300 
academics, people from public health, even people with skills in – in 301 
communication. And so we were able to access their, you know, smart 302 
brains through that approach but also we brought in people as well. 303 
 We had liaisons from other federal agencies here. We had liaisons 304 
from the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers and the – 305 
the National Association of County and City Health Officers, the 306 
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Association of Public Health Labs, Council of State and Territorial 307 
Epidemiologists, all of those folks at different times we either had on 308 
site or we had routine communication with. And so as decisions were 309 
developing, they could be piloted with those individuals and they could 310 
help refine them. 311 
Barbara: And once – once the decisions were – were arrived at, how was this 312 
communicated internally within CDC? 313 
Dan: Well, the plans decision unit would cue up, they would present it to 314 
the leadership, generally the incident commander, and those decisions 315 
then would either be made on the spot or they would be thought about 316 
and then a – a follow up would be given to the director at the next 317 
director’s update which at that point was every morning. 318 
 And so we would communicate it to the director, the director would 319 
then determine whether or not that was the right decision, and then 320 
given that, it would be communicated through various means. If it was 321 
a policy decision, it would have to be sent out through all of our 322 
channels. If it was to clinicians, we would use our COCO calls which 323 
are clinician outreach calls. If it were to the public health 324 
departments, we had routine calls where those would be sent out. We 325 
had mechanisms for sending out health alert network advisories 326 
which are documents that get sent out through fax or through web. 327 
We would post it on the web. We would do press releases. There were 328 
a number of different ways that we were able to do it and to send out 329 
that information but also to target it to the specific groups that needed 330 
to hear it. 331 
 In terms of communicating it within the response, that was done 332 
through basically live broadcast of all the director’s updates that 333 
anyone could access from various different places around the Agency. 334 
Barbara: Were you involved at all in communication with the public? 335 
Dan: Yes. We had to do a number of on-camera interviews, and media 336 
interviews, tele-briefings and things like that. 337 
Barbara: In terms of getting information cleared for presentation to the public, 338 
what was that process? 339 
Dan: I think there was a core group of maybe 10 or 20 individuals who were 340 
having that kind of external interaction – the external interaction 341 
where if you screwed up, people would know about it. And so that 342 
group, I think, was fairly tightly connected by space. We were close to 343 
one another and often were able to hear each other give those updates. 344 
And so, through the process of discussing it in the plans decision unit, 345 
through the process of discussing it at updates, people were able to 346 
know what the right language was, what the approach was, but then 347 
also there was a regular approach to having talking points developed 348 
almost daily where those talking points were in plain language, what 349 
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the major issues of the day were, what the policy decisions were, and 350 
what our plans and communications to the public were. 351 
 Those were made available to anybody but we sent those out also 352 
through all the professional societies so that state health officers and 353 
state epidemiologists who were also doing media interviews were 354 
using the same language and saying the same thing at the same time. 355 
So we tried not to get out of sync either in terms of the content or in 356 
terms of the timing. 357 
Barbara: Thinking back to the early days of the response, what do you feel were 358 
the key decisions that had to be made? 359 
Dan: A number of them, I mean, very early on we had to decide are we 360 
going to stand this thing up because it’s – it’s really the – the thing 361 
we’ve been thinking about, or are we going to try and manage this as a 362 
smaller operation. And so that became pretty clear that it was in our 363 
best interest to get way out in front of the problem and not try and be 364 
building up too late. And so we did lean forward and stand up the 365 
Emergency Operations Center and so forth. 366 
 So that was a key decision. A lot of other key decisions are whether or 367 
not we would begin to produce all of the reagents that we ended up 368 
sending out. We elected to do that very quickly and were able to send 369 
out the kits to all the state health departments that do the testing 370 
almost in real time with the demand for the testing which was – that 371 
was a good decision to make that happen quickly.  372 
 We also did have some resources, financial resources, available that 373 
we could access quickly. But I think people were wise to delineate 374 
what they needed early for a big response and then get that request 375 
for resources into the pipelines ‘cause that’s not something that 376 
happens immediately. And so by doing that, we were able to have 377 
resources at the right time to do the right size of response and not 378 
have to scale back because we simply didn’t have the resources. 379 
Barbara: In terms of organizational resources, did you make changes to staffing 380 
or procedures in any way? 381 
Dan: Yeah. We changed to the structure of the way we were doing the EOC 382 
hierarchy halfway through in the summer when we did have a time 383 
where it was a little bit slower and we knew that we were likely to 384 
have a lot of disease in the fall. That was a change that we did. 385 
 We changed periodically some of the – the ways that information was 386 
flowing up to the director. I think that helped out a lot. But also, there 387 
were a few individuals that stayed on through the whole response 388 
which was key, I think, and to make sure that they didn’t get too tired 389 
and not able to continue, we did have a number of people that were 390 
helping to support them and could step in at any point and do their job 391 
for them. 392 
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 Plus, we did have human resources set up in cycles so every three 393 
weeks or so, people would be in and out of the response and that’s a lot 394 
of logistics. And so I think that’s some kudos to the folks in the 395 
Division of Bioterrorism at Preparedness and Response for really 396 
helping out to try and figure out how many people were needed, when 397 
they were needed, and start cuing them up because the response 398 
would’ve just ground to a halt if we’d not been able to do that. 399 
Barbara: And have those organizational practices been institutionalized for 400 
future events? 401 
Dan: It’s hard to say ‘cause we’re – we’re still – the Emergency Operations 402 
Center’s still active right now. It’s not that much going on but I’m sure 403 
it will be. And these are things that we had practices but never had to 404 
actually put into a real response of this size and this duration. And so 405 
clearly, the things that we’ve done now would get implemented in any 406 
large response. And there are things that we had an idea that we 407 
needed, there were people that were assigned to do it, but the – the 408 
formal home of it, I think is much clearer now than it was before. 409 
Barbara: So in thinking back over the past year, are there things that stand out 410 
to you that were done particularly well in the response? 411 
Dan: Well personally I think the – the diagnostic testing was done very 412 
well. And so this is something where we had devices that were in the 413 
field for clinical trials that detected the first case. Once we knew there 414 
was something unusual, the machines that were in the public health 415 
labs had been put there only three or four months earlier, the reagents 416 
that those machines used to do the testing, we had a mechanism that 417 
had just gotten in place the fall prior that we were able to send out all 418 
of those through a contract lab. We were able to match the demand 419 
pretty well. We had very few public health labs that actually got really 420 
overwhelmed. We knew how many people they might need for each 421 
public health lab, how many machines they would need for different 422 
amounts of specimens that needed to be tested. There was a lot of 423 
planning there that really paid off. The first case was actually 424 
detected at CDC using a PCR test that they had just finished 425 
validating or had been working on. And so that made it easy for us to 426 
be able to take that, put it into a kit and be able to send it out once 427 
FDA had given us the approval to do that. 428 
 So that’s something that I think went very well and it’s really 429 
important too because if you know with certainty cases that are 430 
occurring in multiple places in the US, and you can begin to count 431 
those, and you can begin to say, you know, who is this in, is it in 432 
pregnant women, obese patients, etc., when is it occurring, what’s the 433 
transmission dynamics. If you have a really good test for that, it 434 
makes the rest of the – the work a lot easier because it takes a lot of 435 
the guess work out of it. 436 
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Barbara: …of information that you received or felt you should have, did you feel 437 
comfortable with what you got or feel there were areas where you 438 
didn’t get the information you needed?   439 
Dan: Well, I think the – there were a couple of things before the pandemic 440 
actually started from the – the agricultural side. The surveillance 441 
among swine for what influenza viruses are circulating, that 442 
information we just were not getting. And in part, because it wasn’t 443 
being done. They really did not have a – a formal way of collecting 444 
specimens from swine. There are a lot of reasons why people don’t 445 
want to do that. I think they’re dis-incentives for the farmers. There’s 446 
dis-incentives for the large manufacturers. But I think had we had 447 
better surveillance, not just in the US but in other places, we would’ve 448 
maybe picked this up. We would’ve at least had an idea about what 449 
the spectrum of different kinds of influenza viruses were out there. We 450 
might’ve had tests that had already been validated with these unusual 451 
influenza viruses so that we would be even that more prepared to 452 
detect it and to ramp up if we needed to. 453 
 And so those are things I think that we will be doing better hopefully 454 
through some collaborations with other federal agencies and other 455 
state agricultural agencies. The other part is information about what 456 
was happening in Mexico. And so there’s – there’s a really difficult job 457 
that people that try and monitor these disruptions in other countries 458 
have. And so they need to try and determine is some problem of 459 
increased pneumonias in a country far away, is that something I need 460 
to worry about, how do I get more information about that? You know, 461 
I’ve got 20 of those a week. Which one is the one that really is the one 462 
that matters? 463 
 And so that’s a science that needs to be developed better, monitoring 464 
open source data, understanding of what these kinds of problems that 465 
are occurring, these disruptions, which of those do we need to follow 466 
up on and which ones are something that we actually have to begin 467 
responding to. 468 
 So those two things I think would’ve helped us with a little earlier 469 
detection. There were some regulatory things that needed to be fixed 470 
as well. Our –our country has very good regulations for making sure 471 
that things that get done on people, tests, and things that go into 472 
people, vaccines, that those are safe, and that they’re giving accurate 473 
results.  474 
 However, in an emergency, those regulations don’t do very well. And 475 
so we got around that with some new things called the Emergency use 476 
Authorization that FDA had but there’s a real need for there to be a 477 
more nimble approach to regulation that would’ve – would’ve helped 478 
us out and would’ve made our response, I think, a little bit quicker.  479 
 In addition, when it came to doing the vaccine campaigns and getting 480 
vaccine delivered, we had some ways of getting vaccine out but we 481 
 250 
hadn’t completely figured that part out. And so I think there’s a lot 482 
more to learn about that. And even maybe setting up things like 483 
school located vaccinations to do each fall that essentially become 484 
almost a – a dry run for a pandemic or for some other large response 485 
that requires vaccination. 486 
 So getting the – the pillars at a state that do preparedness, and the 487 
pillars that do vaccines, and the pillar that does communicable 488 
disease, or the stove pipes, if you want to call them that, getting ways 489 
that they’re working together on a routine basis, I think, will help out 490 
for future responses. And that’s something we thought about for a long 491 
time but we just haven’t had the ability to make that happen before. 492 
Barbara: So do you have any final thoughts or recommendations you’d like to 493 
make? 494 
Dan: I think one thing that was pretty clear is that in terms of pandemic 495 
preparedness, that having multi-use platforms were very helpful. 496 
There are platforms for surveillance like the emerging infections 497 
program or other kinds of programs like the vaccine safety data link 498 
that are used currently but when the pandemic hit, we could just 499 
ramp up the work they were doing, or target what they were – the 500 
kinds of questions they were asking, or the cases that they were trying 501 
to find. And so that’s a real important lesson that we keep platforms 502 
for surveillance like that running and ready, and then when we have 503 
problems, we can turn them on.  504 
 Another multi-use platform is the devices that we do our testing on. 505 
And that if we have a device that can do flu, we should have that same 506 
device be one that can do anthrax and respiratory [inaudible 507 
0:04:41.6] virus and other kinds of emerging pathogens so that it can 508 
be rapidly used and we don’t have to think about shipping devices, or 509 
training people, or anything like that. So a multi – multiple use 510 
platform makes a lot of sense both from a surveillance platform and 511 
from the devices themselves, but also, having a warm base. That’s a 512 
term that the manufacturing industry uses for having a level of 513 
manufacturing capacity that can be rapidly increased. And so for 514 
diagnostic test manufacturing, we had that at CDC through a 515 
contract. We were able to increase it. That’s a – that was a very useful 516 
thing that that notion of having a warm base, like having a warm base 517 
of people that vaccinate each year in schools. That’s a warm base of 518 
activity that can be ramped up quickly but it requires you to figure out 519 
how that can be used normally, how you’re going to routinely have it 520 
apart of public health, and then how that can be ramped up using the 521 
same people, same interactions and same collaborations that are 522 
necessary for routine use. 523 
Barbara: Great. Thank you very much.   524 
Dan: Thanks.  [audio ends] 525 
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Interview #9. Martin Meltzer, PhD 
Senior Health Economist and Distinguished Consultant, Division of Emerging 
Infections and Surveillance 
 
Martin: My name is Martin Meltzer. I’m a senior health economist and a 1 
distinguished consultant in the division of Emerging Infections and 2 
Surveillance Systems. 3 
Barbara: Thank you. We’d like to begin with just a little background 4 
information. Could you tell us a little bit about yourself, your training, 5 
your specialization and what brought you to CDC?   6 
Martin: Certainly. My three degrees are all in applied economics, in fact, 7 
agricultural economics. And for the first five years after my PhD, I 8 
worked at the University of Florida in Animal Health Economics. And 9 
then in 1995, CDC started the – what they called the Prevention 10 
Effectiveness Program which is a post-doctoral program for health 11 
economists. So we arrived, five of us, and just about the first 12 
economists that CDC had integrated into their system full time. So 13 
that was just under 16 years ago.  14 
 And one of the first projects actually I started working on then was in 15 
pandemic influenza program. Dr. Nancy Cox who was and still is 16 
Division Chief of the influenza, asked me could I work on some model, 17 
some estimates of the next potential pandemic. And being green, I 18 
said, sure, not realizing how difficult it was.  19 
 But that resulted in a paper in 1999 that presented some estimates of 20 
what would happen if a 1968 type pandemic would occur again in the 21 
U.S. And that paper and the numbers became the basis of a lot of 22 
planning, programs and planning tools that we produced and put on 23 
the internet and were used by federal governments, state, local and 24 
even international and other national organizations and governments 25 
around the world for planning back then. But that was some years ago 26 
already when we first started thinking about pandemic.  27 
When you first started with pandemic planning, the national 28 
pandemic plan was something like 40 pages long if you counted each 29 
page very carefully. 30 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect of H1N1? 31 
Martin: Absolutely. I was involved in the response itself. And right now, 32 
involved in a lot of the writing up and analysis of the data that we’ve 33 
collected, and writing out explaining full and peer review journals, 34 
and other formats exactly how we calculated the numbers that I was 35 
part of the team that calculated numbers for decision making and 36 
what we did over time. 37 
Barbara. Do you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 38 
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Martin: Oh absolutely. It was more than ironic. I was on – getting on a plane 39 
to go to Europe for a conference on influenza and influenza pandemic 40 
planning and preparedness except the pandemic they were talking 41 
about was all H5, Avian Influenza. And all though the conference, 42 
there were these papers, presentations about what might happen if 43 
H5 based pandemic were to occur. And every day, in fact, every hour, 44 
do get reports and updates about this pandemic that was beginning to 45 
evolve based on H1. And, of course, it had greatly different 46 
characteristics than anything anybody had assumed for H5. So whilst 47 
the papers, and all the planning and comments for H5 were very 48 
interesting, and indeed they’re still pertinent, they didn’t have very 49 
much to do with H1N1 that was circulating.  50 
 And so I would be phoning back and saying, when do I come back and 51 
what can I do? And I got off the plane and walked around the halls 52 
and say, how could I be of use? What do you need to know? And this 53 
was like the very early days just when they’re trying to figure out 54 
what does the virus do, who gets it, how may get it and what happens 55 
to them when they get it. 56 
Barbara: Did you have a feeling that this was a potential crisis looming?   57 
Martin: Yeah, I think the word we can drop is potential. This was a genuine 58 
crisis at – it was obvious to me from the very beginning that this met 59 
all the criteria of a pandemic strain. It was human adapted, it was a 60 
strain that nobody had seen before, at least, at that time we thought 61 
so until we got confirmation of the people over 60 later on. It did 62 
spread, and it did cause illness, and it did cause health outcomes – 63 
adverse health outcomes such as death, and hospitalization amongst 64 
those who had contracted disease from it. So there was no doubt in my 65 
mind that this was it. 66 
Barbara: So how did you become involved in the actual response to H1N1? 67 
Martin: Well, as I said before, I’ve actually spent the past 15 years been 68 
involved in influenza pandemic planning producing simple models. 69 
And I do emphasis that, simple math models, to put on the web to help 70 
people plan and prepare. And literally when I returned from that 71 
conference, I went to the Incident Response – the Emergency 72 
Operations Center here at CDC and basically said, what can I do to 73 
help? What do you need to know? How can I help? And essentially I’d 74 
take the approach with modeling. It’s not what can I do and why this 75 
should be useful. I try to go the other way and say, what do you need? 76 
And if you need something, an estimate, or an idea, or a decision 77 
analysis, let me think about it and see if I can come up with something 78 
that would help you. 79 
 So the first couple of weeks was literally walking around talking to 80 
people trying to understand what it was that they thought was their 81 
biggest problems, and what they needed most help with in terms of 82 
decision making. 83 
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Barbara: So how did you then begin to work on your models and your decision 84 
trees? 85 
Martin: Well, the first part was the simple obvious questions which were, you 86 
know, who should we vaccinate. We have some ideas. They had a 87 
straw list which was, in fact, eventually the list pretty much adopted 88 
by the ACIP. But did it make sense? Were they missing somebody? 89 
Did it – was it worthwhile to vaccinate these people once we began to 90 
get a better idea of how many people were sick, and what was 91 
happening to them, what would likely to be the value of vaccinating 92 
those groups.  93 
 So we started to produce some early models giving some estimates and 94 
the word guestimate is probably more accurate because at that time, 95 
we had no idea really of the true number of people that were falling ill 96 
and even the rates of hospitalization and death were somewhat of a 97 
guess. And I was using a lot of 1968 type data. I said if this was a 1968 98 
type data – pandemic, this is what it might look like knowing full well 99 
it probably wasn’t and saying this is initial estimates. And as we 100 
worked on that, was waiting for better data to come along which it did 101 
fortunately and it was a very rare event that we got the better data. 102 
Barbara: Where did you get your information?   103 
Martin: Well originally, as I said, we had to use 1968 because when you start 104 
off, although you might have some initial field data, you really don’t 105 
have any population size data. So we – we knew this wasn’t as bad as 106 
1918, thank goodness, and for that we should be eternally thankful 107 
and grateful. But we did know that it was spreading. Some of the 108 
initial data that I saw reminded me of the lower limits of 1968 in 109 
terms of risk of going to the hospital, the risk of dying given that you 110 
were ill. And I said, this looks a lot like 1968, the very mildest 111 
portions of it. 112 
 So I started using that. And then we did what’s never been done as far 113 
as I know in influenza, we used what we called the pyramid model in 114 
which you start off at the top with the known lab confirmed reported 115 
cases and hospitalizations, and you work your way back by going out 116 
into the field and doing surveys, and getting a sense of who gets tested 117 
if they go to the doctor. ‘Cause not everybody that goes to the doctor 118 
gets tested. So what percentage of people who go to the doctor get 119 
tested? And even the step before that. Not everybody who’s ill goes to 120 
the doctor so we did surveys at particularly Detroit and Chicago, but 121 
there were other similar surveys in New York and Minneapolis asking 122 
people and doctors, if you’re ill, do you go to the doctor? And if you’re 123 
at the doctor, does the doctor test you? And if the doctor tests you, do 124 
they send the sample forward to a state epidemiological lab for 125 
testing? And if the lab tests,  do they send us the report? And same 126 
again with hospitalization. 127 
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 This sort of protocol has actually been used for a while in food born 128 
disease, but it’s never been used, that I know of, prior to this, before 129 
for influenza or any respiratory disease. But it allowed us to calculate 130 
multipliers that is for every hospitalization, I could now assume, at 131 
least from the early days in April, May and June, that approximately 132 
2.7 persons were hospitalized for every person that we got recorded. 133 
And this allowed me therefore to draw up estimates and have a better 134 
idea of what actually H1N1 was doing as opposed to trying to guess 135 
based on data from 1968. 136 
Barbara: What do you think were the key decisions that needed to be made in 137 
these first few weeks and months? 138 
Martin: I – I think to me, as an economist and modeler, some of the most 139 
interesting things when I got off the plane, the decision of how much 140 
vaccine to buy had already been made. And so they separated out the 141 
decision between buying vaccine and using vaccine. So the first 142 
decision had already been made very quickly and I think very 143 
appropriately. 144 
 The second decision was who gets it, who’s to the front of the line 145 
because we knew even back in the 90’s that no matter how much 146 
vaccine was ordered, vaccine production takes time and there’s going 147 
to be a production line. And who gets the first doses off the production 148 
line? Who goes to the front of the line? And we’d been discussing this 149 
for a number of years, various scenarios, various options, various 150 
benefits and downsides of who goes to the front and who goes to the 151 
back. And so one of the most critical decisions was the ACIP 152 
recommendations about who should be vaccinated first. And the ACIP, 153 
as you know, gave a list of people who should be vaccinated first. But 154 
they also had another list within that list of what if there’s a shortage 155 
of vaccine? Who’s the most important to vaccinate first? And that was 156 
the most critical decision in our response as far as I’m concerned 157 
because that then defined the whole nature of the vaccine related 158 
responses. 159 
 The other critical decision was the use of anti-virals. One of the key 160 
decisions was no large scale use of anti-virals for prophylaxis because 161 
of a number of reasons, one of them, they were concerned that we’d 162 
use too much of the anti-virals up front and probably have very little 163 
impact overall in stopping the spread of the disease fast enough. And 164 
also, the great concern that wide spread use of anti-virals early on 165 
might  generate drug resistant strains of the drug – of the flu making 166 
the use of the drug later on when you need it for serious cases almost 167 
ineffective.  168 
 So there was some very careful considered thought about who should 169 
get anti-virals and why and under what conditions. And again, it was 170 
decided that for most people, since this was a mild form of illness if 171 
you have no serious sequela and you were not needing hospitalization, 172 
a lot of people would become ill but they could recover very well 173 
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without the aid of any anti-viral drugs. There was recommendations, 174 
as you know, for people with high risk conditions to get it to prevent 175 
them from going to hospitalization because we also knew fairly early 176 
on that a large proportion, a majority of people in hospital, were those 177 
with pre-existing medical conditions. And so those were the people 178 
that were targeted for use with the drugs. 179 
 So those basic decisions up front about what to do with the response 180 
resources in terms of vaccine and anti-virals, who should get it, clearly 181 
defined the rest of the response. Everything about the response from 182 
them on led from those primary decisions. 183 
Barbara: Can you talk a little bit about how these decisions were arrived at and 184 
who were the decision makers? 185 
Martin: Well, the – the decision was talked back and forwards. I don’t think 186 
there’s a central office that made the single decision and then told 187 
everybody else. From what I saw, was that people here at CDC in the 188 
Incidence Response Command took an input from the subject matter 189 
experts here, they conveyed it up to Washington and Department of 190 
Health & Human Services; people at Health & Human Services 191 
provided input and a collective, as far as I’m concerned, a collective 192 
decision came about. Of course, obviously it had to be agreed upon and 193 
vetted by the very highest levels within HHS, but it wasn’t a decision, 194 
or any of these decisions, were not made in the absence of input. And 195 
indeed, for example, the ACIP recommendations were led mostly by 196 
the ACIP.  And HHS later basically endorsed them, said we will go 197 
with them. There was no argument. There was no saying can you get 198 
the ACIP to revise the recommendations significantly. That did not 199 
happen as far as I could see. 200 
 So the main point there was a lot of this was done by committee and 201 
input from a variety of experts who knew a lot about influenza and 202 
were able to read what little data we had in the early days very 203 
accurately and build on with their knowledge, a great deal of 204 
knowledge, of what influenza was and how it moved through society. 205 
Barbara: Could you talk a little bit more about the types of models that you 206 
used? 207 
Martin: Okay, I, personally based on a lot of experience, I emphasized simple 208 
models that are reduced very often to a spreadsheet. There is a 209 
difference between simple and simplistic models. The simple models, 210 
you strip down to just the essential. Simplistic, is when you leave out 211 
an important element. There’s a fine line sometimes between the two 212 
which is a simple model and which is simplistic and sometimes it’s a 213 
matter of subjective opinion as to whether a model is simple but okay 214 
versus simplistic and versus bad.  215 
The reason however I emphasized simple models in this response was 216 
because several factors, one, the incident response command here at 217 
CDC often wanted answers in a very short turnaround time. I’d get a 218 
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call at six in the evening and can they have something by ten in the 219 
morning. So you don’t have time to do a whole lot of programming and 220 
fancy. And two, there’s that I wanted to and I did, able to share the 221 
models around to people who were not modeling experts but could sit 222 
down and pretty much most of the time open a spreadsheet on a 223 
computer and click away and see what ifs. What if I change this 224 
number here? What if I change that number here? And many times we 225 
didn’t even have a few hours. It would be can we come back with an 226 
answer within half an hour of what if we change this. Not a problem if 227 
you build a simple model. 228 
If you have large scale models running on supercomputers, that is a 229 
challenge. Also, you then have to have large teams of people 230 
constantly programming and re-programming. So this – this was a 231 
decision based on over a decade of experience of using these. They’re 232 
not the exact limit of modeling. They’re not the end all and be all, but 233 
they do have value and use, particularly when people are in tight 234 
corners, they don’t have time and the – always the pressure to think 235 
about all the nuances and they want just the basics and what’s the 236 
essential elements going into that I need to concentrate on to make a 237 
decision. 238 
Barbara: Can you talk a little bit about the Policy Decision Unit? 239 
Martin: Yeah, the Policy Decision Unit to my mind was a unique feature of the 240 
response down here at CDC. And I think it was – I think it was an 241 
absolutely tremendous idea and a good, very, very good addition to 242 
how CDC responds to these crises. I – I’ve worked on the ones for 243 
SARS, small pox, for anthrax and decision making was – is and still – 244 
was and still is, made around a table with a group of experts, and as a 245 
committee essentially or a group of people around the table that make 246 
input information, absorb it, digest it and come out with 247 
recommendations. The thing is, it’s not particularly formal.  248 
 249 
 The Policy Decision Unit follows a very formal methodology which I 250 
think is a good way for several reasons. One is it makes sure that 251 
there’s a group of people who know something about this, they put in a 252 
set of expertise opinions and data into the initial set of data that you 253 
use to answer the question. You also spend a lot of time asking what is 254 
the question. And in fact, there’s a very, very rigorous well-set protocol 255 
that they follow, and part of it is that we discuss it, we talk about the 256 
data, and then there’s a break where you go back to the leadership. 257 
Somebody goes back to the leadership and says this is what we think 258 
is the objective, the question you asked. Do you agree with it? Do you 259 
want a change with it? If we answer it, is this of help to you? And they 260 
get – the leadership can then say well, no, since we last talked to you, 261 
we’ve changed our mind or when you put it like that, I realize that’s 262 
not quite what I want to know. So can you please alter the question 263 
somewhat and come back to us? 264 
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 Again, very formal in that the question is very directed, people that 265 
might with to go off on other topics, not allowed to because you’re 266 
going to just answer the single question. Also, you come down with 267 
three, maybe five at the most, particular courses of action, options, 268 
how do you answer this. You go through the pros and cons. And what’s 269 
most interesting to me as an economist is then you have three to five 270 
particular courses of action. How do you choose? How do you weigh 271 
them against each other? Because the one thing about public health 272 
that most mathematical models, including in economics, don’t account 273 
for is in fact there are many objective functions that you’re trying to 274 
simultaneously meet in public health. Mathematically, models meet 275 
one objective function at a time. Here at public health, you’re trying to 276 
perhaps meet three, four, five. One is, will this get the maximum 277 
number of people vaccinated? But also, will this make people retain 278 
their faith in public health? 279 
 Well, those are perhaps sometimes even diametrically opposed 280 
objective functions. But you can, in this process, list out all those 281 
important objective functions that you – that the group thinks must be 282 
addressed, and you can weigh each [inaudible 0:18:34:1] then say 283 
okay, we agree with you and your recommendation; or no, we want 284 
option one although you recommended option two. We can see why you 285 
picked option two but there’s a couple of other things that we want to 286 
take into account that you didn’t discuss or has occurred since we – 287 
you started this and we want option one. And sometimes they even 288 
pick, well, you’ve got three courses of action. We want course of action 289 
four.  290 
 Although this might seem a failure then when the policy makers pick 291 
a recommendation that the rest of the group, the Policy Decision Unit, 292 
didn’t pick or recommend, I would say, in fact, no. The point of the 293 
Policy Decision Unit was to collect all the available data, digest it, 294 
distill it, quickly, come up with some courses of action, look at the pros 295 
and cons, think of it in depth, and again, very important, think of the 296 
various means about which you’d measure the value of each of those, 297 
the objective function, does it meet this objective function? Yes or no. 298 
Does it meet it well? Yes or no. And then present that result. And in 299 
doing so, that focuses the attention of the Incident Command to what’s 300 
really important. A 301 
And if they come up with a different recommendation, or indeed they 302 
come up with another option, that, in fact, indicates success because 303 
you’ve got them to the point where they say, now I understand what’s 304 
really important. And the Policy Decision Unit really was helping the 305 
policy makers decide what’s most important. And it was unique. We’ve 306 
never done this before at CDC. And if ever – when this next happens, I 307 
hope to see another unit like that again run. Flexibility, people at the 308 
top, it takes a certain talent, special kind of person to run one of those. 309 
They’ve got to be very flexible. They’ve got to deal with a lot of high 310 
strung personalities. Got to be able to realize that at some point you’ve 311 
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got to get to the answer and that you’ve still got to brief the 312 
leadership. And indeed, the leadership up here has to take your 313 
recommendations or thoughts from the – further up the chain of 314 
command and explain to them why it is.  315 
 316 
The other important thing was that following, you had two pieces of 317 
writing from it. You had the slide sets with your comments on, and 318 
there’s also a memo. And even if the memo was basically said we don’t 319 
agree with the recommendation, there’s still a record of how we 320 
reached that – the recommendations, how the data were taken, and 321 
the information distilled. And again, I think that’s far more formal 322 
process than we’ve ever done before in all the years I’ve been here at 323 
CDC and I’ve been involved in a number of these responses now. 324 
Barbara: How are these decisions then communicated internally and publicly? 325 
 326 
Martin: Well internally, the – within the EOC, the Emergency Operation 327 
Center within CDC, the way it’s set up with constant frequent 328 
meetings and a very well organized structure, organization structure, 329 
it’s very easy to set out once a decision’s been made, let it flow down 330 
the organizational chart. And that’s one of the aspects as well is that 331 
an organizational chart of who was responsible for whom was set up 332 
right at the beginning. So everybody had a good idea of their role and 333 
what was expected. But it also allowed for information to at least flow 334 
down most of the time and flow back up most of the time. And so most 335 
of us would know and understand what decisions have been made. 336 
And then the big issue was communicating it up to Washington and 337 
the media, which I fed information to. I didn’t actually go up to 338 
Washington too often. Sometimes I did. Or on the phone more often. 339 
But – and also to the media.  340 
 And again, from the very beginning, we had a very carefully designed 341 
plan about who was going to tell the media. And essentially, from – as 342 
far as I’m concerned at down here at CDC, we had one or two spokes 343 
persons who addressed the media directly, and then, of course, we had 344 
our media communications team that deal with, you know, the written 345 
emails. And we always worked through them. In other words, there 346 
would be a technical question for me might be some question on the 347 
estimate of the number of cases, hospitalizations and deaths which is 348 
fine. I deal with that all the time. But it would go through the media 349 
people and they would act as intermediary between – between us and 350 
the media. And there’s a couple of very good reasons. One is if we just 351 
were to take every single question ourselves openly, it would be an 352 
never ending stream of people at our door and questions. And two is 353 
that if we do that, then after a while, we don’t know what’s going on 354 
elsewhere because we’re so busy and we can’t always link this, what 355 
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we’re talking about, into the main message that we’re trying to get 356 
across. And public health, very often, is all about the messaging.  357 
 I found it fascinating many times. I’d present the numbers to the 358 
incident command team and they would say well – first thing they’d 359 
say, well okay, what’s the public  health message about this? You 360 
know, how can I perhaps give a few comments about interpreting it? 361 
But many, many times, it was – the first concern was what does this 362 
mean about our communications? How do we explain it to the people? 363 
Does it mean we have to change policy? If so, how do we change the 364 
policy and how do we communicate it? Things like that. 365 
 So communications was at the far and center of this response. And I 366 
think they did very well. It’s always stressful. Nothing’s perfect but I 367 
think we have to be given high marks on how we communicated out. I 368 
mean I do understand that some people are unhappy. But I think the 369 
number of people that are unhappy versus the number of people that 370 
thought we gave out adequate and enough information and explained 371 
things, I think, was far greater than the number of people that were 372 
[inaudible 0:24:30.4] unhappy. 373 
Barbara: So looking back over the past year, are there any things that you 374 
would have done differently or would have recommended be done 375 
differently? 376 
Martin: It’s sort of like other people think the pandemic’s over, to me, it’s still 377 
in the middle of the pandemic and writing it up, and thinking about it. 378 
Would it be different? Very little that I can see at this point. Maybe in 379 
two or three years I might think, you know, this – the one defining 380 
feature of the pandemic response as you know it was the delay in 381 
getting vaccine; or, to put it the other way, the epidemiology of how 382 
the disease spread and who it infected, it came early. We’ve never seen 383 
a pandemic or even a flu season come this early and this hard. And so 384 
that meant that we are always behind the 8-ball in terms of vaccine 385 
delivery. 386 
 And there are limits to what the technology can do in terms of vaccine 387 
production and delivery. And so we got caught. And obviously what we 388 
would like is a perfect vaccine that we could produce and stockpile. 389 
That’s been a goal of ours and we’ve had – spent lots of money in the 390 
past researching different types of vaccines. They haven’t panned out. 391 
And we have to accept there are always limitations in our technology. 392 
 So the biggest impediment to a perfect response was pretty much 393 
outside our control. And as far as I’m concerned, would – if we were to 394 
do it again, would we like to have the vaccine product – produced and 395 
delivered early? Sure. Do we have to accept the fact that perhaps it 396 
won’t be? Absolutely. Can we control the speed at which the pandemic 397 
arrives as it did in fall? No. That’s just the nature. In fact, it was 398 
fascinating to us just – during the summer there was a low level of 399 
disease throughout the nation. What that did was like seed it. And the 400 
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moment schools went back, they had this explosion of cases right 401 
across the country; and as I said earlier, unlike anything we’ve really 402 
seen. That – that much activity, that really in the year, 403 
unprecedented. And you can’t plan for that. You can’t say, oh, we 404 
could’ve done better. That just wasn’t feasible.  405 
Barbara: So do you have any final thoughts or recommendations that you would 406 
make? 407 
Martin: Well, I think – I think – I would like to see planning that says take the 408 
good parts. Like for example, the surveillance that allowed us to 409 
produce the [inaudible 0:26:55.5] model with the multipliers that 410 
enabled us to produce simple models that got a handle and – they’re 411 
estimates. They’re not accurate head counts. They’re not accurate 412 
census. But it allowed us to provide estimates that we think are quite 413 
reliable and useful to policy makers. 414 
 I’d like to see that become embedded in the response type of thinking, 415 
the dogma, the protocol that we do, that type of surveillance upfront; 416 
and, right away, without question. There isn’t do we need it? 417 
[inaudible 0:27:27.1] It can be very time consuming, and it can be 418 
expensive and it can, in fact, bother a number of people ‘cause we ask 419 
a lot of people. But more the better. And I think it proved itself. We 420 
couldn’t have done anything that we did in terms of modeling without 421 
that. And in fact, it is interesting to me that, as far as I know and I’ve 422 
yet to see on any other websites from any other countries, estimates 423 
like we’ve produced.  424 
 Other countries have produced and posted estimates, for example, of 425 
laboratory confirmed cases, hospitalization, and deaths which is very 426 
appropriate. But in terms of extrapolating based on what they know of 427 
the multipliers and what does each case that record, how many does 428 
that represent unrecorded, I haven’t seen any other work done. 429 
Doesn’t mean it hasn’t been done but it hasn’t been widely publicized 430 
as us. And I think that went along way to the media and the public 431 
understanding the relative impact, and why this was a pandemic, and 432 
why we needed to get vaccinated when the vaccine was available. And 433 
so, working to ensure that we can replicate this again and again, is I 434 
think to me, the number one priority. I don’t think it’s overly 435 
complicated. I just think it means a lot of hard work and making sure 436 
that it’s upfront. 437 
Barbara: Great. Thank you very much. 438 
Martin: Surely. [audio ends 0:28:43.1]439 
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Interview #10. Toby Merlin, MD 
Deputy Director, CDC Influenza Coordination Division (ICU)  
 
Male: The first thing you want to do is start with the name. 1 
Toby: Okay, my name is Toby Merlin and I am Deputy Director of CDC’s 2 
Influenza Coordination Unit. 3 
Barbara: Thank you. We’re here to develop an understanding of the [inaudible 4 
0:00:17.2] could you tell us about your training and your 5 
specialization?   6 
Toby: Sure, glad to. I trained, I went to medical school at the University of 7 
Florida in Gainesville, Florida, and trained as a pathologist in both 8 
anatomic and clinical pathology at Stanford and University of New 9 
Mexico. And I was on the faculty at the University of New Mexico 10 
really specializing in pathology of infectious diseases and 11 
microbiology. And that’s where I began my connections with the CDC 12 
serving on advisory groups for the CDC. And I actually came to work 13 
for the CDC in 2003, and I came to work at the CDC on projects – 14 
developing laboratory capacity for HIV Aids in Africa working 15 
primarily in Tanzania but also doing some work in Zimbabwe and 16 
South Africa also did some work in Batswana. And then in 2007, I 17 
moved to the Influenza Coordination Unit to be Steve Redd’s Deputy 18 
Director. 19 
Barbara: Great, thank you. Are you currently involved in the H1N1 issue? 20 
Toby: Oh yes. I have been Deputy Incident Manager for the CDC H1N1 21 
response so I have been involved in CDC’s H1N1 response really since 22 
the response began in late April of 2009, so going on 10 months. 23 
Barbara. Can you recall when did you first heard about H1N1? 24 
Toby: Oh yes, I – I may have – I may have – I guess everyone has good 25 
remembrances of this but I was on vacation and I – I woke up in my 26 
hotel room in Istanbul Turkey and there was a strange set of emails 27 
about swine flu being detected in two children on a test device that the 28 
CDC had deployed as part of its development. And I was getting ready 29 
to return from vacation and I didn’t make all that much of it. I 30 
thought it was odd. We had been experiencing swine flu detection in 31 
human beings with refinements in our detecting abilities over the past 32 
couple of years and it was just sort of an odd thing. And I got back to 33 
Atlanta the next day and wasn’t even scheduled to call back to work 34 
and I called Steve Redd and asked what was up and he said oh, you 35 
probably better come in. And I remember saying, isn’t this just 36 
another one of these small swine flu outbreaks? And he said it looks 37 
like it’s something much larger. That was before I knew anything 38 
about what was going on in Mexico. So. I should’ve stayed in Turkey. 39 
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Barbara: Did it strike you at that point that it might be a potential crisis? Or 40 
when did it become clear that it was a larger issue?   41 
Toby: It became clear to me once the size and scale of what was going on in 42 
Mexico became clear, and that the virus was the same virus. It was so 43 
then obvious that this was way beyond anything we had experience 44 
previously in terms of human outbreak of a novel influenza virus. I 45 
mean we, you know, there’d been these little sputters of detections of 46 
swine cases in a couple of people but nothing that crossed 47 
international borders. 48 
Barbara: So how did your day to day operations change or what happened as a 49 
result of this? 50 
Toby: Well, we left our cozy offices in Building 1 and moved to the CDC 51 
Emergency Operation Center. And the Emergency Operations Center 52 
was essentially stood up for the response fairly quickly and all of a 53 
sudden, we, you know, quickly moved from having a small operating – 54 
the ICU is a small group, from having a small group of about 15-18 55 
people to having hundreds of people in the Emergency Operations 56 
Center and running an operation that would begin at, you know, three 57 
or four in the morning and end at nine or 10 at night with people 58 
spanning the night. It really accelerated very, very rapidly. 59 
Barbara: So could you describe a little bit about the early days of this response, 60 
what was taking place? What happened? 61 
Toby: You know, the – what I remember as the key focus early on was really 62 
trying to get a good handle on what was going on in Mexico City 63 
because there was a lot of non-scientific information, a lot of non-64 
verifiable information and trying to get a real as good a grip as we 65 
could on what the actual underlying facts were as well as trying to 66 
rapidly determine the extent of disease in the U.S. and turning up 67 
surveillance systems particularly in the cross-border states where it 68 
appeared most of the disease was occurring. And then so that was on 69 
the – at the – then on the laboratory side, there was this enormous 70 
push to characterize the agent and then develop diagnostics for the 71 
agent so to genetically characterize the agent and develop PCR tests 72 
that could be used to detect the agent. And that was an enormous full 73 
court press that was – turned out to be quite successful. 74 
Barbara: Did you feel you were getting enough information at that point?  Or 75 
the right kind of information? 76 
Toby: That’s a – yes, I think – yeah. I – I do think so. I think the hardest 77 
problem was Mexico City. You know, we have very well established 78 
surveillance systems that have been tested and are used for seasonal 79 
influenza in – in the U.S. And we’re familiar with the data and we 80 
have established laboratory networks for the U.S. Mexico City was all 81 
together a different matter. We did not have reliable laboratory 82 
testing. We had relationships with people in Mexico and Mexico City 83 
that were very good relationships but these people were also very, 84 
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very busy themselves trying to deal with an emerging crisis. So I think 85 
that that – you know, what was going on in Mexico City was – it 86 
would’ve been nice to have been able to have more discrete verifiable 87 
information than we did initially. 88 
Barbara: Did you have existing plans in place to deal with an emerging threat? 89 
Toby: Oh yes. That – that – that’s something I think that we all feel quite 90 
good about as part of the major national pandemic influenza 91 
preparedness initiative that began in 2005. And as a direct result of 92 
the president’s initiative and congressional funding, we had been 93 
working to develop plans to respond to an influenza pandemic and we 94 
had had multiple exercises of responding to the emergence of a 95 
pandemic in the CDC EOC. So we all sort of knew our roles. We – 96 
none of – none of this was really something that we were not prepared 97 
for. We were surprised at the emergence in Mexico and we were 98 
surprised at the emergence from swine rather than H5N1. But I think 99 
we felt quite prepared; so much so that during the initial phases of the 100 
response, people would forget and refer to it as an exercise because it 101 
felt very much like an exercise. It felt very much like the exercises 102 
we’d been through over and over again except this one was real. It 103 
stopped feeling like an exercise after about two or three weeks when 104 
we couldn’t stop it and – and go back to our regular jobs. It, you know, 105 
it – it clearly had a life all its own but we – we all I think felt very well 106 
prepared. 107 
Barbara: So as the virus – as the threat expanded, did you find that you needed 108 
to make any changes either in processes or within your organizational 109 
structure to meet the demand? 110 
Toby: Yea, we made – initially for me, I had assumed a role initially running 111 
the Plans Unit doing decision briefings. But it became clear that Steve 112 
Redd who was the Incident Manager needed a – a shadow Incident 113 
Manager. He needed someone who could do the things he couldn’t do 114 
because he was being pulled in multiple different directions. So I 115 
moved out of the Plans Unit and actually became the Deputy Incident 116 
Manager and took on this role of going to those things that Steve 117 
couldn’t and sort of, I think shadow’s the best word, shadowing his 118 
leadership.  119 
 Then we actually – our major organizational challenge occurred in 120 
June after the initial outbreak and after the characterization of the 121 
virus and the initial response. A lot of the people who were working on 122 
the response went back to their regular jobs. We had not built a 123 
structure that would staff the response indefinitely. And we found 124 
ourselves with losing critical staff that we needed to actually run the 125 
response. And we spent a lot of time in June and July essentially 126 
trying to build a staffing structure so that we – we could staff to 127 
continue the response. So I think all of us found ourselves particularly 128 
in June and July moving from not just running response but running 129 
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response and building a human resources organization to staff the 130 
response which was – none of us had anticipated. 131 
Barbara: Could you talk a little bit about the Plans and Decision Unit that you 132 
mentioned? 133 
Toby: Sure. Part of our exercises had included development of a unit that 134 
would be dedicated to preparing decision briefings for the CDC 135 
Director or the response leadership on issues, and taking the 136 
information and providing them with standardized briefings and 137 
options so – and the notion is to remove the variability in – in decision 138 
making that’s often – that often comes from people presenting things 139 
in different ways, and different formats, and having a standard format 140 
for presenting the – that facts and assumptions, the criteria for the 141 
decision, the options, and Rich Besser who was then the Director and 142 
Steve Redd very much liked this – liked having this – this certainty, at 143 
least the reliability of a way of having briefings presented.  144 
The Plans Unit also ran Team B and Team B was a group of outsiders 145 
led by David Sencer the former CDC Director, and at the time, David 146 
Bell who was a senior leader from within CDC, a group of outsiders 147 
who would provide an outside perspective on what was happening and 148 
decisions we were making. And that information was summarized and 149 
fed up to CDC leadership. 150 
Barbara: Great, thank you. So in terms of information that flowed into the 151 
Decision Making Unit, the Plans Unit, could you talk a little bit about 152 
where it came from and how you felt that process worked? 153 
Toby: We were gathering the information by recruiting subject matter 154 
experts from the response to inform these briefings. So if it was 155 
something that involved deployment of strategic national stockpile 156 
assets, we would bring in people from the strategic national stockpile 157 
and people from the Influenza Division who had expertise in anti-viral 158 
use would bring people from HHS that were involved in acquisition of 159 
anti-virals and decisions about the strategic national stockpile. If it 160 
was a decision about school closures, we would bring in people who 161 
had developed CDC’s community mitigation strategy, people who were 162 
working on the epi-aids that were taking place in communities that 163 
were experiencing outbreaks who could help us understand what was 164 
going on with school closures in those communities. 165 
Barbara: Great. Do you feel that the process worked well and that you were well 166 
informed? 167 
Toby: Well you know, the – I do. The – there’s always a fog of war aspect to 168 
making decisions in the absence of complete information. And I guess 169 
my response is, I didn’t – I did not personally expect us to have 170 
complete information, and I expected that we would be making 171 
decisions with the best information that was available. I think Rich 172 
Besser certainly was very comfortable with that and most of the 173 
response leadership was comfortable with that. When you do that, you 174 
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make decisions that when you have more information later on you 175 
change that decision, you change that direction. I think the best 176 
example, you know, the – the best example of a changed decision is 177 
that our initial guidance on school closure was – we had a 178 
recommendation for pre-emptive school closure that schools would 179 
close as soon as there was evidence of infection in the school, in the 180 
community, to try to dampen down the spread of disease in the 181 
community.  182 
 As we got information about the severity of disease caused by this 183 
virus and the extent of the infection and the public dismay over the 184 
school closures, we moved to a guidance for what we called a reactive 185 
school closures that we recommended that schools stay open, that sick 186 
students stay away from school and that schools really only close if – if 187 
there were no longer enough staff and students at the school to 188 
warrant keeping the schools open or enable the schools to stay open. 189 
Barbara: Could you talk a little bit about the internal communication processes 190 
that you used and developed to keep CDC employees informed about 191 
what you were doing? 192 
Toby: Well, you know there’s – I – I think there are – there were at least two 193 
communities that we needed to focus on internally and one was 194 
actually the response community. The response really has ranged 195 
from having hundreds of people involved to its estimated 1,500 people 196 
involved.  And we needed to take steps to just make sure that 197 
everyone involved in the response knew what was going on. And that 198 
was largely accomplished through our standing meetings. We had 199 
director’s briefings every day and broadcast of those standard 200 
meetings to people in the EOC, and people who could call in so that 201 
everyone, we tried to see that everyone felt that they could listen in to 202 
the briefings for the CDC Director and understand what decisions 203 
were being made.  204 
 Then we worked through the communications department to have 205 
periodic communications and I think they went out weekly updating 206 
CDC staff in general on what was going on. I can tell you in 207 
retrospect, I think that people who weren’t in the midst of it probably 208 
didn’t get a sense of the acuity of it that people working the response 209 
got. 210 
Barbara: Great. Could you talk just a little bit about the decisions that you did 211 
make in terms of how you prioritized them or in the early days what 212 
did you feel were the key decisions that had to be made? 213 
Toby: There were several in the early days – I think there were several key 214 
decisions that needed to be made.  One early issue was related to 215 
borders and what to do at borders and whether to close the U.S. 216 
border with Mexico, whether to implement some type of screening at – 217 
of international travelers. And the decision was made early on to not 218 
close the border and not do that. It was – we had in our exercises 219 
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visited this over and over again. We clearly understood that once 220 
disease was established in the U.S., there was marginal if any benefit 221 
that would come from screening travelers or closing borders. But we 222 
also knew that there was a communications issue with that that many 223 
people, lay people, felt that that was something that you should do. So 224 
that – making that decision and advocating for that decision was 225 
clearly important. 226 
 Another key decision was whether to deploy assets from the CDC’s 227 
strategic national stockpile, particularly anti-virals, oral anti-virals, 228 
and if so, how much and where to. And that was a complicated 229 
decision where actually the initial recommendation from the Plans 230 
Unit was a much – a small deployment of anti-virals from a portion of 231 
the strategic national stockpile to a small number of affected states. 232 
And that was the recommendation. The actual action taken was 233 
deployment of 25% of the strategic national stockpile in sort of pre-234 
arranged trounces to all states. So there was a decision made to really 235 
lean very forward in the deployment of anti-virals.  236 
 You know, there were decisions around, you know, how – deployment 237 
of – of staff to Mexico and decisions about how far to proceed in 238 
providing diagnostic testing, not just domestically but internationally. 239 
The decision was made to provide test kits essentially to every country 240 
internally that was capable of receiving test kits and working with 241 
them. So those were sort of a number of early decisions. 242 
Barbara: Great, thank you. So almost a year later, has your time commitment 243 
and involvement with this changed? 244 
Toby: Yes. There was a period of time I would say from April, wow, into the 245 
summer where I was working as many hours as it was possible to 246 
work. And – and only getting a fraction of the work that I thought I 247 
needed to do done. I moved to, you know, not being able to really had 248 
to prioritize what I was able to work on and some things didn’t get 249 
done. I’m now back to a stage where I actually leave the CDC at a 250 
normal time of day and feel that most of my work has been done. And 251 
that actually feels quite nice. 252 
Barbara: So looking back over the past year, are there any things that you 253 
would’ve done differently? 254 
Toby: There are – yes. Yes, several things. I mean I think – I think we all 255 
would have, you know, retrospective knowledge’s always brilliant. I 256 
think we would all have much sooner implemented a staffing plan for 257 
the response to enable us to keep up staff. It was – it was really a 258 
problem to – to – to have a deficit of staff in the summer and was we 259 
were entering the fall. I think we would have made much clearer and 260 
more rapid decisions about our infection control recommendations. We 261 
had initial precautionary infection control recommendations by 262 
actually late May there was an interest in re-examining them and 263 
moving back from them.  264 
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But this is an issue that rapidly we lost control over and there were a 265 
number of sort of competing interests in trying balance the issues of 266 
infection control versus worker protection in an atmosphere of 267 
incomplete information, an atmosphere of no – no – often unpublished 268 
information and strong opinions. And I think it is something that we – 269 
we just felt events had got control of the situation. You know, we 270 
ended up not being able ourselves to make a recommendation without 271 
going outside of the CDC to the Institute of Medicine and asking the 272 
Institute of Medicine to do a rapid turnaround review of the evidence 273 
and provide that back to us. And I think given it to do over again, we 274 
would’ve taken a different approach on that. 275 
I – actually in terms of the development and deployment of diagnostic 276 
devices, I think that worked famously. I don’t think we would have 277 
done anything differently on that. And in general in our 278 
communications strategy, I think our communications were very good. 279 
I think, you know, it – Rich Besser who was CDC Director in April and 280 
May, was an extremely capable communicator. I think the transition 281 
between Rich and Tom Frieden left a period of time that – a period of 282 
time where there was no full-time CDC Director on board, and where 283 
Rich was acting in no Secretary at HHS and it really created 284 
communications challenges.  285 
So given it to do over again, I mean, that’s something to avoid. But 286 
that’s just sort of uncertainty we had to deal with. If you don’t think 287 
about this in terms of emergency response, but working in a political 288 
environment there – there – you can be in situations where the 289 
political leadership is simply not there; or just coming on and not 290 
familiar with the issues and building their own staff and that creates 291 
an enormous challenges. 292 
Barbara: Thank you. Do you have any final thoughts or recommendations? 293 
Toby: I – it’s going – it’s going to sound probably a little like preaching to the 294 
choir or saying things that are obvious but you can’t – you can’t over 295 
rate being prepared. The things that worked best were the things that 296 
CDC had been preparing for for the last four years. And the reason the 297 
diagnostic testing went so well is that people in the laboratories and 298 
Influenza Decision and Dan Jernigan, in particular, had made great 299 
effort to plan out how the testing would be done, planned out how the 300 
testing would be developed to get FDA clearance of antecedent devices 301 
that an antecedent that were placed in state laboratories to develop a 302 
mechanism for manufacturing and distributing test kits once there 303 
was a need to do this, it was still a huge amount of work but it 304 
wouldn’t have been possible without all that preparation. So the 305 
ability to stand back from a situation and realize that you are going to 306 
need diagnostic testing capability, you’re going to need enhanced 307 
surveillance capability and lay the groundwork for that is really 308 
absolutely critical.  309 
Barbara: Great, thank you very much. 310 
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Toby: Oh, you’re welcome.  311 
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Interview #11 Glen Nowak, PhD 
Director, CDC Media Relations 
 
Barbara: If you could please give us your name and current position. 1 
Glen: My name is Glen Nowak. I’m the Director of Media Relations for the 2 
Centers of Disease Control and Prevention. I’m also the Acting 3 
Director of the Division of Electronic – of News and Electronic Media 4 
here at CDC. 5 
Barbara: Great. And could you give us a little background information on 6 
yourself? Your training, what brought you to CDC, how long you’ve 7 
been at CDC?   8 
Glen: I’ve been formally part of CDC for about 12 years. I came to CDC from 9 
the University of Georgia. I was an assistant then  and subsequently 10 
an associate professor of Advertising and Public Relations at the 11 
Grady College of Journalism at the University of Georgia. I came to 12 
Atlanta to the University of Georgia in 1989. And when I first arrived 13 
at the University of Georgia, I began doing projects for the CDC as a 14 
visiting communication scientist.  15 
 Most of those projects were with the division of HIV Aids Prevention. 16 
And they ranged from helping them test public service 17 
announcements to helping them organize focus group and other 18 
research, and even getting involved in some of the behavioral science 19 
interventions that they did. 20 
 In about 1999, I believe, I applied for a job as the first Director of 21 
Communications at the National Immunization Program at CDC and 22 
was offered that position. And I joined CDC in 1999 as the first 23 
Director of Communications for the National Immunization Program. 24 
I was the Director of Communications and stayed in that office in 25 
communications and I did that for about five years. And then I was 26 
asked to come over on a detail to become the Acting Director of Media 27 
Relations at CDC. And four years ago, I became the – I formally 28 
became the Director of Media Relations at CDC. 29 
 And so I’ve been involved with CDC for – for probably close to 20 30 
years. A lot of my early work was in HIV Aids Prevention. Then I went 31 
to Immunization, and more recently I’ve been involved in all the – all 32 
the different topics and issues that touched CDC as Director of Media 33 
Relations. 34 
Barbara: Great. Well, we’re particularly interested in your involvement with 35 
the H1N1 pandemic response. So if you could think back to last 36 
spring, do you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 37 
Glen: I first heard about H1N1 probably a few weeks before the public did. 38 
One of my press officers, Tom Skinner, had brought to my attention 39 
some research – some findings from the Influenza Division that said 40 
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that they had found a novel influenza virus. And it involved a couple 41 
of children in California, I believe, and he had been talking to them 42 
about how they were going to make that information publicly known.  43 
 And so I was involved in some of those early conversations perhaps 44 
about a week before we held our first press briefing on this novel 45 
H1N1 virus. And so I would say probably around April 17th, April 18th 46 
is when I first became aware of H1N1. 47 
Barbara: And when you were involved in these discussions, can you think back 48 
to sort of the climate, the feeling in the discussions? Did you think 49 
that this was a potential pandemic or did it strike you as a crisis or – 50 
what was the general feeling? 51 
Glen: Well, the general feeling when this was first brought to -at least our 52 
attention in media relations- was that this was something that we 53 
probably should think about bringing to public attention sooner rather 54 
than later, and that wasn’t so much based on the number of children 55 
who had been affected because that point, it was only about two and I 56 
believe both of those children had recovered from their illness and it 57 
was not very remarkable.  58 
 But given the interest that there had been over the past few years in 59 
pandemic flu and the potential for flu – flu viruses to call a pandemic, 60 
we thought that it would behoove CDC to try to bring this to people’s 61 
attention sooner rather than later because if this did turn out to be the 62 
cause of – of more illness or – or serious outbreaks, it would’ve been 63 
better for the agency in terms of its credibility, in terms of being 64 
transparent, to have brought this to people’s attention very early on. 65 
And we knew that when we made that recommendation that – that we 66 
also had to be very careful that at that stage we had no indication or 67 
no idea that this would turn out to be a pandemic flu virus.  68 
 At that point, what we had was a novel influenza virus that had 69 
caused some cases of illness, that may have caused other cases and we 70 
were in the process of – of trying to figure that out as an agency. And 71 
so what we wanted to do is make sure that we notified people, alerted 72 
them to the possibility that this virus has the potential to cause 73 
illness, but also put that information to a – into a context so that 74 
people weren’t unduly alarmed based on the information we had. 75 
Barbara: So in the first few days of your initial response period, were you 76 
working primarily within your own division, your media division, or 77 
were you working with other parts of CDC? 78 
Glen: We were working with other parts of CDC. We’re working very closely 79 
with the influenza division and our influenza experts. We were 80 
working very closely with the CDC Office of the Director. I – I was in 81 
meetings with – with Acting Director Richard Besser as well as Dr 82 
Ann Schuchat who at that point was part of his senior leadership 83 
team. And we had a number of conversations early on about the – the 84 
importance of making sure that this information got out in a timely 85 
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manner, and that when we put the information out that we put it out 86 
in the appropriate context.  87 
 And so one of the things that we did was we did hold a press briefing 88 
on, I believe it was like April 23rd or 24th, and it featured not Dr. 89 
Besser but – but Dr. Schuchat and Dr. Nancy Cox. And one of the 90 
reasons for that was based on the number of cases that we were aware 91 
of, based on the lab results that – that we had as of that date. We 92 
decided that – that was the best way to inform people without causing 93 
undue alarm.  94 
 When the CDC Director is part of a press briefing, it really heightens 95 
things. And so we wanted to make sure that we wanted to get people’s 96 
attention but we also wanted to keep it in step with the information 97 
that we had. 98 
Barbara: Right. So what was – do you recall what was the general public 99 
response to that press brief or did you feel that the media recognized 100 
the severity of what you were discussing, the potentiality? 101 
Glen: Well, very early on, I – I think it was hard for them to put in context. 102 
In fact, the day before that press briefing, we – we had a call and what 103 
we call a background briefing with I believe about five major reporters 104 
to let them know what we were going to be talking about the next day. 105 
And we talked to news media that is often the very first to report on 106 
something. And so we talked to a reporter from Associated Press, from 107 
Reuters, from CNN. And we told them what we knew. 108 
 We told them that we had discovered this novel virus, that the virus 109 
had called illness in at least two children, both of those children had 110 
recovered without any notable difference in the severity or course of 111 
illness from – from seasonal flu, that we had other samples that were 112 
on their way to CDC to test, but it was a relatively small number of 113 
samples. It was probably less than 10 or around 10 or 12. And at that 114 
point, we did not know if this virus had caused other disease, or if that 115 
virus – the virus was causing disease currently. And most of those 116 
reporters chose not to write a story based on the initial briefing. A 117 
couple of them did a little story and said basically what I just said 118 
which is – which was that the CDC had discovered this novel 119 
influenza virus, it appeared to have caused some – some illness, it 120 
wasn’t clear that it had caused any additional illness and it wasn’t 121 
clear it was still – still causing illness. 122 
 And then after our – our press briefing on the 23rd, we did have more 123 
media stories and again, a lot of the media interest at that point was 124 
not so much in the two cases that we had confirmed, but in the 125 
number of test results that – that – that CDC was still – number of 126 
cases that were still being analyzed. And because that number was 127 
still relatively modest, again at that point, most of the news media 128 
was – was pretty conservative and cautious in how they approached 129 
the story. 130 
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 Barbara: Great. Where – where were you getting your information about what 131 
was happening and developing? 132 
Glen: Pretty much directly from the subject matter experts involved. When – 133 
when something like this happens, we – we go right to the subject 134 
matter experts at CDC to – to learn from them what they know, and to 135 
see what their thinking is, and how – how they think it will play out. I 136 
was also in a number of meetings with the CDC, with the Acting CDC 137 
Director and the CDC leadership team related to this. 138 
Barbara: And could you describe a little bit about the internal communication 139 
processes that were being used at CDC in order to keep the CDC 140 
employees informed about what was going on?  141 
Glen: Well, you know, very early on, again the processes were mostly 142 
between those people who were directly involved in it versus, you 143 
know, a broader way of communicating with a lot more employees.  144 
 And at that point, it was, you know, again, when you go back to that 145 
period in time, we had relatively limited information. We also know 146 
that as a matter of course given what CDC does, they do identify novel 147 
viruses all the time. That’s – that’s not an unusual thing for CDC to do 148 
given the business it’s in. And we also identify influenza viruses that 149 
have what look like unique characteristics. With further research, 150 
they may turn out to be, you know, similar to viruses that – that are 151 
already known.  152 
 And so at that point, it was very important for us to – to keep things 153 
in – in that kind of a context knowing again that – that there is a lot of 154 
– a lot more interest in influenza viruses and as a result of that extra 155 
interest on both the public, and the media and the healthcare 156 
community in influenza viruses, we probably – we had a great 157 
obligation to make known what we knew about that virus sooner 158 
rather than later, even though I, as I mentioned, at the point that we 159 
were talking about this, we started talking about this, we only had 160 
two children who had been impacted and we only had about seven to 161 
10 samples that were on their way to CDC. 162 
Barbara: So as time went on and the situation became increasingly more dire, 163 
and more cases were reported, and the Emergency Operations Center 164 
was activated, and CDC began a more – a more coordinated response, 165 
who did your role with the media change? 166 
Glen: Well I guess – I guess one – one important transition I should – I 167 
should probably elaborate on a little bit, we did our press briefing on 168 
April 23rd with Dr. Schuchat and Dr. Cox. And at that point, we 169 
thought that we pretty much had brought people up to date and we – 170 
what we said in the press briefing that we would let people know more 171 
as we knew more. Our anticipation when that press conference ended 172 
was that we probably weren’t going to be back with an update for at 173 
least a few more days, perhaps another week or so.  174 
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 About three hours after that press briefing though, Dr. Besser got 175 
word from Canadian health officials that they had been testing 176 
samples from Mexico where – where a country that had been 177 
experiencing a lot more severe disease at that time had been in the 178 
news because many people had died from influenza or influenza-179 
related complications.  180 
 And so about three hours after that first press conference, we were 181 
brought back down to the Emergency Operations Center to get an 182 
update from Dr. Besser about the situation in Mexico. And at that 183 
point when we – when we realized that this virus had contributed to 184 
much more illness than – than what we were aware of previously, had 185 
probably been responsible for a lot more severe illness, at that point, 186 
we realized that we – we probably were going to be back 187 
communicating to the public and the media the very next day, and we 188 
were probably going to be dealing with Dr. Besser, as the Acting 189 
Director of CDC. 190 
 And in that afternoon of – of discussion about the next steps, one of 191 
the things that was abundantly clear was that this was going to 192 
probably be of media and public interest for a while and that we, CDC, 193 
had to be prepared to be in front of cameras answering media and 194 
policy maker questions quite frequently and be ready to go and 195 
assume that for the next few days, next few weeks, we were going to 196 
be having to update people on a regular basis. 197 
Barbara: Right. Often times in public health emergencies there are really heavy 198 
demands placed on organizations for immediate and very detailed 199 
information about the threat. In this case, there were a lot of 200 
unknowns and uncertainties, so how did you deal with that? 201 
Glen: Well, one of the first things we did to deal with the unknowns and 202 
uncertainties is if you look at the transcripts of Dr. Besser’s first press 203 
briefing, one of the things that we did was we – before we gave an 204 
update in terms of what we knew about this virus and the number of 205 
deaths it was causing, we had Dr. Besser spend about two minutes 206 
giving reporters in the media kind of a lay of the land, telling them 207 
what to expect in the coming days and weeks. He told them up front 208 
that, you know, the information we were talking about this day was 209 
likely to change and change in ways that were not predictable, that 210 
there was going to probably be considerable uncertainty, there would 211 
be uncertainty for probably long periods of time and we would have to 212 
act and make decisions in light of uncertainty, that our decisions may 213 
change; they may change quickly, and without notice, and people 214 
should be prepared for that; that states, and communities, and 215 
countries across the world may take different actions, different steps 216 
in term of preventing, and combating, or treating illness caused by the 217 
virus; that that would not be surprising; people should not be 218 
surprised by that; in fact, that was a good thing because it would help 219 
us in terms of identifying best practices.  220 
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 And so I think that setting the stage was a really critical step and it 221 
was – it was something that we came back to quite often in those first 222 
couple of weeks because we made the assumption that may reporters 223 
as – or as this grew in scope and scale, more reporters were – were 224 
coming – becoming interested. New reporters were coming online and 225 
we wanted to make sure everybody was operating from the same 226 
course out of assumptions. 227 
 And so one of the things that we – we did take a lot of effort or made a 228 
big effort to do was to make as many of our assumptions explicit to try 229 
to guide people, particularly the reporters and the public in terms of 230 
how things may play out, and to foreshadow things that may change 231 
so that they wouldn’t be surprised and be critical or – or become 232 
negative as a result of change. 233 
Barbara: I recall, and I think you probably do, during the period of time as it 234 
was developing, there was considerable media sensationalism for lack 235 
of a better term. There was inaccurate reports, misleading 236 
information, web postings. How did you manage that, or attempt to 237 
manage that, or did you have any role with that? 238 
Glen: Well, I think at first I put that in perspective. I – I think the vast 239 
majority of the media coverage was very accurate. We – we monitored 240 
the media on – on an hourly basis. And I got reports every day and I 241 
think if you do this for a living and you see the full scope of media 242 
coverage, I think one of the things that impresses – that impressed me 243 
was that the vast majority of the media coverage was correct.  244 
 Some stories, as would be expected, probably were more 245 
sensationalistic; but again, a lot of those people were – were dealing 246 
with the same uncertainty that we were dealing with as an agency in 247 
terms of trying to anticipate where this was going. There had been a 248 
lot of – of hype and warnings about pandemics over the last five years. 249 
A lot of people had warned the people in the public that if a pandemic 250 
or the next pandemic came that many people could be harmed, many 251 
people could – could die. And so there was – there’s a – a lot of work, 252 
ground work that had been laid, many – much of it probably not 253 
intentionally, that caused a lot of people including some in the media 254 
to come to this – this – this new virus with the expectation that we 255 
were on the cusp of something very dramatic and very tragic.  256 
 And then you also had – what – one of the media conventions is – is 257 
they will seek out experts, and they will seek out experts who will 258 
provide them with the full range of opinions, and projections and 259 
estimates. And very early on, nobody had a good crystal ball. And as a 260 
result, many in the – many stories included projections and estimates 261 
that – that in retrospect seem quite extreme. But you had a lot of 262 
people trying to get their – their – their voice out through the media. 263 
 And then websites are always, I think, going to be a challenge. I think 264 
the expectation that – that you can get every website to run your 265 
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perspective, provide your information, cover this like you would – you 266 
would like it to be covered is completely unrealistic. And what you’re 267 
better off shooting for is the vast majority of them being in concert 268 
with your messages and I think we achieve that. But – but to expect 269 
that there would be no media hype, I think, is unrealistic. Public 270 
health, I remember an expert in public health once told me public 271 
health is about one foot on the brake and one foot on the gas. And I 272 
think you saw that throughout – throughout the last – through the 273 
months of this pandemic. 274 
Barbara: Good. You mentioned decision making a while ago. I was wondering if 275 
you could talk a little bit about the process of how you made decisions 276 
in the media relations division about what information to share with 277 
the public, when to share it, how much to share and so forth? 278 
Glen: Well, very early on, we realized that we were going to have to have a 279 
regular basis in the media. Part of that was just sheer survival. The – 280 
when something like this takes off, we get more media calls than you 281 
can handle on a one-on-one basis. And so you have to then switch the 282 
systems to manage that volume of media.  283 
 And so one of the systems we did was we instituted daily press 284 
briefings. And if we needed, we – we did a couple of additional smaller 285 
press briefings each day. So for the first five, four or five weeks of this, 286 
we did a press briefing every single day, including weekends, 287 
including holidays, to bring people up to speed. Every day, we got 288 
together with the people who were going to be serving as the spokes 289 
people for those press conferences, whether it was Dr. Besser and 290 
most of them were Dr. Besser, sometimes he was joined by Dr. 291 
Schuchat, sometimes he was joined by Dr. Cox, depending on, you 292 
know, what the specific issues were, and we looked at what had been 293 
reported as of that morning. We looked at what we knew as an agency 294 
that was different from the previous day. We looked at how things 295 
were playing out and we – we tried to anticipate where the stories 296 
might be going, where the media and reporter interest might be going. 297 
And we factored all that into trying to figure out what our key 298 
messages were going to be that day.  299 
 One thing we also tried to do every day before we did a press 300 
conference was to think in terms of if this press briefing or this 301 
interaction with the media works, what would or should the headlines 302 
be for most of the stories? And so we tried to make sure that we had 303 
that kind of communications discipline, not just knowing what were 304 
the two or three key messages that we want to deliver, but to also 305 
know what the bigger umbrella message was. And so we – we spent a 306 
lot of times thinking about, you know, what our – what our – some 307 
potential desired headlines. 308 
 We also tried to make sure that we coordinated and disseminated our 309 
key messages with a wide range of others who might be called upon by 310 
the press. And so once we did a press conference, we made sure that 311 
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we distributed our key messages widely. We distributed them to state 312 
and local health officials through their public affairs offices. We 313 
distributed them to partner organizations. We developed lists of 314 
people who were getting called by the media to – to be experts and to 315 
be quoted in stories, and we worked to provide them with our key 316 
messages. 317 
 They didn’t have to agree with us but at least you want to make sure 318 
that they accurately portrayed what CDC’s messages were. 319 
Barbara: Did you experience any sort of, pressure’s probably too strong, but any 320 
sort of emphasis on the need for more transparency or any pushback 321 
from the media or any sort of a challenge from the media that perhaps 322 
CDC was not being completely forthcoming with the public? Did that 323 
occur at any time? 324 
Glen: No, not really. In fact, we got way the opposite phenomenon. After 325 
about four or five weeks, I had reporters asking me are you – when are 326 
you going to stop doing these daily briefings, telling me that we had 327 
worn them out which was – which was a highly unusual event. But no, 328 
throughout – throughout – we made every effort and it was – and we 329 
had the full support and endorsement of Dr. Besser and Dr. Schuchat 330 
that whatever media inquiries came our way, we would look at them 331 
and we would – we would evaluate them and we would try to do as 332 
many as possible; not obviously, we had to – had to make sure that we 333 
prioritized Dr. Besser and Dr. Schuchat’s time. And so that meant 334 
that – that entities that could reach large numbers of people like 335 
CNN, Associated Press, and Reuters, and Washington Times, you 336 
know, were our top priorities. But we made sure we cast our net as 337 
widely as possible, that we – if it wasn’t Dr. Besser and Dr. Schuchat 338 
doing the interviews, that we found appropriate subject matter 339 
experts to talk to the – to the media outlets that were calling us.  340 
 We sent an invitation to media to come to CDC to observe. And again, 341 
Dr. Besser fully endorsed that strategy and I know it made some 342 
people nervous because we had media in the Emergency Operations 343 
Center, and we had them there very early on. We had media at CDC 344 
and once they’re here, you know, they all want to go in different 345 
directions but each one of them had to have a press person assigned to 346 
them to make sure that they didn’t go places where they couldn’t go 347 
since they weren’t federal employees. 348 
 And then in August, we spent – we invited about 50 or 60 media to 349 
come to CDC for a two-day workshop that they could – that was on the 350 
record, they could spend time talking to our experts.  351 
[break in audio 0:23:04.8] 352 
 Looks good. Looks fine. Alright, I guess we’ll have to start that 353 
question somewhat over, right? I can’t remember the question. 354 
Barbara, you want to ask a question? 355 
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Barbara: Okay, well were you finished talking about the workshop that went on 356 
with Dr. [inaudible 0:23:27.4] being there and were – had you 357 
completed that thought? 358 
Glen: Well, I guess I could pick up that thought. One of the – one of the 359 
things that we did that I think was very helpful was we invited about 360 
50 or 60 media to come to CDC for a two-day workshop in August. And 361 
it was on influenza, on H1 – 2009 H1N1 influenza, but it was designed 362 
to give them a chance to talk to our experts on the record. We brought 363 
almost all of our flu division experts into that workshop at some point 364 
in time. And we – we gave them an update, not just on the current 365 
situation, but we also talked about how the thing – how H1N1 might 366 
unfold in the fall, how the influenza vaccine situation may unfold in 367 
the fall. We talked about the differences between H1N1 – the 2009 368 
H1N1 flu and seasonal flu which we also anticipated in the fall. And 369 
we – I think we achieved a really helpful forum for answering their 370 
questions and getting our – our key messages out.  371 
 And when we issued the invitations, our expectations were pretty 372 
modest. We were hopeful that maybe 15 to 20 news organizations 373 
would accept our invitation, and I think we had a response rate 374 
probably about 95, 96 percent. And we had to move from – from a 375 
small conference room into one of the large auditoriums to 376 
accommodate all the media interest. And we had all the major media 377 
here giving us pretty much their undivided attention for two days. 378 
Barbara: Great. Would you say that they’re – your primary means of 379 
communicating with the public was through television media or did 380 
you have other message that you used? 381 
Glen: Well the – I think we used a number of methods. Television’s 382 
obviously the most visible, reaches large numbers of people. A lot of 383 
people do get their information and news from TV. But I think equally 384 
important and probably not quite as recognized is – television relies on 385 
– on probably a handful of other media for their information. And so 386 
it’s very important for us to get our – our messages into the Associated 387 
Press stories, into the Reuters news service stories, onto CNN because 388 
often times those three media influence what many of the TV stations 389 
are doing, and how they’re thinking, and whether they’re covering a 390 
story, or whether how – how they’re covering a story. And so, they’re 391 
equally important.  392 
 We also used a wide variety of social media as well as purchased 393 
media, donated media. So the TV was probably the most visible but 394 
probably equally important was with some of the print media as well 395 
as some of the – the other broadcast media such as radio.  396 
Barbara: Could you talk a little bit about how you used social media and what 397 
you used? 398 
Glen: Well, social media, we did a number of things. We developed a 399 
Facebook page. We developed a Twitter account so people could follow 400 
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us through Twitter. And I think at one point, there were 1.2 million 401 
Twitter followers just on the H1N1 alone.  402 
 We – one – probably one of the key things which is – which is the 403 
realm of new media but – but probably is not something that many 404 
people would ever notice, a lot of people come to CDC’s website for 405 
information. And they will simply cut and paste that information and 406 
then re-purpose it and post it on their website. We know, for instance, 407 
state and local health departments do this a lot. They come to CDC’s 408 
website, and they will cut and paste information, and put it on their 409 
website. Sometimes they’ll credit CDC. Sometimes they won’t. That – 410 
that’s fine.  411 
 But one of the challenges with that approach is that when we update 412 
information on our website, they may not know we updated it. And in 413 
H1N1, there was a lot of updating happening on web pages that were 414 
related to – to this virus, to prevention measures, to our 415 
recommendations. 416 
 And so one of the things that we developed that falls in the realm of, I 417 
guess, new media was something called Content Syndication. And 418 
through this effort, what we did was we – we reached out to 419 
organizations such as local and state health departments and said, if 420 
you would like to use our content, or we noticed you’re using our 421 
content from our website, we’d like you to sign up. And if you sign up, 422 
you can, through this Content Syndication effort, when we update a 423 
web page on the CDC website, it will automatically updated on your 424 
site. You won’t have to do anything. 425 
 And so that way, we can be sure that you have the latest information 426 
and you can be sure that you have the latest information from CDC. 427 
And that’s something that we think has got much wider applicability 428 
but it was a break through because it helped us maintain or helped us 429 
achieve more consistent information on local and state – state and 430 
local health department websites.  431 
 Another tool that had been developed was something called flu.gov 432 
and flu.gov was run by the Department of Health and Human 433 
Services. This content syndication program enabled us to help them 434 
with flu.gov. They could again take content from CDC’s website and 435 
when we updated it on our website, it would automatically be updated 436 
on flu.gov. 437 
Barbara: That’s great. In terms of the information that you decided to post or 438 
share, can you talk about the process that you went through for 439 
clearance of the information or how – how was that managed? 440 
[break in audio 0:28:59.7] 441 
Glen: …your original question. 442 
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Barbara: Okay, so the first thing would be about your process of deciding what 443 
information to share, how you – how you worked that process, who 444 
made the decisions about what information to share and… 445 
Glen: The [inaudible 0:29:24.0] go back to your original question. 446 
Barbara: Okay, so the first thing would be about your process of deciding… 447 
Glen: We’re good to go so you can go – go to your original question. 448 
Barbara: Okay, so the first thing would… 449 
Glen: Well, in terms of what information to share, as I mentioned, one of the 450 
things that we knew is that very early on, we were doing a daily press 451 
briefing. And so one of the first factors in terms of what information to 452 
share was what do we know today that we didn’t know yesterday. 453 
What new information is there that is of relevance, of pertinence, 454 
public health value, that we should share with people today. And I 455 
think those were probably the, you know, the major criteria was, you 456 
know, what is new, try to look at how relevant or pertinent it is to a 457 
wider audience, whether and how it had public health implications 458 
and making sure that we gave them those public health implications. 459 
 We also would look forward and we would say, you know, what are the 460 
things that could happen, or will be happening – happening in the 461 
next two, three or four days, that we may benefit from foreshadowing, 462 
letting people know what options are under consideration. And most of 463 
those conversations, I guess, started our flu branch, our flu division. 464 
But they quickly involved CDC senior leadership. 465 
 You have to remember, all these parties, all the major parties were 466 
getting together in the morning as – at – as part of a director’s update. 467 
And so we media relations were present with about 15, 16 other senior 468 
leaders including those involved in the response, those involved in 469 
monitoring what was happening, those involved in vaccines. And so 470 
every day, very early in the morning, we like the CDC Director heard 471 
the updates and those updates were one of the most critical factors in 472 
terms of giving us a sense of what were the possibilities to talk about 473 
that day. 474 
 We then would have conversations with senior leadership at – at the 475 
Department of Health and Human Services. We would give them some 476 
idea of what we thought could be the major topics for the press 477 
briefing that day or for – for public updates. We also looked at what 478 
was possibly going out to the healthcare provider community, to 479 
clinicians, in terms of information to see whether that had anything 480 
that we should be aware of, and be mindful of, and bring to people’s 481 
attention.  And so we would go through that process every day. We 482 
would then develop, draft some key talking points, some key 483 
messages, some possibilities, circulate those probably by about 11 484 
o’clock in the morning; and I say 11 o’clock in the morning because we 485 
typically were doing our press briefings around noon or one o’clock.  486 
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 And so two hours before those press briefings, we would circulate what 487 
we thought was a pretty good draft to HHS, to the flu branch, to the 488 
CDC OD, to the Acting Director, have them take a look at the 489 
information, get their reactions, their edits, their suggestions, do 490 
another iteration, re-circulate that, do another iteration, re-circulate 491 
that. And then very often, we were working right up to 10 minutes 492 
before the press briefing in terms of sharpening and honing our 493 
messages. 494 
Barbara: In your own organization in the media division in responding to 495 
H1N1, did you find it was necessary to make organizational changes 496 
whether in terms of process, or staffing, or resources of any type? 497 
Glen: We – very early on, we – we realized that we did not have enough 498 
regular staff to – to maintain the hours, and pace, the schedule that – 499 
that this required. We have a relatively small number of press officers 500 
who are in the CDC Office of the Director. And that – that’s probably 501 
ranges from 12 to 15 on any given day depending on where you sit 502 
with vacancies and people who are on vacation or out sick.  503 
 This required – we knew pretty much a – a seven day a week, 24 hour 504 
capability. And so one of the first things we did was we – we put out a 505 
call to try to find all the people in the organization at CDC who had 506 
either been part of our office in the past, or whose jobs entailed 507 
working with the media, if only on a part-time basis, or who had skills 508 
that could be used as part of this. 509 
 And so, for instance, there are people who are really good writers. And 510 
one of the things that we need was – was talking points and key 511 
messages. So if we could find people who were good writers, that 512 
helped us enormously. They didn’t have to be people who had 513 
experience dealing with the media and with the press, but they could 514 
do some of the other work that goes on in terms of being able to do an 515 
effective media response. 516 
 And so we brought in a number of people on detail. We brought in 517 
some people through outside contracts to kind of build up our staff. We 518 
worked to build a work schedule that made sense in terms of 519 
sustaining people for long period of time. And then the other thing we 520 
did is – is again, we work with state and local health officials, public 521 
affairs officers and we had daily calls with them, shared our 522 
information with them so that we could direct some of the people who 523 
are calling us to the right people in the states to be able to answer 524 
their questions. 525 
 And again, it was a way of taking some of the burden off of us in terms 526 
of handling media questions. But he biggest thing we did was – was to 527 
make sure that we did these – these daily briefings and got the media, 528 
our staff and our spokes people into this daily rhythm, this daily habit 529 
of knowing at one o’clock every day the CDC would give an update. 530 
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Barbara: Okay. Great. I guess my last question would be just in terms of 531 
evaluating what you thought worked well, perhaps were challenges 532 
that were unanticipated, things that did not work so well. Any – any 533 
thoughts along those lines? 534 
Glen: Well, I think – I think what worked well, there – there were a number 535 
of things that – that helped us have an effective response. I think it 536 
started with the recognition of – of CDC’s leadership, that it was going 537 
to be important to meet the demands, the communications and media 538 
demands, that we had to meet them head on, and start right from the 539 
beginning with the expectation that we had to be open, we had to 540 
place a very high priority on answering the questions of the media. 541 
‘Cause if you don’t start with that priority, you never recover. 542 
 And so – so from the word go, Dr. Besser and the CDC senior 543 
leadership had made a commitment that this is going to be in the 544 
media, and we’re going to do whatever we can to meet the demands of 545 
the media, to make the media – to make ourselves assessable and 546 
available to the media, and so that we can reach the public through 547 
the media. And I think that was the first really important thing that 548 
that worked. 549 
 Second, was following through on that. It’s easy to say that but as Dr. 550 
Besser and Dr. Schuchat can probably attest, they were probably 551 
putting in, you know, 20 hour days. And we were probably placing 10 552 
hours of demands on them some days in terms of the media demands. 553 
And they – they never hesitated. They went wherever they needed to 554 
go. This can involve significant travel, whether it’s going to 555 
Washington, DC, whether it’s going to New York, whether it’s going to 556 
downtown Atlanta. And so that was very important. 557 
 I think another thing that worked really well was – was the approach 558 
that we took which was trying to figure out what were our desired 559 
headlines, and what could come up in the next couple days that – that 560 
could change so that we could foreshadow those things. I think that 561 
that really helped us stay ahead of things thinking – thinking like the 562 
media in terms of where the story was going, and how it may switch, 563 
and how it may change. I think that was extremely effective. 564 
 Making sure that we circulated our key messages as widely as 565 
possible to both internal parts of CDC as well as to external audiences, 566 
I think, was extremely helpful because in many cases the state and 567 
local health departments were scrambling. They too are – were 568 
sometimes understaffed and so they greatly appreciated having our 569 
key messages and they were able to tailor our messages for use in 570 
their state or their community. And I think that was extremely 571 
helpful. 572 
 I think one of the – one of the challenges, talking about challenges, 573 
was that no matter how many people you send your key messages to, 574 
no matter how many people you have invited to be part of your 575 
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process, there are still going to be some you miss and some of those 576 
will be internal. And so I think one of the challenges that unfolded 577 
was projections and estimates. There were a lot of people including 578 
government officials and government agencies outside of CDC, some of 579 
them at HHS, some of them outside of HHS, that were making 580 
projections and estimates based on things that they probably had 581 
read, or heard, or seen, as part of pandemic planning; but when they 582 
made those estimates, however well intentioned, that set us – that 583 
created some difficulties. I think one area was in terms of projections 584 
about number of doses of vaccine.  585 
 We at CDC, if you look at our messages in June, we were very careful 586 
to say we don’t know if we’ll even have vaccine. You know, many 587 
times, things go wrong in the vaccine production process. We’ve seen 588 
that happen with seasonal flu. And so we made a decision at CDC not 589 
to get into the – into making estimates or projections regarding doses 590 
of flu vaccine.  591 
 Unfortunately, others including some work for the federal 592 
government, did make projections. And those projections then were 593 
extrapolated or projected on to CDC, and we had a hard time getting 594 
people to understand that those projections were – were – were just 595 
that. They were – they were guesses. And we spent a lot – we – I think 596 
we lost some momentum trying to backtrack and talk about, you 597 
know, why there wouldn’t be so many doses available at a certain 598 
date; when if we had stayed what we thought was the best strategy at 599 
CDC which was to be very cautious, very conservative about 600 
projections, I think it would’ve worked out better.  601 
 But again, I think it speaks to the complexity and the number of 602 
people that – you know, the media will call upon anybody and 603 
everybody. Sometimes you can – you can – you can guess or – or based 604 
on expert judgment have a good idea of how many people or who those 605 
people may be, but you’ll never be able to guess all of them. And – and 606 
I think that’s one of the challenges. 607 
 And I think another challenge is just understanding and recognizing 608 
that – that after a while, different reporters want to write different 609 
stories. And so while 80 percent of the media may be covering things 610 
the way you would like them to cover, when you have an event like 611 
this, there’s always going to be reporters who are going to stake out 612 
purposely so, different ground, different issues. And that could be a 613 
challenge for – for everybody when they do that but I think you have 614 
to expect that that’s going to happen and not – not be surprised. And I 615 
think that took some people by surprise that there would be some 616 
reporters who’d go in different directions. 617 
 And in terms of staffing, I think – I think staffing is always going to be 618 
a challenge because you – you – you really have to staff for – for day-619 
to-day operations. But you do have to be able to put in place plans that 620 
enable you to surge more quickly. And I think we learned some things 621 
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in this process about steps that we have to take in the future to be 622 
able to build capacity or bring on additional capacity faster. We – we – 623 
it probably took us an extra couple of weeks to figure that out. So I 624 
think – I think one of the things that we learned is that we have to 625 
have to have steps in place to be able to do that more rapidly within a 626 
matter of days versus weeks. 627 
Barbara: Great. Do you have any final recommendations that you would like to 628 
offer for the future? 629 
Glen: Well, I think – I think I hope that when people look at this that they 630 
realize that one of the reasons it went so well was because the 631 
communications was very good. But if they look further, I think they 632 
will see that, you know, we – we really did follow the tenets of risk 633 
communications early and often. And so we shared – we were 634 
comfortable sharing dilemmas with people, acknowledging the 635 
uncertainty, telling people what the uncertainty would mean. We were 636 
comfortable in telling people that the course would change and when 637 
the course changed, we did, you know, we acknowledged that that was 638 
going to be disruptive for some.  639 
 But that – that just was part and parcel for the territory. And so I 640 
think we were always mindful that part of our job in communications 641 
was – was guiding, and setting the appropriate expectation level. And 642 
if you don’t set the appropriate expectation level, you know, a lot of 643 
this goes much worse. 644 
Barbara: Thank you very much. This is…[audio ends] 645 
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Interview #12. Stephen Redd, MD (RADM, USPHS) 
H1N/A Incident Commander and Director, Director CDC Influenza 
Coordination Unit  
 
Barbara: Good afternoon. If you could please give us your name, just 1 
acknowledge the date, and where we are, and your present position. 2 
Steve: My name is Steve Redd. It’s February 18th, 2010, and we’re at the 3 
CDC Clifton Road Campus in the basement of Building 19, I think. 4 
Barbara: And your present position? 5 
Steve: My present position is the Incident Commander for CDC’s H1N1 6 
response and I’ve been doing that since last April. Before that, I was – 7 
I am the Director of Influenza Coordination Unit which is responsible 8 
for organizing CDC’s pandemic preparedness work. 9 
Barbara: Great, thank you. Well, what we want to do today is develop an 10 
understanding of the history of the H1N1 virus as a public health 11 
threat and CDC’s response to this threat as it emerged. We are hoping 12 
to create an oral history of the CDC’s response to this public health 13 
issue and are interested in details of your role and participation in the 14 
CDC’s response. These are key to helping us document the events and 15 
processes that shaped the organization’s response. And we hope this 16 
oral history record will be useful to future leaders by giving them the 17 
benefit of your experience with H1N1 as they confront new and 18 
possibly similar challenges. So we’re hoping you will recall in as much 19 
detail as possible your experiences in recognizing and developing 20 
strategies and practices to cope with H1N1 as it emerged and grew 21 
into a global health issue. So if we could start with a little background 22 
information on you. Could you tell us about your training, medical 23 
specialization and what brought you to CDC? 24 
Steve: Well, I went to medical school at Emory so I’m trained as a medical 25 
doctor. And during one of the summers of medical school, I worked at 26 
CDC in the Co-STEP Program in the Reproductive Health Program. 27 
So that, both from the proximity to – to Emory and working here that 28 
summer, when I finished my training in internal medicine, or as I was 29 
finishing it, I – I did the EIS program. I came to CDC in 1985 and I’ve 30 
worked in a lot of different parts of CDC since then, in bacterial 31 
diseases, in international health, in malaria, in the measles work, for 32 
about eight years in environmental health with the asthma program 33 
there, and for the last four years, I came to work on flu in the spring of 34 
2006 as a new unit was being formed to manage the preparedness 35 
work that CDC was doing. This was in the days of bird flu and a very 36 
high priority was put on being prepared for bird flu pandemic. So that 37 
what I’ve been doing -- I had been doing, between that period of April 38 
2006 and April 2009. 39 
Barbara: Are you currently completely involved in the H1N1? 40 
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 41 
Steve: Completely since last April. Yes. 42 
Barbara. Since last April. So do you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 43 
Steve: Well, the – there were – there were a couple of different things that 44 
happened and I remember the date of April 15th. We – as part of our 45 
preparedness work, we had a weekly meeting to review progress in 46 
getting prepared for a pandemic. And part of that was kind of in a new 47 
thing that had happened and there was a single case of – of swine flu 48 
virus that had been identified. In fact, the person had recovered before 49 
the identification was made at CDC. So we heard about this case from 50 
San Diego. It was detected using a machine that was a prototype that 51 
we were developing under contract to identify influenza virus 52 
infections and the – the thing about this particular infection, when it 53 
was originally identified, is it wasn’t a seasonal virus so it wasn’t the 54 
normal H1N1, it wasn’t an H3N2, it wasn’t a V virus, it wasn’t H5N1, 55 
it was an Influenza A virus. So that led to a series of laboratory 56 
investigations that eventually identified it as something that had 57 
never been seen before. It was a single case and we – the really – 58 
people wondered if this was the kind of thing that had always been 59 
happening; we just never had the capability to detect it.  60 
 And what the investigation that was going on was intended to identify 61 
the – the pig, or the farm, or the county fair that the person had been 62 
to that – where they had acquired the infection. So that was the very 63 
first day. On Friday, April 17th, I was actually in Galveston with my 64 
ex-boss giving a talk about pandemic preparedness, and a second case 65 
of the same infection was identified that was in a different county and 66 
there was no obvious connection between those two cases. And that 67 
next day, on the 18th, it was a Saturday, we had a conference call with 68 
the California Health Department. It was a couple of hours. And one 69 
of the early decisions that I think was a really important one was at 70 
the end of that call the decision to draft an MMWR Article to notify 71 
the public of these two cases from – and it was to be published early 72 
the following week. And I think that initial decision to get that out – 73 
out of CDC – if we hadn’t done that, we would’ve never ever caught up 74 
because during that week, more cases were identified. These from 75 
Texas and then a couple of days after that, cases from Mexico that 76 
were very severe were identified. So that was – that kind of launched 77 
everything.  78 
 The Wednesday, the 22nd, is when we activated the Emergency 79 
Operation Center. We had three locations in the US of these cases. 80 
And the first, that Thursday night, the 23rd, was when the severe 81 
cases from Mexico were identified. And that led to a lot of discussion 82 
with the – HHS, the Department on what our next steps were, how we 83 
were going to try to figure out whether this was a severe illness, or not 84 
severe, because the cases in Mexico were very severe and the cases 85 
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that we’d identified were not very severe. Most of the people had 86 
actually recovered. 87 
 So it really sort of cascaded from there. And we knew we were going to 88 
be very busy after that Thursday for a long time. 89 
Barbara: So it, early on, struck you as a potentially serious crisis?  90 
Steve: It did. I think that the – it was probably those cases, the sort of third 91 
round of cases from Texas that made us known it was going to be 92 
widespread. And then shortly after that, when severe cases were 93 
identified that – I think what actually happened is that we learned 94 
that we knew less and less about what the situation was than what we 95 
thought. And that was a little bit unnerving but kind of keeping a grip 96 
on the uncertainty became an important way of navigating; and also, 97 
identifying some practical actions to take to find out more. 98 
Barbara: Do you recall what steps you took immediately in the first few days 99 
and what those actions were? 100 
Steve: Yeah, I think that the – the biggest initial thing was that MMWR 101 
article which I think was published on the 21st of April. But a series of 102 
guidances were developed after that relating to treatment, to infection 103 
control, practices, and some decisions about whether to recommend 104 
that people who are exposed to the case receive anti-viral drugs and 105 
that all took place in those first few days. I think that probably after – 106 
well, and then on that phone call on the Thursday night when the 107 
severe cases were identified, we sort of organized the response into a 108 
couple of categories of activities. And I’m not sure we were actually 109 
organized in this way but it was a way to kind of plan what we needed 110 
to do the first being to understand what the situation was and there 111 
was epidemiologic investigations and laboratory work in that area.  112 
The second was to do things to treat people and control the disease so 113 
kind of the intervention zone which included the question of travel 114 
advisories and movement restrictions, treatment, protection for 115 
workers who would be exposed to the illness and the development of a 116 
vaccine.  117 
And then the third thing was the – the third big category was 118 
communication and putting as much information as we could out 119 
about what we knew, what we were doing to find out more. 120 
Barbara: And what was the process you used in putting the information out to 121 
the public? 122 
Steve: The first, well, there was the MMWR when the cases in Texas were 123 
identified, there was a press conference that Anne Schuchat was the 124 
spokesperson. She was the acting Deputy Director of CDC at that 125 
point. And when the cases in Mexico were identified, Rich Besser, the 126 
acting Director, gave a press conference and described what was going 127 
on. I think that was really at a very uncontroversial decision also. I 128 
should – I think was very – very correct going that route as well. 129 
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Barbara: And organizationally, did you notice some impact immediately and 130 
change – any changes that needed to be made?  131 
Steve: Well, on the Wednesday after the Texas cases were identified, we 132 
organized in the Emergency Response – the Emergency Operation 133 
Center and we used the model that we had exercised the previous 134 
October so it was actually a kind of familiar setting except it was real 135 
instead of not real and so that – yeah, in fact there was one person 136 
that – it was Marsha actually, Marsha Vanderford who a couple of 137 
times talked about the exercise when she was describing the event. So 138 
it was actually a pretty familiar environment because of the exercises. 139 
Barbara: So you had existing plans in place? 140 
Steve: We did. We had – this really had been my job before the response had 141 
been developing an operations plan and exercise program that we 142 
were doing with contractors but we organized – we’d had five 143 
functional exercises where we pretended that there actually was a 144 
pandemic occurring and we gave briefings, did interviews with the 145 
press, all the things that we would have to do during a real response. 146 
Barbara: Did you find you needed to change anything or modify anything? 147 
Steve: We – we were constantly changing things and I think at that – if that 148 
– that’s one bit of advice is that you should never hesitate to change if 149 
it seems like change is needed. And so one – one example of something 150 
that – and I think there were other examples that could be really 151 
similar but in the first few days, there was a first was a real burden of 152 
notifying the other parts of government, and other governments as 153 
well. And so it was pretty chaotic. Things were – be called to a 154 
conference call with people from the White House, or Health and 155 
Human Services, or getting calls from the Department of Homeland 156 
Security, or Department of State.  157 
And on one day, we – we – our originally planning had been to have 60 158 
minute briefings. And on one day, we – the – there’s something that 159 
was happening at 8:30 so we had a 30 minute briefing. And it turned 160 
out that that 30 minute briefing, that that was actually the right 161 
length of time for the briefing and so from that day onward, we kept it 162 
30 minute briefings. But it was really the conflicts that we couldn’t do 163 
a 60 minute briefing that led us to the 30 minute briefing. So that – 164 
that sort of thing was occurring quite frequently. 165 
Barbara: So in terms of the CDC’s internal communication processes, could you 166 
offer some insight into the – how that worked in this case?   167 
Steve: Sure. I – I would put that in kind of two levels. One was people who 168 
are working on the response that we had, a daily briefing of the 169 
Director, and we also had several meetings to coordinate our activities 170 
through the day. And I actually think those coordination meetings 171 
were extremely important in keeping everybody on the same page and 172 
evolved with throughout the response that during April and May we 173 
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had daily 4 or 5 PM meetings for an hour where we talked about 174 
either something that was evolving or strategy issue or did a decision 175 
briefing. And we backed off from that in June. We reinstituted that in 176 
August so there was a lot of tinkering with the daily schedule.  177 
 178 
 The other part of the response though was for the rest of CDC and so 179 
initially I think it was a conference call, it might have been a video 180 
conference, but we had a briefing of – of – of Center Directors and 181 
Division Directors and we did that for several weeks as the situation 182 
was evolving. I think that the – keeping everybody apprised of what 183 
was happening in the Emergency Operation Center, that might be 184 
something that we could’ve done better particularly in the lull 185 
between the intense activity of April and May, and what might’ve seen 186 
like a lull to other people but was even more intense activity in June, 187 
July and early August. So we did briefings of Center – the Center 188 
Director, our group, a Division Director group, just describing what 189 
the activities were.  190 
 It was hard to do enough of that to – I think probably the rest of CDC 191 
might have felt during that period that there wasn’t as much going on 192 
as there actually was. 193 
Barbara: Did you feel that you got as much information as you needed? 194 
Steve: I did. And – and I think that was partly because of my role was to 195 
know and coordinate the information flow from the response upward. 196 
So I think that that – that’s probably something about the – using the 197 
Operation Center that really the organizational entities largely melted 198 
away and people worked as a team in that – in that net environment. I 199 
think that – we – partly that was the result of the exercises and that 200 
kind of knowing that you – you might normally work in a certain 201 
division or branch; but in the response, we’re a single team and new – 202 
yeah, there’s a new organizational structure that we have to work 203 
within. 204 
Barbara: And how was that communicated to everyone, the new structure? 205 
Steve: It – there – we had a chart and we were constantly changing that also. 206 
I mean one of the – one of – speaking of sort of memories from those 207 
early days, I – it was pretty long hours the first week or two and I took 208 
a, sort of a night off and went to my son’s trumpet concert. And I was 209 
feeling pretty good about the response and I realized that there were – 210 
I didn’t really have a clear sense of actually who reported to me and 211 
that was kind of – made me recognize that maybe it wasn’t so clear to 212 
people. And so there were two people that were kind of floating in the 213 
upper parts of the response that we actually made up titles for and 214 
had them report to me. So that – that was a way that we had to kind 215 
of keep things structured. And I do think that that, you know, was 216 
something that was constantly changing. Probably got really finalized 217 
in June and July with a – a task force structure that we had an 218 
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epidemiology surveillance and laboratory task force, a vaccine task 219 
force, medical care, encounter measures task force, a community 220 
mitigation task force, a communications – I’ve said that but – let’s see, 221 
we had four, or six, a media and – media and communications, and I’m 222 
forgetting the sixth. Let’s see, anyway, there was a sixth one. It’ll 223 
come to me. Maybe I’ll ask for that to be edited [inaudible 0:34:55.5] 224 
the tape. 225 
Barbara: Would you recommend this task force structure be part of a protocol 226 
for response? 227 
Steve: Well, we’re going to document that wasn’t the way we had responded 228 
in the exercises and I think for a pandemic response, it’s the right way 229 
to organize, and probably it doesn’t so much matter exactly how it’s 230 
organized as that it actually is organized, and that people have 231 
responsibilities, and that the leadership of those task forces keep 232 
people below them apprised of what’s going on. I’m not sure that the 233 
exact structure is so important as the fact of having a structure. 234 
Actually, I thought of the last task force too, it was the state and local 235 
coordination task force which was kind of a cross cutting task force 236 
but did a lot with the funding and the organized communication with 237 
the state and local health departments and other partners. 238 
Barbara: Good. In terms of decision making, if you can think back early on, 239 
what do you feel were the key decisions that needed to be made in the 240 
first few weeks and months? 241 
Steve: Well, the – I think the – was – is really, you know, in terms of things 242 
that we actually did, make decisions, or provide recommendations, 243 
develop guidance, and then some of the real specific things like 244 
shipping, counter measures, anti-virals, and personal protective 245 
equipment that got shipped to states. Those – those were kind of the 246 
few things that we actually did so a lot of what we were doing was 247 
channeling information and making decisions or recommendations. 248 
 And I think in the first few days or maybe week or so, there was so 249 
much activity that the decision making was not very organized and I 250 
think that’s an important thing to try to get a grip on is what are the 251 
decisions that need to be made and just the process of identifying 252 
them is really helpful in – to provide the structure that’s needed. We 253 
actually used a method of decision making that was called the Plans 254 
Decision Unit so we’d identify a decision that needed to be made, 255 
there’d be a group that would sequester, come up with a briefing in a 256 
very structured way, including options, pros and cons for options, and 257 
a developing criteria for evaluating the options, and then 258 
recommendation and we’d talk about that and come up with a – all the 259 
important things were actually recommendations even though we call 260 
them decisions but we’d come up with a CDC recommendation.  261 
So that was a pretty rigorous process designed to make sure that we 262 
weren’t forgetting something important. And I think it – it worked 263 
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pretty well once we got it going. The first big decision was about the – 264 
the recommendations for school closure. And that was – the – the 265 
exact date was kind of the end of the last week of – of April, beginning 266 
of May. And what was clear to us – the – the planning that we had 267 
done was that if there were severe pandemic, there’d be pre-emptive 268 
closure of schools for up to 12 weeks. And we – when we first saw 269 
these cases, they weren’t as severe as what we thought a – a pandemic 270 
like 1918 with a 2% mortality would look like; but we weren’t sure. 271 
And so we initially had kind of a middle ground where if a case was 272 
identified in a school, we recommended closing the school for seven 273 
days initially as the first part of that recommendation.  274 
But we were hearing from health departments that that seemed a 275 
response out of proportion to the problem and that a less restrictive 276 
option seemed to make more sense to people who were in the field. 277 
And these were people we knew well that were kind of on the front 278 
lines that we respected. And we fed that into this decision making 279 
process and we ended up over about a four or five day period 280 
recommending  not doing this reactive school closure but closing 281 
schools when the educational mission couldn’t be accomplished, 282 
recommending that sick children be sent home and not attend school 283 
until they were – actually, initially, it was for seven days during that 284 
period.  285 
So that was an example of – of having recommendation that was made 286 
not in the decision making process and then trying to examine it and 287 
we backed off from it in a – in a – what I think was a very sensible 288 
way to do that. And school closures dropped precipitously after that. 289 
Barbara: Do you recall how that decision making group was formed and who 290 
was involved? 291 
Steve: For that particular one, Stephanie Zaza was the person that convened 292 
the group and did the briefing, but there were a number of people from 293 
different parts of CDC that had expertise either in flu or in the – this 294 
community mitigation procedures. I don’t know the exact people that 295 
were on, you know, did develop the briefing but it was a separate unit 296 
from the – a defined unit within the response. 297 
Barbara: But you were – it was within your organization? 298 
Steve: Yes. 299 
Barbara: So, you were… 300 
Steve: Right. We just made the assignments as what the decision briefings 301 
need to – or what decisions we needed a recommendation on. 302 
Barbara: And then once the recommendations or decisions were arrived at, how 303 
did you communicate those internally? 304 
Steve: Well, I think we weren’t quite so strong on this as the other but what 305 
– ideally we drafted a memorandum that summarized what the 306 
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decision was, what the reasons were, what the options were and that 307 
could be a vehicle for communicating both to the CDC Director and 308 
then above. And I think that, in those early days and the response, our 309 
integration with the rest of the Department wasn’t nearly as good as it 310 
got to be later on. And some of that was that people were just starting 311 
their jobs in the new administration and we didn’t know who they 312 
were and we didn’t have a forum to do that. I think that’s actually one 313 
of the strengths of the – I guess probably from June on that we 314 
participated in a daily teleconference with the Chief of Staff and the 315 
leadership of HHS, the – the [inaudible 0:41:13.8] Nicky Lurie, Laura 316 
[inaudible 0:41:15.5] who was the Chief of Staff, Tony Fauci from 317 
NIAID, Jesse Goodman from FDA, and that – that was kind of the 318 
core group that we had a daily kind of discussion of issues. 319 
Barbara: So overall, would you say that there was, in your view, from your 320 
perspective, the response was effective or do you feel that there were 321 
areas where things could’ve been done differently? 322 
Steve: Well, I think both. I think that certainly – I do think it was effective. I 323 
think there were – are lots of things that we could’ve done quicker or 324 
done better. Probably from the standpoint of the overall response, the 325 
biggest issue was the – the development and production of – really the 326 
production of vaccine and what we know now is that large quantities 327 
of vaccine became available after the fall wave. And so the opportunity 328 
to prevent those cases just like the ’68 and ’57 pandemic that the 329 
vaccine became available after the bulk of disease. So that – that – it 330 
was a disappointment. I don’t think there’s anything that the response 331 
could’ve done to make that go better.  332 
 I think tied to that though was a not very good communication about 333 
the uncertainty around the availability of vaccine that I think people, 334 
state health departments and the public felt that we promised that 335 
vaccine would be available sooner than it was available. 336 
Barbara: There was also a little public fear of the vaccine that became almost a 337 
rumor to some extent? 338 
Steve: That’s true. I hate that – I kind of think that we were pretty good 339 
about that actually that there was a – a sense that the – this was a 340 
new virus therefore the vaccine had to be a new vaccine therefore 341 
there was more uncertainty about the safety than there was; when in 342 
fact, that wasn’t the case that – it was a new virus but it was very 343 
closely related to flu viruses at all kinds. And the methods that were 344 
used to produce it were exactly the same as are used for seasonal 345 
vaccines year in and year out. And the – the – really what happens 346 
every year is that there’s a – or almost every year is that the strains 347 
that are used to produce the vaccine change. And so this was really 348 
like a strain change in the vaccine. And I think that there was an 349 
element of – where, you know, just from the polling that we did that 350 
people thought this vaccine was more dangerous than seasonal 351 
vaccine and less likely to protect than a seasonal vaccine was. And 352 
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probably – it’s actually probably more likely to protect because it’s 353 
such a close match with – with the circulating virus that’s not always 354 
the case with seasonal – seasonal viruses and seasonal vaccine.  355 
 And the safety, it turned out to be exactly the same as seasonal 356 
vaccine, very safe. I think that’s it’s hard to communicate without the 357 
experience that we had but as we did accumulate experience we were 358 
able to communicate that. I think this was also something that was 359 
really important was the effort that we put into monitoring for 360 
adverse events that might be related to the vaccine, that this was a 361 
big focus of work at CDC and also a structure for collaboration within 362 
the Department was set up. This was kind of in the August, 363 
September, October time frame. 364 
Barbara: So, along those lines, would you have any recommendations based on 365 
your experience for perhaps some redeployment of organizational 366 
resources or organizational structural changes? 367 
Steve: Well, I think we – I would say that overall in the response, we had 368 
funds for preparedness that we were able to convert into response 369 
funds right away. And in the spring, there were a lot of enthusiasm for 370 
the response so it was easy to recruit people into the response. Funds 371 
were appropriated for the response over the summer so that – that 372 
helped us. I think internally we didn’t really have a problem with 373 
financial resources. There were issues with having enough people to 374 
do the work particularly during the summer when the focus – it was 375 
out of the media temporarily or at least at the same kind of fevered 376 
pitch, but we weren’t able – we have challenges recruiting enough 377 
people to work on the response during that – that kind of summer, not 378 
really – not really a lull from there’s still disease transmission but I 379 
think we did kind of fall below the – the numbers needed. 380 
 That – we did get that righted during August and had lots and lots of 381 
people doing the right work from August through – through December 382 
and January. But I think this is really – it is a big challenge. I would 383 
say that there were three kind of organizational challenges to keep 384 
things running. One was personnel, so keeping enough people and 385 
actually keeping track of all the people. The other was the thing that 386 
we talked about earlier, that Plans Decision Unit. That was hard to 387 
keep staffed. And the third area was policy that we – we recognized 388 
during the summer that we needed a strong policy presence and it 389 
really wasn’t until October until we got that staffed adequately.  But 390 
that was – that was really valuable once we got the right kind and 391 
right number of people in the policy area. 392 
Barbara: So looking back over the past year, are there things you would’ve done 393 
differently with knowing what you know now? 394 
Steve: Well, there are little things but I think the biggest one would’ve been 395 
to – for the vaccine development to have really worked harder to – and 396 
this is not so much me but for the overall response, to make sure that 397 
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we were not giving overly optimistic projections for vaccine 398 
availability. I think that was probably the biggest – the biggest thing 399 
that didn’t happen the way that it should have. Everything else, you 400 
know, wasn’t perfect and there’s room for improvement but that was 401 
really the big thing.  402 
Barbara: So, do you have any final thoughts or recommendations you’d like to 403 
add? 404 
Steve: Well, I guess in terms of for the next person that leads one of these 405 
responses, I think one of the things that is really important to 406 
recognize is when more structure is needed and also to recognize when 407 
there’s too much structure. And when there’s not enough structure, 408 
people will be confused and the efforts won’t be as effective as they 409 
could be because they’ll – people’ll be wondering if they’re doing the 410 
right thing. If there’s too much structure, people will be in meetings 411 
all the time and will be communicating rather than doing the work. So 412 
I think that there’s a constant adjustment of that balance between too 413 
much structure and excessive rigidity and not enough structure and 414 
chaos. And, you know, I think that’s where the – the leadership is to 415 
kind of get that in the right zone, and recognizing that there are going 416 
to be periods that are just inherently confusing. 417 
Barbara: Good. Well, thank you very much. 418 
Steve:  Sure. [audio ends 0:48:48.3] 419 
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 Interview #13. Anne Schuchat, MD (RADM, USPHS) 
Director, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases; 
Principal CDC Media Spokesperson for H1N1/A response 
 
Anne: Dr. Ann Schuchat. I’m the Director of the National Center for 1 
Immunization and Respiratory Diseases at the CDC.   2 
Barbara: Thank you, Ann. I wonder if we could begin with a little background 3 
information about yourself, your training, medical specialization? 4 
Anne: Sure. I’m a physician. I’m an internal medicine specialists and I’ve 5 
been at the CDC for 22 years. I came here for the Epidemic 6 
Intelligence Service Program and I stayed. I was – began with 7 
Infectious Diseases and I’ve worked in Infectious Diseases and 8 
Vaccines for my whole career, going from EIS Officer to Medical 9 
Epidemiologist, Branch Chief within the Respiratory Diseases Branch 10 
and Bacterial Diseases. And then most recently became the Center 11 
Director for the new Center – National Center for Immunization and 12 
Respiratory Diseases.  Is that enough? 13 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect of the H1N1 response?   14 
Anne: Yea, since the beginning I’ve had a major role in the H1N1 response. 15 
When the response began, I was actually serving as the Acting Deputy 16 
Director for CDC during the transition. But my long-term job as 17 
Center Director for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases meant 18 
that I’ve been involved in pandemic planning, and then had a lead role 19 
in the response as well. 20 
Barbara. Can you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 21 
Anne: Sure. Friday evening, April 17th, I opened my door at home and my 22 
cell phone went off, and my colleague, Beth Bell was on the phone. 23 
Beth was serving as the Acting Director of the Center while I was on 24 
this detail to the CDC’s Office of the Director. She was calling to let 25 
me know that our lab had found two different children with new 26 
influenza virus that had swine origin. We had been following unusual 27 
influenza cases that had swine origin. We’d had one here, and one 28 
there, over the past two years or so. But these were two children with 29 
no contact with each other, or with pigs or animals apparently, who 30 
had a new strain that wasn’t one we’d already seen.  She let me know 31 
that and talked about what the team was doing to work with 32 
California in further evaluation and planned on, you know, putting 33 
together an MMWR report on this.  34 
So that was when I first knew about it and I in turn called Rich Besser 35 
who was the Acting Director to let him know as well. 36 
Barbara: And when you first heard about this, did it strike you as a potential 37 
crisis situation?  38 
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Anne: Well, I think that it was interesting because this was a strain that was 39 
different and it – the principal of the thing was that we needed to 40 
really get to work with California and understand whether there were 41 
more of these. The illness involved had already re – improved. The 42 
kids were better and so it wasn’t necessarily a crisis but it was what 43 
we call a potential public health event of international concern. And so 44 
that why we eventually ended up reporting it through the 45 
International Health Regulations. 46 
 So Beth really went through the couple things that were critical, what 47 
was going on and, you know, many of the right things were being 48 
done. So it was interesting and not necessarily tipping me off as a 49 
crisis but certainly something I immediately called the Director about. 50 
Barbara: When do you feel that the Organization began to take this as an 51 
emerging crisis? 52 
Anne: Well, we – I would say, by the following Wednesday, we – we had a 53 
weekly – we had, for years, been having a weekly Wednesday morning 54 
influenza pandemic update bringing people from different parts of the 55 
agency together to talk about what was going on. And that particular 56 
Wednesday was during the Epidemic Intelligence Service conference, 57 
the EIS conference. It’s once a year. It’s kind of out on the suburb of 58 
Atlanta.  59 
And so I knew that, you know, Rich Besser was planning to be at the 60 
conference and decided no, I should be at this flu meeting in person. I 61 
had to be at the conference ‘cause I was moderating a session and 62 
called into it. And I think the discussion on that Wednesday morning 63 
about what else we knew because we’d found a few more cases by then 64 
was, you know, the next level. And then, of course, it definitely became 65 
a crisis on the Thursday when we – Thursday, April 23rd, when we had 66 
the first press conference and later learned about the confirmation in 67 
Mexico. So the press conference for us was just seven U.S. cases, 68 
everybody’s better, we don’t know if it’s something or nothing. And by 69 
that night, we definitely knew that Mexico’s very severe cases were 70 
the very same virus. 71 
Barbara: Can you describe the events of the first few days after that? 72 
Anne: Right, well the – the Thursday was a really big day. You know, the – 73 
the – for me, I did this press conference together with Nancy Cox 74 
which is unusual. We usually do press conferences, you know, after big 75 
meetings or when there’s an article coming out. But this was actually 76 
news that we were making. And then we had a – a conference call 77 
later that evening with leaders at Health and Human Services to 78 
make sure they understood the details that we were then aware of and 79 
could discuss it with other leadership across the government.  80 
 That evening was this incredible thunderstorm in Atlanta. You’ve 81 
probably been talking to people about it. And so, you know, I know – 82 
remember sitting there on the phone with lightning and thunder just 83 
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really loud and this conversation where Rich was really explaining to 84 
HHS the likelihood that this was going to be a big problem and 85 
helping them – they were generally new to this whole area as new 86 
appointees or – not even – we didn’t have a Secretary yet. So it was 87 
with other leadership who were newly – newly there to convey, you 88 
know, what we did and didn’t know at this point. 89 
 And as I got off the phone, I had a voicemail from Nancy Cox sharing 90 
with me the discussion she’d just had with collaborators in Mexico 91 
about the virus and the details we knew then. And then later that 92 
night, I was phoned by a colleague who had been called by a colleague 93 
of his who had just got out of a meeting with the President of Mexico, 94 
the Cabinet meeting that the Mexican President had about what was 95 
going on in Mexico and should we basically shut all the schools down 96 
in Mexico. 97 
 So that evening was fairly intense in terms of going from seven cases 98 
who were pretty much okay to Mexico was closing their entire school 99 
system and was very memorable. The next morning, our Emergency 100 
Operation Center was fully activated. There were, you know, instead 101 
of a handful of people, the place was full and we began a non-stop 102 
intense effort over the next – the next, you know, weeks. And then, of 103 
course, it’s turned into months. 104 
Barbara: What do you think were the key decisions that needed to be made in 105 
the first few weeks or months? 106 
Anne: Okay, so the first several days there were a number of decisions. The 107 
issues involved what do we do with the border? What’s going on with 108 
Mexico and are there travel – needs for changes in travel advisories? 109 
Should we distribute the anti-viral medicines we have? How should we 110 
do that? To all states? Just to the ones that know they have cases? 111 
What level of severity does this thing have? What are we to do for 112 
schools? What should we do for anti-viral use? Should it just be for 113 
sick people or should it be for prevention? Should it be for everyone 114 
who’s sick or just some people? How long should things be closed? If a 115 
school is closed, how long should that be? What guidance should we 116 
give doctors about testing? Should they test everyone? Do we want to 117 
know about everyone? What about contacts? Do they need special 118 
precautions or not of people who are confirmed to be ill? Really, there’s 119 
dozens of major decisions.  120 
 And then a handful of major policy ones by, you know, we went 121 
through many rounds of interim guidance on the school issue, and the 122 
anti-viral issue, the mask issue that you probably have talked to 123 
others about, or – and 95 respirators. But by June, we were really 124 
focusing in on decisions about a vaccination program, both – early 125 
decisions about buying vaccine, antigen, buying Adjuvant and then 126 
subsequent decisions about what type of program might we need.  127 
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 We had to make most of those decisions early in June because they 128 
were pretty much related to a budget request that was going in for 129 
emergency funding. 130 
Barbara: Who were the key decision makers in this process? 131 
 132 
Anne: You know, there were several kinds of decisions and so some of the 133 
decisions that were of vital importance to the health care professionals 134 
or to the public were not that controversial, issues about who ought to 135 
be tested for the virus or really how to use the anti-viral medicines. 136 
We had a large technical specialty unit with experts in a lot of 137 
different areas and they would develop content and then it would be 138 
reviewed by higher levels of the response. 139 
 The first 10 days or so of the response, I think, the policies and 140 
decision making was really internal to CDC. And then as then as the 141 
people in very senior leadership positions at HHS arrived, we entered 142 
a more formal policy development and review process phase. And so 143 
the, you know, materials would often cross disciplines so people within 144 
CDC, different groups, would get together about best ideas and work 145 
these things out. And then for really major decisions like release of the 146 
anti-virals to the states, we had formal decision briefs here at CDC 147 
that went through a rigorous structured process presented to the CDC 148 
Director or Acting Director, decision made and then recommendations 149 
given to the Secretary or her agent.  150 
 Some of these guidances that we were developing required other 151 
departments or other agencies within HHS to opine. And so that was 152 
coordinated out of the Chief of Staff’s Office at Health and Human 153 
Services. For something like the vaccine planning, this was – there 154 
was a leadership group across HHS with one or two of us from CDC, a 155 
couple of people from HHS, Office of the Secretary, BARDA, somebody 156 
from NIH, somebody from FDA, the – usually that core group of us 157 
making decisions about how much vaccine antigen should we buy? 158 
What about the Adjuvant? What about fill and finish of vaccine 159 
products? When do would make these decisions? 160 
 And then CDC pretty much developed and proposed the strategy for 161 
vaccination and then we presented that in multiple ways to the 162 
Secretary and then across the government to the National Security 163 
Staff or Homeland Security Staff at the White House. So those were, 164 
in June, decisions that were then linked to budget requests to OMB so 165 
they really did need this broad support. 166 
Barbara: And how were these decisions communicated both internally at CDC 167 
and then publically? 168 
Anne: Well for things like the anti-viral recommendations or who should be 169 
tested, we have a number of networks that we use to notify health 170 
professionals, to notify the public health labs. We have our Joint 171 
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Information Communication Center, the JICC, basically can push a 172 
button and have a health alert advisory or warning go out to selected 173 
groups. We use the MMWR for many of our important guidance 174 
documents and we did extremely frequent press briefings. So we were 175 
doing them daily for a while and we also used webcasts and other 176 
channels to disseminate information, not just as news, but as ways to 177 
really reinforce our message with the target audiences. 178 
Barbara: Often times in public health emergencies, there are very heavy 179 
demands placed on the organization for immediate and detailed 180 
information about the threat situation. Did you find this to be the case 181 
with H1N1? 182 
Anne: Yea, we had a, you know, it was extremely intense. I’ve been part of 183 
our response to Anthrax, and SARS and, you know, West Nile virus a 184 
little bit, but Hantavirus long ago and I think that this is, by far, the 185 
most intense response we’ve had both because of the newness of the 186 
problem, because it started here in the U.S. and because a pandemic is 187 
sort of the mother of all health threats.  188 
Also, because we’re in a 24/7 media, internet, news environment and 189 
because a this began during a transition in leadership when it could 190 
have been in different circumstances that the focus was not on us but 191 
was on another part of the government but partly because this 192 
information was – we had the information as CDC working with the 193 
state and local health departments and having the lab, and partly 194 
because we didn’t actually have a Secretary of HHS at the time this 195 
began and we didn’t have an Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and 196 
Response. The new one hadn’t arrived yet. 197 
There were reasons that – or we had one who was going to be leaving. 198 
There were reasons that CDC was the natural place to be at the spot 199 
light but we certainly, incredible intense interests by the public and 200 
the media and, of course, we have a means now to serve that demand. 201 
And we had a policy, you know, we were asked to and we probably 202 
would have had this anyway but, HHS said we don’t want you to turn 203 
any media request down. And so we had to figure out how to meet 204 
those needs which were huge and both did them by the daily press 205 
events and by feeding lots of information out but really by being 206 
available for live and taped radio, TV, you know, in person standup 207 
kinds of things nonstop. And so it was several of us who were doing – 208 
doing the media at that point. 209 
Barbara: How did you manage media sensationalism of H1N1, inaccurate 210 
reporting misleading information? 211 
Anne: I think that we did really well but a couple things helped. One is that 212 
a number of us have had risk communication training and for crisis, 213 
public health crisis, risk communication is the best communication 214 
strategy so the idea of the – the audiences needs were not unfamiliar 215 
to us. The other thing is that we, over the year, really worked very 216 
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closely to anticipate the media’s needs. Glen Nowak runs our media 217 
office and really was brilliant with his. And HHS did a really nice job 218 
as well.  219 
 We had a workshop for about 50 journalists last August to bring them 220 
in here for two days to hear directly from all the scientists in great 221 
detail, and from some of us spokes people in less detail, so they’d know 222 
what to expect. And then HHS organized three different table tops 223 
with reporters in three different cities. The Secretary did work at the 224 
White House which I accompanied her on to reach out to print, 225 
broadcast and wire reporters twice, and two rounds of those in, I 226 
think, the summer. We did two rounds o those to get people familiar 227 
with what might be happening, what kinds of things we don’t think 228 
are stories but they might want to do as stories and give them a 229 
common base. 230 
 In spring, of course, we had to build off the relationships we already 231 
had. We didn’t have those kinds of things. But actually a lot of the 232 
media had been through a pandemic table top years before. So the 233 
concepts might have been scary but they were familiar to some of the 234 
core media.  235 
 And then I really think our – our press office was fantastic in 236 
preparing us and the Administration had this wonderful policy which 237 
was they wanted science and health experts speaking about this. They 238 
didn’t want politicians. And so we were thrown into being the spokes 239 
people. 240 
Barbara: In terms of balancing the need of the Organization to inform the 241 
public and yet not panic the public through – through the media 242 
communication, how – how did that process work? 243 
Ann: Well, you know, when you study risk communication in public health 244 
crisis, you actually learn that people don’t tend to panic. And so 245 
whatever the music is on the radio or the TV coverage, you know, 246 
panic isn’t a natural response usually for this kind of thing. So I think 247 
that we had key principles that we wanted to be accurate. We wanted 248 
to be rapid. If we could be talking about something before others, you 249 
know, we might be able to – to provide the base for the story rather 250 
than have to be in a reactive mode. And that we were committed to 251 
acknowledge uncertainty, that we weren’t going to say we were sure 252 
about things when we weren’t. And unfortunately, with influenza, it’s 253 
very hard to be sure about things.  254 
 So the media interest was the greatest when the uncertainty was the 255 
greatest. But we were still viewed as credible sources even with 256 
acknowledging the – the many unknowns. And then we really had, I 257 
think a commitment to transparency to say, you know, we’re working 258 
on that. We don’t have it yet. We’ll get it to you when we can. We’re 259 
really trying to make sure it’s right by the time we give it to you. 260 
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 And I think that with this climate of, you know, just the natural 261 
expected suspicions that people have, all the different theories and 262 
such, you know, our being as transparent as possible and as, you 263 
know, honest as possible, that we don’t know everything, that some of 264 
these questions you have that might turn out to be right, we need to 265 
look into it.  266 
 So it was, you know, it was both building on communication science 267 
and the – the science base that we had. 268 
Barbara: So looking back over the past year, from your perspective, are there 269 
things that CDC could’ve done differently? 270 
Anne: I think that there’s always room to improve. And so there are process 271 
issues where something’s were harder to do than they should’ve been, 272 
and there are some more fundamental decision making where I think 273 
we’re really going to need time to help us figure out whether a 274 
different anti-viral strategy might have been better. You know, I – we 275 
decided to focus, you know -- based on a number of factors, we focused 276 
on anti-viral medicines for those who were severely ill, or people who 277 
had milder illness with risk factors to get worse. If we’d been more 278 
liberal, anybody with any kind of symptoms might -- there have been 279 
fewer unexpected complications. Would the healthcare system have 280 
done worse because more people would’ve been showing up to get the 281 
anti-virals? Countries did different things and so I think in the next 282 
few years, we’ll learn a lot about different approaches. 283 
 So I think that’s one question that I wonder about because I know 284 
there are, you know, that there are many different ways you could’ve 285 
approached this. I think that certainly some countries decided to go 286 
for adjuvant vaccine. We decided not to. By deciding not to go for 287 
vaccine, we essentially were stuck with this very slow delivery of 288 
vaccine the first month or so of the program. And that was the same 289 
time when disease was really on the upswing. I think in retrospect, it 290 
was the right decision because we were trying to balance what was 291 
acceptable to people with, you know, the idea that there’s a known 292 
track record for non- vaccine. But I think, you know, one could wonder 293 
if we’d – was there any way that we really could’ve gotten a lot more 294 
vaccine quickly given the manufacturing problems. Certainly other 295 
ways to monitor and improve that are needed. But from our 296 
standpoint, how else could we have gotten a lot of vaccine quickly? 297 
Well, maybe by adjuvant. So I think it was the right decision but it’s 298 
one that I also wonder about. 299 
Barbara: You mentioned some processes that you felt could have been improved 300 
or – or adapted differently? 301 
Anne: Yea, I mean I think a good thing about our response was we really 302 
tried to self-correct. You know, there were times where, you know, 303 
with an emergency operation center; we had, you know, dozens, 304 
probably hundreds of desks of different groups that were focusing on 305 
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different issues. There was a period where, you know, guidance 306 
documents and information were coming from like all over the place 307 
and we realized it was taking more time to go through these things 308 
than to – than it merited. And that we needed to put a stop on, you 309 
know, everybody initiating their own guidance document for this tiny 310 
little niche group. 311 
 And so I think that there – those processes improvements were 312 
needed. Could we, you know – or sometimes it took us longer to make 313 
the corrections. I think the key process thing that was a struggle for 314 
us was the staffing and what looks, from the outside world, like the 315 
pace of a response is very different than what a response really needs. 316 
So from the world’s perspective or the public’s perspective or really 317 
CDC at large’s perspective, April and May were the big times. And 318 
June onward, everything was fine.  319 
 Whereas, for our response, April and May were the discovery 320 
investigation phase but June onward, we knew we were going to be 321 
having to have evidence based guidance for schools, and evidence 322 
based guidance for travel, and evidence based guidance for businesses 323 
and we were going to have to have a massive vaccination program 324 
planned out to the Nth degree. And it was quite difficult for us to get 325 
the staffing you needed quickly in the summer as it was easy to get 326 
the staff in the spring when the response was just so obviously in the 327 
news. 328 
 The other thing that was procedurally difficult is the funding. We, you 329 
know, May – the weekend of May 17th or 18th, a couple of us spent 330 
drafting out a budget for vaccination program and rounds and rounds 331 
of policy decisions, emergency funds or Congress appropriates, you 332 
know, but the ability to move money from this part of the government, 333 
to another part, from within our agency, to states, to locals, to where 334 
they can do the vaccination really took extraordinarily too much time. 335 
 And so the process of how you fund this kind of response and can 336 
really be nimble, I don’t think we did well despite people were working 337 
non-stop, you know, we got our first guidance out, you know, people 338 
worked through the July 4th weekend to make sure on that Tuesday, 339 
this thing was ready to go and could be posted by the time of this big 340 
summit we had. 341 
 I think that money aspect, had we had a whole lot of vaccine quicker, 342 
which would’ve been great, I’m not sure we would’ve had the things in 343 
place to deliver a ton of vaccine quickly. So that’s – that’s a process 344 
thing that needs a fix. 345 
Barbara: Do you have any final thoughts or recommendations that you would 346 
like to make? 347 
Anne: Well, I think it’s been really important that we were taking pandemic 348 
seriously before this started because as an agency and with our state 349 
and local public health partners, we were, you know, this didn’t come 350 
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out of the blue. A lot of the things that were difficult, we’d thought 351 
about. We didn’t have answers for all of them but we – we’d try to, you 352 
know, improve the systems and the communications and so forth. I 353 
think the – the – there are a lots of things I could say for whoever has 354 
to be the spokesperson next time about ways to try to do as good a job 355 
as possible there. But I think as an agency, a key message is that 356 
working together with the other parts of the federal government, and 357 
together with the state and local government, rather than having 358 
completely separate operations has to be essential to any kind of 359 
public health response. 360 
Barbara: Great, thank you very much. 361 
Anne: Sure. Okay.  [audio ends 0:25:29.5] 362 
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Interview #14 . Michael Shaw, MD 
Associate Director for Laboratory Science, Influenza Division 
 
Michael: Michael Shaw. I’m Associate Director for Laboratory Science, the 1 
Influenza Division, here at CDC in Atlanta. Today is Thursday, 2 
February 28, 2010. 3 
Barbara: Thank you. We’re here to develop an understanding of the history of 4 
the H1N1 virus as a public health threat and the CDC’s response to 5 
this threat as it emerged. We want to create an oral history of the 6 
organization’s response to this public health issue and particularly 7 
your role and participation in the CDC response. This is key to helping 8 
us document the events and processes that help to shape the 9 
organization’s response. We hope this history will be useful to future 10 
leaders by giving them the benefit of your experience with H1N1 as 11 
they confront new and possibly similar challenges. So may we begin 12 
with a little background information on you. Could you tell us about 13 
your training, your medical specialization and what brought you to 14 
CDC? 15 
Michael: I started in influenza actually when I began graduate school in the 16 
1970s. And my first year in graduate school was when the 1976 swine 17 
flu incident occurred, the outbreak at Fort Dix, New Jersey. I am 18 
basically – I’ve been primarily influenza ever since. After I got my 19 
PhD, I was at the Rockefeller University in New York for a post-doc in 20 
Virology Laboratory working with Purnell Choppin, an old influenza 21 
person. I was there, became a faculty member. I left there and came to 22 
CDC in mid-1980s as a visiting scientist. Then, to University of 23 
Michigan at Ann Arbor, Department of Epidemiology which also has a 24 
very rich history of influenza. Some of the very first influenza vaccine 25 
work was done there. And then after a permanent position opened up 26 
at CDC in 1993, I came back here in the Influenza Division. It was 27 
just the Influenza Branch at the time and I’ve been here ever since. 28 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect of the response to H1N1? 29 
Michael: Yes, very much. Our division was the front line. We’re the ones that 30 
got the first specimens. It was our group in the laboratory that 31 
actually identified the virus, was able to tell that it was something 32 
different. So we’ve been in it from the very beginning and will 33 
continue to be in it long after most of the people in the Emergency 34 
Operation Center stood down. 35 
Barbara. When did you first heard about H1N1? 36 
Michael: Well, this particular strain, it was when we first got the specimens 37 
and figured out that there was something unusual. It was the – the 38 
week after Easter I remember because I was home at the time with 39 
my grandsons and had some conference calls, talking about the lab 40 
results that had come in, and toward the end of that week was when 41 
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we realized it truly was something different and we had to get the 42 
notification out to basically the rest of the government and to WHO.  43 
Barbara: Did you – did it strike you as a potential crisis situation or some 44 
serious threat emerging?  45 
Michael: Well, at the very beginning, we suspected that it was just another 46 
swine influenza that had jumped to humans because these happen 47 
maybe three or four times a year. It was only when we got the second 48 
case that was unrelated with the same virus, and then a few days 49 
later discovered it was in Texas, and the same day we discovered it 50 
was the same virus that was in Mexico, everything sort of came 51 
together at that point and we realized that it was much, much 52 
different from what we’d seen before. 53 
Barbara: So when you recognized the – the novelty of this or the uniqueness of 54 
this, whom did you notify and what actions did you take? 55 
Michael: Well, the first notification goes up the chain. The Director of our 56 
center, Ann Schuchat, was one of the first ones notified. Steve Redd, 57 
Toby Merlin and the Influenza Coordination Unit, and it went up to 58 
the CDC Director who was – Rich Besser- was acting Director at that 59 
time. So that was a standard protocol to send it up like that; and they 60 
in turn notify HHS in Washington who while at the same time we had 61 
been notifying colleagues and WHO and a formal notification was 62 
made by the U.S. Government to WHO under the International 63 
Health Regulations. 64 
Barbara: Could you describe the first few days of this initial response period? 65 
What happened?   66 
Michael: Well, the first few days, it was making sure everyone who was 67 
supposed to know knew and to get as much information out to our 68 
partners. Our Influenza Division at CDC is – is a WHO collaborating 69 
center in the Global Influenza Surveillance network. There are other 70 
collaborating centers in London, Tokyo and Melbourne. So there was a 71 
conference call held among these WHO partners at the same time. We 72 
shared the information we had, the genetic sequence information we 73 
determined at that time and that was not just to let them know what 74 
was going on here but so that they could sort of set up the alert in 75 
their own countries to see if they were seeing anything similar. So it 76 
was on several different levels. There was a ramping up of the 77 
laboratory activity here to increase the diagnostics and the – the 78 
molecular analysis of the virus, making sure that all the partners in 79 
Washington were notified, plus all our partners in WHO. 80 
Barbara: Did you find that you needed to make any modifications to your 81 
routine business practice or the way that you were doing – conducting 82 
business every day? 83 
Michael: Well, as – as part of the process, we started sending out the 84 
notifications to public health laboratories in the US, requesting 85 
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specimens, requesting information of any unusual outbreaks they 86 
were seeing because this was right at the end of the regular flu season 87 
and usually activity is going down. We knew since the virus was in 88 
Mexico and that Mexico was a very popular destination for college 89 
students going on spring break who were coming home at about that 90 
time, it – it – it was logical to increase the surveillance on college 91 
campuses too. We very quickly heard about outbreaks in New York 92 
City. The specimens started coming in which meant that we had to 93 
ramp up our own laboratory activities. Basically people were working 94 
around the clock, seven days a week. We started talking to other 95 
laboratories at CDC to get assistance from them. And it was soon after 96 
that the Emergency Operations Center was activated and we – we 97 
started expanding in general all of the laboratory aspects of what we 98 
were doing. 99 
Barbara: I feel like there was a period of time where you had planning to do in 100 
response and perhaps you could talk a little bit about within your own 101 
team or organization, the kinds of planning exercises you went on and 102 
how you enacted them.   103 
Michael: Well, we’d had quite a few exercises during the pandemic planning 104 
where we had worked out the – the reporting chain in the Emergency 105 
Operation Center. That we could activate pretty quickly. Everyone 106 
knew what they were supposed to do. The trick here [inaudible 107 
0:08:17.1] was actually ramping up the laboratory activities because 108 
that involves expanding into space basically we didn’t have because 109 
we had already been cramped before the outbreak hit and we had to 110 
figure out how to do a lot more work, in basically the same amount of 111 
space, with the same number of people. There were a lot of volunteers 112 
from other groups who were willing to help. And we couldn’t have 113 
gotten through it without that.  114 
 But there were also problems that – that were popping up that we 115 
hadn’t anticipated. For example, since this was essentially a swine 116 
virus and we – we tried to get away from that word, but it did come – 117 
it was a swine origin virus. That means that USDA was concerned 118 
about it as well. And for transferring animal pathogens within the US, 119 
USDA has control over that. So at the beginning, there was the 120 
possibility that USDA would have put restrictions on shipment of the 121 
specimens if they could be classified as animal pathogens. That would 122 
have greatly inhibited our ability to get specimens from these different 123 
outbreaks all around the country. So it required some pretty close 124 
work with our colleagues at USDA to make sure that restrictions like 125 
that weren’t put in place, and that we were able to ship specimens 126 
quickly. 127 
Barbara: Can you give us an idea of approximately how much of your time was 128 
devoted to the H1N1 issue? 129 
Michael: Well, it – it rapidly consumed just about all of the time. My position is 130 
as Associate Director of Laboratory Sciences means that I’m primarily 131 
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overseeing the three lab branches in the Influenza Division and since 132 
they’re the ones that first detected the virus, they were the only ones 133 
essentially in the world that could’ve diagnosed it at the time. It 134 
required not just getting our own group up but getting the reagents 135 
and the tests to the place where we could get them out to other 136 
laboratories so that they could do the testing and not everything 137 
would have to come to us. That was something we did very quickly 138 
and it required us working with FDA too because they have to clear 139 
the assay before it can be released for diagnostics. And that was done 140 
really in record time, in only like two weeks after identification of the 141 
virus. We had these assays out to all the US public health laboratories 142 
in well over a hundred laboratories worldwide. So that was a 143 
tremendous effort that we were able to build on some structure we 144 
already had in place as part of our planning when we didn’t know 145 
what the next pandemic was going to be. 146 
Barbara: Did you find that the time commitments changed as the virus spread? 147 
Or did it seem to remain constant?  148 
Michael: It did change because in the beginning there was a heavy emphasis on 149 
the diagnostics. The people wanted to see if the virus was in their 150 
community, was in their state, if it was spreading. After the tests were 151 
out there and it was pretty clear the virus was essentially everywhere 152 
in the country, the emphasis shifted more to looking at if the virus 153 
was developing resistance to anti-viral drugs, if the virus was varying 154 
very much because one of the first things we needed to do was – was if 155 
the virus was fairly constant, fortunately it was, that made it easier to 156 
find a vaccine strain because it meant that they were all essentially 157 
alike.  158 
 So there are a lot of things that had to be scaled up rapidly because 159 
just of the nature of influenza. It’s a very variable virus so we had to 160 
solicit specimens from different areas, from different age patients, 161 
from different levels of severity to make sure they had a good picture 162 
of – of everything that was going on. 163 
Barbara: Did you feel that you got enough information? Were there areas where 164 
information was lacking? 165 
Michael: I think from the – the US, we got a great deal of very useful 166 
information. The problems started occurring when it was spreading to 167 
other countries where often these other countries were 168 
understandably very – they were getting hit pretty hard themselves. 169 
And they had enough trouble keeping up with their own diagnostics to 170 
take the time to pack up some virus and ship it off to us so we could 171 
look at it. So there were times when we would’ve liked to have known 172 
better what was going on for example in Central and South America 173 
and we did send our own people down to train, to help them get their 174 
labs up and running. But that’s – that’s nothing new. That’s always 175 
been a problem getting – getting current representative specimens 176 
from all over the world.  177 
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Barbara: So looking back over your experience over the past year, what would 178 
you have done differently? 179 
Michael: Well, actually not much. I think it went very well at the beginning, 180 
extremely well. It would’ve been nice to have – had an idea of what 181 
was going on in Mexico earlier than we did. It took a while. We were 182 
getting conflicting information for one thing. The outbreaks were 183 
scattered around in Mexico. There were reports, it was flu reports, it 184 
wasn’t flu and, you know, if – if we’d been able to get the specimens a 185 
little earlier, it might’ve given us probably not a lot of time but a 186 
couple of weeks, maybe even a month earlier, getting the vaccine out. 187 
It could’ve headed off a lot of the – the fall wave of the virus in this 188 
country if we’d had the – the vaccine earlier. 189 
Barbara: And do you think the – the main issue with getting the vaccine earlier 190 
was related to getting the specimen information? 191 
Michael: It was because no one was willing to commit to say that this is a good 192 
vaccine strain to use until you have enough information about the 193 
circulating viruses to know that it’s a good representative. And that 194 
just requires data, and data requires time. And that’s something you 195 
can’t speed up.  196 
Barbara: Is there a way through maybe external coordination or other agencies 197 
that this process could be improved? 198 
Michael: In this particular case, it was pretty much our ballgame. All of our 199 
planning for pandemics had been assuming it was going to start in 200 
some other part of the world, we would have some advance warning. 201 
None of our planning included us being an affected country and it 202 
definitely didn’t include us being the one where the virus was first 203 
identified. So we didn’t have that advance warning that was factored 204 
into all of our pandemic preparations. We were literally right in the 205 
middle of it from the beginning and it had clearly spread to multiple 206 
places, California, Texas, Mexico, before we even knew it was there 207 
which is why I say if we had – I mean, it’s – as a scientist you’re 208 
reluctant to say definitely about anything but it’s about as definite as 209 
you can get that this started in Mexico. And that gets back to the – if 210 
we had gotten down there earlier, gotten specimens earlier and saw 211 
that something unusual was going on, it probably wouldn’t have 212 
stopped the pandemic but it would’ve given us a little advance 213 
warning to get things ready before it – these outbreaks started in the 214 
big cities. 215 
Barbara: So, in closing, what would you have any particular last thoughts to 216 
add or recommendations that you could make? 217 
Michael: Well, one – one thing I’d like to emphasize is that, you know, in a 218 
situation like this, you really appreciate how – how devoted the people 219 
in the laboratories are and they’re – they often don’t get the credit 220 
they deserve. They’re the ones that are actually in there working with 221 
these specimens that are coming in from the field. They’re the ones 222 
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that actually identified this virus to let us know that something 223 
unusual is going on and these people were putting in long hours, not 224 
taking time off. They were – I mean, this is what – this is why they go 225 
into this field. This is why you choose this as a career. It’s the people 226 
who are running on adrenaline and they did an incredible amount of 227 
work in a short amount of time. And I think everybody surprised 228 
themselves. They didn’t know they could do so well until the – the gun 229 
was pointed at your head. 230 
Barbara: Good. Thank you very much.  [audio ends 0:17:48.8] 231 
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Interview #15.  Marsha Vanderford, PhD 
Director, CDC Emergency Risk Communication System, Emergency 
Operations Center  
 
Barbara: Could you give us your name and your current position? 1 
Marsha: Marsha Vanderford and I am the Director of CDC’s Emergency 2 
Communication System. I’m also the Branch Chief for the Emergency 3 
Risk Communication Branch in the division of Emergency Operations. 4 
Barbara: Are you currently involved in some aspect of H1N1? 5 
Marsha: Yes, we are still activated in support of H1N1, the response, even 6 
though things are ramping down. The Emergency Operations Center 7 
has not been deactivated yet and so whenever it’s standing up, the 8 
Emergency Communication System also stands up. 9 
Barbara. Do you remember when you first heard about H1N1? 10 
Marsha: Yes. We were in an after action session from an exercise we had done 11 
the week before on hurricanes. And in the middle of that active – or in 12 
the middle of that emergency after action activity, I got an email 13 
saying something about H1N1 and I remember standing up and 14 
leaving the meeting and going back into the Emergency Operations 15 
Center to find out that there was confirmation of H1N1 and that 16 
people were in the process of determining whether or not there was 17 
going to be activation of the Emergency Operations Center in 18 
response. 19 
Barbara: Was there a sense that this was an emerging crisis?   20 
 Marsha: I don’t know that I understood it at the moment. We had been 21 
preparing for years for pandemic influenza and I think our – our 22 
assumptions were that it would be very likely be Avian Influenza. So I 23 
– I didn’t know quite what H1N1 meant in the spectrum of different 24 
kinds of strains of flu, but it – you know, it took, I think, a couple of 25 
hours to really get a sense that this was new, this was novel, this was 26 
not seen in people before, and then sort of the awareness that this 27 
could be – this could be the pandemic that we were concerned about. 28 
Barbara: Could you describe the first few days of this initial response period? 29 
Marsha: Yeah, I think it was a little bit of a – a surreal feeling if you will. We 30 
had done so many exercises in preparation for pandemic influenza. 31 
And everyone, I think, had such a heightened sense that this would be 32 
such a severe event and that it – it – it – that the repercussions of it 33 
would be so dramatic that in the first several days as we were 34 
watching this event and trying to gather information, that sense that 35 
oh my gosh, this is it. This is what we’ve been preparing for. And so I 36 
think all of those moments of thinking – sometimes it felt like we were 37 
still exercising; that – and then you realize, no, this is real. People are 38 
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sick. People are – this is spreading. So there – for – I think for us in 39 
the Joint Information Center which is where the Emergency 40 
Communication System sits during an activation, I think there was a 41 
sense – and I can remember several of us that afternoon that we first 42 
became aware of it, it was maybe seven or eight o’clock at night, and 43 
there were several of us still in the Joint information Center, kind of 44 
saying to one another, oh my gosh. This is what we’ve been planning 45 
for and preparing for. And at that point, of course, we had no idea how 46 
it would unfold, how rapidly it would go but it sure fit from everything 47 
we knew the kind of virus that we could anticipate to turn into a 48 
pandemic. 49 
Barbara: Were your existing plans activated?   50 
Marsha: Yes, we have – the Agency had and still has an operational plan for 51 
pandemic influenza. We also have a national response plan, and CDC 52 
has emergency operation plans, so lots of different layers of plans. And 53 
at the moment of activation, the Emergency Communication System 54 
occupies the JIC and begins the process of reviewing information 55 
that’s available, begins gathering information from the media to try to 56 
determine what’s being said, begins to assemble teams and call people 57 
into the Joint Information System – or Center. So all of those things 58 
begin happening as per protocol.  59 
Barbara: Did you feel that your existing plans met the current situation? 60 
Marsha: Well, I think we had been – I think that all hazards plan in terms of 61 
how we fit into the organization, the kinds of channels, and 62 
distribution and outreach that we were expected to do, all of those 63 
kinds of plans that in a sense were content free, those operational 64 
plans, I think, yes, worked very well. There were many plans that we 65 
created in different places for a pandemic influenza communication 66 
outreach.  67 
And -- for example, I served on the World Health Organization 68 
Communication Sub-task group that developed the implementation 69 
and the revision to the implementation guidelines for pandemic 70 
influenza. And we had just met two months – a month and a half 71 
before this meeting we had in Leone to layout the objectives for 72 
communication that fit within the objectives for response as a whole. 73 
But all of those assumptions were based on very severe, fast growing, 74 
very deadly strain of pandemic influenza.  75 
So I think many of the things that we were prepared to do in the first 76 
couple of weeks, we were moving in that direction because it was 77 
moving quickly, was spreading, nobody quite knew yet what the 78 
severity would be. And then suddenly, it was – it was – there was kind 79 
of a turning point where I think we realized maybe the first wave was 80 
not going to be as severe. And so many of the materials that we 81 
developed, many of the objectives that we had for communication 82 
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didn’t fit the reality of that first wave; and then subsequently didn’t 83 
actually fit the second wave that we had in the fall either. 84 
So much of the work that we had done pre-H1N1 was to develop 85 
camera ready materials, guidance for the public, for schools and so 86 
forth, that as we went through the process, we found were not 87 
appropriate for this incident. And so we found that we actually had to 88 
start over on many of the things that we sent out to the public because 89 
we didn’t have – the assumptions of the plans weren’t realized in the 90 
event. 91 
Barbara: In terms of the process you used to quickly recreate these materials, 92 
how did you go about that? 93 
Marsha: Well, we didn’t recreate exactly the same materials. This turned out, 94 
especially at the very beginning, I would say, April – late April, all the 95 
way through the middle of the summer, to be a guidance driven 96 
communication response. And what I mean by that is that the Agency 97 
scientists rapidly put out interim guidance for response, for 98 
professional audiences, for epidemiologists, for state health officers, 99 
for laboratorians, for clinicians. And then from those guidance 100 
documents, the communications staff rapidly developed fact sheets, 101 
talking points, key points, Twitter messages, text messages, buttons, 102 
widgets, RSS feeds and so forth. Those things were taken from the 103 
guidance documents and then disseminated through channels and 104 
partners.  105 
 And so the process of going from a highly technical document into 106 
public lay audience versions of that was a lengthy one, and sometimes 107 
a difficult one because it’s hard to go from highly scientific messages – 108 
guidance to very easy-to-understand public messages. So the – the 109 
answer to the question was it easy to go back quickly to those public 110 
messages we developed earlier and re-purpose, it wasn’t. It – it took 111 
longer than we hoped. So the technical guidance was out there much 112 
more quickly and we think effectively. It took us much longer than to 113 
translate those and clear those with the scientists for use by the 114 
public. 115 
Barbara: Is there anything in particular you could recommend in the future to 116 
make that smoother? 117 
Marsha: You know, it’s a hard – I think that was one of our big challenges in 118 
communication was that we had a really, you know, expert scientist 119 
but a shallow bench. And so the same people who were creating these 120 
materials, were also trying to clear audience – lay audience versions of 121 
them. And so, you know, when – when these two priorities clash, are 122 
we going to issue new guidance documents or update old ones, are we 123 
going to spend those energies actually clearing documents for the 124 
public that would be more easy – easy to understand, you know, 125 
guidance documents win. And so it took us quite a while to do – and 126 
sometimes we never got down to the appropriate literacy level.  127 
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 I think the last time we really did a hard look at our web content, for 128 
example, it’s about 11th grade. And, you know, health communication 129 
guidelines on literacy would tell you that you probably ought to be 130 
focused on about the 6th grade reading level. And, of course, that has 131 
nothing – I mean that’s – that’s not even dealing with health literacy 132 
which is another complicated issue. So that was one of our challenges. 133 
And – and I think the – the way to address that is obviously – the best 134 
way would be to have more people able to do clearance who aren’t also 135 
necessary for doing the guidance documents themselves. 136 
Barbara: In times of public health emergencies, there are often very heavy 137 
demands placed on organizations for immediate and detailed 138 
information about the threat situation. Did you find this to be the case 139 
with H1N1?  140 
Marsha: Sure, and particularly in the first weeks, maybe couple months of the 141 
– the event where people were wondering, is this really going to be the 142 
severe pandemic we’ve been waiting for. Our media relations division 143 
led by Glen Nowak did a remarkable job of meeting the intense media 144 
demands, putting our CDC Director, Dr. Rich Besser, the Acting 145 
Director at that time, in front of media daily, sometimes we even did it 146 
more than that, answering questions, disseminating guidance and so 147 
forth. We also had big demands on our CDC info, the public inquiries 148 
line. In terms of numbers of calls, we had lots of requests for, you 149 
know, key messages, translations of fact sheets and so forth. 150 
 So, yeah, we were pretty swamped. I think to give you a sense of – of 151 
the response, we started on April 22nd on the H1N1 site, at that point, 152 
which was Swine Flu because it had not, at that point, been known to 153 
transfer to humans. There was one page and on that day, there were 154 
6,000 views of that page. Two days later when we had a confirmation 155 
of human cases, then we started to build that capacity. By the middle 156 
of July, we had 500 pages of content up and the highest day of views 157 
was, I think, sometime in July, was eight million views in one day.  158 
 So you can kind of see the demand for information just in terms of the 159 
number of hits and the change – web page views and the number of 160 
changes over that time. 161 
Barbara: So in managing the demands, these increasing demands for 162 
information, did you find it necessary to make staffing changes… 163 
Marsha: Oh sure. 164 
Barbara: …organizational changes? 165 
Marsha: Sure. We have in the Emergency Risk Communication branch which 166 
is the core, 24/7, 365 communication response branch, we have a little 167 
over 30 people. During the time of the spring response, we had in the 168 
Joint Information Center which is where all the communication staff 169 
comes together, most of it anyway, over 300 people in sometimes three 170 
shifts a day across about 15 different teams.  171 
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Barbara: Did you feel that the communication systems in place at CDC were 172 
adequate to respond? 173 
Marsha: I think the systems themselves were – were quite strong, were 174 
targeted in the right ways. We have some teams that are targeted 175 
toward particular audiences such as clinicians. We have some teams 176 
that are focused primarily on channels such as web or hotline. And so 177 
I think we had covered really the systems that were needed but we 178 
didn’t always have enough staff to keep up with the demand. 179 
Barbara: How about the issue of media sensationalism, inaccurate reporting, 180 
misleading information and so on? 181 
Marsha: Yeah, I – I think we were very fortunate. We do media monitoring 182 
every day. We monitor print, and internet, and television, and radio, 183 
and – no, we don’t do radio. That’s – that’s not – that’s right. TV, 184 
internet, print, blogs, Twitters; and for the most part, the information 185 
that was in those media were – were accurate. Sometimes our key 186 
messages were not always what we would hope. One of the things you 187 
always know with – with media is that the first time you list 188 
recommendations for what people can do to protect themselves, they’re 189 
covered. But we know that people need to be reminded over and over 190 
again, especially if a response is long. And the media don’t – they don’t 191 
repeat those very often.  192 
 So we would find sometimes it wasn’t so much that the information 193 
wasn’t correct but it didn’t always include all the things we would 194 
hope and that people needed to know. 195 
Barbara: In terms of making decisions about what information to release to the 196 
public, can you talk about that process? 197 
Marsha: There – I think – CDC’s default position is really to transparency. 198 
We’re very fortunate in the leadership we have and, of course, 199 
President Obama made very clear as he came into office just before 200 
H1N1 hit that there was an expectation of transparency. And so the 201 
default position is if we have information that helps protect people, 202 
that helps people to do their jobs, and it is cleared and – and verified 203 
to the extent that, you know, we could, based on the best information 204 
we had, our scientists were very proactive in – in – in wanting to get 205 
that information out. And I think just the fact that we did media 206 
events almost every day for the first two months and very often what 207 
was presented in – in those briefings was before we even got stuff up 208 
on the web. That would be the daily update and there would be new 209 
information announced in the press conference before it was even 210 
cleared to go on the web, I think is – is evidence that – that was, I 211 
mean, it was pretty clear that that was our high priority. 212 
Barbara: Would you describe the web as being the primarily communication 213 
channel with the public? 214 
 314 
Marsha: No, I – I think, you know, people – news media obviously played a 215 
major role in getting people’s attention, in keeping H1N1 in the public 216 
awareness even when it got into the summer and the fall when people 217 
were not as likely to be attending to it. The website is – is kind of the 218 
comprehensive information repository, if you will, so that news media, 219 
you know, we can be as complete as we want to in explanations but 220 
they’re not going to pick up all of that. So what we hope is that the 221 
awareness and the attention that people paid to the media would then 222 
drive them to the CDC website where they could look for more 223 
information. CDC’s website was the primary website for this response. 224 
It was much more comprehensive. We know from our colleagues 225 
around the world, the other communication counterparts that – that 226 
we work with, that they turned to CDC for information; and even the 227 
WHO, you know, the links and so forth, we know that a lot of WHO 228 
traffic came to CDC’s website. 229 
Barbara: Do you feel that you received the information that you needed in order 230 
to create public messages? 231 
Marsha: Absolutely. Communication at CDC is very fortunate. There are a lot 232 
of places where communication’s kind of an afterthought, after 233 
everyone decides what needs to be done, then communication is told to 234 
get it out the door. That’s not the case here. Communicators are at the 235 
table during briefings. They have an opportunity to brief the Director, 236 
to brief senior leadership about what recommendations we have for 237 
communication messages. Communicators were embedded in every 238 
task force and so even though our Emergency Communication System 239 
has the role of coordinating across all of the communications, there 240 
were communicators working with the vaccine task force to develop a 241 
full campaign for vaccine promotion in the fall; there were 242 
communicators sitting with community measures group to talk about 243 
social distancing, school closure measures, developing tool kits that 244 
would help businesses to create plans and execute them should they 245 
have needed to do so.  246 
 So communication really is an integrated part, I think, of all of our 247 
interventions with people understanding that it’s not enough to make 248 
the recommendation that you have to consider how it’s going to be 249 
communicated at the same time. 250 
Barbara: Have these practices been institutionalized for future crises? 251 
Marsha: Yeah. The processes of integration of communication into our 252 
interventions is institutionalized in all of our emergency planning, so 253 
there’s an annex or a separate plan for hurricanes, and for nuclear 254 
events should those occur, for bio-terror events. And there’s always a 255 
section about how communication works within that system. Right 256 
now, we are working on Haiti – the Haiti responses for the earthquake 257 
and we are at the table making recommendations, working through 258 
the process of developing and disseminating messages. So even before 259 
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H1N1, those processes were in place and they continue afterwards as 260 
well. 261 
 We have done some different kinds of management of communication 262 
in the H1N1 response that’s different because it’s been such a long 263 
one. But I think the inclusion of communication within all of the 264 
interventions and planning is still the same. 265 
Barbara: In terms of internal communication processes with CDC employees, 266 
how did you communication with them? 267 
Marsha: Within the Joint Information Center, there is a desk and the 268 
concentration of the team that sits at that desk is for CDC employees. 269 
And so throughout this event, there were articles written for the CDC 270 
Connects which is our internal web communication forum. There were 271 
all hands meetings in which our Director talked about what was going 272 
on. There were announcements, you know, from the Director to CDC 273 
employees. So I think the way we set up our Emergency 274 
Communication System really works to the advantage here because it 275 
would be easy to forget your own employees, and you shouldn’t 276 
because you need their support, and they need to know what’s going 277 
on as well to protect themselves, as well as to understand how their 278 
Agency’s playing a role. And we have a team whose focus is on 279 
communicating to CDC employees. And so whatever’s going on, 280 
however we update or talk about issues, that group’s role is to 281 
communicate it to our employees in the same way as the clinician 282 
communication team’s role is to look at what’s going on and say, what 283 
is that needs to be communicated to clinicians out of this information.  284 
 So having teams that are focused either on channels or audiences 285 
helps us not to lose somebody in the pile. 286 
Barbara: So in thinking back over the past year of your experience, are there 287 
things that you would do differently? 288 
Marsha: I think so. At the very beginning of the response, we were organizing 289 
all of the communication pieces. And at that point, I think we were 290 
trying to sort out what the best organizational structure would be. 291 
And over time, I think because of the length of the event, 292 
communication got very diffused across a lot of organizations. And I 293 
think we were very busy at the beginning in just trying to respond. I 294 
think I would have spent more time really thinking organizationally 295 
about sort of the long haul instead of getting quite as focused on the 296 
response. But it’s very hard to do that because there’s a million things 297 
to be done. And thinking across the long haul is the hardest thing to 298 
do when you’re in the middle especially of, you know, an intense 299 
activation. 300 
Barbara: Do you have any other specific recommendations that you would make 301 
for future events? 302 
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Marsha: Planning without locking yourself in. We – we had communication’s 303 
staff at work for years getting ready for pan flu. And one of the things 304 
that we did to make sure that we would get, you know, our feet on the 305 
ground right away was to develop camera ready what we thought were 306 
sure fire evergreen messages. And they were beautiful pieces of work 307 
done, thoughtful pieces of work done, tested messages done. We spent 308 
a lot of resources doing that. And I think what we know now and we 309 
probably knew then but we were so sure that – that this would, you 310 
know, be a more severe event was that we probably need to be more 311 
focused on shells, templates that could be quickly adjusted rather than 312 
things that were really camera ready. I would say that – that may 313 
have been the thing that – that if we could do it again I would do 314 
differently. 315 
Barbara: Great. Thank you very much. 316 
Marsha: You’re welcome.  [audio ends] 317 
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Interview #16.  Stephanie ZaZa, MD, MPH (CAPT, USPHS) 
Deputy Director for Strategy, Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response  
 
Stephanie: My name is Stephanie Zaza. I’m the Deputy Director for Strategy in 1 
the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response at CDC.  2 
Barbara: Great. And how long have you been with CDC? 3 
Stephanie: I’ve been with CDC for 19 years, and I’ve been in this position for the 4 
past four years. And in a variety of roles, within this position, I’ve 5 
mostly focused on strategy, high-level strategy and policy for CDC 6 
regarding preparedness and response generally but also specifically 7 
for flu planning. And as part of pandemic planning, I had been trained 8 
as one of four or five CDC leaders who could run a very specific kind of 9 
decision planning process. And we had done a fair amount of 10 
exercising for that process during the several years leading up to the 11 
H1N1 response. So I’ve been involved not only in some general 12 
planning and policy for preparedness and response but also some very 13 
specific training for influence pandemics. 14 
Barbara: Great. And are you currently still involved in some aspect regarding 15 
H1N1? 16 
Stephanie: I am. I’ve been asked to work on some issues in follow up to how we 17 
look at our response using oral anti-virals, and how we could 18 
potentially improve our ability to not only get those anti-virals 19 
distributed from federal asset control in our stockpile but then how do 20 
we move those to the states, and then how do we do a better job of 21 
tracking those anti-virals in the states and making sure that the 22 
people who need them get them. And we’ve just started that process so 23 
I’ll be working on that over the next future weeks and months. 24 
Barbara. Great. Thinking back to about a year ago and the first initial cases of 25 
H1N1, do you recall when you first heard about H1N1? 26 
Stephanie: I do. I was actually in Washington, DC on a three month assignment. 27 
And I was at a meeting of the Institute of Medicine in their building 28 
and I received an email from Phil Navin who is the director of our 29 
emergency operations center asking me to participate in a call of the 30 
Department and CDC regarding some cases of an unusual flu in 31 
California. I And because the Institute of Medicine building is – I don’t 32 
know what it’s made of, it’s Kryptonite or something, and I had to go 33 
stand out on the sidewalk to take the phone call because I couldn’t get 34 
a signal otherwise.  35 
And so the first I heard about it was on that call and really wasn’t 36 
quite sure at that point what, if any, role I would have or if this would 37 
even really materialize into anything important or major. And at that 38 
point, there were I think only a couple of cases and it was an usual 39 
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virus but nobody really had a very good sense, at least I certainly 40 
didn’t have a good sense, of what this would turn into. 41 
Barbara: And when did you – when do you recall becoming aware that this was 42 
in fact going to become a crisis event? 43 
Stephanie: Well, it was very rapid after that. You know, the next couple of days, 44 
there were a lot of calls and I got pulled off of pretty much everything 45 
else I was working on on that assignment which was coming to an 46 
end. And Mr. Navin actually contacted me and asked me to serve as 47 
CDC’s liaison in the both the CDC Washington office and in – with the 48 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response since I was 49 
already on the ground in DC.  50 
And so I began attending meetings pretty much all day every day 51 
including that first weekend. And I think I realized at that point that 52 
regardless of the number of cases, this was going to be a big deal and a 53 
big response, and that we were going to have to move quickly to figure 54 
out what was going on, and if it was going to materialize into 55 
something substantial. So I think it was within a day or two, but it 56 
was – it was still unclear, I think, even into the first week just how 57 
many cases there would be, whether or not it would really turn into 58 
anything important. And at that point, I don’t recall that the 59 
relationship to the cases in Mexico had been established. So it was 60 
still really evolving very fast. 61 
Barbara: Alright. I understand from your bio that you were involved in either 62 
leading or being part of the Plans Unit for the pandemic response? Is 63 
that correct? 64 
Stephanie: That is correct. I was actually still in Washington. My – it was about a 65 
week after that first phone call. And I got a call from Steve Redd late 66 
one evening as I was walking back to my apartment. And he asked me 67 
to return to Atlanta to assume leadership for some important decision 68 
briefings that needed to be made regarding some of our community 69 
mitigation measures. So he, in particular, was interested in having me 70 
come back and lead a process to help the Agency think through 71 
whether or not we should be recommending school closures, which was 72 
a very, very big part of the initial response, particularly in New York, 73 
and it was costly, and it was very, very difficult to implement, and 74 
there were a lot of questions about whether or not we should be 75 
recommending that.  76 
So I did come back to Atlanta and the second weekend, it was the first 77 
weekend in May, began sitting down with a group of people who could 78 
provide some of the original – some of that very early data about the 79 
epidemiology, and the cases in schools, and children, and teachers, 80 
and what we were seeing, and to work through what our options were 81 
regarding making this recommendation, and then being able to take 82 
that, summarize it and bring it back to leadership group to help them 83 
understand what their options were and to make recommendation. So 84 
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it happened within the first week. I came back to Atlanta and began 85 
that process with that particular decision briefing, and then worked 86 
on that over the next several weeks. 87 
Barbara: And could you describe a little bit the organization in the Plans Unit, 88 
and the other people who were involved, and how they were selected to 89 
be part of it? 90 
 91 
Stephanie: Uh huh (yes). If I recall, the Plans Unit leadership, I – Toby Merlin 92 
was the original leader of the Plans Unit piece that was about decision 93 
briefing. There’s a separate element of planning which is the more 94 
operational planning which Dave Kennedy and David Maples led in 95 
terms of the basics of incident management. But that wasn’t really 96 
part of the – the Plans Unit per se that did the decision briefings. Toby 97 
Merlin led that. And if I recall, it was me, and perhaps Lisa Koonin, 98 
and Lisa Rotz. I actually can’t remember. There were a few other 99 
people who had been trained to do this particular method of – of 100 
options analysis, and recommendations, and decision briefings.  101 
And so they were calling on us to try and run through these processes 102 
with the subject matter experts who could provide the data, and could 103 
provide some of the reality checks on what those options were. So it 104 
was a relatively small cadre of people who were actually on the Plans 105 
Unit. But then, if I was given an assignment, so for example, the 106 
assignment to do the school closure recommendation, I would then 107 
pull in people from the epidemiology Unit, from the group of people 108 
who thought about school closures in the past and who’d done some of 109 
the original planning for that, and I, you know, I can’t remember, but 110 
for each one, it was a generally slightly different group of people based 111 
on their expertise.  112 
We always tried to bring in an ethicist to help us think through the 113 
issues. We would bring in, depending if it was an issue around using a 114 
medication, we would bring in somebody from our stockpile program 115 
and make sure we brought clinicians in. We would bring in people who 116 
understood the particular population that we were trying to affect so 117 
we brought in some folks from our Division of Adolescent and School 118 
Health for the decision briefing around school closures. So it depended 119 
on the issue who we brought into the room for that decision brief.  120 
But the Plans Unit itself was actually a fairly small group of people 121 
who either led the decision briefs or supported those decision briefings 122 
in terms of scheduling meetings, preparing materials and so on. And 123 
the two people that I worked with very closely who provided excellent 124 
program management, were Mark Frank and Denise Bouvier, and 125 
they were just instrumental in keeping the process moving, and 126 
making slides, and getting the slides from the – from the meeting 127 
room to the executive conference room, and making sure we had 128 
everything. They were really terrific. 129 
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Barbara: Okay, great. And where – what were your sources of information? Did 130 
you get – have external sources, internal sources, a combination? And 131 
did you feel that you were receiving adequate information for your 132 
decision briefs? 133 
Stephanie: We had – we generally started with internal sources of information so 134 
we were trying to make our decisions based on the data that we were 135 
collecting through our surveillance, and lab, and epidemiology 136 
programs. And then, we, in a couple of cases, there was a group that 137 
Dr. Besser had initiated that they called Team B, which was a group 138 
of outside experts from around the country who could weigh in on 139 
certain issues and help us think through them from a more practice, 140 
or academic, or policy perspective. And a couple of times in doing 141 
decision briefs, we would bring a specific question to them and ask for 142 
their input, and then we would take that input and bring it into the 143 
decision briefing process itself and use that as a source of information.   144 
So it wasn’t so much having that group vet the decision, but having 145 
them provide input on a specific question or specific piece of the 146 
decision so that we could use that information to help craft a better set 147 
of options and a better set of sometimes the criteria we needed to use 148 
to evaluate the options. So we often used only internal sources of 149 
information when it was a very technical question. But when it had 150 
overtones of policy or major practice decisions, we would generally ask 151 
our Team B folks as a very convenient source of sort of reality 152 
checking to weigh in on some of the issues. 153 
Barbara: Could you think back to the earliest – the earlier days and do you 154 
recall what were in the beginning key decisions that you felt or the 155 
director felt needed to be made in the first weeks and months? 156 
Stephanie: Uh huh (yes). Well as I mentioned, the first – the very first decision 157 
brief we did was a very important one on school closures. It was early 158 
May, schools were going to be in session for at least another month or 159 
two months, and so these decisions about school closures were 160 
extremely important. Right after that, we were asked to look at a very 161 
important decision around whether we should recommend that 162 
colleges, in particular, should cancel commencement exercises. These 163 
are a very big deal. They’re costly. They bring people from all over the 164 
country, if not all over the world, together.  165 
And so we were asked to look at that question and provide a 166 
recommendation and then write guidance around that. We were asked 167 
to look very early on at the issue of whether we should recommend 168 
that healthcare workers use N95 respirators versus masks. And that 169 
one, I actually don’t know how that one ever resolved. I was pulled 170 
into a different set of activities before we concluded that one.  171 
And then there was another very interesting briefing very early on 172 
that they requested a decision briefing on around the use of the 173 
previous year’s seasonal vaccine. There was some – it was the end of 174 
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the vaccinating season for the 2008-2009 vaccine, and there was a 175 
question as to whether there was any potential use for that vaccine, 176 
and it would be expiring at the end of June, and  there was, I think, a 177 
million doses left in our own federal stockpile. And so there was a 178 
question about whether or not we should be using that for something. 179 
And so we – those were the four that I was asked to lead a process, to 180 
develop options and provide a recommended approach for CDC. 181 
Barbara: Great. And has that – do you know or has the Plans Unit become sort 182 
of institutionalized in crises response? Is it something that will 183 
happen – will be triggered automatically in the future because of your 184 
experience? 185 
Stephanie: I think so. My understanding is that they’re trying to build that into 186 
the more generic response profiles. This really did come about in 187 
pandemic planning and was something that one of our major 188 
contractors brought this method forward and said this could really 189 
help as we were – this was the group that had been contracted with us 190 
to – to help with our exercise program for pandemic flu over the 191 
previous three years. And they suggested this approach as a way to 192 
help think through very tricky decisions, to very quickly analyze 193 
options and bring recommendation forward. It was very successful.  194 
In the exercise program, I think it was instrumental in the actual 195 
response and my understanding was that the same contractor was 196 
asked to develop a more generic approach and training program for 197 
other staff at CDC to learn how to do this and how to lead this 198 
approach.  My feeling is that it’s an extremely systematic but rapid 199 
method for looking at a lot of information very quickly and bringing it 200 
forward to a leader. As a matter of fact, I ran this process on a 201 
completely different issue for a completely different disease with a 202 
group of subject matter experts who had never seen this method 203 
before, and in two hours, were able to very quickly move through a lot 204 
of very complex data and facts, and move to figuring out what our 205 
options were to recommend to the director of CDC, and to take this 206 
forward to the Department for a decision.  207 
So it’s a very effective method and one that I use all the time because 208 
it suits my style, and it suits my need to move very quickly. And I do 209 
think that it will be something that we’ll be able to very easily 210 
translate over to other types of responses. It’s a matter of socializing 211 
it, I think, making people more familiar with it, getting additional 212 
people trained to lead the process and to also find ways to do it a little 213 
bit more quickly. We’ve – we were initially doing these over the course 214 
of a full day or even day and a half, and we’ve been able to learn how 215 
to do it more quickly, and to sort of pre-populate some of the pieces of 216 
the decision process, and then let the group actually have something 217 
specific to chew on rather than starting with a blank slate.  218 
So I think we have a – some steps to take to – to make it more 219 
generalizable and to take it forward, but I think it’s very useful and I 220 
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think we’ll be using it. I’m already using it so – in my regular course of 221 
daily business. 222 
Barbara: Great. So taking a step back in sort of the bigger picture, looking at 223 
the organization’s response generally to H1N1, how would you 224 
evaluate it and could you point out strong points or areas where 225 
perhaps could be improved? 226 
Stephanie: Well, you know, over all, I – my perspective has always been that we 227 
did a very good job under very unusual circumstances of not only a 228 
pandemic that played out in very different ways than we’d ever really 229 
planned for or thought about and we were very flexible and able to 230 
move into this different scenario. It was really very different from 231 
what we’d planned for. I – so I think we did a good job in being flexible 232 
and learning as we went.  233 
We also, for better or worse, and I think most of the time it was for 234 
better, had – when questions came up or when we weren’t sure what 235 
to do, we purposefully said what is the – what did we plan for? What 236 
did we practice? Let’s do that first and figure out how we need to be 237 
flexible within that. So we had these very excellent plans to fall back 238 
on and start with so that we weren’t making everything up as we 239 
went. So we were, I think, very flexible within a systematic and 240 
practiced approach that we’d been practicing over the previous three 241 
years in our exercise program. So I give us full marks on being able to 242 
respond quickly, and effectively, and flexibly given the nature of the 243 
scenario as it played out.  244 
The other very unusual thing that was going on, as I’m sure you’re 245 
aware, was that the political structures were not in place at – when 246 
this all started. We did not have a confirmed Secretary of HHS and 247 
her senior staff were not in place until some point in the first couple 248 
weeks. She was confirmed on May 4th or 5th which was, you know, full 249 
week into it and to her credit, jumped on a very steep learning curve 250 
and really did, I think, a great job of stepping into the breach and 251 
making sure that the Department had what it needed to do what it 252 
needed to do.  253 
But that said, I think that there were – we were operating in an 254 
environment of – of either no appointed leadership or brand new 255 
appointed leadership throughout the entire Department and – and 256 
CDC was looked to to lead in that situation and I think that our 257 
leadership did an excellent job of stepping in, making decisions, 258 
moving things forward, using data to drive decisions, to not letting the 259 
expedient or the easy things drive what they did, but to make very, 260 
very difficult decisions and then to move those forward. And then, in 261 
the middle of all that, to educate a new group of appointed and elected 262 
leadership, and to make sure that they knew what was going on, I 263 
think they did a very good job.  264 
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The other thing I think CDC did extremely well was laying out a very 265 
clear, and open, and transparent communication process, and making 266 
sure that not only were we talking with the people we normally talk 267 
to, our state and local health department partners for example in 268 
frequent, daily if not multiple times during the day, calls, but also to 269 
the public, directly to the public and making sure that our senior 270 
leaders were visible and available. I don’t know how many press 271 
availability sessions they did, and talking points, and interviews. It 272 
was constant. And I think that the only way to help lead through that 273 
kind of situation is to be very active and proactive in a communication 274 
portfolio of activities, and I think they did a very good job on that. 275 
We did a good job in, as I said, in following the plans and making sure 276 
that when we were asked to do something, we were asked to, for 277 
example, distribute anti-viral medications from our federal stockpile 278 
to the states, moved the entire, you know, allocation that we were 279 
asked to move, within seven days to all fifty states, to the four major 280 
cities that we work with directly, to eight territories including those 281 
very far away in the South Pacific. So, you know, we were able to do 282 
that. We were able to implement, design, develop and disseminate a 283 
laboratory diagnostic kit within, I think, two weeks to the state 284 
laboratories so that they could do their own testing.  285 
So there were a number of things that I think we did very well that we 286 
had planned for, prepared for, we thought about and did, and made 287 
decisions about very quickly and were able to do.  288 
The things that I think were challenging were some of the things that 289 
we didn’t do as thorough a job planning for. We had done some 290 
planning around community mitigation measures, for example, school 291 
closures, and risk-based border strategies, you know, do we keep 292 
people from coming into the country or leaving the country. But again, 293 
we had planned for a completely different scenario and our – our 294 
triggers for implementing those types of pretty stringent activities 295 
were all based on a much more severe disease. And we had, I think a 296 
very difficult time adjusting to a disease where it was very unclear 297 
what the overall severity was, and to distinguish that from some of the 298 
very severe cases we were seeing in subpopulations, and how do you 299 
make decisions then about closing a school when the people at most 300 
risk were not necessarily all of the school children but a subset of 301 
those children. And I think that was just very, very difficult. I’m not 302 
sure how other kinds of planning might have helped in that situation 303 
but that is definitely something that I think we need to look at.  304 
We also had a very hard time once we sent anti-virals out to the states 305 
really having – being able to track what happened, and did the people 306 
who needed them get them, and that’s further complicated by the fact 307 
that – the stockpiled drugs that we were using are also available in 308 
the commercial market. So it’s very difficult to know when those two 309 
different supplies mix together how they’re being used. So that was a 310 
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big challenge and one that we know we need to confront not just for flu 311 
but for any other scenario when we’re providing medications our 312 
ability to make sure that they’re getting to the people who need them, 313 
not just to the state health department, but to the – the population is 314 
something we need to look at a little bit more carefully. 315 
I think those were the – the big things regarding some of the things 316 
we could’ve done better. You know, it’s hard to say, we were very 317 
flexible. We could always have but, you know, people, I think, will say 318 
we could’ve been more flexible. I think there were some challenges 319 
with vaccine in terms of meeting expectations because we didn’t get as 320 
much in the way – as many doses as we thought early on from the 321 
manufacturer. So again, was that a – a communication issue? Was it a 322 
real issue of availability of vaccine? And how do we do that better? 323 
And how do we set expectations for what’s going to come and when it’s 324 
going to be delivered, I think, are important.   325 
So those – I think those are the big strengths and weaknesses from 326 
what I observed. I’m sure there were others. 327 
Barbara: Well, that’s great. So just in closing, do you have any other 328 
recommendations or suggestions you’d like to – to give for the future? 329 
Stephanie: I think that, for me, the most important lesson I learned was that we 330 
had done so much planning, and so much exercising in it, I think, 331 
really, really paid off in this particular situation, that we were able to 332 
rely on that, and use that, and be flexible within what we places had 333 
learned in that exercise program. As an Agency, we do not have the 334 
resources, and have not been able to either secure or – or reprogram 335 
resources to be able to do that for most of our other scenarios that we 336 
might be asked to lead through a response. And I think that this was 337 
such a valuable piece of the experience that I – I hope that we’ll be 338 
able to take that lesson and apply it to some of the other areas where 339 
CDC will have a – a major role to play, and we need to make sure 340 
we’re ready to do that and we’ve done some exercises, and we’ve 341 
rehearsed how we’re going to do it, and where some of the challenges 342 
are that we may not even anticipate. I think that was the places 343 
where we had the biggest problems were the things we didn’t 344 
anticipate. And so, not even knowing through an exercise program 345 
what some of those are really leaves us behind the 8 ball. So I would 346 
hope that that’s for other parts of the Agency that have other 347 
scenarios to contend with. To me, that’s probably the biggest issue. 348 
Barbara: Great. Well, this is wonderful and thank you very much. 349 
Stephanie: You’re welcome.  [audio ends 0:26:38.6350 
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